Baroness Hamwee
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Modern Slavery Bill
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendment 67F in this group but, before I discuss it, I should say how much I agree with the thrust of everything that has been said this afternoon. I tabled some amendments which we discussed at the end of our proceedings last Wednesday, which went in the same direction as many of the amendments in this group. It is perhaps as well that the group was not made even longer by having those amendments in it.
The noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked why we should go to all this trouble and then constrain the commissioner’s remit and role. That seems to me to go absolutely to the heart of the issue. The commissioner should be able to take a holistic—I do not much like that word—viewpoint of everything that is going on that relates to trafficking. The issues are very complex and interrelated and our understanding of them is developing fast, so the commissioner should be allowed the scope that the commissioner designate has clearly identified. However, as others have said, we should not leave it to him to find ways round the legislation, as it were, which is what it sounds as if he is seeking to do, although I am sure that he would not put it that way.
Moreover, I wonder whether the Secretary of State should have a power to redact passages from reports in the interests of national security. I am not sure whether I am right about this, but I could not find a similar power for the Secretary of State in respect of the reviewer of terrorism legislation, where you would think that would certainly be needed. I think what this boils down to is that we have to respect the fact that the commissioners who are appointed will be entirely sensible.
My amendment picks up the point about data collection and would insert a power to collect, compile, analyse and disseminate information and statistics. The Government’s response to the report of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, which argued for the ability to deal with data, did not, as far as I could see, address that. As Governments always do, they said that the scrutiny was welcome. However, the point was also picked up by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which commented:
“National human rights institutions … generally do not have the Ombudsman-type power to take up individual cases, but they do have a significant role in collecting data in order to monitor the State’s performance in observing the rights of individuals”.
If I can put it less assertively, may I ask my noble friend whether he can confirm that research, which is mentioned in the clause, covers the points which I have included in my amendment? Even if the role is restricted to enforcement, which I very much hope it is not, data collection is important in enforcement. Enforcers need to know what they are up against. I also ask my noble friend whether the Government will be producing a data-sharing protocol, which is recommended in the review of the NRM. There will be another point on data later, but if the Minister is able to answer, that would be interesting.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I rise in support of these amendments aimed at strengthening and broadening the remit of the anti-slavery commissioner, which is very much in the spirit of the recommendation put forward by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The JCHR concluded that the commissioner’s mandate,
“remains weak … and narrowly focused”.
Following questioning of the Government, the committee accepted the need to avoid any overlap or confusion with the role of the Victims’ Commissioner—I see that the noble Baroness is in her place—but we said that we did not consider this to be an inevitable result of broadening the role beyond its narrow focus on law enforcement.
Amnesty made the point in its briefing that the Home Secretary has emphasised the need for a co-ordinated and holistic approach, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to tackling modern slavery. It said that this is why it is so important that the commissioner is properly resourced and empowered to look fully across the piece. I agree with that.
The JCHR recommended that the Government should follow the model of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner, which the noble Lord, Lord Patel, has talked about. When we discussed this at our last sitting, I commended the Government for having strengthened the position of the Children’s Commissioner and made it a much stronger body than it was. That was very much to the Government’s credit, although I would add that the Minister mentioned on Wednesday the fact that the Children’s Commissioner is housed in a Department for Education building, as if that meant that it was fine for this commissioner to be. The JCHR strongly recommended against that, because it impinges on the commissioner’s independence—but that is by the by.
Despite having set up this very good model of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner, the Government deliberately decided not to pursue that model for the anti-slavery commissioner. They then pointed out that this was reflected in the much smaller budget for this commissioner than for the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. I could not help but wonder whether this was partly about trying to save money. Are they trying to have an office of the anti-slavery commissioner on the cheap? The old proverb about a ha’p’orth of tar came to mind.
I want to return to a question I asked the Minister at our previous sitting, when perhaps I did not make myself fully clear. I asked the Minister why the Government do not see the anti-slavery commissioner primarily as part of the human rights machinery, as they told the JCHR. The Minister replied that the commissioner,
“is not a national human rights institution as defined under the Paris principles”.—[Official Report, 3/12/14; col. 1382.]
However, he agreed that it would play a key part in improving our human rights response to tackle modern slavery. In my speech last week I quoted from the exchange between Humpty Dumpty and Alice in Lewis Carroll, on how we understand the meaning of words. When I reflected on the Minister’s reply to me, I rather felt as though I had walked through the looking-glass. It was, of course, perfectly open to the Government to make the anti-slavery commissioner compliant with Paris principles. That was a political decision and choice. However, they chose not to.
So let me rephrase my question. Why did the Government choose to make the anti-slavery commissioner not compliant with the Paris principles? That is: why do they believe it should not be part of the human rights machinery—not why it is not technically part of the human rights machinery—when we are all agreed that it has this key role in improving our human rights response to modern slavery? I am baffled, I have to say.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 72D, 73B, 74AA, 74CA and 74DA in my name. These amendments are all designed to give the anti-slavery commissioner greater freedom of manoeuvre in dealing with the Home Office and to prevent endless procrastination over the release of reports submitted to the Home Secretary and the Home Office, particularly if they contain what I would call “unacceptable messages”. We have been over this ground in both sets of amendments at some length. This is all of a piece with some of our earlier discussions. We have certainly seen in real life how reports of other independent sources of inspection or advice can—how can I put it?—languish in government department in-trays. Some of these amendments attempt to address real issues.
