Former Afghan Special Forces: Deportation

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister inform the House whether HMG are in direct contact with the Pakistan Government and authorities specifically on this issue, now?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I assure the House that His Majesty’s Government are in direct contact with the Pakistan Government at the very highest level. They are being extremely co-operative about not returning to Afghanistan people who may be at threat as a result of the recent conflict.

King’s Speech

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, many threats to UK security, economic well-being and values have been identified. However, one that has gained far more traction in recent years is the threat that China poses. Although scant reference was made in the 2021 integrated review, that was remedied in the refresh update, in which China was referred to as

“an epoch-defining and systemic challenge”.

The recommendations fell into three broad categories: protect, align and engage. It seems that this still fails to spell out a coherent strategy for dealing with what are, after all, severe threats, not only to the UK but to the rules-based world order.

Strategy implies having a clear and agreed vision of where one wishes to be in relation to a serious standoff. Every action taken thereafter—whether in foreign policy, diplomacy, trade, public statements and relations, or expression of values—restates that vision explicitly and consistently. At present we have tactics, albeit broad and necessary ones, on how to protect, align and engage, but not yet a strategy. China experts have repeatedly referred to this absence of strategy. One, Charles Parton, has gone so far as to spell out the “10 Be Clear” steps to clarify relations with China, the emphasis being on recognising the need for co-operation in several areas while making it crystal clear to China where the red lines are.

I shall summarise the major threats faced by the UK, among other nations. Much of the defensive construction and militarisation is taking place on islands whose ownership is still disputed. This construction enables China to work towards control of international shipping lanes essential for global trade.

The increase in espionage, especially that surrounding developments in technology, is now widely acknowledged. MI5 warns of the dangers of illegal procurement of technology, AI and advanced research or product development. A recent Civitas report estimates that UK universities have received between £122 million and £156 million over the past seven years, £30 million of which is subject to US sanctions.

Taiwan is under constant threat, including the undermining of democratic institutions and the economy. Although experts do not believe that invasion is likely in the immediate future, China, as Taiwan’s largest export market, pursues measures to undermine the Taiwanese economy, especially in agriculture. In addition, given that China remains dependent on Taiwan for a steady supply of advanced semiconductor chips, efforts to hijack that industry continue.

These policies alone should make it clear that China most certainly has a strategy, which is to overtake the USA as the predominant world power and secure its economic position in the long term. Its tactics include a variety of ways to undermine the rules-based international order.

What might be the points of leverage or influence? Contrary to conventional views, China is bothered by international criticism and goes to some lengths to conceal its less acceptable policies. However, atrocities such as the genocide of the Uighur population continue in part because the international reactions are often contradictory, or at least inconsistent.

While AUKUS, the Five Power Defence and the Indo-Pacific Quad—which the UK has not yet joined—are all necessary alliances, more direct action is also necessary. The fear that such strong representation might adversely affect trading volumes—China is the UK’s third-largest trading partner—is not borne out by the evidence. China understands and respects strong, even hostile, statements and action, provided that its interests are protected. The UK may have an added advantage in that the PRC supposedly believes that it has special influence on US policies.

Lastly, is the US policy of strategic ambiguity with reference to Taiwan a sufficient deterrent in the eyes of the PRC? The clue lies in the word “ambiguity”. The PRC cannot be certain that any move on Taiwan would provoke an unequivocal reaction from the USA, which enables it to continue testing the boundaries. The absence of effective sanctions at the trashing of the Sino-British joint declaration on Hong Kong following the implementation of the national security laws signals weakness on the part of the UK and others, which is exploited by the PRC, while the hesitancy to monitor the intentions of Chinese scientific and technical students at UK universities opens to way to outright theft of ideas and techniques.

The strategic direction of the UK, together with nation partners, could be defined as developing an international network to maintain and strengthen the democratic system and rules-based international order. The chief methods include making it abundantly clear that any encroachment on these values and processes will be met with severe international condemnation and sanctions. There should be no room for ambiguity.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Wednesday 19th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, one of my earliest introductions to the workings of the British Government came from Anthony Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain in the early 1960s. In it, he argued that one of the main functions of the FCO—as it then was—was contingency planning. I have to assume that this continues, and my topic today therefore concerns what the UK Government’s plans might be if and when China attempts a serious onslaught against Taiwan and, secondly, if and when the Taliban gain power in Afghanistan and start wholesale repression of women’s rights.

On the former, China has made it abundantly clear that incorporating Taiwan as part of the mainland is its intention—indeed, its primary foreign policy objective. The integrated review talks about competition, co-operation and counteraction against China’s policies, with a heavy emphasis on trade. However, astonishingly, it does not even mention Taiwan. China might be forgiven for not taking the threat of counteraction and critical partnership all that seriously when it is underpinned with an ever-increasing number of trade deals. Obviously, the issue of Taiwan is not the only worry in relation to what China will do next. The whole Indo-Pacific tilt, a major plank of the integrated review, will be affected by its actions in the coming decade.

What measures are being discussed to draw up serious sanctions against China on the part of not only the UK but, perhaps, all those democracies in the Indo-Pacific region, which would include the USA? Will our partners in the region be content to see international shipping disrupted by China, or islands in the South China Sea and land belonging to democratic nations bought up, bit by bit, to further China’s imperial vision? Will China’s belt and road initiatives interfere with free trade agreements with and beyond the region? Are nations stretching from New Zealand to the US prepared to co-ordinate robust action and, if so, is China aware of the consequences of its actions?

