Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 6th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 89. I think that everybody in the Committee is more or less on the same page in what we are trying to achieve here. This amendment would add,

“or withdrawing medication, hydration, or life-sustaining devices”

to Clause 2(2). This has perhaps been forgotten about, but people sometimes rely on ventilators and other equipment to sustain their lives, so it is not a big leap forward to add this to the legislation. It is simple and straightforward, and amending Clause 2(2) seems to make sense. I cannot think of any reason why the noble and learned Lord should not adopt the amendment as a sensible way forward. It indicates—we have had this conversation a number of times, but we have to bear it in mind—that there are still significant weaknesses. We have to make the Bill safe.

On the hostile reaction to what we are trying to do here, I gently remind the Committee that when we last discussed this subject on 22 October 2021, at the Second Reading of the Assisted Dying Bill that Baroness Meacher brought forward, her Private Member’s Bill had 10 pages and 13 clauses. The Bill before us has 51 pages and 59 clauses. People have to understand that this is a massive Private Member’s Bill and is not normal in terms of how we deal with such Bills—it is much bigger. With that, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will have no difficulty in accepting Amendment 89.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 103. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for adding her name to it. It is a modest amendment simply seeking to ensure that a person is not categorised as terminally ill if they have refused life-saving treatment because they are influenced by a mental disorder. The noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, was perceptive in addressing some of the issues that concern me and are why I tabled this amendment.

We are talking about any individual who, in effect, voluntarily brings themselves within the definition of terminal illness as defined in the Bill. As we heard on the previous group, supporters of the Bill often present the six-month prognosis as clear-cut and argue that we all know what we mean by terminal illness. In public discussions, the example given is usually cancer, which again seems fairly clear-cut. But we heard on the previous group that life and death and diseases are rather more complicated. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, raised some very thought-provoking issues around that.

I want to make a bit more concrete what terminal illness would mean in the examples that I talk about. I have noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, started this theme in the previous group, and I was very affected by the moving speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, which also pertains to this. Where someone suffers a serious depressive episode, perhaps related to a debilitating physical illness that is difficult but none the less treatable, what would happen if, in a temporary period of despair, they refuse treatments such as dialysis or HIV antivirals, therefore potentially leading them to a terminally ill prognosis? Would they be eligible for assisted death in that instance?

Or let us take the case of a suicidal person, perhaps a prisoner suffering mental distress, who has attempted to take his own life several times before but suicide prevention policies have saved him. I think in particular of prisoners I have long campaigned for who are on IPP sentences. Tragically, suicide figures among that group of prisoners are very high and suicidal ideation is a real factor for those prisoners. Our imagined prisoner is not just mentally disturbed but physically dependent on insulin for diabetes and needs to take it to remain alive. If that person refuses to take that treatment and becomes seriously ill, bringing upon himself the inevitability of having a progressive disease and it becoming terminal, would he be eligible for assisted death under this Bill?

This example would seem to contradict the slogan of many of the Bill’s supporters, which we frequently hear: “They’re dying anyway”. As it happens, it is a phrase that I find particularly chilling, but, in this instance, they would not be “dying anyway”; they would be dying in a self-induced way. How will the idea of terminal illness in such instances be weighed up? In the case of our IPP prisoner refusing to take treatment such as insulin—perhaps even refusing to eat or drink—this could lead to an inevitable assisted death, because he would meet the physical criteria of terminal illness when, actually, the root cause was not inevitably progressive.

I like to imagine that we as parliamentarians, along with campaigners, will be successful in ensuring that IPP prisoners are freed from the hopelessness of an abolished prison sentence that psychiatrists uniformly and consistently say is a major factor in making people suffer mental illness in prison. If the IPP was ended, that prisoner could resume their medical treatment and their mental ill-health would have changed because the social circumstances would have changed. Therefore, they could resume their treatment, start engaging again, feel that they have a reason to live and become treatable, with recovery possible—but not if it is too late as they have already had an assisted death. In other words, terminal prognosis is not inevitable in that instance but self-induced, driven by a disturbance of the mind.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has some insight into the issues in this amendment, as he has explained. He has tabled an amendment and talked about any disease caused by a person not eating or drinking when that occurs as a result of mental disorder. Obviously, the focus there is on anorexia and eating disorders, but is this not a similar example?

I raise these issues because this is a loophole that has been nagging at me. I cannot see anywhere in the Bill where safeguards exist to prevent such undoubted unintended outcomes. Without those safeguards, the drafting of the Bill could inadvertently incentivise self-destructive choices about treatments for illnesses that are treatable, and lead to irreversible early death facilitated by state medical services when life-saving medical treatments could have ensured that people lived and were not categorised as terminally ill. It is this confusion—about who defines terminal if you put yourself into that category—that I would like the noble and learned Lord to reassure me about and clarify.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayman (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord says that we should understand the ordinary meaning of words, and I agree with him. I must say to him, however, that my own mother—who turned her face to the door and stopped eating and drinking—did not commit suicide. We did not feel that. She was at the end of her life, she was terminally ill and she decided that she had had enough. She did not want the next blood transfusion, and she did not want any more time. I find it really offensive to be told that she committed suicide.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I also want to respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada. Words do matter, which is why plain speaking matters. Being told that you cannot say certain words because they might offend someone is unhelpful. Can the noble Baronesses respond to the fact that, in opinion polling, if people are asked whether they support assisted dying, many will say yes? If they are asked whether they support assisted suicide, they say no. In other words, calling something what it is—namely, suicide—is not necessarily something that the noble Baronesses should be frightened of. They cannot instruct us as legislators to do the job of spin doctors in trying to make something more palatable by using kind words. We have to be honest with the public and then they will decide; it is up to them.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, agree that the cardinal difference between suicide and voluntary assisted death is that voluntary assisted death applies to people who are already dying? There is no way that they are going to survive, and that seems to make the whole difference. What we seek in this Bill—and I very much support the safeguard proposed by my noble and learned friend in Amendment 87—is that the process of dying should be free from terror, pain and humiliation. It will not stop the person dying. Therefore, it is not suicide.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