I accept that my amendments are pale imitations of the more radical amendments moved and discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, in the previous group. I would certainly withdraw some of mine if the Government were moved to accept many of his. That is not bargaining across the Table but a statement of fact; the noble Lord has some very powerful amendments which deliver more effectively than my amendments. I do not always travel hopefully about whether Home Office Ministers in this place are able to deliver changes, so I shall press on with my more limited amendments.
Amendment 72ZZA requires the commissioner to produce a three-year plan, not just a one-year plan. That enables him—sensibly, I think—to plan ahead for a reasonable period of time. Amendment 72B removes the detailed control of the Home Office over the plan, as prescribed in Clause 42(4), (5) and (6). These seem totally superfluous, given that Clause 42(1) already gives the Home Secretary the power of approval over the strategic plan. Why do we need these extra, more detailed control methods, other than to demonstrate what we have said for some time about the Bill: that it too often finds ways of controlling the room for manoeuvre of the anti-slavery commissioner?
Amendment 73B removes the detailed Home Office control over the nature of the commissioner’s annual report by removing Clause 42(9). It is another attempt to loosen the shackles, in the phrase I used earlier. Amendments 74AA, 74CA and 74DA are designed to ensure that Ministers do not delay in laying the commissioner’s annual report before Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. They all require the annual report to be laid within a month of receipt by the particular Ministers.
These amendments are in the best interest of the commissioner’s independence and safeguard the position of Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. We have to remove some of these controls in order to give the commissioner more freedom of manoeuvre and to ensure that important reports are not delayed in reaching Parliament and public scrutiny. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendments 73ZA and 74ZA in this group and it would be very odd if I did not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Warner, given the debate we have just had. I do not think that I need to lay it on with a trowel. However, I will use this opportunity to refer to the duties of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, because Section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2006, to which my noble friend referred, has a mere six subsections, and that is it—and he gets on with it. I have still not been able to find the constraints on his report, which would take the form of redactions, to which my noble friend referred. However, as I said, I can understand the need for them for the commissioner as well as for the reviewer.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have two short amendments in this group. I will come back, outside the Chamber, to just what Section 36 says. I am not taking issue with the substance, in any event.
Amendment 76A would delete Clause 43(4). The clause is about the duty to co-operate with the commissioner. It provides that complying,
“does not require or authorise any disclosure of information which contravenes any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed)”.
Looking at Clause 43(4) alongside Clause 43(3), which provides that disclosure,
“does not breach any obligation of confidence”,
I would like to ask my noble friend why one is accepted by the legislation and the other is not. Why does data protection, as I assume it is, apply but not confidential—I am not sure about privileged—information?
My second amendment, Amendment 77A, is quite different, but it is to enable me to ask a question. Clause 43(6) refers to regulations being allowed to be exercised by Scottish Ministers and by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. I have suggested that the Welsh Assembly Government be added to the list in order to ask my noble friend about the question of health. Health, after all, is one of the issues to which we need to have regard when we are looking at the needs of people who have been trafficked or enslaved. This seems to me very relevant. I do not know whether it is intended that Wales should come under Clause 43(6)(c), as “any other public authority”—I think that they might be a bit insulted if that were the case—or whether I have got it wrong that health is not intended to be covered in all of this. I beg to move.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment and I will try to deal with the questions of clarification that she raised.
The effect of Amendment 76A would be to permit public authorities to provide information to the commissioner where it would otherwise contravene restrictions on the disclosure of information, other than those as a result of an obligation of confidence under the common law. Therefore, public authorities would, for example, be obliged to disclose information to the commissioner where such a disclosure would otherwise be restricted by statute or order of the court. While we want to ensure that the commissioner is able to gain access to information from relevant authorities to improve the UK’s response to modern slavery, in doing so we must ensure that we are not requiring those authorities to provide information in breach of existing restrictions on information sharing or permit authorities to disregard court orders, although we recognise that a balance has to be struck.
For this reason the public authorities and officials have been given a certainty that they will not be breaching any obligation of confidence under the common law when providing information to the commissioner. We consider that this subsection ensures that we achieve the right balance between respecting existing information safeguards and ensuring that the commissioner has the necessary powers to carry out the role effectively.
My noble friend’s Amendment 77A seeks to create a power for the Welsh Government to specify which Welsh public authorities are required to co-operate with the commissioner. The Welsh Government play a key role in the UK’s effort to tackle modern slavery. They are active participants in the interdepartmental ministerial group on modern slavery, and we have worked innovatively and determinedly to raise awareness of modern slavery and improve the response in Wales. We have worked closely with the Welsh Government on the development of the Modern Slavery Bill.
The focus of the commissioner’s work, and indeed of this entire Bill, is to combat crime and protect its victims, which are non-devolved matters as regards Wales. Engagement with Welsh authorities by the commissioner would seek to deliver on these objectives and any infringement on those authorities’ devolved functions is entirely incidental to, or consequential on, this purpose. It is therefore wholly appropriate, and consistent with the devolution settlement for Wales, for the Home Secretary to specify that a Welsh public authority is required to co-operate with the commissioner without the need for regulations made by the Welsh Government.
