Rules-based International Order

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for her comprehensive introduction to this important debate. I think many of us will be emphasising the many points that she made.

That there is a threat to the system of political, legal and economic rules which have governed international relations since the end of World War II is in no doubt. A new feudal order is emerging. The question becomes: should this, if not be accepted, at least remain unchallenged or should there be new international norms and treaties taking into account current realities such as environmental conditions, international commitments, and principles of national sovereignty and self-determination? If the latter, what might these new norms look like and who would draft them? Perhaps it is preferable to go for a middle way and focus on reforms to the existing order. The task is to salvage an international order that is now gravely weakened.

cthe last almost 80 years underpinned the principles of sovereignty, democracy and human rights. More recently, international rules have resulted in trade liberalisation through economic governance, the advent of a number of new peacekeeping missions, the International Criminal Court, as we have heard, and the insistence on women’s and LGBT rights. But there remains suspicion and departure from these accepted norms because they are perceived as imposing a system invented by liberal democracies for the benefit of western diplomatic, military and economic agendas.

These growing views of western manipulation have given rise to a gradual but quickening departure from these rules. Egregious examples abound. They include the distaste for multilateralism, with Trump—I nearly said “chump”—insisting on the unimpeded exercise of American power in pursuit of defined national interests; China’s preference for bilateral diplomatic transactions, together with a newfound assertiveness in the UN, as well as its unbending approach where its interests are threatened, an example of which is its refusal to abide by the court of arbitration decision concerning disputes with the Philippines over the South China Sea; and, of course, Russia’s subversion of international rules.

We have the continuing fragmentation of the system brought about by new centres of world power, increasing populist and nationalist pressures, new and empowered centres of political dissent, international crime and terror networks, and the rise of non-state actors, among other 21st-century developments. This democratic backsliding and the accompanying rise in authoritarianism threatens international peace and stability by undermining the democratic political process—for example, by using technology supply chains as a means of repression.

Last September, the United Nations adopted a resolution, a “pact for the future”, which called for a recommitment to international co-operation based on respect for international law and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. The actions pledged included sustainable development, peace and security, digital co-operation, and a focus on youth and future generations. Subsequent suggestions concerned amplifying these actions—for example, strengthening the International Criminal Court, establishing global conduct for outer space, further embracing soft power, trade policies that better protect human rights, and a recalibration of the “responsibility to protect” principle. At the same time, it was acknowledged that this was no easy task, assuming, as these actions do, a common standardised definition that would enjoy legitimacy, reward investment in co-operation, reconcile clashing interests and deter conflict.

Another major theme was the necessity of engaging with a far wider range of constituencies, from citizens and civil society to the private sector and even local political actors. Above all, there has been a consensus among reformers that preventive mechanisms are key. The UN enjoins states to facilitate more sustainable and robust frameworks for prevention, again working with local knowledge and skills, especially with NGOs.

This is a task that has scale and complexity. The responsibility to protect is a failing norm, codified by all UN member states in 2005 but too often seen by some states as intervention by the backdoor. The three main pillars of R2P are: the primary responsibility of the state to guarantee the safety and security of citizens; the responsibility of the international community to support states to implement this norm; and the responsibility of the international community to ensure protection of civilians where the state has failed to do so and when the state targets its own citizens.

It is not unfair to question the relevance of this principle in the face of ever-growing challenges. What strategies might work? Should R2P be recalibrated, defining more closely the second pillar to reflect the increasingly multifaceted nature of governance? Should the UN promote capacity building as its main plank, developing joint response mechanisms with regional organisations in collaboration with civil society organisations? Surely broadening the base of actors to provide evidence would help to embed R2P. It is encouraging to note that ASEAN is beginning to develop and integrate the R2P curriculum into its training courses for police and justice agencies. We cannot allow this crucial principle to die. Everyone with an interest in peace and security should be working to make it more agile, widespread and effective.

Finally, recent UK Foreign Secretaries have given support to a modernised rules-based international order that benefits everyone and holds to account those who infringe it. It has been pointed out that defending the rules-based order will require multi-pronged strategies. I hope that the UK Government will be closely involved in helping to achieve this.

China: Human Rights and Security

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 19th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I too thank my noble friend Lord Alton for never letting up on China. All of us are very grateful, and this being the last debate of this year is very fitting.

This House is becoming louder in its warnings about the threat that the People’s Republic of China poses to the UK’s security and economy. The actual and perceived threats help to shape UK foreign policy with regard to China, yet many commentators argue that the UK, despite some welcome announcements from the Government, still does not have a viable political strategy on China and therefore remains vulnerable to events as they occur. As so many have said, what is urgently needed is a clear statement of red lines with regard to PRC suppression of minorities and a policy incorporating concerns about and action on cyber and other attacks, and the aggressive threatening of international shipping lanes and trading relations in the event of severe tariffs imposed by the USA.

