Armed Forces Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox of Soho, who spoke eloquently about the need for improved housing for service men and women and their families. I am grateful, too, to my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire for his introduction to the Bill.

In my contribution today, I want to focus on protection from sexual and violent behaviour and domestic abuse, stalking and harassment, in Clauses 5 to 10; support for victims of service offences, in Clauses 11 and 12; service courts, in Clauses 21 to 27; and Schedules 2 and 3. These clauses and schedules all have a direct impact on the victims of offences perpetrated by service men and women. I have some concerns that, as they stand, the proposals do not give parity with the non-military administrative police and court systems. I also want to ask some questions about the protocols on visiting forces, in Clauses 41 and 42, in the light of the recent case in Cambridge.

My Front-Bench portfolio of victims and vulnerable people is more usually found in home affairs and justice legislation, and it is good to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, again. It is also good to see the Bill trying to strengthen the arrangements inside the military criminal justice system to match those elsewhere. I particularly thank Aurora New Dawn and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust for their briefing on the Bill and for copying the letter that they have sent to the Secretary of State for Defence. Both groups are very concerned that there are some key gaps in the Armed Forces Bill that will mean that victims in the military system do not get the same level of support and protection. I really hope that the Minister will agree to a meeting with them and those who speak today on these issues, preferably before Committee stage. If possible, it might be helpful if the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, could be present at the meeting, because, as Courts Minister, she has recently been dealing with the equivalent in the non-military world.

I know from my own experience, two decades ago now, as a victim of a sustained, nearly three-year stalking campaign that the effect on victims of an obsessive, manipulative stalker is awful but, worse, that victims are re-victimised when those in the criminal justice system just do not understand how serious it can be. Since 2012, the laws relating to stalking have slowly changed, but those changes are only partially covered in the Bill. I note that the effectiveness of service stalking protection orders—SSPOs—will depend on the ability of military personnel, not just military police and courts, to recognise stalking, assess risk and respond appropriately. This is reflected in the report of the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, which included an official recommendation that:

“The introduction of the restrictive orders under Clauses 5 and 6 should be accompanied by extensive training across the system in order for the measures to be properly understood, implemented, and enforced”.


One thing is clear: the need for training to identify and respond to stalking will be even greater within the Armed Forces setting than in the civilian world. That is because the nature of service life presents unique challenges, including hierarchical structures, close-knit communities, shared accommodation, deployments, and overlapping professional and personal relationships, as well as opportunities for community surveillance. We know already from domestic abuse cases in the military world that these factors will increase opportunities for perpetrators to maintain unwanted contact and try to exert control, as victims may continue to live, work and serve alongside them.

Effective implementation of SSPOs will therefore depend on specialist training delivered by independent experts, as in the civilian world, so that any personnel can recognise stalking behaviour, understand patterns of escalation and respond appropriately, as well as fully understand all the SSPO provisions, including the possibility of placing positive requirements on perpetrators. It is important to note that the statutory guidance on the independent stalking advocate requires specialist stalking responses and should not be subsumed within broader domestic abuse frameworks. Over a third of stalking cases are nothing to do with domestic relationships.

This is also reflected in the recommendations arising from the super-complaint on the police response to stalking, led by HMICFRS, the IOPC and the College of Policing, which highlighted the need to draw on specialist expertise in the development and delivery of all stalking training. Failure to identify stalking can result in victims being directed into responses that do not adequately address stalking-related risk and allow behaviours to escalate. Why is there no provision in the Bill for this important training?

Another area I have concerns about are the arrangements relating to the service stalking protection notices themselves. Early intervention is particularly important in stalking cases, where behaviours may escalate over time and are associated with an increased risk of serious violence and homicide. While the introduction of the SSPOs is very welcome, there remains a significant gap between identifying risk and securing an order within the civilian system.

The Bill addresses this challenge in the domestic abuse context through the provision of domestic abuse protection notices, which provide immediate protection while interim orders are being pursued. It is shocking that there is no equivalent mechanism in the Bill for stalking. Introducing service stalking protection notices would provide an important safeguard during this period and bring the stalking provisions into closer alignment with the domestic abuse framework.

It is not clear from the relevant clauses and Schedules 2 and 3 whether or not the Bill provides for continuity of protection after a convicted service man or woman has left the services. Whether a domestic abuse protection order, a stalking protection order, a sexual harm prevention order or a sexual risk order, it absolutely beggars belief that the service protection order automatically lapses when the offender has left the military, often after release from prison, even if the details of the protection order make it plain that the military police and/or military court still believe that the victims in these cases need formal protection.

It appears there is no facility at the moment to transfer protection orders, with the appropriate level of information, to the civilian police service where the victim and their dependants live, and the service where the offender will live, to explain under what circumstances the protection and prevention order was made. It should also ensure that victims are signposted to civilian victim support that is appropriate for their case. At best, the Bill is ambiguous; at worst, these specific issues and gaps were highlighted by the evidence of the Director of Service Prosecutions at the Bill’s Select Committee hearings.