The Welsh Government have been regularly consulted on the role of the commissioner and it is worth nothing that they have not requested the inclusion of a regulation-making power within this clause. We will, of course, consult fully with them before specifying Welsh public authorities in regulations. I pay tribute to the good co-operation which is already taking place between the Welsh Government and the UK Government in relation to modern slavery issues.
Given this explanation, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I will, of course, do so. I felt that the response to Amendment 76A was more about “the what”, which I think I understand, than “the why”. However, I do not want to comment further without having had the opportunity to read what my noble friend had to say.
I am not sure that I am persuaded about Wales but that is perhaps not a discussion for now: we may have other opportunities to do so. I will think about that further and perhaps have a word with my noble friend about it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Our amendment proposes a new clause to the Bill providing for the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue guidance on the charging of known or suspected victims of human trafficking, and for a prosecution of a trafficked, enslaved or exploited person to be reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions before going to trial.
The first part relating to guidance reflects a feeling from a number of groups and organisations involved in these cases that it is far from clear how the Crown Prosecution Service deals with the public interest test when looking at victims of trafficking. We need to reduce uncertainty about when victims will be prosecuted. A model for the clarity of guidance called for in our amendment is the DPP’s guidance in relation to a totally different issue—assisted suicide.
On authorisation for a trafficking prosecution, which is also addressed in our amendment, we want to establish the principle that prosecutions of trafficking victims should happen only in exceptional circumstances, which is why we wish prosecutions of those who have had a national referral mechanism decision or are awaiting one to be authorised at the most senior level, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Trafficked victims can be badly damaged and vulnerable and can wait 12 months in remand before a trial goes ahead, which only adds to their problems considerably. Evidence from the Helen Bamber Foundation to the Joint Committee on the Bill referred to the need for women to feel supported—to feel that they would be believed and that they would not normally be prosecuted. Allowing prosecutions to go ahead goes along with what traffickers would have told their victims: that they would do better to stay with them than go to the authorities and be prosecuted and deported.
Similar evidence from the Poppy Project discussed the 55 women that it has helped in the past year who were identified as trafficking victims only once they were in prison, usually on remand. Another example from the Poppy Project involved an adult woman who had been underground for 11 years in a brothel. She escaped and used a passport that her trafficker gave her and that she thought was legal. It was not and she ended up being imprisoned for immigration offences, even though she was not the one who had committed the crime. No one, it seems, investigated the trafficker who had given her the passport and who was able to carry on recruiting and procuring more victims. While the crime the woman committed was not committed during enslavement, it undoubtedly arose from her trafficking.
One consequence of the examples to which I have referred is that it seems almost certain that more trafficking victims have been prosecuted in this country than traffickers. There is a need for all those coming into contact with people who have been or may have been trafficked to be able to recognise the offence and that we do not find such cases ending up in court unless authorised at the top level as being appropriate to prosecute. I hope that will also be the Government’s objective and that the terms of our amendment will be accepted.
Finally, I would like to raise one point on the issue that my noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley has so effectively raised in relation to the reasonable person test. My point is simply a query, since I shall await with interest the Government’s response to her amendments. On the reasonable person test in Clause 45(1)(c), I ask the Minister whether the reference to the reasonable person “in the same situation” as the slavery or trafficking victim means that the assessment of whether a reasonable person would have had no realistic alternative to doing the act which constitutes the offence will be based on a view of what a reasonable person who had had experience of suffering the same kind of traumatic experiences and effects as the victim would have done. If so, how many people, in the Government’s view, would be able to make that assessment?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I welcome the principal provisions, but I share her concerns. I thought that she was entirely clear in speaking to the amendments. Trafficking and slavery are trafficking and slavery. Not to be prosecuted for offences committed when one is trafficked or enslaved is a matter of human rights. Those rights should not be dependent on the individual’s characteristics; they are completely separate issues. I do not need to repeat everything that the noble Baroness said, but I will quickly refer—the title is probably longer than the reference—to Policy and legislative recommendations towards the effective implementation of the non-punishment provision with regard to victims of trafficking, by the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. She said:
“The penalization of a person for acts that they have committed as a cause or direct consequence of being trafficked must be seen in that context:”—
the context of human rights—
“not only does it unjustly punish and stigmatise victims of serious crime; it would also violate these human rights objectives”.
I come back to that. It is not a small point, but it is very specific and clear, and I fear that we will be muddying the waters if the wording remains as it is.
Baroness Garden of Frognal
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, and I am grateful that they felt able to welcome the government amendments.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley. As she set out, Amendments 80A and 82 would remove the “reasonable person” test for children and adults. Whenever any statutory defence is created, we must be very careful to ensure that the line is drawn in the right place so that the people who need it can access it, but also to avoid unfairness or injustice to potential victims of serious crime and to prevent the defence being abused by those seeking to escape justice.
