Baroness Drake
Main Page: Baroness Drake (Labour - Life peer)Consumer Rights Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts
Baroness Drake
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 63AB I shall also speak to Amendment 63AC. The Government seek to ensure that markets function well by increasing the range of measures available to enforcers under the civil law enforcement regime, which is an initiative to be welcomed. Of course, good business needs safeguards as to how these powers will be used, and Schedule 7 sets out the conditions that enforcement bodies have to meet. However, if those safeguards are so extensive that they act as a deterrent to private enforcement bodies to use the enhanced enforcement measures, much of the value of the new powers will be lost.
Subsections (9) and (10) of proposed new Section 219C, which my amendment would delete, in Schedule 7, set a requirement that a private enforcement body, taking enforcement action, must act consistently with any advice or guidance that the relevant trading standards primary authority has given. Of course private enforcers should consult public enforcement bodies and take into account their views—that is not disputed—but in practice the unintended consequences of proposed new subsections (9) and (10) could mean that a private enforcer would be prevented or deterred from taking civil action that is inconsistent with advice that had been received by the defendant company from its primary authority. This greatly increases the risks involved in taking civil action, particularly on exposure to costs, and makes it much less likely that private enforcers will use the enhanced consumer measures.
If the defendant can satisfy the court that the private enforcer is acting inconsistently with primary authority guidance, the enforcer will automatically lose the action and be liable to pay the defendant’s legal costs. It will be simply irrelevant that the action would otherwise be correct as a matter of law and/or have considerable merit. This exposure to costs in these circumstances will act as a deterrent. No doubt the Government will argue that private enforcers can mitigate that risk by consulting the primary authority in advance of any action. However, that is easier said than done. For example, the primary authority may not have accurate records of all the advice and guidance that it has provided. It may be formal advice, written, oral, or the records may not be reliable. This may be particularly true in respect of any so-called informal assistance or oral advice. When the primary authority has changed, when a company switches authorities or when a company merges or is acquired, the relevant records may be confusing, imprecise or not readily identify all relevant guidance. The private enforcer may proceed in good faith on the basis that there is no advice, but if then later during proceedings information about advice comes to light, the case may be thrown out, whatever its merits, and costs awarded.
The claim may not align precisely with the scope of the subject matter covered by the advice from the primary authority. That may lead to legal arguments as to whether the private enforcer’s case is inconsistent with the authority’s guidance or whether it is elaborating on that guidance, thereby making its action permissible under Schedule 7. Win or lose, the private enforcer’s costs will go up. The court may give a very broad interpretation to the advice that a defendant company receives from the primary authority. This may be particularly so if the records of the authority are imprecise or inadequate. In such a situation, the private enforcer would lose the action and be exposed to costs, even if its arguments on consumer detriment had considerable merit. If a private enforcer seeks to identify such potential inconsistencies in pre-action discussions, the uncertainties created by the proposed safeguard as drafted may still deter it and inhibit effective consumer protection, which these extended civil powers were intended to provide.
If private enforcers are prevented or deterred from taking action that is seen as inconsistent with the advice given to a defendant company by its primary authority, this places a huge burden on that authority to get its advice, and the record of its advice, right. Why? Because it creates what I term a double lock: locking private enforcers out of taking action against the company but locking them into the advice already given. Yet the primary authority may not fully appreciate the implications of a company’s commercial practice over time, and it may not be apparent how a trading standards official could have reasonably reached the view that informed the guidance given to a company. Given that companies can take comfort from and rely heavily on assurances received from trading standards, and given the absolute protection afforded companies by the proposed safeguard, they would have a very strong incentive to argue for the broadest application of any primary authority guidance in their favour, so ensuring that the primary authority advice acts as a deterrent to the private enforcers actually using their civil powers. In her reply, could the Minister explain a little more about how the trading standards bodies will operate in the new civil enforcement regime, particularly given my understanding that the primary authority will be largely focused on criminal activity?
I believe that the safeguards in proposed new Section 219C(9) and (10) are unnecessary. Under the Enterprise Act 2002, private enforcers are already required to consult the Competition and Markets Authority before taking enforcement action, to ensure that their proposed action is neither duplicative nor detrimental to action being taken by others. Furthermore, if the Regulators’ Code is applicable to private enforcement bodies, as is intended under the Bill, any enforcement policy that a private enforcer develops under the code will include a requirement for it to consult other enforcement bodies—most notably the relevant primary authority—prior to taking enforcement action. This amendment would not prevent a private enforcer’s action from failing if the court is persuaded that it is inconsistent with previous advice from trading standards, but it would remove an automatic ruling against the private enforcer on such grounds and the exposure to consequential costs.
