Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Carberry of Muswell Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Carberry of Muswell Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I focus particularly on Amendments 83 and 84, which purport to deal with a hypothetical “banter ban”. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Young, said about these amendments because I have been struggling to understand why they are thought necessary. I regret to say, with the greatest respect, that I am still none the wiser.

The wording in those two amendments does not need to be included in the Bill because most overheard conversations that someone who hears might not like would already fail the test of unlawful harassment in the Equality Act 2010. Most overheard conversations would not fall under the definition of harassment in Section 26 of that Act. That would include the example given by the noble Lord of a blind person at a football match. To be caught by the definition, something an employee hears at work and finds objectionable or offensive would need to be relevant to a protected characteristic and would also need to have

“the purpose or effect of … violating”

the person’s

“dignity, or … creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.

If this were put to the test, it would not just be about the employee’s subjective perception. If a case like this ever ended up in court, which is highly unlikely, the court would also have to take into account all the circumstances and would need to decide whether it was reasonable for the overheard conversation to have had the effect of violating dignity or creating a

“hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.

In other words, the subjective is balanced against the objective, and context will always be crucial.

The average everyday chat in the pub or elsewhere would not pass these tests, however much someone dislikes what they hear, so the Bill would not require employers to take steps to prevent conversational expressions of opinion on, in the words of the amendment,

“a political, moral, religious or social matter”.

Of course, in some circumstances, third parties do abuse and harass employees. It happens with depressing regularity, notably in hospitality, which the noble Lord seeks to exclude from the Bill altogether. It can happen when abuse is obviously directed at an employee by way of a pretended or fake conversation that is obviously expressly designed to be overheard and to offend. That is the whole point of this clause. Instances of obvious direct harassment and abuse of employees by third parties would, rightly, be protected by the Bill under current definitions.

It is important to note that steps to prevent this would not place an onerous burden on employers. As my noble friend the Minister said in her introduction, regulations will set out steps that employers should take, but many employers already take relevant steps to prevent this sort of offensive behaviour. For example, your Lordships will be very familiar with signs on public transport or in healthcare settings warning that abuse of staff will not be tolerated. That is very familiar to all of us.

The broader point here is that the Bill’s purpose is to require employers to take all reasonable steps to prevent their staff being harassed and abused by customers or members of the public. It is not about preventing or regulating private conversations or restricting free expression. I suggest that Amendments 83 and 84 would not add anything and are not needed.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the whole of Clause 20 should not stand part and should be dropped from the Bill. The amendments that I have put my name to are mitigating, in case this very dangerous clause is not dropped, but I remain hopeful that the Government will realise—despite what the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, just argued—that this clause will, no doubt unintentionally, be not only bad for business and a range of public-facing institutions but detrimental to workers.

I appreciate that the Government are seeking to reassure and dampen down the public unease about this clause with their suggestions that campaigners are hyping up the threat that it could pose to free speech, but I have yet to hear a convincing positive argument for why legislation is being used to create this sweeping new duty that will significantly expand all employers’ liability for third-party harassment of their employees. It is unclear why, if any employee has evidence of harassment as just described, they do not call the police. Should this not be left for criminal law to deal with, rather than extending employment law?

This clause puts the onus on employers to plan for, prevent and police alleged problematic interactions—a task they are simply not qualified to do, and indeed should have no right to do. This clause amends the Equality Act by reinstating liability for harassment of employees by third parties. As we know, that was in the original 2010 Act, but, when the then coalition Government consulted on the matter, there was such negative feedback that it was kicked out in 2013. Why has it now reappeared, with no consultation?

Moreover, this new duty is considerably more onerous. For example, there are no exemptions. One of the amendments that I have put my name to tries to at least carve out especially vulnerable sectors. As we have heard, employers would be liable for any single act of harassment by a third party. In the previous iteration, employers would have been liable only if the employee was harassed for a third time. Again, an amendment has been tabled to remedy this. To date, the Government have not presented any evidence that would justify ignoring the reasons why the original liability was rebutted, so what has changed that demands it?