When gaps such as this are created in stalking cases, danger thrives. The offender thinks they are home free and, especially with stalking, might well target their victim again. If they think that the police in their area do not know about them, that will embolden them further. Will the Minister say that the Government will table amendments prior to Committee to remedy this serious and dangerous gap?

Finally, I am very concerned by reports in the Guardian and by the BBC last week about the case of the US Air Force pilot, Captain Jacob Wulfson. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is much more expert than I on the military court system of visiting forces, and I look forward to his contribution. My focus is on how badly the victim in this case was let down, not just by the US court-martial process but by the local police and the CPS, at the moment it was suggested—I presume by RAF Lakenheath—that the case should be moved from the Cambridgeshire Constabulary to the US military courts.

My information comes from the two reports of the case. The most horrifying aspect is how on earth the rape of a British subject in Cambridge, which is British soil, by an American who chose to live off-base in Cambridge, could be tried in a US system that derides and diminishes a victim in a way that our criminal justice system—from police to courts and appeals—absolutely cannot.

I mention the Wulfson case as an exemplar. We know there have been many other such cases where the US system has intervened but without the details becoming public. I suspect that many of those are equally unsatisfactory. For example, I did not know that, in the USA, no rape case can be tried without evidence from the victim, even if there is ample forensic and other witness evidence, and that the victim can be cross-examined and derided by the defence attorney in a manner absolutely forbidden in our courts. Further, I did not know that the prosecutor does not need to have specialised training in rape and other sexual offences to balance the defence attorney’s contribution, or that, in this particular case, the eight jurors—all service personnel from Lakenheath, who, under US law, can also judge the case—can include someone with a spent conviction for sexual assault. This is unbelievable.

The victim has been brave beyond measure, but she does not have—as we have here—the chance of submitting a request to the Attorney-General for a review of an unduly lenient sentence. Further, because she is an alien—that is, not an American citizen—she is not entitled to any support from the American victims system, which helps guide their citizens through. That is shameful. Even worse, any convicted US service man or woman has an automatic right of appeal, as well as being able to ask the Secretary of Defense or the President to grant them clemency because their military service outweighs their crime, even if it is a serious sexual or violent assault.

This case is an absolute travesty, but it is not isolated. We need to address why Cambridgeshire police or the CPS thought it appropriate to allow the case to pass to Lakenheath base. Can the Minister please write to those of us speaking on this issue today to answer the following questions? At what level was the decision to transfer made? What was the relevant rank of the police officer or CPS staff? Did they have training to do this and therefore understand the full legal ramifications of the decision on treatment and justice for the victim? Were there any referrals back to the Ministry of Justice? I presume they would be via the Attorney-General, but I do not know. Do the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, the Home Office and the Foreign Office have a co-ordinated approach to or a protocol for cases such as this, where the crime occurs on British soil but the case is moved to a visiting military court system?

It is interesting that we now have an interdepartmental protocol between the Foreign Office, the Home Office and the coroner service for when a British citizen is murdered abroad, with these departments all helping bereaved families. In cases similar to the Wulfson case, is there a protocol with these departments’ opposite numbers for high-level conversations to understand the consequences? I would be very grateful if the Minister, and the Courts Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, could provide the answers to these questions as a matter of urgency, preferably before I and others table amendments in Committee.

Armed Forces Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd September 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