The noble Baroness raised concerns that the reasonable person test would breach EU directive requirements, which would make it difficult for us to work in cross-border operations. However, it does not place the UK in breach of the directive. As the pre-legislative scrutiny committee identified, the UK is already compliant with all its international obligations. The test will have no impact on cross-border operations. However, I note what she said, and the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Perhaps we can agree to discuss this again before Report.
The reasonable person test is an objective test. The “no realistic alternative” formulation in the reasonable person test came directly from the case law that the noble Baroness mentioned. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on whether the reasonable person would be someone who has suffered the same sort of experiences, that is indeed how that would be applied in these cases. People who have been enslaved or trafficked may commit criminal offences in a wide variety of circumstances. Such a defence may not be justified in every case. For example, the courts have consistently ruled that the defence of duress can never apply in cases of murder. We must not create a defence so wide that it amounts to a loophole in the law. It is important that we protect not just victims but society. An objective test plays a crucial role here: allowing a prosecutor or jury to consider all the circumstances, while also considering the accused’s characteristics, such as age and the other characteristics set out. We consider that removing the objective test would leave the defence dangerously broad.
Turning to Amendment 84A, which deals with Director of Public Prosecutions’ guidance on non-prosecution of victims, the Code for Crown Prosecutors is issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions. It gives guidance to prosecutors on general principles to be applied when making decisions about prosecutions. The code requires the prosecutor to complete two stages: is there sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and is a prosecution required in the public interest? It is not the case, and never has been, that just because there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution the public interest will require one. That discretion is a vital protection and helps avoid unnecessary or unjust prosecutions. The code is supplemented by a body of legal and policy guidance on specific offences and procedures, which includes guidance on suspects in a criminal case who might be victims of trafficking or slavery. This is updated on a regular basis to reflect case law or any other changes and is published on the CPS website.
Baroness Kennedy of Cradley
In Schedule 3 there are very serious, violent crimes listed and it is understandable why they have been included. However, there are over 130 different offences to which the non-prosecution defence will not apply and along with the very serious—murder and rape—there are offences relating to immigration, criminal damage and theft. Schedule 3 has ramifications for victims, so the offences listed, and the existence of such a schedule, should not become law without a debate in this House. We should probe a little deeper and consider five issues with the Schedule.
First, does such a list help the trafficker? Evil minds work in evil ways. To a trafficker, Schedule 3 could be an escape strategy. It has been described, by Parosha Chandran, an award-winning human rights barrister, as a traffickers’ charter. It is a list of crimes that traffickers know the state will prosecute for—they just need to find victims to do them—and traffickers will make sure that victims know that the state will prosecute for those crimes. Will the Schedule therefore have the unintentional effect of dangerously exacerbating the vulnerabilities of those who are already enslaved or trafficked and lead them to become involved in more serious crimes?
Secondly, does such a list lead police and prosecutors to stop looking for the signs of slavery and trafficking for these offences? Despite clearly listing the offences most frequently committed by enslaved and trafficked adults and children, the guidance we already have has not been effective in stopping victims being prosecuted and convicted for these offences. There are a number of examples where no police investigation into the victim’s situation, as a trafficked or enslaved person, has taken place and the victim has been wrongly imprisoned. Even when crimes are flagged as frequent crimes of trafficked victims in the CPS guidance, there is still little or no investigation. So a list of crimes specifically for non-prosecution may never lead to an investigation into the trafficked or exploited situation of the victim. This means that, once again, the traffickers get clean away.
Thirdly, does such a list contain the right offences? As pointed out in the other place, the impact assessment of this Bill states that Schedule 3 is drawn from Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act. However, immigration offences are in Schedule 3 but not in Schedule 15. As Michael Connarty MP rightly asked, how can we deny a trafficked victim the right to a statutory defence because they resist arrest? We know that children especially—and adults too—are suspicious of authority, because the traffickers have made them that way; they are scared and do not understand the language. Should this offence be included?
Fourthly, the crime that a victim is typically forced to commit today is not what they may be forced to commit tomorrow. Even though there is provision in the Bill for Schedule 3 to be reviewed, this takes time. In this time, victims are being criminalised by our system and the traffickers are making their escape.
Finally, the facts are established for each individual case, no matter what the crime. If a crime is committed, whether or not it is listed in Schedule 3, the police will investigate and the CPS will still consider whether the evidential threshold has been met, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute and whether the non-prosecution defence applies. If the police and CPS can satisfy themselves that they can secure a conviction by being able to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt, they will proceed to prosecute—whether the offence is listed on Schedule 3 is immaterial, as the child or adult will be prosecuted. If the offence is serious it would, inevitably, be in the public interest to prosecute. Why is the list of exceptions necessary? In Committee in the other place, Peter Carter QC, said:
“I think legislating by list of exceptions is a recipe for disaster and confusion”.—[Official Report, Commons, Modern Slavery Bill Committee, 21/7/14; col. 36.]
I agree. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I support the points made by the noble Baroness, who has pointed to unintended consequences, among other matters. This is a list of the most serious offences and there has not been much consideration of offences which may very often be committed in the context of trafficking. The noble Baroness rightly referred to the violation of immigration law. We heard this afternoon of an instance of false information relating to travel documents. To my mind—I am completely unbiased of course—this sort of thing is entirely understandable.