The question of Chinese technology and its inroads into the UK has been very ably covered by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, but I would like to underline that the PRC, as we know, is intent on achieving a world monopoly of electronic communications technology. As we have heard, cellular modules of the “internet of things” are crucial to almost all aspects of infrastructure, such as logistics, power grids, water supplies or the ability to paralyse financial payment systems.

Chinese companies currently own about 70% of the world market in cellular modules, as we have heard. Other countries struggle to compete with subsidised Chinese manufacture, which has a protected domestic market and seeks to gain a monopoly by means of supply of parts, favourable regulation, financing at competitive rates, access to key materials and products such as semiconductors at below cost. And let us not forget that the PRC is ever vigilant in taking over potentially failing companies around the world. The consequences of anything approaching a monopoly of PRC-supplied parts, and the access to data that this would facilitate, are severe, and would for example bring the UK defence forces to a standstill.

My predominant interest remains the democratic independence of Taiwan, a country of great strategic importance to China and expressly targeted by President Xi as ripe for integration with the mainland of China. This intention has been repeated too often to be ignored. Although expert opinion doubts that there is an imminent possibility of invasion, the so-called “grey attacks” are increasing in number and severity. Frequent military exercises are intended to disrupt and intimidate the Taiwanese, as are efforts to undermine Taiwan’s economy and democratic institutions.

Taiwan, as we all know, is the world’s largest producer of superior semiconductors. Despite competition from China and the USA to build semiconductor facilities, the technological skills and environment required are considerable and unlikely to surpass Taiwanese production rates. Although this is a great strength for Taiwan, it is also a liability, making integration with China all the more desirable for the PRC. Any interruption to the supply of raw materials, clean water or labour would have an immediate effect on production and compromise the global market for consumer electronics, currently valued at $1 trillion. The top 20 clients of the semiconductor manufacturing companies are worth in excess of $7 trillion.

Why does Taiwan’s continued existence as a separate entity matter? Apart from the democratic view that freedom is preferable to repression, the possibility of a China-controlled region encompassing international shipping lanes is ominous. China is intent not only on returning to an imperial grandness but on surpassing the USA as the world’s dominant political and economic force. The ability to control world shipping trade would represent a major step towards its grand plan.

The Government have committed to a thorough audit of PRC efforts to destabilise UK defence and security, which is eagerly awaited. Meanwhile, several suggestions for further protection have been put forward by China experts. These include ensuring that the FCDO maintains Mandarin-speaking specialists on China, and establishing a China-focused expert committee, preferably at Cabinet level, with a range of Ministers, particularly in the technological field, to monitor relations with the PRC. Such a committee would assess the national security risks offered by imported technology; arrive at a clear definition of national security for all government departments; set out priorities for defending critical national infrastructure; build up lists of trusted suppliers of electronic modules and chips, and other electronic manufacturers; and identify opportunities to work with international partners and allies to counter Chinese imperialism.

I suggest that our thinking and actions on China should not be dictated by the PRC. With the PRC’s largest military build-up since the end of the Second World War, deepening relations with Russia and increasing incursions into Taiwan and surrounding territories, it is clear that China is laying the ground for future domination beyond the south and south-east Asian regions. We ignore this at our peril.

Taipei Representative Office in the United Kingdom

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness D'Souza]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they plan to review the status of the Taipei Representative Office in the United Kingdom.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, the UK’s long-standing position on Taiwan has not changed. The UK does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan but does have a strong unofficial relationship based on deep and growing ties in a range of areas, underpinned by shared democratic values. The Taipei Representative Office works in the UK in the absence of those diplomatic relations. The UK does not have plans to review the status of the TRO but continues to work constructively with it in pursuit of our shared interests and within the parameters of our long-standing position.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

I thank the Minister for her Answer, and I acknowledge that this is a difficult area. However, the London Taipei office is not invited to or included in any diplomatic events; does not receive protection from the police protection unit; is not exempt from council tax or business rates; cannot open a bank account with any British bank; and cannot secure meetings with Ministers or FCDO officials beyond director level, among many other restrictions. I wonder whether the Minister will say whether she feels that this is adequate support for a thriving but threatened democracy.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, whenever I am asked about my feelings on these issues, I know that it is probably wise to choose my words incredibly carefully. To reiterate: the Government do not have any plans to change the current long-standing position, but we have deep ties with Taiwan through various means, as do our Parliaments. Much as I hear and understand the noble Baroness’s concerns about the current situation, at present the Government do not plan to change it.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and International Committee of the Red Cross (Status) Bill [HL]

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 8th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

With trepidation, I ask whether now is the moment for a speech. I believe it is.