On Afghanistan, I have to thank the Minister for meeting some of us to hear our concerns. We were, and are, most grateful. It seems likely that the Taliban will, if not govern in the future, be a major part of any new Government. Current Taliban and other terrorist groups’ outrages in Afghanistan point to the future. Women’s rights and the education of girls appear to be the focus of their attacks. Some say that Afghanistan is not the country it was over 20 years ago, as people have gained a taste for democracy and hugely courageous women have taken up public office. Optimists argue that this will not be easily conceded but, as we know, Taliban violence knows few bounds and it has to be assumed that decades of human rights, education and entrepreneurial programmes could be destroyed within months. What key elements of Afghanistan’s eager embrace of democratic institutions in the last two decades will the UK Government, together with their partners, seek to maintain, and by what means? What do HMG think will be possible in a worst-case scenario and what plans do they have to set up emergency programmes, however minimal these might be?

A very large number of NGOs have worked tirelessly in Afghanistan to assist the democratic process. However, while many will fear to remain, some will. Some are already thinking of what programmes can be run without incurring the wrath of the Taliban: projects such as technical connectivity, online learning, the encouragement of homecrafts, local manufacturing and the like. Are Her Majesty’s Government fully aware of these possibilities and are they planning to fund such enterprises?

I am sure that Members of this House would welcome an update from the Minister on the progress of the Doha talks, with Pakistan’s involvement, and what contingency plans there might be if the talks fail. A return to civil war in Afghanistan may well follow the departure of US and UK troops. The battlefield will then be open to the Taliban and other non-democratic forces, which could destabilise not only Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours but the entire Indo-Pacific region.

The troop withdrawals are understandable but military resources must be rapidly replaced by financial resources—resources which are not subject to severe cuts. Nothing is ever as good as it promises to be, or as bad, but if sovereignty now stands alongside security and prosperity as core UK interests, the responsibly to promote and protect democracy in its many different forms comes with the territory.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th March 2021 Lords Chamber

I am very concerned about the signals in respect of human rights that are being sent by Clause 12. I am hugely persuaded, of course, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in his view that Clause 12 should have no place in this legislation.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak on this Bill for the first time in Committee. The Bill seems so far to have divided the House into at least two camps: those who oppose the Bill altogether and those who seek to amend it radically. I am of the latter camp. Amendment 26, to which I have attached my name, introduces yet another safeguard, one that upholds and supports the UK’s human rights obligations under the two main conventions on human rights. Briefly, as has been said time and again, the Government should not be further enabled to derogate significantly from these conventions in the absence of parliamentary approval.

The emptiness of this clause has already been addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I would support the removal of the clause altogether. In case that does not happen, however, Amendment 26 serves as an important safeguard and should prevail. The question of derogation in this context, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is somewhat contradictory. We all know that torture is a grave breach of the Geneva conventions, with corresponding obligations and sanctions, and, as we have learned, commission of the act of torture in any shape or form is a non-derogable offence.

By including this clause, the Government are acknowledging the extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights, something that they have hitherto declined to acknowledge. If the clause is included, there will be those who will welcome it precisely due to its support of the extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights. That said, its inclusion in its current form appears to go against the absolute prohibition on torture and is therefore a dangerous hostage to fortune and should not be in the Bill.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB) [V]]

My Lords, all that needs to be said about the Bill has already been said, and I will merely reiterate my main concerns in the interests of both my conscience and solidarity.

I welcome the Bill. It is long overdue and will greatly contribute, above all else, to improving morale in the Armed Forces. That said, there are many elements of it that were queried through amendments which were rejected in the other place but which would, I believe, have added clarity to the Bill and, more crucially, would have ensured that the UK remained within its obligations under several international treaties to which it is a state party.

Clearly, I am among many who have raised these issues. I refer to the clauses that allow certain war crimes to remain uncontested and unprosecuted due to an in-built statute of limitations. It appears that there are three specific issues of concern that not only contravene several conventions—the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the convention against torture—but leave survivors of torture without redress. Here, I might add, having worked with torture survivors for many years, that many of them yearn for a formal acknowledgment, in terms of a prosecution, of the wrongs that have been done to them so that they might begin their recovery.

There is a triple lock of presumption against prosecution, the requirement that prosecutions against torture can happen only in exceptional cases and the right of the Attorney-General to exercise a veto against prosecution. Taken together, these are in effect a decriminalisation of torture. Astonishingly, it is conceded in the Bill that sexual offences are never acceptable under any circumstances, the implication being that torture, by its omission, is acceptable.

The passing of the Bill into statute in its current form would undermine the UK’s long and good reputation for having championed legislation against war crimes and would negate its actions on the atrocities in Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The statute of limitations for prosecution is unrealistic, to say the least. Given that most investigations are nearly always very slow to start and often subject to many delays, the presumption of no prosecution will in fact apply to almost every case. It would be both counterproductive in providing a dubious precedent to other, less democratic states and embarrassing for UK officials to call for prosecution of war crimes at international forums on, say, Syria, Iraq or Myanmar, while denying victims in the UK the same legal freedoms. Those concerns will undoubtedly be addressed in later stages of the Bill.