21: Schedule 3, page 98, line 40, at end insert—
“Part 1AService Stalking Protection Notices1A In Part 3 of AFA 2006 (power of arrest, search and entry), after Chapter 1A (inserted by paragraph 1) insert—“Chapter 1BService Stalking Protection Notices74E Power to give a service stalking protection notice(1) An authorised service police officer may give a service stalking protection notice to a person falling within subsection (2) (“P”) if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that—(a) P has carried out acts associated with stalking against another person, and(b) it is necessary to give the notice to protect that other person from stalking, or the risk of stalking, carried out by P.(2) A person is within this subsection if the person is aged 18 or over and is—(a) subject to service law, or(b) a civilian subject to service discipline.(3) A “service stalking protection notice” is a notice prohibiting P from carrying out acts associated with stalking against the person for whose protection the notice is given.(4) A service stalking protection notice may provide that P—(a) may not contact the person for whose protection the notice is given;(b) may not come within a distance specified in the notice of any premises in which that person lives or any other specified premises.(5) If P lives in premises in which the person for whose protection the notice is given also lives, the notice may also contain provision—(a) prohibiting P from evicting or excluding that person from the premises;(b) prohibiting P from entering the premises;(c) requiring P to leave the premises.(6) It does not matter where the acts associated with stalking referred to in subsection (1)(a) took place.(7) In this Chapter—“acts” includes omissions;“authorised”, in relation to a service police officer, means of or above the rank of naval lieutenant, military or marine captain or flight lieutenant;“service police officer” means a member of a service police force.74F Matters to be considered before giving a notice(1) Before giving a service stalking protection notice to a person (“P”), an authorised service police officer must, among other things, consider the following—(a) the welfare of any person under the age of 18 whose interests the officer considers relevant to the giving of the notice; (b) the opinion of the person for whose protection the notice would be given as to the giving of the notice;(c) any representations made by P about the giving of the notice;(d) in a case where the notice includes provision relating to premises lived in by the person for whose protection the notice would be given, the opinion of any relevant occupant as to the giving of the notice.(2) In subsection (1)(d) “relevant occupant” means a person other than P or the person for whose protection the notice would be given—(a) who lives in the premises, and(b) who is personally connected to the person for whose protection the notice would be given or, if P also lives in the premises, P.(3) The authorised service police officer must take reasonable steps to discover the opinions mentioned in subsection (1)(b) and (d).(4) It is not necessary for the person for whose protection a service stalking protection notice is given to consent to the giving of the notice.74G Further requirements in relation to notices(1) A service stalking protection notice must be in writing.(2) A service stalking protection notice given to a person must state—(a) the grounds on which it has been given,(b) that if the person is reasonably suspected of being in breach of the notice, they may be arrested in accordance with section 67(2), (3), (4) or (5) by a person subject to service law,(c) that an application for a service stalking protection order under section 236M will be heard within 48 hours of the time of giving the notice and that a notice of the hearing will be given to the person,(d) that the notice continues in effect until that application has been determined or withdrawn, and(e) the provision that may be included in a service stalking protection order.(3) The notice must be served on the person personally by a service police officer.(4) On serving the notice on the person, the service police officer must ask the person for an address at which the person may be given the notice of the hearing of the application for the service stalking protection order.(5) After serving the notice on the person, the service police officer must make reasonable efforts to inform the person’s commanding officer of the giving of the notice.74H Breach of notice(1) A person who is reasonably suspected of being in breach of a service stalking protection notice may be arrested in accordance with section 67(2), (3), (4) or (5) by a person subject to service law.(2) Section 67(6) applies in relation to the power of arrest conferred by subsection (1) as it applies in relation to the power of arrest conferred by section 67.(3) A person arrested by virtue of subsection (1) must be kept in service custody and brought before the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court—(a) before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest, or (b) if earlier, at the hearing of the application for a service stalking protection order against the person.(4) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (3)(a) ends, the following days are to be disregarded—(a) any Sunday,(b) Christmas Day,(c) Good Friday, and(d) any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.(5) If the person is brought before the court as mentioned in subsection (3)(a), the court may—(a) give orders for the further detention of the person in service custody, or(b) direct that the person is released from service custody.(6) The court may, when directing a person’s release from service custody under subsection (5)(b), require the person to comply, before release or later, with any requirements that appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.(7) Where a person is given a service stalking protection notice under section 74E, a Provost Marshal must apply for a service stalking protection order in respect of the person.(8) The application must be heard by the court not later than 48 hours after the notice was given to the person, and subsections (3) to (7) of section 236D apply to the application as they apply to an application for a service domestic abuse protection order.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a Service Stalking Protection Notice (SSPN) by mirroring the existing framework for Service Domestic Abuse Protection Notices, giving service police an equivalent power to provide immediate protection pending the determination or withdrawal of an application for a Service Stalking Protection Order.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have all three amendments in this group. They aim to improve the arrangements for cases of service stalking. Amendment 21 wants to create a service stalking protection notice—SSPN—by mirroring the existing framework for the service domestic abuse protection notices, giving service police an equivalent power to provide immediate protection orders pending the determination or withdrawal of an application for a service stalking protection order. I am very grateful to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and Aurora New Dawn for their briefings and for correspondence in recent weeks.

Before going into the detail of these three amendments, I want to thank the Minister for his letter of a few days ago, following Second Reading. He says very clearly in that letter that the changes I want in order to strengthen the protections against stalking are not necessary because

“we fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the Service Police and other relevant personnel have the skills and knowledge necessary to identify stalking behaviour, assess risk and make effective use of the new protective measures”.

I am remembering discussions with Ministers in 2012, 2016, 2019 and 2022, when we tried to do the same for non-service stalking arrangements. Every single time we have not put the detail in the Bill it has gone wrong further down the process and has had to come back to Parliament to be corrected because, unfortunately, stalking, which is itself a very unpleasant crime, can quite often lead to murder. Therefore, some of these things that I am proposing are very much to protect the victim.

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I hope that, with what I have said, I have reassured the noble Baroness to an extent about some of the steps forward that the Government have tried to take and some of the improvements and changes that have been made to the Bill—particularly the inclusion of that conversion when somebody leaves and moves from military service into civilian life, but also the inclusion of interim service stalking protection orders.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and the other speakers, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, with whom I have worked for many years on this; I am very grateful for her support. I am also grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has shown some interest in this. I think the point raised about whistleblowing and making sure it is part of this package as well becomes vital. As we discussed yesterday on the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, it is absolutely key to changing the culture, which is what one wants in this sort of situation. I am also very grateful to the Minister for the detail he has gone into.

I should have made it clearer that the service stalking protection notices that my amendment seeks to create are different from the interim stalking orders, not least because they would be a tool that can be used by a police officer without having to go to a court. It is like the first step on the ladder. Going to court takes time and you have to assemble a case for it to be heard, whether by a magistrate or in another court. Therefore, it is a much more serious document, with more serious implications.