I can see a point to that, but the message I was given by the mental health practitioner who rang me from the mental health team—I think he was a psychiatrist—was basically that once somebody is in a home, these tests become much more difficult because of the nature of the environment. That may differ from home to home—and yes, when my father had pneumonia and was clearly delirious, he was at home. If there are concerns, we should surely make sure, if people have a cognitive impairment, that we know that is the case, but if somebody does not—if there are the short-term issues that are being discussed in the amendments, in particular Amendments 111 and 112—then surely those people who want an assisted death would want it ruled out that they had some sort of cognitive impairment if it were temporary and reversible. That is the sort of thing we really need to get right, not only for those people who have an impairment but for those who actually do not have one but would not then be able to have the assisted death that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others might wish them to be able to avail themselves of.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this small group, which I did not expect there to be so much rich conversation about, indicates why care homes really are an important focus for the Bill. I absolutely want to echo the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about care home workers: they have not been consulted. Might the noble and learned Lord make a commitment to meet up with representatives of the care sector to discuss the very real issues that the Bill will create for them if it passes? We can recognise that many of the people in society who will, at some point, be eligible for assisted death if the Bill passes will probably be in care homes, because that is where elderly people are, who might well get terminal diagnoses—rather than 14 year-olds. We are talking about a different cohort; that has at least to be considered. Some of the previous contributions have therefore been very helpful. I really thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for laying out so clearly why this should matter to us all.

I am somewhere between the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on care homes because, for the purposes of this discussion, I would rather not go down the care home horror story route. However, even if you accept care homes as positive places in general, there are still huge challenges in the Bill in relation to them. I will lay out some of these challenges.

Despite the horror stories, in most instances, care homes are incredibly important to society’s care of the elderly and frail. Although they are too often neglected—understatement of the year—by state support, they are fulfilling an incredibly important public service. By and large, the care workers I know and have encountered—far too many of them, for a variety of reasons—are heroic. They are poorly paid, underappreciated and overworked, and we know there is a massive turnover of staff. These things have been well covered in different discussion. I also find that many care workers are amazingly generous and creative in their care of our older citizens who are in need of residential care.

Despite all that, we must be realistic. There are difficult, challenging circumstances in care homes, and we have a social care crisis, which we talk about all the time. This is the living example of that crisis. There is not enough space in care homes, and they can be chaotic—not because of the staff. In a day-to-day sense in care homes, standard mental capacity assessments are done by overworked care workers who are not clinical professionals. I worry that these assessments used for treatments might bleed, in some way, into the future as a way of signing off a new medical treatment on the block: assisted dying. We must recognise that as a possible concern.

I am slightly contradicting myself now, but we must recognise the kind of pressure that people are under. Many elderly people in care homes have had things like do not resuscitate orders or inappropriate diagnoses. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who made a point that I too can relate to, where an elderly person was given their meal and drink, and it was ticked off by care staff as having been eaten and drunk but it was not; the elderly person did not even know what it was, but it was ticked off anyway. That was not cruelty, on behalf of the staff; it was rushing around. They did not feed that elderly person, but they were not starving them; they simply did not have time to sit down and do anything about it.

This matters because a large number of people who may fall into eligibility because they are terminally ill will be people whose capacity needs to be assessed, and they will live in care homes. The problem is that care homes are a gathering of people who have fluctuating cognition. The main thing that goes on in care homes, beyond care, is that cognition changes all the time. The idea that a firm, autonomous decision will be made in those circumstances needs to be, at the very least, queried slightly.

We are talking about UTIs, dehydration, infection or the effects of medication, but the big one, of course, is undiagnosed dementia or early dementia that no one has yet noticed. Alzheimer’s Society data shows that only two-thirds of those with dementia have received a formal diagnosis. Sadly, there are massive waiting lists, so the diagnosis rate is low—and in Wales, inevitably, it is sadly even lower. There is also hidden dementia, where no one is trying to get the people assessed but it is there none the less. Due to the heightened risks of cognitive impairment issues and the instability of cognition, we definitely need to take these amendments seriously. We need to have specialist clinical assessments to ensure that capacity means capacity and is not part of a “good days, bad days” scenario.

Anyone who has had relatives in care homes, or spent any time in one, will know all about the “good days, bad days” situation. You can go in one day and chat away to a coherent and articulate older person, but the next time you see them they are completely incoherent and confused. You then go back and they are chatting away again.