As drafted, proposed new subsections (9) and (10) pose a real risk that private enforcement bodies will be deterred from using the extended range of civil measures available to them because of the level of exposure to the risk of costs that the drafting of the schedule on safeguards gives rise to. My amendments on private enforcers, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Best, on public enforcers, raise real issues as to whether these civil enforcement powers are usable, or will indeed be used in practice, because of the way in which they will operate. Given the long lead-in to these civil enforcement powers being implemented, it would be helpful if the Minister, in her reply, could elaborate on the timetable for extending these powers to both public and private enforcers.
Amendment 63AB is a probing amendment to try to clarify how appropriately the Regulators’ Code will be applied to private enforcement bodies. Schedule 7 would make any use of the enhanced consumer measures by a private enforcer a relevant regulatory activity covered by the code. I understand that any regulator or enforcer needs to have an enforcement policy governing its enforcement activities, and that policy must adhere to the principles of the code. However, I am also aware that under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, the duties on any person exercising a relevant function are pretty extensive.
The code was introduced to govern the relationship between business and full-time regulators. It will now apply to private enforcers such as Which?—for whom the majority of its activity is not of a regulated nature, but rather involves campaigning, researching, and all the other things that we are all aware that it does. The issue here is that there is a rationale for the application of the code as regards the exercise of a private enforcer’s statutory functions, but it would not be at all desirable if the application of that code was then extended to enable the wider activities of the private enforcer to be challenged. To use Which? again as an example, if it were to name a poor-performing company in its magazine research, how could the Government give reassurances that this Bill will not allow the code to be used to challenge the publication of the findings of such research?
The language of the code is not always appropriate for private enforcers, and some duties are not limited to regulatory activity—for example, the general duty to support economic growth. I cannot believe that the Government are arguing that one can give a private consumer campaigning body a general duty to support economic growth. If one did, how would one interpret it? If a private enforcer took action against a company, the consequence of which was to reduce the company’s business, would it have failed in its duty or would it have supported economic growth because it had contributed to securing more functional markets? It would be helpful if the Minister could give assurances on how the code will apply in practice to private enforcement bodies.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 63B in this group is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Best, and of myself, and I will speak mostly to that amendment.
Amendment 63B is key to the implementation of many of the powers that we much welcome in the Bill. The problem is that without this amendment, trading standards will think twice—or three or four times—before using the Government’s suggested route of taking civil rather than criminal action following infringements. At present, where criminal action is taken—which of course does not allow for redress for consumers—trading standards does not risk having to pay defence costs. However, should it use the new civil enforcement measures, which we welcome, it would then risk expensive legal costs, which will automatically make local authorities very risk averse. Indeed, a large case could cost as much as £250,000, which is a massive chunk of the annual budget of many local authorities’ trading standards services.
Trading standards, of course, have always had the option of injunctions, but that only puts an end to whatever sharp practice was going on—it neither penalises the trader nor compensates the customer. We therefore support the advances in the Bill, because they take that further. However, without this amendment, we fear that the risk of cost—as it would be a civil action—will undermine the new, enhanced measures in the Bill. If the Government prefer these to the criminal route, which is what we understand, they will have to reduce the disincentive which this threat of civil costs poses.
We realise that it is possible to apply to the courts for a protective costs order to limit the exposure if the case has been brought forward by a trading standards officer in the public interest. However, that is a pretty rarefied procedure, and it is much more likely that, in those circumstances, the case will be taken through the criminal courts—of course at considerable expense to the taxpayer—or else it may not be pursued at all.
Which? has strongly supported Amendment 63B, as has the Trading Standards Institute. I know that Which? wrote to the Minister in August—I think that it was to the Minister in this House but it could have been to the Minister in the other place—saying that the Bill should be amended to limit significantly the risk that enforcers taking action under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 would be liable for the defendant’s legal costs in the event that the action was unsuccessful. It is felt by them and by us that they should be liable only where the enforcer has acted unreasonably. Therefore, Which? feels that this amendment will be key to ensuring that the enhanced consumer measures are used in the way that the Bill intends. It is particularly important for trading standards, which will have to get a lot of sign-off from many committees before it takes civil action, and those requirements will be much higher with that risk of paying the defendant company’s costs, which has not been before it when it has taken criminal action.