Superficially, protecting employees from harassment sounds fair enough to all of us, but a lot hinges on what we consider harassment to mean. First, one confusion to clarify is that the content of this clause is sometimes bundled together with the issue of sexual harassment, giving it a moral force that is not merited. To be clear—as others have been—Clause 20 covers liability for third-party non-sexual harassment.

There is then the common-sense notion of harassment in people’s minds. This is understandable but misplaced. Lord Sumption, in Hayes v Willoughby in 2013, said of harassment that it is

“an ordinary English word with a well understood meaning”,

going on to describe it as

“a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm fear or distress”.

If only that was the definition. Unfortunately, Lord Sumption’s wise thought that harassment has a well understood meaning is not true in the 2025 era of lawfare.

Section 26 of the Equality Act defines harassment as

“unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic”.

The EHRC guidance sets out that this can include “spoken words”, “banter”, “jokes”, “written words”, “imagery”, “physical gestures”, “facial expressions” and “posts on social media”. That is a very broad catch-all list of forms of harassment that employers will now have to protect their employees from when encountering third parties.

Harassment under the Equality Act includes indirect harassment. I cannot see any way for an employer to seek to comply with this when they will be compelled to take all reasonable steps to prevent their staff encountering, or even overhearing, those conversations, jokes and remarks that they might find upsetting in view of their protected characteristics. Harassment cases taken to employment tribunals increasingly concern conduct having the effect of harassment, rather than behaviour intended to have that effect. The motives or intentions of the third party are irrelevant.

I have noticed that, in response to previous speeches raising concerns about this clause, the Government have argued that it will not be enough for the claimant simply to claim that someone’s conduct is offensive, and that there will be an objective test in which the reasonableness and facts of the individual situation will always be considered. But in every iteration of harassment—in law; in codes of conduct, including our own, here in the Lords; and, for example, in all elements of the regulation of hate speech—a key factor is the perception of the claimant. That is unduly subjective—something I have raised as a problem on numerous occasions, only to be told by Government Ministers that victims’ feelings are a core component. I would be more than happy if the Government were proposing amending equality law to tighten this up and narrow down indirect harassment, but, in the present circumstances, Clause 20 is a minefield and opens the door to egregious and boundless litigation across the board.

I want to consider who these third parties are. Maybe in the Government’s mind they are lairy, drunken, rich businessmen shouting abuse, or some mythical, anti-social, boorish bigots roaming around public-facing establishments hunting down hard-pressed staff to harass. In reality, who is it who goes to the football or the rugby and may fall foul of the law, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, illustrated? It is other workers who relax on their days off by supporting their sports clubs, and who do not mince their words while doing so.

Who do the Government think frequents pubs? These third parties could well include workmates who go for a pint after a long shift and may want to let off steam by moaning about their bosses, only for a member of the bar staff to take their lively views personally and feel harassed. They could be a group of care workers, gossiping away as they get their nails done and discussing the local grooming gang scandal, to which someone who works at the beauty salon takes offence. What about a bunch of apprentices on a night out at a comedy gig who join the heckling banter and perhaps shout something that a staff member or steward says insults their protected characteristic? What about the ex-police officer reading a Brexity book in the cafe and chatting to a staff member about it, and so on?

In other words, beyond some abstract legalese, third parties in the flesh are fellow workers trying to spend their private time unassailed by undue, back-door state regulation of their speech and leisure.

I note that, in universities, third parties are not just external speakers but students, who are now considered consumers and customers. Already, without this clause, there is a growing phenomenon of university management imposing rigorous speech codes on the student body in the form of anti-harassment policies under the guise of dignity at work and study policies. Many of us who are campaigners for free speech, such as those at the Free Speech Union, or my colleagues at the Academy of Ideas and Living Freedom, are working with students to roll back these policies that are a serious threat to academic freedom. Clause 20 would not only justify such censorious policing of students’ speech but would, in effect, necessitate it, as it would be remiss of any university not to take steps to minimise the liability risk of students offending academic staff and making them feel unsafe and complain of harassment.

