Health and Social Care Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Finlay of Llandaff
Main Page: Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Finlay of Llandaff's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberCan I also ask the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about his amendment, in which he proposes setting up another very strong bureaucracy? It is a corporate body, known as a clinical senate; I presume, because it has a proper officer, that it will have a range of officials. It is suggested that it should revalidate doctors within the area, but I am wondering how that would work with the GMC and others. It will maintain a whole system of clinical governance within clinical commissioning groups and also authorise some of the clinical commissioning groups.
I can understand the noble Lord’s wish for some strategic leadership. I have been a regional chairman—and I have to say that our medical advisory groups were really excellent compared to those of south-east Thames. We had really good ones. But I am anxious about this matter. I sense that this is simply a probing amendment, because the membership of what the noble Lord proposes would be extremely bureaucratic. I understood that these were advisory boards, and that it was to try to get some of the clinical input from the acute centre into the commissioning groups so that they understood perhaps more clearly what they were commissioning in terms of acute services.
I very much look forward to what my noble friend is going to tell us as to how he sees this issue. But I must say to the most right reverend Primate—I think I have got that right—that if he can manage the Anglican Church he really could manage the National Health Service.
I wonder whether this is one of the occasions where the organigram that we were discussing previously in Committee might be helpful. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us in his summing up when we might expect to see that diagram.
My Lords, we heartily endorse the important role that clinical advice will play in supporting the NHS Commissioning Board in fulfilling its duties and carrying out its functions effectively. We fully expect clinical networks and the new clinical senates to make a vital contribution to this.
The Government intend that doctors, nurses and other experts from across health and social care will form clinical senates to give expert advice to commissioners. They will do this principally, although not exclusively, in two situations: senates will have a role in the authorisation of clinical commissioning groups, as well as having a role in advising on significant service change on a large geographical scale. Existing clinical networks will also be taken forward and developed and will advise on how specific services can be better designed to provide integrated and effective care. The Government are committed both to retaining and strengthening clinical networks and to using them to help ensure that a range of professionals play an integral part in the clinical commissioning of patient care. The networks will include patient and carer representatives that exist in areas such as cancer care, so that they cover many more areas of specialist care. Networks will have a stronger role in commissioning, in support of the board and local clinical commissioning groups.
Although we fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Patel, in highlighting the important role that both clinical networks and senates will play in the new system, I cannot support his Amendment 51, nor can I support Amendment 224A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The reason why I cannot accept them is the same in each case: both of them would specify the roles of networks and senates in legislation. That would restrict the range of ways in which they can operate, which in turn would limit the value that is delivered for patients.
Clinical senates and networks will not be statutory organisations, and that is why they are not referred to in the Bill. That, surely, is a positive thing. It gives them much needed flexibility in how they operate, maximising benefits for patients while minimising bureaucracy. This flexibility will allow both senates and networks to act as enablers of the commissioning system, supporting commissioners by providing them with expert advice. They will not act as another layer of management or administration which hinders progress; instead, the board will host both clinical senates and networks, allowing any supporting functions which can appropriately be shared to be organised with the least administrative bureaucracy. The review of the current system of clinical networks is identifying the features that deliver the greatest benefits, allowing the new system to build on these in a streamlined way that effectively drives improved quality and outcomes.
The board will be subject to a duty, in the proposed new Section 13J within Clause 20, to obtain appropriate advice to enable it to discharge its functions effectively. We believe that this general duty is sufficient to ensure that it seeks appropriate advice, including, of course, clinical advice. In practice, clinical networks and clinical senates will form one way in which the board fulfils this duty.
Clinical commissioning groups are also under a similar duty to seek appropriate advice. Although the board will host senates and networks, clinical commissioning groups will be closely involved in their design and functioning, as well as benefiting from their advice. It is expected that the board will issue guidance about avoiding conflict of interest where this might arise. The exact number of clinical senates is yet to be determined but they are expected to be able to offer informed, strategic advice across a health economy, which might suggest having around 15 across the country. Clinical networks will be based on patient flows rather than NHS boundaries, so variations in size will continue, but representation will always be appropriate to the remit of each network.
I shall speak to Amendment 92ZZA, which stands in my name and those of my noble friends. At this time of night, brevity is of the essence. This amendment addresses a crucial point.