The point about these notices is that they are a tool to make the stalker aware very quickly that there are now certain rules they must follow and that things will escalate quickly if they disobey them. I am looking at the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, because I cannot remember what year they were added, but they were added because there was this lacuna between identifying a stalker and being able to get some protection for the victim.

On the other points, the Minister very kindly offered in his letter to meet me and anyone else interested, including the charities I have been working with. I think the best thing to do would be to have them with us at that meeting, because they have some very specific concerns about detail that I could not possibly go into in the Chamber at this particular time of night.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I thank the Minister. I am very grateful to him for that. On that basis, depending on the meeting, I may bring an amendment back on Report, but for now I withdraw Amendment 21.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

24: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Domestic abuse and summary hearings for assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm(1) A commanding officer may not hear summarily a charge of assault or occasioning actual bodily harm where the alleged conduct amounts to, or is alleged to amount to, domestic abuse.(2) In any case to which subsection (1) applies, the allegation must be referred to a service police force for investigation or the Director of Service Prosecutions for consideration of prosecution before the Court Martial or such other court as has jurisdiction.(3) In this section, “domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove the power of a commanding officer to hear an allegation of ABH when there is a domestic abuse element to the allegation.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group and, while they are not related to stalking, the principles behind tabling them are not dissimilar. They specify more detail than I think the Minister is comfortable with, but each states very clearly where the boundaries are on a number of issues.

Amendment 24 seeks to remove the power of a commanding officer to hear an allegation of assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm when there is a domestic abuse element in the allegation. The amendment says that, in those circumstances, the case must be referred to a service police force for investigation or to the Director of Service Prosecutions for consideration of prosecution before that court martial or other such court has jurisdiction.

This whole area around the role of the commanding officer, who will have a very different knowledge of individuals, not just those who report to them but also perhaps their families who are involved in this case, is a sensitive one. We have to compare this with the position of the service police or prosecutors, who will not have that personal knowledge of all the individuals. It is obvious that any more serious crime that was committed would not be permitted to be heard by the commanding officer—and yet, a crime involving assault or ABH and domestic abuse can at present be heard summarily by the commanding officer.

The reason for concern is that the domestic abuse guidance for those involved in investigating DA and associated crimes are that all those involved should have specialist training to understand how domestic abuse, assault and ABH need to be identified when often victims say that those in authority in the past have diminished the seriousness because it was domestic or the perpetrator has managed to hide it very well. But assault and ABH are not minor crimes: committed on a domestic partner, they are very serious.

The role of the commanding officer in hearing cases at this level may be understandable if it is a fight between two servicemen, so I understand why there is some provision there, although there are many who now question whether this should be the responsibility of the commanding officer at all. But my amendment specifically draws out assault and ABH in a domestic abuse setting and says that that must be dealt with by the service criminal justice specialists.

There is a general principle here. The Centre for Military Justice and many individual victims and campaigners find it unreasonable that there is still a role for the commanding officer in these cases at all.

I think it was the Minister who referred to Gunner Jaysley Beck: an appalling case. She was sexually assaulted by a warrant officer more than twice her age and then sexually harassed for months by her line manager, who was almost 10 years her senior. The inquest found that the Army’s failure to deal with her report of sexual assault appropriately, and the pressure of relentless sexual harassment she had endured, contributed to her death by suicide on 15 December 2021.

Before and after the inquest, the family, with support from the Centre for Military Justice, campaigned for greater independence in the handling of serious service complaints for service personnel who have suffered serious sexual harassment, discrimination and bullying in the military. On 18 March 2025, the Government announced that they were taking responsibility for the handling of serious cases such as these away from any single service itself. That is good. However, I am afraid that some anomalies remain, such as the issues in my amendment relating to ABH and domestic abuse.

Amendment 25 ensures that the services victims’ code must always apply to victims of sexual offences. It also ensures that service personnel whose cases are being taken forward in the criminal justice system will receive an equivalent right to service-provided victim services as those whose cases are taken forward in the services justice system. I laid this amendment to prevent service personnel and their victims falling through the cracks between the criminal justice system’s victims’ code, the services victims’ code and all the other things that might pertain to their case.

Amendment 26 relates to

“Production orders: notice to the subject of the material”.


It sets out in some detail how an application is made, then handed or served to the individual. It also sets out that the judge advocate must be satisfied that all the requirements have been complied with, with some exceptions noted where it would involve risk of harm or exceptional other circumstances. This is not dissimilar to the requirements for the civil police arrangements under powers of stop, search, seizure and retention. I believe that this amendment would both strengthen the process of a production order and prevent any abuse of such an order.

All three amendments are highly specific and may seem rather niche, but they aim to do one thing: to clarify and improve the service justice system for all those who come into contact with it or who administer it. I beg to move.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward these amendments, which are of significance to us all as we seek to improve the current situation. I also thank my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his contribution, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie. I will address some of the points they made in my remarks.