As I said during Second Reading in July, this is an important Bill which provides two significant organisations with a long-awaited change in their legal status. I again pay tribute to noble Lords across all sides of the House, including the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, for his continued support and dedication in seeing this Bill through. The Bill has received unwavering support in both this parliamentary Session and the last, demonstrated by the fact that no amendments were tabled ahead of Committee in September. This is a true testament to the value that all noble Lords place on the aims of this Bill.

It is critical that both the CPA and the ICRC are given the correct status in UK legislation so that they can conduct their work and deliver their objectives while operating in the UK. This will guarantee that the CPA remains headquartered in the UK, and that the UK is able to give the ICRC the guarantee that the information it shares with the UK Government is secure and protected.

The UK is deeply committed to the Commonwealth and believes that the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting which commences in Samoa later this month will be an important opportunity to mobilise action on shared interests, including upholding Commonwealth values—values which are embodied by the CPA’s important work in strengthening inclusive and accountable democracy across the Commonwealth. The UK’s long-standing programme partnership with the CPA is testament to the organisation’s value. Treating the CPA as an international organisation will allow it to continue to operate fully across the Commonwealth and international fora, and to participate fully in areas where it is currently restricted, including signing up to international statements and communiques.

The ICRC is an essential partner for achieving the UK’s global humanitarian objectives. It has a unique mandate from states to uphold the Geneva conventions and works globally to promote international humanitarian law. It has a unique legitimacy to engage all parties to conflicts, and has unparalleled access to vulnerable groups in conflict situations. The ICRC is frequently the only international agency operating at scale in many conflicts. It is therefore critical to enable it to operate in the UK in accordance with its international mandate, maintaining its strict adherence to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and its working method of confidentiality.

Officials will work closely with the CPA and the ICRC to agree written arrangements, setting out the parameters of the status change as well as the privileges and immunities which the Government have decided to confer on both organisations. These arrangements will then be implemented by secondary legislation. Privileges and immunities will be based on functional need, and other facilities and the relevant exemptions and limitations will be specified in the Order in Council. Once again I assure noble Lords that any Order in Council made under Clauses 1 and 2 will be subject to the draft affirmative parliamentary procedure. This means that both Houses will get the opportunity to debate and approve them.

I thank all noble Lords for their continued support and useful contributions throughout the passage of this Bill. Like many others, I look forward to seeing it progress in the other place, where I am sure it will receive the same unanimous support. Finally, I pay tribute to the FCDO policy officials and lawyers, whose efforts in both this parliamentary Session and under the previous Government have contributed to making the Bill happen. I also extend my gratitude to the drafters in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel for preparing the Bill.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I add my thanks to the Government for their speedy and decisive actions, without which the Bill may have lingered for a little too long. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting is coming up shortly, and it will be a great pleasure for those involved to announce the acceptance of the Bill. Had it not been accepted, there would have been some rather serious threats to the position of both the ICRC and the CPA within the UK. So my thanks are due.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and International Committee of the Red Cross (Status) Bill [HL]

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I too welcome the noble Baroness to her ministerial post and look forward to working with her.

This Bill has been very thoroughly washed, first in the other place, where it received an unopposed Second Reading due to the sterling efforts of many people, including the right honourable Maria Miller and Ian Liddell-Grainger—both no longer Members of the other place—the secretary-general of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Stephen Twigg; the senior staff of the ICRC and many more, over many years, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, has said.

The Bill was also unopposed and supported in this House before it fell due to Prorogation. I had thought that there would be a bit of a tussle to ensure that it got through the ballot of Private Members’ Bills, but, as a generous and hugely welcome gesture, the Government have made it their own business—we are all truly grateful.

As many will remember, and as has been said already, the Bill essentially grants international status to both the CPA and the ICRC, enabling both bodies to benefit from the immunities and privileges of all other international bodies. These include, as we have already heard, the power, by Order in Council, to confer legal capacities of a body corporate on the CPA and ICRC; to grant the organisations, their information and staff certain privileges and immunities commensurate with their functional needs; to provide that references to international organisations in general legislation include, from now on, references to the CPA and ICRC; and to allow for certain confidential information that the ICRC shares with the UK Government to be exempted from legal disclosure requirements.

At the Bill’s Second Reading in this House before Dissolution, some useful suggestions—and indeed amendments passed in the other place— were put forward as to the bespoke enabling powers. As I understand it, these will be incorporated, where relevant, into separate written agreements that each organisation will agree with the Government.

There has been some urgency to the Bill and its unnecessarily long journey. The CPA governing body at two previous annual conferences determined that, should international status not be reached, there would be, as we have heard, serious efforts to move the headquarters to a member state that would be more sympathetic to the immunities and privileges already outlined. These privileges and immunities are—as we have learned, but which I wish to emphasise—absolutely crucial for the ICRC if it is to continue its UK operations in accordance with its international mandate. Speedy passing of this small and uncontroversial Bill will be a win-win. I look forward to seeing it on the statute book.