Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. I oppose the amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Markham, said, this is a decision for the people of Wales to make—not for the people of England, who dominate this Parliament, both in the other place and here.

The problem arises because of the complexity of the devolution arrangements for Wales, and we could spend quite a lot of time—which I am sure no one wants to spend—going through it to try to understand why it has happened. In essence, it has arisen because the enabling of the Senedd to do anything is determined by criminal law; that is how the legislation has been drafted. That is not the case in Scotland: they have the freedom. That is denied to Wales because of the way that the devolution arrangements work. It cannot be right and fair for this position to remain. The noble Lord, Lord Markham, put his finger on what the solution ought to be.

We cannot adopt what has been suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. If we did so, the Senedd would have no power to do anything because of those constitutional arrangements. Therefore, the solution that has been put forward, to delete Wales from the Bill, is a non-starter; we have to do something.

This is particularly important because, as has been said, although this is partly a great moral issue and partly an issue about the NHS, it is only in incidental effects a criminal law issue. The settlement makes it a criminal law issue, but we ought to allow the moral issue and the issue in relation to the NHS to be determined in Wales. If the Bill were to be passed in its current form, and then the Welsh Government decided that they did not want to implement it, the only people who would be able to obtain assisted dying in Wales would be those who were prepared to pay for it. That cannot conceivably be right.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, and I have put down an amendment to try and resolve this. We have had it degrouped. I do not think any noble Lords have had much experience of reading the Government of Wales Act. The only experience noble Lords ought to have of doing that is if one suffers from insomnia.

In the coming period, we ought to settle down with the sponsors of the Bill and with the Government to try and work out a just solution to this problem; otherwise, I regret to say, the debate on the Floor of the House on the way in which we solve these problems will be time-consuming. It is not really the best way of dealing with such an important issue, which can be solved technically. I am sure everyone would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Markham, that it is a decision for the people of Wales and not for the people of England, who dominate this legislature. Wales should not be regarded as inferior to Scotland.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, bearing in mind that this is a Private Member’s Bill, it seems to me, as an Englishwoman, that whatever efforts are required, we should be, at the end of the day, removing Wales from it.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, in my modest experience of six departments in both Houses of Parliament, I have always come to the conclusion and repeated that Whitehall does not do devolution. By the way, I declare an interest: I live in England but within 10 miles of the border of Wales. Therefore, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on raising this in a practical fashion that probably nobody else in the House is able to do. I doubt that Members of Parliament in the other place had the opportunity to raise it in detail, because there will be MPs running on both sides of the border. I commend him on raising it, and I resent the fact that he was interrupted at the end.

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[Baroness Browning (Con)]

My Lords, many years ago, in another place, I served on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee and was present taking what became the Mental Capacity Act through the House of Commons. When I came to your Lordships’ House in 2010, I was fortunate enough to secure a House of Lords inquiry to look post-legislatively at how the Mental Capacity Act was working. From the evidence we took at the time, we found that the ability of the medical profession—by which I mean not just doctors but all those across the piece, including social care workers—was not as ideal as it perhaps sounds in today’s Committee. Whatever is built into the Bill to assess either capacity or ability, there will need to be a heck of a lot of training for us all to feel comfortable that the professionals involved know how to go about their task.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the report last month of the National Audit Office, whose press release stated:

“The Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) and NHS England (NHSE) do not clearly understand what proportion of palliative and end-of-life care is delivered by independent adult hospices, and therefore, how much they are reliant on the sector, or what the real impact of government funding is”.


We have heard that palliative care is patchy. I know from my own recent experience with a close relative that, had I not been somebody capable of organising it myself, it would not have taken place. We are not dealing with finite disciplines in the debate on this group, and I caution the Committee that it is not as perfect out there as it sounds today.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare that I was a vice-president of Hospiscare in Exeter. I am probably the only person in this Committee who has tried cases of capacity, again and again, both as a High Court judge and in the Court of Appeal. One case was so difficult that the Court of Appeal, where I was presiding, sat until 1 am. Noble Lords may not have thought that the Court of Appeal did that very often. It is important for your Lordships to realise that some cases that I tried were extremely easy to try—one in particular involved a Miss B, who was obviously competent—but other cases were extraordinarily difficult. One case—the one that we did until 1 am—concerned somebody with a needle phobia who was expected to need a caesarean, and she objected because she could not bear the idea of a needle. At one in the morning, we took the view that she did not have the mental capacity to decide on her caesarean. She was hugely relieved and had the operation without any trouble. But that was not a unique case—the time was, but not the problem.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington (Lab)]

My Lords, I of course enormously respect the experience of the noble and learned Baroness and her ability to make these judgments. I am sorry that she had to sit until 1 am. But does she feel that those decisions would have been more or less complex and difficult if she had been judging them on the basis of ability?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I have not the remotest idea. It is such an important point that I would have to go away and reflect. I am not commenting on ability or capacity; the point I am making to the Committee is about the difficulty of this for a doctor, or several doctors—probably GPs. The Royal College of Psychiatrists, of which I am an honorary fellow, has said firmly that it wants nothing whatever to do with the panel or with this, so doctors who are not psychiatrists will decide, with other people, whether somebody has or does not have capacity. That is what is currently in the Bill.