Looking at the list, I was interested in the inclusion of Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill, when we know that some victims of trafficking and slavery are forced into positions where they act on behalf of their own slave-masters in carrying out some of the acts which are comprised in those offences. But that is no different in substance from the concerns that the noble Baroness has raised about other matters. I share that concern. I do not think that by including the list we are doing anything other than creating difficulties for ourselves in applying the non-prosecution provision.
Lord Browne of Belmont
My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of Amendment 86H in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I am sure that other Members of this House will want to thank the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness for their persistence and perseverance in repeatedly bringing the need for a child advocate for trafficked children before this House.
As we look today at Clause 47 of this Bill, which in some ways makes provision for child trafficking advocates, I am sure we can agree that we have come a long way on this subject from 2011. I am aware that the Government seek to justify the rather weak nature of the clause on the basis that they want to wait for the conclusion of the advocate trials before providing more detail. In some ways I think this argument stands up to scrutiny but in others I have to say that I find it wanting. No doubt important things will be learnt from the trials that will inform practical questions regarding matters such as implementation, but I do not accept that that should be used as a reason for not providing a clear and up-front statutory definition of the role of the advocate. It seems odd that we should sign up to the name “child trafficking advocate” in the Bill without signing up to a proper definition of the role.
There are at least two major problems. First, in terms of the basic definition of a child trafficking advocate, the definition is set out in numerous international best practice documents and confirmed by our own experience. The Still at Risk report, for example, recommends that an independent trusted adult should be appointed as soon a trafficked child comes to that authority’s attention. Amendment 86H makes it clear that this should happen. The Still at Risk report also says that that person,
“would ensure that all potential victims of trafficking are able to understand their rights, ensure that their voice is heard in decisions that affect them and are supported effectively through the different legal processes they are engaged in”.
I am very supportive of the principle of setting out the functions of the advocate in the Bill, as exemplified in Amendment 86H.
It is significant that this same definition and approach are also reflected in all the relevant international best practice documents developed by the EU, UNICEF and the UN. For example, the UNICEF guidance states:
“The role of a guardian is to be an advocate for the child in a wide range of discussions and decisions about what should happen to the child, in particular to ensure that the decision-making process primarily considers the best interests of the child. The role is also to be a link between the child and the various agencies the child comes into contact with, to ensure the child is kept informed of any relevant developments with respect to him or her, and to accompany the child in a physical way, in particular when she or he is moved between various places”.
It is also essential that the role of the advocate should be recognised by other public authorities, otherwise, as the noble Lord, Lord Henley, said just over three years ago,
“it risks creating confusion for children if plans for their care are not effectively co-ordinated”.—[Official Report, 25/11/11; col. 1282.]
The second reason for my belief that this is not a strong enough clause as it stands is observing the debate on guardians that has occurred over the past few months in Northern Ireland, which the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has referred to. Noble Lords may be aware that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, has introduced a Bill on human trafficking to the Northern Ireland Assembly. He is sadly not able to give his own wisdom to the House today, as he is in Northern Ireland speaking on other matters on human trafficking before the Assembly. The key point is that, in another part of the United Kingdom, a clearly independent adult will be appointed to a child who has been or who is about to be referred to the NRM or to a separated child. That adult, an independent guardian, will be trained, qualified and supported in that role and the functions are set out in statute in Clause 21 of the Northern Ireland Bill, which will very soon now become law. That person needs to ascertain and communicate the views of the child, represent them, and liaise with other organisations involved in their care and making decisions in relation to the child—for instance, a court or tribunal. They will assist the child to obtain legal advice, keep the child informed about relevant proceedings, contribute to a plan for the long-term welfare based on an individual assessment of the child’s best interests, accompany them as necessary, and work to establish contact with the child’s family where it is in their best interests.
Interestingly, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may add to their functions as necessary by order so that if new functions arise they can be added. I suggest that this freedom to adjust provides a crucial model for the United Kingdom Government given that, on the one hand, it is simply not credible to include a child trafficking advocate provision in the Bill without a proper definition—especially when, thanks to domestic and international best practice, the definition is clear—yet, on the other hand, adjustment may be desirable in the light of the experience of the trials. It provides a mechanism whereby we could give child trafficking advocates a proper definition but not remove scope for that definition to be amended, although I stress that I think the real usefulness of the trials will pertain to practical matters of implementation rather than that of definitions. If I were to add anything to Amendment 86H, it would be the power to make such additions to the list of the advocates’ functions.
The other thing I should note about the Northern Ireland definition, like that of proposed new subsection (8) in Amendment 86H, is that it makes plain that other persons or bodies providing services or taking decisions about the child have to recognise the role of the guardian and provide the guardian with relevant information so as to allow the guardian to carry out their role effectively. In contrast, Clause 47(4) only enables the Home Secretary to issue regulations to this effect if she so wishes. It seems to me that the provision of child trafficking guardians in Northern Ireland goes much further than the current proposals in Clause 47. The reason we are rightly concerned to help victims of trafficking is because they are, without doubt, among the most vulnerable people in our society and that vulnerability is greatest when dealing with children.