On Amendment 24, as set out by the Government in the other place, we are already committed to reviewing Schedule 1 criminal conduct offences for summary hearings and Schedule 2 serious service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as part of implementing this Bill following Royal Assent. However—and I hope this speaks to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie—for offences related to domestic abuse such as assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the necessary changes will be made by secondary legislation following the review. That would obviously involve consultation with a wide range of people. Schedule 1 offences are summary offences and therefore the commanding officer has a role. Obviously, Schedule 2 offences are more serious. We are looking at what we do with respect to that and what changes may or may not be made.

The proposed changes would be consistent with current defence policy, which is that such cases should always be referred to the relevant police authority so that they can consider investigating them. Where offences are removed from Schedule 1 and added to the more serious Schedule 2, the practical effect would be that they are investigated by the Defence Serious Crime Command and, if a charge is directed, tried at the court martial rather than at a summary hearing. As I say, that will be subject to a review. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, raised quite considerable concern that if we did move forward, we needed to move forward constructively, carefully and with wide consultation. That review will take place to do that, but it is part of the implementation of the Bill and therefore the amendment is not acceptable to us. We do not want it in the Bill because that would prejudge any review which is to take place.

On Amendment 25, protecting victims is a clear priority. There is no question that we would ever restrict the application of the code for victims in the CJS in respect of victims of sexual offences or domestic abuse. The code for victims in the CJS is aligned with Section 2 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which sets out the statutory rights of victims in England and Wales. The code for victims in the CJS and the code for victims in England and Wales will contain the same principles and the same 12 rights. This ensures that victims of service offences and civilian victims receive equivalent standards, protections and entitlements, which goes to the heart of what the noble Baroness was asking for.

If a serving person is engaged with the civilian justice system, they will still be entitled to the single service welfare support mechanisms, which are designed and tailored to support individual needs. A range of comprehensive support from both welfare professionals and the chain of command can be employed to support personnel, tailored to those individual circumstances, and can be provided by unit welfare officers, medical staff and pastoral support. Where needs are complex or relate to serious, enduring and/or multi-agency cases, a referral to specialist welfare support may be required. This is delivered by specialist trained staff, and each of the single services offers that option in addition to first-line welfare support. Although we are not where we should be, there has been some improvement.

I thank the noble Baroness for Amendment 26, relating to production orders, and for highlighting this important issue. This new clause is not required as any change to the procedures around production orders could be enacted through the relevant secondary legislation—if a change is needed, we can do that through secondary legislation—so long as a review of the current procedures has been completed so that we know what we are doing if we seek to make any change.

On a point that the noble Baroness was asking about, we will consider further whether our procedures around production orders, specifically with regard to giving notice to the individual to whom the information relates and the provision that representations can be made, should fully reflect the relevant procedures in the civilian courts and whether it is appropriate and necessary that they do so. I reassure the noble Baroness that, while the requirement for further review around production orders is considered, victims of crime are informed about information requests from third parties. That is an important addition.

When a victim information request is submitted to a third party, service police must, under Section 44B of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, give notice to the person whose information is being sought. However, that requirement does not apply in certain circumstances; for example, where it is not reasonably practical in the circumstances or, importantly, where doing so might risk causing serious harm to the victim or another person. Again, that is an important qualification. The code of practice relating to these requests also states that when the victim is informed, their views should be sought and they are able to make representations—again, unless specific exemptions apply.

I hope that with those explanations and reassurances, particularly with respect to one or two of the reviews, the noble Baroness may find it appropriate to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to all the speakers. To address the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I think he is looking at that clause the wrong way round. He asked about the definition of actual bodily harm, where the alleged conduct “amounts to” or “is alleged to amount to”. I think one is an incident that has been witnessed by someone who is not the victim, and the other may be where it has not and therefore it is a “he said/she said” situation. That is my understanding of why the wording is as it is. I hope that explanation helps him.

I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Smith. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, made an important point about the chain of command, and I do not underestimate that at all.

That takes me to my response to the Minister. I am glad that there is a review, and I am sure there are many other issues as well as the ones that I have raised. However, the message that I have been picking up from the organisations and individuals I have been talking to is that in 2026 it may not be completely appropriate in some of these justice issues for the old-style chain of command to remain with the commander. If the review is going to be looking at that, I will be content not to do anything at the next stage, and ditto with the secondary legislation. If I am unhappy with the secondary legislation, I may return to the next Armed Forces Bill after this one. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 24 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is, unfortunately, unable to be in his place tonight, so I am speaking on his Amendment 36.

In October 2006, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford moved an amendment to the Armed Forces Bill, with the support of Air Marshal Lord Garden to confine sentencing in court martials to the presiding judge advocate alone, following consultation with the members of the panel. He said: “The area of sentencing for criminal offences is difficult and complex. Sentencing is an exercise for which the members of the panel have no training whatever. They do not attend sentencing conferences or have the training on sentencing that the most junior assistant recorder in this country receives, let alone any further or higher training for dealing with serious offences”.

