Trade Bill

Baroness Fookes Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am rather pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, since it gives me an immediate right of reply. If she looks carefully at the debates last week, which she was listening to, she will find that at no point did I assert that any of the amendments were out of scope—not least because I have put down further amendments myself that are intended to have an impact on the processes for making regulations for trade future trade agreements, and indeed which impact on schemes outwith the text of the Bill. I will come on precisely to that in Amendment 91 in this group.

I say gently to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the making of law is not solely the province of lawyers. There is a very valued tradition in this House that we bring expertise from a range of different disciplines. As it happens, my discipline—my original training—is that of a civil servant. Some 39 years ago I wrote the instructions to counsel for a major piece of legislation, and just under 10 years ago, as Leader of the House of Commons, I was responsible for Parliamentary Counsel and the scrutiny of legislation brought before the two Houses, and for the structure of the legislative programme. For 40 years I have engaged in the process of legislation. The fact that I am not qualified lawyer in no sense excludes me from making the points that I made.

As it happens, I did not say that anything was out of scope. The point I gently made last week was that quite a number of the amendments we were looking at were intended to influence—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to stop the noble Lord, but I understand that there are still some problems with hearing. Is that true of other Members of the Committee? No? Perhaps we can resume and see how we get on.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I was making the point that in amendments last week, I was trying to help the Committee. The objective of quite a number of the amendments was to influence the content of future trade agreements, but the effect of the amendments would have applied only to the continuity agreements. We will need to understand that in particular on Report, and to seek in some cases to amend the Bill, and to do so with the effect that people are looking for.

To come back to this group, I spoke on Thursday, I think, about Philip Morris. I will not repeat any of that but will simply say that it gives rise to considerable sympathy on my part about the actions of some companies. However, the absence of investor-state dispute settlement—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but there has been a request that he starts his speech again, because quite a lot of it was lost. May I trouble him to start again?

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Since I have no text, it will not be the same speech, so if you will forgive me, I will not do that. It will appear in Hansard, and I encourage Members to read it there. In any case, I am now talking about the amendments in this group, as opposed to responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which noble Lords can read in Hansard.

On these amendments, I have great sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was saying. When Philip Morris was frustrated on an investor-state dispute settlement, it effectively used Honduras and the Dominican Republic to use WTO procedures. So the absence of ISDS is not enough in itself—we have to ensure that we are proof against that. In fact, where Australia was concerned, as it happens, the public health exemptions in the WTO were sufficient in the last decision of the appellate body that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, regrets the absence of: the last decision it made in June was to uphold Australia’s position. We have to be very mindful of that.

Before I get to my own amendment, I will speak to the others. There is a very legitimate question. Are the Government planning simply to roll over existing EU agreements as they are, including where there are ISDS provisions and including with CETA in due course, where there is an investment court system? I am very interested to know what the Government’s intentions are. Certainly, my expectation is that it will be very difficult to have a continuity agreement while departing substantially from continuity.

As regards Japan, I do not have the text of the UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, but while the EU-Japan agreement encourages mutual investment, Article 8.9.4 of it makes clear that, while market access, national treatment without discrimination and most-favoured-nation status are offered, it says that for “greater certainty”, most-favoured-nation treatment

“does not include investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures provided for in other international agreements.”

I will be very interested to know in due course whether the UK-Japan agreement says the same thing. I know that my friends in Japan take the view that we will not be able to accede to the CPTPP without accepting an investor-state dispute settlement. So this is a very interesting moment in understanding whether we are joining with the European Union in moving away from investor-state dispute settlement, or whether we subscribe to the Japanese view that it remains a legitimate vehicle in international trade agreements.

Amendment 43 proposes a multilateral investment tribunal. I wish that we could use such a process. The Doha round did not accept a multilateral investment provision—the proposal failed. We have bilateral agreements, but while they might be desirable they are not sufficiently widespread to allow us to get to a multilateral tribunal. Putting in legislation a requirement for such a tribunal when people have not yet signed up to one seems heroic.