Given their greater vulnerability, it seems very odd that the Government should have included such a weak clause in the Bill. While I am happy to celebrate that Northern Ireland will provide the best protection for child victims in the whole of the United Kingdom, it pains me to consider the many trafficked children in England and Wales who will not benefit from this greater protection. I am not satisfied with this, and I very much hope the Government will not settle for such an inequality. The good news is that Amendment 86H closes the gap. I very much hope that the Minister will accept it.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the determination of those who have pursued this cause is admirable. The noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness are a formidable pair. I simply want to comment on one point in Amendment 86H, about legal representation. From my—now not very current—experience as a solicitor, I well know the importance of being able to take clear or reasonably clear instructions, and to be able to rely on those instructions. I take the point about the voice of the child but I do not think that that is inconsistent with the role of representatives.
Baroness Hamwee
“Assessment of victims
A person suspected of being a victim of an offence under sections 1 or 2 shall be assessed psychologically during the investigation of the offence.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendments 86J, 86K and 86L in this group. Amendment 86J seeks to insert a new clause. I contacted a member of the Bar who practises in this area and asked him whether the provisions available to protect and support victims in court and in their dealings with the police were adequate, even if they were not always well used. In other words, should we be thinking of anything to go in the legislation or is it really a matter of guidance and practice? He came straight back to me with the thought which I have incorporated in this amendment.
Of course, protection in court is very much a matter of practice, in line with some legislation and with guidance. The practice needs a foundation. This would be a foundation for something quite wide. My counsel friend said:
“Every other measure follows from an assessment and those presenting a case will do so fully informed if they have the psychological assessment”.
The victims of slavery and trafficking are so very unlike others. There are many issues that befall them and their presentation in court is difficult. My counsel friend believes, as is obvious, that an assessment should be mandatory.
This is not about referral to the NRM; it is about investigation and prosecution as well as support. An assessment may say that there is nothing too much to be concerned about, but it may say that this individual is very damaged, very vulnerable and that the best way to investigate is as follows. Or, in court, someone with the appropriate knowledge can say, “The victim giving evidence is not able to articulate what, from my work with him, I believe he is feeling. A different line of questioning may be appropriate”. This is not just about support; it is also about the resilience to give evidence and to assist the police, and resilience in proceedings.
My other two amendments can be put very briefly. The first adds a reference to consultation to Clause 48 —the Secretary of State’s guidance on the items listed. I am suggesting that this should be after consultation. I hope that my noble friend will be able to reassure me that it will be after consultation. The second amendment—in order to get the grammar right, it requires a few more words—essentially changes “determining” to “identifying” in Clause 48(1)(c)—the arrangements for identifying whether a person is to be treated as a victim of slavery or trafficking. This is to probe whether this provision is about the NRM, where the term “determination” is used, but so is the term “identifying”. Determination has a whiff of formal proceedings which may be wider than the Government intend. As I say, this is a probing amendment.
Amendment 86M is probably the central amendment in this group and I do not want to steal any thunder by speaking to it, save to say that it is an extremely important amendment and I am very glad that it has been tabled. If we are establishing rights for victims, the logic is that those with the power to grant or deny the right must also be held to account—and that would be via a right of appeal. My first amendment is 86J and I beg to move.
Lord McColl of Dulwich
My Lords, I am pleased to introduce Amendment 86M in my name, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I am grateful for the input of the charities involved in its development, including CARE, ECPAT and the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group.
The amendment deals with what is, for me, a foundational aspect of any modern slavery Bill worthy of that name, yet it is not adequately provided for in the current draft. The Bill will be the foundation of legislation for all action on modern-day slavery for decades to come. As such, it must have the victims at its heart and make proper provision for them. I welcome the addition of Part 5 following the recommendations of the pre-legislative scrutiny by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, of which I was privileged to be a member. However, I feel that Clause 48, which provides a mechanism for guidance on identifying and supporting victims, does not go anywhere like far enough to ensure that the Bill is victim-focused.
I thank the Minister for his comments in his letter sent to Peers following Second Reading, sharing the concern that we provide victims with the services that they need. I am pleased to know that the Government are considering the recommendations of the review of the national referral mechanism and hope that this will lead to a significant improvement in the identification of victims and the provision of support services. However, I do not share the view implied in the Minister’s letter that legislating for the NRM will make the system inflexible, nor do I believe that legislation is a distraction from the process of improvement.
In my opinion, Amendment 86M provides a much needed statutory foundation for operational and structural improvements, in response to the critique of victim identification and support in the review. The flexibility of guidance can be useful in responding to changing circumstances, but guidance is not the place to establish fundamental principles. It is my view that the fundamental principles for identifying victims and providing them with support and assistance should be laid out in legislation. Amendment 86M lays out these core principles. The clause relates broadly to two issues: first, the processes around identifying victims; and secondly, supporting victims—how long we should support them and with what types of services.
Let me first turn to the matter of identifying victims. Amendment 86M addresses the fundamental principle that the formal process for identifying victims and conferring on them a certain status that makes them eligible for services and support needs to be transparent through proposed new subsections (1) to (4). During our scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Joint Committee heard evidence from many NGOs that, because the national referral mechanism is established only in policy and guidance, there is a lack of transparency about decision-making. Anti-Slavery International described this as leading to,
“arbitrariness of application and access for victims”.