The whole structure that the Bill sets up for the NHS depends on a number of things to work efficiently. It depends on the clarity of responsibilities and on different bodies having a clear understanding not only of their own role but of their role in relation to each other. One of the most important parts of the process underlying the structure is integrity. Although there has been much exaggeration about potential conflicts of interest in some of the things that I have seen, there is one—the one that I have highlighted in this amendment.
One commendable thing about this Bill is that in relation to acute care and hospitals we are stopping the process by which organisations—in this case acute trusts—are rewarded for the volume of the procedures they do rather than the quality of their outputs. It is important in commissioning that we stick to that same principle. There must be no possibility whatever that anybody who is involved in the commissioning of services stands to gain by the provision of those services, or their volume. That is why I have drafted this amendment. It may be imperfect in some way or another but its intention is to say that those commissioning decisions must be completely separate from the derivation of any benefit—or pecuniary benefit—as a result of that.
I have absolutely no problem whatever with people who either work for or are shareholders of commissioning support organisations advising CCGs on what to do. If they are, as we have been led to believe, experts in commissioning and clinical commissioning groups want to bring in their expert advice, that is absolutely fine. I do not have a problem with that at all, as it could be a much more efficient and effective way in which to do it. However, it would be unacceptable if those same people had any role whatever in the decision-making processes of the CCGs, either by being a member of a CCG board or by being a member of one of the CCG sub-committees. My amendment attempts to remove that potential conflict of interest. It is probably one that the Government had intended to remove, but they have not done so in the Bill as it stands, and so there is a loophole which needs to be closed in order that there is complete integrity about the process.
My Lords, this group of amendments and this debate are incredibly important. The risk of conflict of interest relating to general practitioners is particularly high because they are independent contractors—they are not NHS employees and therefore are not answerable in the same structure as an NHS employee would be within an organisation. Independent contractor groups may be small or they may be as large as practices.
I have been a GP myself and have had to go through the business of partnership agreements. I know only too well from colleagues of mine how disastrous the break-ups in partnership agreements can be and the degree of animosity that can occur. When we talk about GPs being on commissioning groups, there is a real problem in terms of how much they are going to get paid for undertaking commissioning decisions. If they are commissioned from an organisation with which they have a link—because they are a GP with a special interest and they work in another organisation—what are they being paid for? The content of their general and medical services contract is not closely defined. If they have a special interest, which their practice then refers to one of the partners in the group who is providing a service as part of another provider group, there is a risk that people in that practice will be getting double-paid under the organisation of that arrangement.
To try to explore this, I telephoned Assura, a group which is providing dermatological services in an area. I tried to explore the situation with regard to their internal governance arrangements and commissioning arrangements if they have a GP working there and how those arrangements are monitored. I was reassured by what I was told by the person on the phone, who was most helpful. However, it did not take away my anxiety. This provider was being careful and making sure that clinical governance structures were in place, but I have not been able to understand where the controls are on a clinical commissioning group. Will they be only on people who are GP principals on it, or will they apply to all the doctors who are working in general practice? Where will the GPs sit if there are a small number of principals, a large number of salaried GPs in an area who are doing all the clinical work and who know what needs to be done, and a senior partner who is taking the profits out of the business which is the business of the general practice?
Where coterminosity links to this is that, if you have coterminosity between the commissioning group and other services—local authority services, education services and so on—you at least have another organisation, or two others, which will be seeing what is happening. If you take a complex family—perhaps a single parent with one child with developmental delays, another with complex conditions such as epilepsy, diabetes or whatever, and another child who might be being neglected—then, by having triangulation between local authority services, education services and those services being commissioned, the gaps in the commissioning process may emerge. However, if you do not have coterminosity, I can see each group saying, “It falls outside our area”, and the children or the patients will fall through the gaps. With regard to the commissioning group, poor decisions in commissioning or decisions which involve a conflict of interest may not be revealed for a very long time.
Therefore, I urge the Government to look closely at these amendments, particularly the one tabled by my noble friend Lord Kakkar on the Nolan principles, because, unless we tighten up on the processes that will monitor and provide governance over the way that members of the clinical commissioning group behave, we run a risk. I wish that I could share the optimism of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that the conflict of interest will lie only among those supporting commissioning decisions, but I do not.