Finally, I am concerned about the disproportionate effect that this will have on groups in society who hold dissenting views, expressions of which are too easily and regularly misrepresented as harassment. Surely any businesses that operate venues as part of the hospitality industry will seek to manage their liability through a risk-averse approach to any potentially contentious gatherings booking their premises. You can just imagine the conversations: “Oh God, no. Those evangelical Christians want to book a room again. That could be seen as harassing our gay staff”; “Oh, damn—that pro-Israel group wants to hold a meeting here, but lots of the catering staff are pro-Palestinian migrants. It is a bit risky”; “Drat. That bolshy Women’s Rights Network and Let Women Speak lot have arranged to meet here with all those customers wearing ‘Women = Adult Human Female’ T-shirts. That is bound to wind up our right-on, trans-ally bar staff. Just tell them we’re fully booked”.

In other words, Clause 20 could lead to overly cautious, “better safe than sorry”, informal blacklists. It could radically change and toxify the relationship between businesses and their customers. It is no longer “the customer is always right”, and you can forget about improving customer service; now customers are third-party harassment risks to staff.

We live in an era of divisive cancel culture. This misplaced assertion of the right not to be offended threatens social cohesion. We as legislators should seek to dismantle this culture and not add to it, as Clause 20 absolutely does.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, there have been very helpful and mainly anxious speeches during this debate. I am very grateful to my colleagues but also to the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, whose speech this afternoon was probably the most enlightening and helpful. I say that because throughout her speech she described how improbable it was that anything described in the other speeches would happen. Unfortunately, we do not have the promise of the noble Baroness adjudicating on the claims that will be brought as a result of this clause.

I should declare at the outset that I spent 15 years as a libel barrister specialising in media law and freedom of expression. I am also a commissioner at the EHRC. I know only too well that the law as intended gets misconstrued. If one looks back at the EHRC’s code of practice in relation to equal pay, one sees very clearly that the code, issued under Trevor Phillips, was never intended to be deployed in litigation that has resulted in the bankrupting of Birmingham City Council or in the absolutely constraining circumstances imposed on large companies. It is just not there. Similarly, the reputation of our immigration tribunals is on the floor because they are likewise applying provisions in the Human Rights Act, which we are bound by the ECHR to apply, but they are applying them in subjective, absurd ways that I do not doubt for a minute the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, would throw out if they were in front of her.

So what are we to do? We know that there is common sense on all sides of this Chamber, but our job is to scrutinise legislation and ensure that, when it gets to a court and to a judge, it can be properly and safely applied. That is why I support some of these amendments: there must be a way, and I beseech the Minister to review this and to look at what anxieties on this side of the Committee could be closed by some of these amendments.

I have done a search of the Article 10 case law under the human rights and European legislation where there has been tension in other countries. In France, for example, employees were harassed directly because of smoking outside—only in France, of course. In Germany, it was because they were wearing uniforms while biking. In all those cases, Article 10 rights were protected because the legislation was specifically drafted to say that the harassment was directed at the employee. The original clause here is not safely drafted, which is why I am asking the Minister to look at this again. It is not clear that it is only direct discrimination or harassment of an employee that will be caught by this. That is why we have had so many speeches this afternoon worried about what loopholes are being allowed with the clause as currently drafted. To be compliant with Article 10, we need to tighten it. We need, in this Chamber, to scrutinise it and ensure that the message goes back to the Government that it needs to be tightened.

The other thing that the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, so beautifully enunciated in her speech was how it ought to be a reasonable perception of the activity that was deemed to be harassment. Again, we would hope that any sensible court would look at that and say, “Yes, absolutely”, but that test is not in the clause as currently drafted. I will read Clause 20, “Harassment by third parties”:

“In section 40 of the Equality Act 2010 (employees and applicants: harassment), after subsection (1) insert … (1A) An employer (A) must not permit a third party to harass a person (B) who is an employee of A”.