The 2006 Act was a major reform of the system but did not include this particular amendment. It did, however, abolish the pre-existing review system whereby the Judge Advocate-General reviewed the conviction and sentence before they became final, a process which historically had operated as a check on the sentence passed. The 2006 Act introduced a service supervision and punishment order under Section 173, which imposes a quite concrete restriction on a serving soldier’s movements.

A service community order employs the community order requirements contained in the civilian sentencing legislation, adapted for service courts. The court martial can impose one or more requirements on the convicted serviceman as part of such an order. However, the SCO is principally a sentence for someone who is being dismissed from the service, and it follows him into civilian life. The recent Sentencing Act 2026 brought in the possibility of new restrictions to the SCO, the most important of which is the imposition of a restriction zone to prevent an offender from entering a particular area with, for example, the intention of assaulting or harassing a victim. Other restrictions may prevent him drinking in certain pubs or attending public events or even impose restrictions on driving.

There is, therefore, a whole army of sentencing disposals for those who are convicted. Professional judges are trained to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of imposing particular restrictions on the individual who stands before them. This requires experience and judgment. The court martial panel consists of a president and members of warrant officer rank and above who are drafted in for a particular case. The president is usually an officer for whom the position is a final posting, but the members may never have been in any sort of court before. Compare that with a magistrates’ court. The sentencing powers of a magistrates’ court are still restricted to 12 months’ imprisonment on a single charge, even though the magistrates will individually have undergone considerable periods of training. The court martial panel, without any training, is unrestricted.

Further, there is no longer a review by a professional judge of the sentence they choose to pass. Certainly, the judge advocate at the hearing can advise the panel and has a casting vote in the event of equality of voting by the members, but he can be outvoted altogether and his advice ignored.

In 2014, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford gave evidence before a departmental review in Washington as part of an inquiry which led to widespread reforms of the military justice system in the United States, the equivalent of our 2006 Act. These reforms were intended to transform military justice from a disciplinary system operating under the chain of command to something increasingly resembling an independent criminal court operating within US Armed Forces. In its report, the 2015 Military Justice Review Group also pointed out, as my noble friend had urged, that military judges had greater experience and expertise in sentencing than randomly selected panel members. It was concerned about sentencing disparity. The existing system gave the panel very broad discretion and relatively little guidance. From a constitutional point of view, it was concerned that there was the perception of command influence over sentencing and military command culture could influence punishment. It is perhaps possible to detect such a culture in the public utterances of a certain Mr Hegseth.

In its Military Justice Act 2016, Congress compromised on the issue. Judge-alone sentencing became the norm, but as a concession to tradition, a convicted person was entitled to opt for sentencing just by the panel alone. During the four years that followed that Act, it was observed that defendants chose judge-alone sentencing in 96% of the cases. As a result, the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, established in 2021 in the aftermath of intense congressional debate over sexual assault in the armed forces, was concerned in sexual offences cases that a service court martial panel would almost inevitably be male dominated, as in the case of Captain Jacob Wulfson from Lakenheath, that the noble Lord and I both referred to at Second Reading.

The commission recommended judge-alone sentencing in all non-capital general and special courts martial, subject to the establishment of sentencing parameters and mandatory restitution, akin to our own Sentencing Council. We have always led the USA in the reform of military justice, and it galls me that in this instance, it has taken the right and proper lead that sentencing is a matter for professionals and not for one-day amateurs.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken in the debate and for the thoughtful comments they have made. To deal with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, the information I have is that there is no shortage of court martial board members. I can give the figures that the ministry has provided to me: in 2025, 447 service personnel were sworn in for 283 trials, and there has been no difficulty in constituting boards. The court martial already draws from a sufficiently wide pool of eligible personnel, so, as such, the amendment is not required. If she has more detail that she would like to share, obviously that would be useful, but that is the information that I have been provided with.

It is vital that board members are up-to-date and possess the necessary practical experience of the latest single service policies, procedures, standards and values. For that reason, individuals who have left service even recently may no longer be as acquainted with changes across the services since their departure. The Government acknowledge the valuable, meaningful contribution that veterans continue to make across our society. However, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to seek to draw on their past experience and knowledge for service on a court martial board, particularly when there is no shortage of board members.

Amendment 36, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, ably spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to remove military lay board members from the court martial sentencing process, so that sentence would be decided by the Judge Advocate alone. One argument often used is that this would mirror the Crown Court in England and Wales. However, I do not agree that the Crown Court model should simply be replicated in all cases within the UK service justice system. The current position is the same as that during the passage of the previous Armed Forces Bill in 2021, that the Judge Advocate and the service members of the board discuss and decide the sentence together. That is not an anomaly or a weakness; it is one of the strengths of the court martial to have service members and the Judge Advocate deciding on sentences together.

In answer to one of the specific points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that does not mean that the UK court martial has remained unchanged since the 2021 Act was implemented. In 2022, a new court martial rule was introduced that ensured that each court martial board includes at least one servicewoman. This is not sufficient, but it is a step forward. That is the only point I would make—which I am not sure my noble friends to the left of me totally agreed with—but all I am saying is that while it is not sufficient, it is a step forward.

