Equality (Titles) Bill [HL]

Baroness Deech Excerpts

Friday 6th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trefgarne]

I have some doubts about the proposal being brought forward by my noble friend. I am anxious, of course, that the peerages and baronetcies of Ireland should all be treated fairly and equally if we possibly can, but the fact is, as my noble friend said, that these matters are of extraordinary complexity. We have already dealt with the problems being faced by my noble friend Lord Shrewsbury. My noble friend Lord Caithness described the problems being faced by the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty. What are we to do about this? At the very least, if we agree some of these amendments, we risk making the Bill a hybrid Bill. Noble Lords smile at that, but the fact is that a hybrid Bill is a very different animal from the one we are considering today. It needs Select Committees, learned counsel and all sorts of distinguished things that take a great deal of time and, no doubt, a great deal of money. My noble friend’s amendment takes us along that rather dangerous path, and I invite him to reconsider it.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, although I am no expert on the hereditary peerage, I entered into a correspondence with the Ministry of Justice—in fact with the Crown Office—on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, told the House at the end of Second Reading that my specific point about husbands—and, indeed, the whole Bill—is a matter for the royal prerogative. According to the Crown Office’s letter, hereditary peerages are a matter of property.

It therefore seems to me to be very simple. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, we may not discriminate on grounds of property. Article 14 says that there shall be no discrimination on, inter alia, grounds of status; it is absolutely straightforward. If hereditary titles are property, we simply cannot discriminate. Under own Equality Acts—we have not yet got to those amendments—we cannot attach conditions to women that we do not attach to men, and vice versa.

The whole Bill therefore boils down to the fact that where there is a title, which is property, there must be equality—no “ifs” or “buts”, no petitions, no waiting for this, no waiting for that. Where people have a title which attaches only to one sex and not to the other, it is against our equality law.

Our only hope of getting this legislation through the House of Commons is to have a straightforward, simple Bill that applies the principles, which we cannot avoid, of the European Convention on Human Rights and our own equality law. We should strip away all the carbuncles and just get down to what has to be done under our law.

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, there is a problem with the noble Baroness’s proposition that a hereditary title is property. There is more than one respectable view on that, as I understand it, so it may or may not be property. Another way forward, of course, would be to seek some sort of derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to hereditary Peerages. The Spanish Government are faced with the same problem. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister has some information about how the Spanish Government are responding to this difficulty. They recently created a new hereditary marquis in Spain who turned out to be the coach of the football team. However, they then lost so he may be stripped of it after all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Deech]

On a point of order: according to the Crown office—and it should know—it is written in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 5th edition, Volume 79, paragraph 808:

“A peerage is an incorporeal and impartible hereditament, inalienable …”

It is real property akin to land. Of course, even if the Royal Prerogative enters into this, I think it is a lawyer’s point that a parliament can change or nibble away at or remove parts of the Royal Prerogative, so I hope that will not stand in the way.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. I recognise her legal expertise in this area. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, that I have not entirely followed the Spanish Government’s debates, and I am sure he could also inform us on the Dutch, Belgian, Italian and Swedish debates on what happens on titles. I can recall a most wonderful evening in Rome, talking to Italian liberals—a nearly endangered species—hosted by a wonderful woman called La Contesssa Machiavelli. This was not at all the content I had in my mind at all. If we are going to make comparisons on titles, there are a lot more: I am not sure whether Andorra—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, some while ago, I was chairman of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Little did I think that that post would have any bearing on today’s debate. Without going into the detail, there is no doubt that modern law, including the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of a couple of years ago, leads us to the situation that children, however they are conceived, enjoy the same rights as those conceived in the natural fashion. In fact, I think that the amendment goes further than is absolutely necessary—it may be a storm in a teacup—because if the child has the gametes of both parents, it is their child. However, the law says that a child born to a surrogate mother is actually the child of the surrogate mother. The law treats the baby as the child of the mother from whose body it emerged. This amendment would achieve something, but if we are ever going to get a general statement of principle from the Government or elsewhere, it will have to be along the lines that the use of in vitro fertilisation techniques, as in other walks of life, will make no difference to succession to titles.

[Lord Jopling]

The noble Baroness may recall that I was heavily involved in the 1990 Act following a constituency case, which I mentioned earlier. The law was changed so that in the case of a surrogacy the genetic mother could get an order from the High Court that she be deemed to be the full mother, not the surrogate mother. In this case, no doubt, the same procedure would have to be followed, as in the High Court ruling. At that stage, the genetic mother would be fully the mother.