I warn your Lordships that this can be difficult, particularly when it involves depression. I had a friend, a solicitor, who suffered from depression. She said that she used to fall into a black pit and try to crawl up the sides, which were slippery. It was clear to me that, when she was in that depression, she certainly did not have the ability to make serious decisions. So I warn your Lordships about the potential problems of assessing capacity.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to substitute “ability” for “capacity” in Clause 1(1)(a). As Clause 3 explains—we have already spoken about this at length—capacity is to be understood as defined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. But, in my view, capacity so defined is the wrong measure to use to discern whether someone is in a position to make a proper judgment about ending their own life.

The Mental Capacity Act sets a very low threshold for having mental capacity. The Act requires—it could hardly do otherwise—that the person concerned must be able to understand the information relevant to a decision, but it dictates that this requirement should be understood in the laxest way, because Section 3(2) states:

“A person is not to be regarded as unable to understand the information relevant to a decision if he is able to understand an explanation of it given to him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances (using simple language, visual aids or any other means)”.


We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about the problems of information, facts, evidence and understanding that she has encountered in her very distinguished specialism. In effect, then, someone who can grasp only a diluted, simplified version of the information needed for a decision is still thought to have capacity to take it.

In Section 3(3) the Act adds that, although the person concerned may be able to retain the information, as per Section 3(1)(b):

“The fact that a person is able to retain the information relevant to a decision for a short period only does not prevent him from being regarded as able to make the decision”.


The Act therefore allows that someone who cannot retain information in the normal sense of the word “retain”, which means that something is kept, in this case in the memory, none the less has capacity.

Although the Act makes the threshold for mental capacity as low as it can, arguably that is good for the purpose of the Act, because very strong reasons are required before we take an individual’s power of agency over important decisions about the conduct of their life, which is the result of declaring that they lack capacity. If there are any grounds, however slight, we should accept that they have capacity.

But, in the case of the Bill, this position is reversed. We are dealing here with a decision that, in its gravity and irrevocable nature, is completely unlike most—or all—of those important decisions that the Mental Capacity Act was designed to regulate. Where the decision is to end one’s own life, what matters above all is that the agent is able to understand its meaning and consequences. It is not enough in this case that the information relevant to the decision is grasped in a simplified or pre-conceptual form, as the Mental Capacity Act definition would allow, nor that the information is retained only for a moment, then to be forgotten, as again is allowed by the Mental Capacity Act definition. The threshold for being allowed to take the decision must be much higher. Even though making it higher would take away the power of agency from more people than a lower threshold would, it is wholly justified when, as here, it concerns a decision that, if made, will entirely and irrevocably remove an individual’s power of agency.

I agree that “ability” lacks the precise legal definition— I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, who was very candid about what that could mean—that “capacity” has. It is better to have an imprecise phrasing that points in the right direction than one that points the wrong way. Moreover, the phrasing of the amended clause indicates how we should understand ability. It is an ability to make the brave and difficult decision to end one’s own life. Clearly, an ability commensurate with the gravity of that difficult and brave decision is an appropriate way. I support the aim, and, indeed, the wording, of the noble Baroness’s amendment, because of the gravity of the decision that is being taken.

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[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

It is very important that we understand where these reports come from. This one is issued by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but it has not been subjected to scrutiny by the members. Although they have many good points, and we can look carefully at their recommendations and assess them properly, we need to make a decision ourselves.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I have a practical question to ask. Do other doctors get training on what is meant by “capacity”?

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

There is never enough training—let us assess that.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

I do not think I can add much more to what I have already said. We are debating the Bill. The House will adjourn fairly shortly, and I will have a discussion in the usual channels. There is no government time that can be made available for the Bill.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Is it not time that the Government look to give some government time to the Bill? As has already been said, this is one of the most important Bills ever to come before this House. For the Government not to give us government time, as the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has just said, is unfair to the Bill.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

All I can do is repeat myself: this is a Private Member’s Bill, and the Government do not have any government time to give it at the moment.