In 2025, 28% of the service personnel who were sworn in as board members for court martial proceedings were women. Again, that is not what it should be, but it is a significant improvement. Since December 2024, court martial boards have been almost exclusively tri-service.

The judge advocate is of course the expert on sentencing. It is true that any sentence passed by the court martial must be determined by a majority vote, meaning that the judge advocate’s voice could, theoretically, be outweighed. However, the judge advocate will give the board the legal framework, identify the relevant sentencing guidelines and set the proper parameters within which the sentence must be considered. Failure to have regard to those guidelines and parameters opens the way to an appeal in the Court Martial Appeal Court.

The board members do not replace the judicial role. Their role is different and complementary. They bring current service experience to the assessment of what sentence is appropriate within the lawful framework. Service personnel are subject to rules, standards and operational expectations that go beyond ordinary civilian employment. Conduct that might appear straightforward in a civilian setting can have a markedly different impact in the military context, particularly where it affects discipline, cohesion, readiness, safety or operational effectiveness.

Board members bring up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of single service policies, procedures, values and standards. The amendment would reduce the board’s role from one of equal participation to one of consultation only. There is a real difference between being consulted and being part of the decision. Consultation would mean that the judge advocate could hear the service perspective but reject it. The current system ensures that the service perspective is taken into account in the sentencing decision, while remaining subject to the judge advocate’s firm legal direction.

Nor is there any legal issue that this amendment needs to address. Sentencing in the court martial is already subject to stringent legal controls. The court martial must have regard to the relevant sentencing guidelines, which for criminal offences incorporate the same guidelines used in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. The Judge Advocate-General also issues detailed sentencing guidance for the service courts. Aggravation and mitigation are fully addressed in open court by the prosecution and defence, and pre-sentence reports from experienced probation officers are available where required. Sentences are reasoned in open court and may be reviewed subsequently by the Court Martial Appeal Court.

It is also important to remember that, while military experience informs sentencing, it does not displace the legal principles governing it. Any mitigation advanced on behalf of an offender—whether arising from previous operational service, commendations, awards or personal circumstances—must be assessed within the sentencing framework directed by the judge advocate and in accordance with applicable sentencing guidelines. To be clear, board members are not free to substitute personal views of military merit for the lawful sentencing exercise, and any sentence that failed properly to reflect the relevant legal principles would be liable to appeal.

As court martial sentencing includes service-specific sentences such as dismissal, reduction in rank and service detention, military board members are particularly well placed to assess the practical effect of those sanctions on both the individual to be sentenced and the wider service community. Board members are lay decision-makers directed to exercise their own independent judgment: importantly, they are not representatives of the chain of command. Their current military experience assists the court; it does not compromise the court’s independence.

The Government argue that the amendment would therefore reduce the service character of the court martial without adding any significant additional safeguard. We believe that the current balance is the right one: the judge advocate provides the legal expertise and safeguards; the lay board members provide current military experience and independent judgment. Together, they produce a sentence that is lawful, reasoned and properly informed by the service context. For these reasons, I ask the noble Baronesses not to press the amendments.

Armed Forces Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th September 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

53: After Clause 42, insert the following new Clause—
“Visiting forces agreements(1) The Secretary of State must publish in unredacted form any part of a treaty, memorandum of understanding or agreement between the United Kingdom and any sending country relating to visiting forces containing a decision about a jurisdictional question, including in relation to the Visiting Forces Act 1952.(2) Alongside the material published under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a document setting out the reasons behind any decision about a jurisdictional question contained in the relevant treaty, memorandum of understanding or agreement.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the nature of any agreements reached between the UK and a sending country in relation to jurisdiction over visiting forces, and requires the Secretary of State to set out the reasons behind such a decision.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford cannot be in his place today as he is recovering at home after an operation. We hope that he will be back with us by Report. I have signed his amendment and I will speak to it. I have tabled Amendments 54 and 68, and I have also signed Amendment 55 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. To protect their identities, the victims’ names that I will use are not their own.

I am sure noble Lords will recall the disgraceful case of US spy Anne Sacoolas, who in 2019 was driving on the wrong side of the road in Northamptonshire when she hit and killed Harry Dunn, aged 19. The US authorities then managed to spirit her out of the country to evade justice. We then became aware that the US authorities do not respect our policing and justice systems. She was eventually brought to justice, but only because of Harry’s family’s campaign and then public and governmental pressure.

In recent months, following the brave disclosures made by a victim of rape and sexual assault by a US serviceman on UK soil—not on his USAF base—many more shocking cases have emerged. At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Thomas and I spoke of this case. In 2023, Jacob Wulfson, a US Air Force pilot, sexually attacked a Cambridge resident in his own Cambridge property, so not at the Lakenheath base where he worked. His victim, whom I have talked to, was very clear that she was alleging rape and sexual assault.