Baroness Jolly
I have been advised that the criminal system and the civil system are significantly different. Probably the easiest thing to do would be to write to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hayter for her remarks and the Minister for her responses. Perhaps I may deal first with some of the issues that have been raised in those responses. Reference was made to private enforcers having access to the primary authority’s advice, but the issue is that the Bill refers to all advice or guidance given by the primary authority. That is very broad and the parameters are not defined. I cannot ascertain from the Minister’s response the position as regards what happens when the advice is incomplete, what is the status of the advice in terms of whether it has to be formally documented, and the quality of the advice. It is a question of understanding. Will there be a definition of “primary authority advice” that is designed and designated to be fit for purpose as a consequence of the Bill? At the moment there is a great deal of ambiguity around what comes under the phrase “advice or guidance”, what will be “fit for purpose” and what will entail “records”, because these are pretty broad in the Bill and going against them would be pretty wide in its impact. There is still a lack of clarity around that point.
Given that extending these civil powers to private enforcers will not come about until the Government have satisfied themselves on how the civil powers for the public enforcers bed in, it would have been helpful to have been given greater clarity on the timetable. While something is desirable, if it is very far away, one must begin to question its desirability. It would be helpful if the noble Baroness felt able to elaborate a little more on this, at least in writing.
I turn to the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Best, and the arguments deployed by my noble friend Lady Hayter. Of course they are reflective in some ways, although not in all, of the concern about the problems public enforcers will face, as well as private enforcers, in that exposure to costs under the terms of these safeguards will make them reluctant to use their civil powers. There is a question around whether the deterrent effect can be reinforced using the restricted resources that we know trading standards will face. Equally, private enforcement bodies have limited resources so they cannot willy-nilly avoid the consequences of what is in the Bill. Yet we all know that consumer bodies make a significant contribution to consumer protection by challenging dysfunctional markets. The Government must have accepted that because they put these provisions in the Bill in the first place. However, if the safeguards become such a disincentive, and the implementation of these powers is so far into the future, one begins to question the progress that the Bill offers in extending the civil powers measures.
Finally, on the point about exposure to costs, I conceded in speaking to my amendment that nothing in it would prevent a court from, as now, deciding that a private enforcer’s action should fail because it was inconsistent with previous advice and that exposure to costs would remain. My amendment would remove the automaticity of a case failing and exposure to costs existing because something, for whatever reason, was inconsistent with advice given when, as I said earlier, I have no sense of the nature of the primary advice as it will be defined for the purposes of the schedule in the Bill.
I have rehearsed my points. If the noble Baroness can elaborate further in writing, certainly on the timetable, it would be helpful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I rise briefly to support Amendment 105B, and perhaps I may tender some advice to the Minister. I suspect that this is one of those issues that, were it to be put to a vote in the House at Report stage, it would not be a happy moment for the Government, who would oppose it. However, I am sure that the Minister supports the objectives here.
We are all clear about how wrong it is for companies to be targeting advertising material at children and to rely on pester power to deliver what they want. My reason for speaking is because I agree with everything that has been said in this debate bar about two sentences. Those two sentences were spoken by my noble friend Lord Mitchell. Although he did not mean it, he gave the impression that somehow the cuddly illegal money lender, the loan shark operating in the pub who threatens to kneecap you if you do not pay up, is somehow preferable. I do not regard the payday loans companies as necessarily preferable, but we have to be conscious that one of the consequences of tightening up on the payday loan market will be that more people will seek recourse to illegal money lenders.