The 2013 report from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Hidden in Plain Sight, indicates that existing guidance relating to processes under the NRM does not seem to be consistently followed, which gives me great cause for concern over the Government’s proposal that guidance under Clause 48 will be sufficient to ensure the correct operation of the NRM process.
I welcome the review of the NRM that has been undertaken and I am pleased that the Modern Slavery Strategy states that the Government are giving serious consideration to its recommendations for a radical restructuring of the process. However, I believe that any such restructured process should ultimately be established in regulations. This was also the view of the Joint Committee, which said that the Home Secretary should set out the process for identification by order. This approach will provide the flexibility which the Minister mentioned in his letter, but equally allows for greater transparency in the process than exists at present.
Amendment 86M requires the Home Secretary to establish the identification process in regulations and to seek the input of an Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner on the guidance about the identification of victims. One key aspect of this transparency is the process for which Amendment 86M specifically provides. It is the creation of an internal and external appeals process. The current NRM process has no such formal mechanisms for review. Where individuals wish to challenge a negative decision, they must either make an informal request for reconsideration or seek judicial review. The informal process, relying as it does simply on the discretion of an official, is in no way transparent and provides no sense of security for victims when they enter the system. On the other hand, judicial review is extremely formal and costly and does not review the substantive merits of the person’s case. A formal built-in appeals process, with the possibility of a second-tier external review, is needed to provide appropriate transparency and accountability. This is why I have proposed new subsection (1)(c). I was rather disappointed with the response of the NRM review to this point. I am not convinced that its proposals for regional multidisciplinary panels will reduce the need for challenge, nor that the review’s suggestion—that another panel chair could offer a second pair of eyes when a review is requested—will be adequate to provide the transparency that is so important. I hope the Government will support my proposal for a more formal process set out in regulations.
I was also disappointed to read that the NRM review reported that the submissions from many NGOs showed overwhelming support for the preservation of the national referral mechanism solely for victims of trafficking. I am sorry, but I disagree. I recognise that international reporting structures and data comparisons mean we need the clarity of specific statistics on victims of trafficking, but we must ensure that there is a clear mechanism for the identification of victims of slavery who have not been trafficked. Without such a mechanism, we are left, once more, with the problems of transparency which I am seeking to address through Amendment 86M. As it stands, Clause 48 applies to victims of the offences under both Clauses 1 and 2, and this is right. Amendment 86M also applies to victims of slavery and trafficking offences and would require a formal mechanism for identification to be established in regulations.
Having set out the requirements for identification, I turn to proposed new subsection (5). This sets out how long the assistance must be provided for under the reflection and recovery period. There are two questions for your Lordships. First, how long should it be and, secondly, should we set this time period in statute? Those of your Lordships who have studied the European convention will know that our international obligation is to provide a so-called recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days. Such a period shall be sufficient for the person concerned to recover. The UK already has a recovery and reflection period of 45 days, so we are ahead of the minimum. However, I have heard NGOs say, time and again, that even 45 days is not long enough for a victim to properly reflect and recover and that 90 days would be far more appropriate. This is what I am proposing in Amendment 86M. Indeed, the NRM review says:
“Many to whom we spoke thought that victims ‘are failed’ at the end of the 45 day period”.
This is a very sobering assessment of how we are treating victims. Studies show that, during the first three months, a high proportion of victims of human trafficking display symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and that longer reflection periods can greatly improve chances of providing substantial assistance to victims of trafficking. That is why I am supporting a 90-day reflection and recovery period.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I am struck in these amendments by how prescient contributors are of the arguments I am about to deploy. I was wondering how it could be that people were so aware of this. The reality is that we have had a rather open and extensive consultation period. Indeed, the officials working on the team are constantly meeting with outside groups and talking to people. Alongside that, my noble friend Lady Garden and I have been trying to do the same with your Lordships’ House. Therefore, I suppose that it is not too much of a surprise that respective positions are known—but that does not mean that they cannot be moved on either side.
I take slight issue with one of the caricatures put forward, perhaps unintentionally, by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, that somehow victims’ protection in the United Kingdom may not be of the same standard outside Northern Ireland. I do not accept that. Not least, of course, we are going to have an Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, who will cover Northern Ireland. I am sure that that would be a key part.
The other point is that, as I have said before, we are open to looking at the legislation and experience in Northern Ireland and to sharing best practices with each other. The notion that somehow victims are just a passing shot in the Bill does not stack up to the discussions we are having or the legislation, where we talk about victim reparation orders, enhanced access to legal aid—which has been widely welcomed—special proceedings in court to encourage victims to come forward, presumptions about age, child trafficking advocates, and statutory defence if they are involved in committing a crime. All the way through, we all shared a commitment that those who have suffered most should be considered most. At the same time, we recognise that one of the best ways that one can serve victims is by ensuring that others are not added to their number by making prosecutions.