Amendment 91 is not about investor-state dispute settlement; it is about disputes between states. The best example to have in mind is the dispute between the European Union and the United States. As a result of US action, the dispute reached the point where it was lawful under WTO rules for the EU to apply specific import duties against US exports into the European Union.

The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 relates to this, but why I am talking about a different piece of legislation? The original Trade Bill and the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill were introduced at the same time, at the end of 2017. They were intended to be considered side by side and they cross-refer considerably. In this instance, it is entirely right for us to look at the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act and ask whether the parliamentary scrutiny arrangements relating to it are correct. Section 15 of the Act gives the Secretary of State the power to impose through regulations additional import duties as a result of an international dispute—for example, regulations to impose import duties on US exports. That power is exercisable through the negative resolution procedure, but in my view it should be an affirmative resolution procedure—this should be added to the list of affirmative resolution procedures in Section 32 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act.

The argument in the Government’s Explanatory Notes for using the negative procedure in the great majority of cases where customs duties are imposed is that there are so many such regulations that they have to be made in that way, otherwise they become impractical. That is patently not the case here. In this instance, I encourage my noble friend the Minister to agree that there will be relatively few international disputes that give rise to the imposition of such duties and that, when that happens, it will by its nature be of considerable significance and therefore should be in the form of regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I will speak in particular to Amendments 52 and 94 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, to which I have appended my signature. I would like to use this opportunity to probe my noble friend on the precise state of the dispute resolution mechanism generally, as well as in relation to ISDS, but I have a lot of sympathy with other amendments in this group.

I will leave the details of the amendments to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, but, using them as a vehicle, I refer to the Library Note, which states on page 8 that

“the Government states it may need to implement the results of an arbitration/alternative dispute resolution decision under a continuity agreement.”

On page 9 of the Explanatory Notes, the Government state:

“This could include, for example, implementing decisions made by a joint committee of the parties set up under a trade agreement or implementing the results of an arbitration/alternative dispute resolution decision.”


I will refer to some examples, although not as many as we had from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, in his excellent opening speech on this group of amendments. There does not seem to be any parity given, in the EU application for the review of subsidies before the World Trade Organization, to Boeing. The dispute that the EU—and through it, the UK—has brought with regard to America giving subsidies in large measure to Boeing does not seem to have got very far very quickly, whereas the decision taken by the US Administration against the EU for the claim that was brought for subsidies and action for Airbus brought a very swift response from the US that has in particular harmed Scotch whisky.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I entirely endorse what my noble friend Lord Lansley said: one of the reasons we are here is as legislators, whatever background we are from. I declare for the record that I am a non-practising Scottish advocate.

Scotch whisky is our largest export of food and drink—probably one of our largest exports of any product—and it suffered a 27% decline in exports in the fourth quarter of 2019. This has brought enormous tension within the UK. The Scottish Trade Minister has said on numerous occasions—most recently as reported in the Times this weekend, or perhaps today; I am not sure—that the Scottish Government would like to see a much more rigorous approach by the UK Government and the EU as a whole to see these subsidies lifted. It raises a more general question. I understand that the Trump Administration have made a general threat to walk away from the World Trade Organization mechanism.

So I will use this little debate to ask my noble friend: what is the status within the continuity agreements, particularly those that have already been signed, of the dispute resolution mechanism? Has it been squared off with the devolved Assemblies? Are they all in agreement as to what the mechanism will be? Does my noble friend share my general concern that it takes a woefully long time for a dispute resolution to be reached under the World Trade Organization—something that is now compounded by the threat on the table by one of the biggest players to walk away? In addition, can my noble friend tell us what the status is with the devolved Governments, and what the dispute resolution mechanism is that has currently been agreed under those rollover agreements?

I place on record my concern at the impact on one particular product, which happens to be our major food and drink export, beyond doubt—Scotch whisky—and ask when my noble friend the Minister might expect a resolution.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Earl, Lord Caithness.

[The Earl of Caithness (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend the Minister for the correspondence that we have had since our last discussion. I found his letter, which I got yesterday, very helpful. I also thank him for his continued efforts to assuage my concerns with regard to ISDS. He is getting there but he has not won yet. In his letter, he mentioned the Vattenfall case, because I brought that up with him and he kindly agreed to fill in some more detail for me. But surely the Vattenfall case merely confirmed that an ISDS was not necessary. It was actually the German Constitutional Court that sorted out the problem there. The courts, in an open and transparent way, must surely be the right way for trade disputes to be settled, rather than in the murky waters of an ISDS.