There is the first problem: we do not limit the harassment to direct harassment, and we need to do so. To ensure that it will be applied and interpreted by tribunals in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, envisages, we need to ensure that that is tightened. Clause 20 goes on:

“(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), A permits a third party to harass B only if … the third party harasses B”—


there is still no tightening of the definition of “harass”—

“in the course of B’s employment by A, and … A failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the third party from doing so … In this section ‘third party’ means a person other than … A, or … an employee of A”.

There is no reference at all in that clause to what test a court is to apply to the perception by the employee of the harassment. All the European cases, by which we are still bound under the ECHR, require an objective test to safeguard our freedom of expression rights under Article 10. What I have heard this afternoon is that there is no dispute between the two sides of this Committee that protecting Article 10 in the balance that happens here is the right thing to do, but that test is not in this clause, which is why these amendments are so important. We need that test and we need the direction of the harassment at a specific person, so that it cannot scoop up the other conversations or any of the other activities that are happening around them. It must be like the French case, the German case and all the other cases, which anyone is welcome to look up as I did. For that reason I support these amendments and beseech the Minister and the Government to look again at this. The way this clause is drafted is of very real concern.

[Baroness Carberry of Muswell Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I did not want to interrupt the noble Baroness when she was speaking. However, I refer her to Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010, with which I am sure she is familiar, as an EHRC commissioner. That is where the relevant test is set out.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. It is difficult to know where to start, so I thought I would do so with a couple of parish notes. To the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I say that the young man who was on the other end of her call was required by contract to read out a script. If he had deviated from the script, he would have been dismissed. The noble Baroness was not guilty of harassment, but of a lack of empathy concerning his contract. To the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, I can report that hummus is for sale in the Co-op in Bow. Indeed, following the cyberattack, that was about all it had for sale. To the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, I say that were he taken to court in the circumstances he describes—though I think that unlikely—for being grumpy in a football ground, all he would have to do was say where he was, and the judge would let him off on mitigating circumstances.

When the noble Lord, Lord Young, was announced as a peer I was very pleased, because I thought he would add something to your Lordships’ House from which we would benefit. To a great extent, that has revealed itself today. Through a cleverly and carefully constructed straw man argument, he has set up today’s debate. That straw man has been paraded, hoisted aloft, by a series of speeches either wittingly or unwittingly misapprehending the purpose of Clause 20. Before I begin to discuss that, though, let me say that I have been worrying about the use of the word “banter”. That word causes me to worry, and I will explain why to the noble Lord, Lord Young. For as long as I can remember, it has been used as a defence: “It was only a bit of banter”. It was only a bit of banter, but what was it? It has been justifying racism, sexism and homophobia since time immemorial. I was very surprised, therefore, that a man who understands words in the way the noble Lord, Lord Young, does, should use that phrase. The alliteration may work; but I am not happy with the word “banter”.

As I understand it, the point of the Bill is not the noble Lord’s straw man of policing personal conversations; the point is to take on the problem of workplace bullying by customers and users of particular facilities, and ensure that the employers adequately defend the workers, particularly those who have to interact with the public and who may otherwise feel exposed.

I would like briefly to drag this debate into the area of the practical reality for many people, often young, who work in industries where contact with customers is unmediated. After graduating, I ran a bar for a year, and I know what it is like for people working in those environments. They are largely in service industries—the very industries that some of your noble Lordships seek to absent from the Bill. My understanding of this part of the Bill is that it aims to protect people from having to withstand unreasonable behaviour. If we were to throw out that objective in the way that some of these amendments suggest, that would be to declare that we do not care about the plight of those employees and how they are treated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about the customer always being right. That is one of the problems. In the past, bosses have taken the side of customers against employees because they need the trade. In a way, the clause seeks to address that. There are other potential economic benefits, too. For example, many people talk a lot about recruitment problems in the service industry. One of the ways of enhancing such jobs would be for potential recruits to know that their employer has their back. Many good employers already do that; but everybody needs to know that there is an expectation across the board that they will be protected.

To echo my cry at the start of Committee, we need to see how the Government expect this to operate. Here, I join forces with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. We need to see what the draft regulations will look like and understand how the guidelines will interpret those regulations, so that your Lordships can be calmed and brought down from the current position.