Those points made, I am not quite sure I will live up to the creative billing the noble Lord, Lord Alton, urged on me, but I shall respond as best I can to the points made. I am grateful for the tabling of Amendments 86J, 86K, 86L, 86M, 102B and 102C, which deal with crucial issues relating to identifying and supporting victims of modern slavery and to legal aid. This is why the Modern Slavery Bill includes a provision requiring the Secretary of State to issue guidance to ensure that front-line professionals understand how they might encounter and identify potential victims of modern slavery and how they can help them to access the support they need.
This guidance will focus on the effective identification of both child and adult victims of modern slavery and will provide information to front-line professionals and others on potential signs that someone may be a victim and on what to do. It will also set out the assistance and support on offer to victims through the government-funded adult victim care contract, currently operated by the Salvation Army, and local authority child welfare and safeguarding arrangements, including the presumption about age provisions in Clause 49. The Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner will also have a key role in ensuring that victims can be quickly identified by all front-line professionals. We are fully intending to consult on this guidance so that we can get it right, and therefore I do not believe that the amendment is necessary.
Amendment 86J seeks to require all victims to be psychologically assessed during the investigation of a modern slavery offence as set out in Clauses 1 or 2. While I appreciate my noble friend’s intention of ensuring that an assessment of victims’ needs is undertaken at an early opportunity and her awareness of the often deep psychological trauma these heinous crimes can inflict, I do not believe that this amendment is the right approach to achieve those laudable aims. The amendment may force victims to undergo a psychological assessment, even if they do not want one. I am sure that that is the last thing we should do. Added to that, all the way through this victim-focused legislation is the idea that victims have to consent to all the actions taken on their behalf. Instead, I offer the following reassurance. Adult victims who are referred to the national referral mechanism are entitled to receive psychological support through the national victim care contract currently run by the Salvation Army. Any such support would be provided following an appropriate assessment of an individual’s needs.
I now turn to Amendment 86L, tabled by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I believe it is a probing amendment in relation to the intention of Clause 48(1)(c), which sets out that guidance should include,
“arrangements for determining whether a person is to be treated as a victim of slavery or human trafficking”.
The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure that such guidance covers the national referral mechanism decision-making process to determine whether a person is to be treated as a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The wording of the Bill reflects the terminology used in relation to the national referral mechanism. “Determination” is used to describe the reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions by the competent authority, whereas “identify” is used to refer to the initial identification of potential victims by first responders. I reassure my noble friend that the paragraph as presently drafted covers both these elements of the national referral mechanism process, and I trust that the intention of the amendment is not to limit the scope of the guidance in any way.
Amendment 86M seeks to put a referral mechanism into statute which ensures that victims get at least 90 days’ support which is not conditional on the willingness of the person to act as a witness in any criminal proceedings. Although administratively we provide potential victims with a minimum of 45 days to recover and reflect, in practice many victims are supported for a much longer period. As noble Lords may know, we are currently retendering the contract for adult victim care services and have reflected on the national referral mechanism review recommendations in building the requirements for the new contract. That includes consideration of how we might provide ongoing support to victims once they have received a decision confirming that they are a victim of modern slavery. Our aim is to help these individuals move on with their lives so that they are not revictimised through being retrafficked.
Finally, Amendments 102B and 102C will enable the commissioner to exercise functions in relation to individual cases until amendments are made via secondary legislation to legal aid provisions. The Government are strongly of the view that it is not the role of the commissioner to champion individual cases or to track victims who receive support. Their role is to strengthen our collective response to modern slavery, working closely with law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders, including civil society organisations, to identify more victims and prosecute more perpetrators. We recognise the importance of understanding the longer term outcomes of victims. That is why we are considering how we can work with the victim care contractor to best achieve this. Of course, information from individual cases may help inform the commissioner’s work in this regard, but it is not for the commissioner to advocate for individuals.
Potential victims of trafficking currently gain access to legal aid following a positive reasonable grounds decision of the national referral mechanism. Legal advice is not necessary for an NRM referral. The reasonable grounds decision is generally made within five working days after an individual has been referred to the NRM, and the decision has a low threshold. This test is an important gateway to avoid abuse of a system that provides access to a range of support, including legal aid. We recognise that there are concerns about the operation of the NRM. That is why we commissioned a full review of the system and will be piloting a new approach to the NRM in response to that review. We will ensure that any wider changes to the NRM are reflected in the provision of legal aid.
I thank noble Lords for tabling these amendments and allowing us to discuss some crucial issues. I hope that I have addressed noble Lords’ concerns and that—with the undertaking, as with previous groups, that we will continue reflecting on the detailed comments that have been made—they will take that reassurance and not press their amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I was looking to see if the noble Lord, Lord McColl, wanted to come in. I know that all noble Lords are very appreciative of the time and effort that Ministers and officials are putting in to meetings and discussions outside the Chamber. I hope that the teasing and the prescience does not deter them from continuing with that; I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton. My amendment about psychological assessment—I take the point about consent —is really not about the NRM or about support for victims and their recovery; that is obviously extremely important. I was seeking to pick up the role of psychological input into an investigation and prosecution. That is a different matter. It is clearly not appropriate now for me to expand on that any further, but if I can test the Minister’s patience, maybe this is something for outside the Chamber.
I note what the Minister said on my other two amendments—I am happy about those—and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 86J.