My noble friend also said that the UK had never faced an ISDS claim that had reached arbitration. That is absolutely right, and I think that the public reaction would have been a lot noisier and more visible to us all if a claim had reached arbitration. Surely the reason for the current situation is that our ISDS agreements tend to be with developing countries in which we are investing. Looking ahead, the situation will be very different if and when we sign a trade deal with the US, which has very big investments in this country.

It is interesting to note—and I would be interested in what the Minister thinks on this—that Canada, having had rather bad experiences with ISDS when it was part of NAFTA, withdrew from the ISDS in the new USMCA trade deal in order to get away from that difficulty. Unless we follow a somewhat similar pattern, I fear that the UK will get severely punished in the future.

I will pick up a theme started by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, when he introduced this amendment and to which other noble Lords referred: the chilling effect of ISDS. In particular, my concern is the chilling effect on environmental regulations and environmental law in the future. ISDS has been used to challenge important regulations, such as those on fracking in Canada and, as I mentioned on Thursday, plain packaging for cigarettes in Australia. This has cost Governments in the countries involved a considerable amount of money. Governments have been reluctant to regulate in these areas because of the mere threat of an ISDS. If we are to fulfil the aim of the Prime Minister, which he stated to the party conference this morning, to have a green revolution to bring us back to economic prosperity, the one thing that we cannot afford is to have ISDS threats on environmental regulation hanging over us in the future.

What has not been raised so far in our debates is the report, Costs and Benefits of an EU-USA Investment Protection Treaty, which the former BIS department commissioned from the London School of Economics. Can my noble friend comment on it? It warned of going beyond

“the traditional core of favourable standards of treatment backed up by access to ISDS”,

containing

“provisions concerning the host state’s right to implement treaty-consistent measures to protect the environment”.

The report found that the UK would necessarily incur costs in defending itself against investor lawsuits, even if the UK wins, and that is something that has not happened to date. It goes on to say that it is

“virtually certain that such costs under an EU-US investment chapter will be higher than under the status quo”.

To quote from the report again,

“we suggest that an EU-US investment treaty would impose costs on the UK to the extent that it prevents the UK government from regulating in the public interest.”

That is exactly the point I have just been making: it is the chilling effect of ISDS. The report concludes that a treaty without ISDS would be a less costly option for the UK. As a minimum outcome, therefore, we should surely ditch ISDS as a matter of urgency, and I find it quite interesting that at least two of the countries with which we have rolled over continuity agreements, Morocco and South Africa, are ditching ISDS in other trade deals that they are doing.

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That brings me to the conclusion of my remarks. I hope that what I have said has reassured noble Lords and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, to withdraw his amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I have received a request from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, to speak after the Minister.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comprehensive response to the debate on this group of amendments. I am grateful for that; it shows the seriousness of this issue. I and other noble Lords will reflect on his remarks.

I have two questions. The first relates to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which I support. As I understood it, if we were to bring retaliatory measures or sanctions, they would have to have been authorised by the dispute settlement body at the WTO, so by the time they came to Parliament, either under the negative procedure or the affirmative procedure, they would be public anyway. Therefore, Parliament’s ability to use the affirmative procedure would be based on what was already in the public domain.

Secondly, I am still not sure why the Government have not indicated that they will continue with their support for moving towards an investment court system in our continuity agreements with Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico, which are yet be signed, given that the European Union has stated categorically that moving towards such a system is the approach for those countries and is now, to quote the Commission in October 2019, “on the table” in all ongoing investment negotiations. I simply do not understand why the Government, who supported moving to a multilateral system, now say that they are fully engaged and cannot say what their position is yet. Why can the Government not simply say that they support this in principle and are working with others to bring it about?

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Motion agreed.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, that concludes the work of the Committee this evening. The Committee stands adjourned. I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room.

Committee adjourned at 7.31 pm.