I chair the National Trading Standards Board, and one of the things we fund is the Illegal Money Lending Team for England and the Illegal Money Lending Team for Wales. Those teams are only scratching the surface of the problems that exist around illegal money lenders. They are very nasty individuals who are quite happy to squeeze money out of individuals in perhaps the same way as these corporate entities do—except that they do so using violence and all sorts of intimidation. Some of the cases that have been pursued by the illegal money lending teams are horrifying. Illegal money lenders use their power and strength to intimidate vulnerable people and families, including rape of the women concerned, beatings and other attacks. These are organised criminals who sometimes operate in small groups and sometimes as part of bigger networks. We have to be extremely cautious. When the Government accept these amendments or something similar to them either now or at the Report stage, I hope that they will look at what else needs to be done to protect the public from illegal operators as opposed to the legal ones we are talking about in this group of amendments.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I support all of the amendments in the group, but I want particularly to speak to Amendment 105P. The mere existence of the payday loans, high-cost consumer credit market is to me a consumer detriment, particularly for vulnerable consumers who access it, but of course that is not an issue which is up for debate under these amendments. The FCA remit is to regulate markets, not to outlaw or to ban these companies. Only the Government can drive the policy needed to secure for not-for-profit affordable lenders sufficient capital liquidity to provide an alternative source of credit. Amendment 105P seeks to address the issue, because notwithstanding the regulation of payday lenders, the need for affordable credit still remains for a particularly vulnerable group of people. As I say, only the Government can drive the policy to address this issue. In the mean time, given that the payday loan market exists, the demand side has certain key characteristics with which we are all familiar. A high proportion of borrowers experience financial distress. Many will come from less well-off socioeconomic groups and will have few assets. A significant number of borrowers will have two or more loans, exposing them to unsustainable and spiralling debt.
Many borrowers get payday loans to cover basic needs, including the needs of their children, yet many are in acute repayment difficulties. According to the CMA, more than one-third of loans were not repaid on time or at all, often bringing considerable consumer harm relative to the amounts that were borrowed in the first instance. That is a demographic crying out for intrusion by the Government to create a sustainable market for affordable credit, as these people will still be vulnerable to the need for that credit. Amendment 105P turns its attention to the fact that the standing need for affordable credit for this vulnerable demographic has to be addressed by the Government.
Amendment 105P also captures the argument that the introduction of a broader levy funding base should not be a lost opportunity to significantly expand the availability of a free debt advice service. That is a compelling argument. By comparison, the new pension freedoms and choice agenda due in April 2015 comes with a guaranteed guidance service on the assumption—quite rightly—that the position of pension savers and consumers in the marketplace will be more vulnerable to poor decision-making without such guaranteed guidance. A levy is being raised from among the relevant providers of financial services which is to be dedicated to funding that guaranteed guidance.
No doubt the argument will be made that significant numbers who would benefit do not seek debt advice and that the allocation of funding to a debt advice service has to be proportionate to the demand for such guidance. My response to that is to say that the Government should take the lead in stimulating or creating the demand and the take-up for that debt advice service. I am sure that the proposed pension guarantee guidance would not be deemed a great policy success if few people took advantage of it—even more so with vulnerable people exposed to unsustainable debt and high-cost consumer credit, missing the opportunity to expand the availability and the take-up of a free debt advice service would not be a policy success. Amendment 105 in particular says that we are dealing with a particular manifestation of the need for credit. However, even in addressing the payday loan companies, the systemic problem will still need to be solved: how people can get access to affordable credit and how they can get access to and use a free debt advice service.
I should perhaps declare an interest in that I am a member of the TPAS board which is currently involved in delivering the pension guidance guarantee. Hopefully, that will not detract from the merits of my argument.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest as the retiring chair of StepChange, the leading debt advice and solutions charity, which has already been mentioned this evening.
This has become a rather wide group of rather disparate amendments, and I worry that some of the important points that need to be made in this area might get lost. As well as dealing with the very important issues about the impact on children of payday loan advertising, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter propose measures, as we have just heard from my noble friend Lady Drake, to ensure a further clearing up of the payday lending sector as a whole. There are other amendments still to come which deal with elements that go together as part of this overall policy.
This is rather a dense set of amendments, and I apologise in advance for spending some time on the two amendments to which my name is attached, Amendments 105P and 105Q, but I think they are important. However, I do not want to lose the very good speeches that we have already heard. Somebody asked what the state of play is now in childhood. My noble friend Lady Crawley said that we have to think quite inventively about how the language of children’s protection needs to be modernised when we are dealing with issues such as advertising more generally. Even to talk about restricting adverts in a system which is 50 years old—the watershed—is to ignore the complete change in viewing habits that we are currently living through, with people watching individual programmes in a variety of different information-gathering machines, such as tablets and iPads.