Under the terms of the Visiting Forces Act 1952, it is clear that, where an offence by an off-duty American serviceman against a British civilian takes place off an American base, the investigation and any subsequent court case should usually be in the UK Crown Court; the rest of the Bill goes on to talk about exceptions to that. What happened in this case was that the Cambridgeshire police waived jurisdiction—and, as I understand it, not at a senior level. The trial took place via a court martial before a US military judge and a panel at the Lakenheath base. All the UK protections that are offered to victims of alleged rape and serious sexual attacks disappeared at that moment. Worse, because the victim is not American, she was not entitled to the minimal victim support that is available to US citizens in US courts, as compared to the victim’s rights here in the UK. Worse still, since the victim was brave enough to talk to the Guardian newspaper, many more similar cases have been reported. So this is now, we understand, not a rare occurrence.

I can see why our beleaguered police forces would welcome the removal of cases from their very heavy workloads, but these decisions are not being made at the right level and it is not clear at all that the CPS is involved. I was astonished to discover that many of the specific agreements between us and other countries on such justice systems are made as secret and confidential between the UK and the country. We in Parliament, the press or even the victims cannot find out the details.

The Guardian exposed another case in July. Rebecca fled the house of an American airman in Suffolk, going to the police to report that he had raped and violently attacked her. She saw specialist health and police staff. They looked after her. She was given an ISVA—an independent sexual violence adviser—to support her in the legal UK process. Then, the USAF at RAF Lakenheath did exactly the same as in the previous case I described and persuaded Suffolk Police to transfer the case to it because justice would be quicker. Then Emily, the wife of the accused—Tyrion Davis—also came forward to say that she had been raped and sexually assaulted by him on a number of occasions. At the subsequent Lakenheath trial, he was convicted of sexually assaulting both Rebecca and Emily. On discovering that the jury panel at Lakenheath would be composed of Davis’s military peers from a small base, by our jury pool for civil court cases standards, Rebecca said:

“It’s like, if I did something wrong outside of work, having all of my nursing colleagues being on the jury … It doesn’t make sense”.


In another case, Hannes Marschalek boasted to his friends that he had exposed himself from his house in the small town of Littleport, near RAF Lakenheath, to a 16 year-old girl and four young women as they went past. When asked why US Air Force authorities had taken over the case, a spokesperson said that they had

“negotiated jurisdiction over this case with the local police using all available facts at the time”.

The accused was able to negotiate a plea bargain in his case and was convicted on a much lesser charge. He later won an appeal in a US military court this year, which quashed his conviction on technical grounds even though the court papers showed that he had texted two friends to say he had

“definitely just flashed a couple [of] ladies walking from the train, LOL”

and later texted:

“I took all of my clothes off when I walked in. I went to go open a window and I was standing right in front of it when they walked by”.


He also admitted in court that he had done this twice before. The US military court sentenced him to two months. If it had been in a UK court, he would probably have received two years. Then, astonishingly, a US military appeal court dismissed the guilty verdict against him, ruling that prosecutors had made an error by charging him under the wrong offence; I suspect that they realised that it should have been a more serious one.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Bennett, and the noble Earl, Lord Minto, for their important contributions on an incredibly important area of law, in relation to which a number of matters have been raised, recently and not so recently, that cause us all concern. For legal reasons, I will read verbatim the information I have before me; this is such an important area, and I do not want to be misquoted as that would not help the various people we wish to see being helped. Noble Lords will notice that when I get towards the end of my remarks, I will make one or two important comments that I hope will offer some, if not total, reassurance to your Lordships and to those who read our proceedings about how we are trying to move forward.

The legal framework governing the allocation of jurisdiction between the UK and a visiting force is set out in UK domestic law through Section 3 of the Visiting Forces Act 1952, with further reference to Section 12. This framework applies both to states that are party to the NATO status of forces agreement and to non-NATO states that have bilateral arrangements with the UK and are designated under Section 1 of the Visiting Forces Act 1952. In all such cases, visiting forces remain subject to the provisions of the Act. Any other agreements or arrangements are modelled on the provisions of the NATO status of forces agreement and reflect the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act 1952. The Visiting Forces Act is already publicly available and the principles within it are applied by UK prosecuting authorities on a case-by-case basis when questions of jurisdiction occur. I hope that provides some reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her views on the Bill and acknowledge her concerns, and those of others, about the Visiting Forces Act 1952 and why the United States is not explicitly referenced as being subject to the legislation. I reassure her and others that the United States is already included as subject to the Visiting Forces Act by virtue of Section (1)(1)(b). This specifically explains that, along with the countries individually named in Section 1(1)(a), a country will be subject to the Act’s provisions if it is designated by Order in Council. The United States, along with Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Norway, were included in the Visiting Forces (Designation) Order 1954, Statutory Instrument 634/1954, and so fall under the Visiting Forces Act 1952.

On Amendment 55, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Brinton, for their views on the Bill and acknowledge their interest in the Visiting Forces Act 1952 and the proposal to restrict and regulate how requests for transferring jurisdiction are determined in cases involving qualifying sexual offences. I begin by reassuring them that the Government are fully committed to ensuring that alleged sexual offences perpetrated by visiting forces are treated with the utmost seriousness and that jurisdiction for such cases is decided in accordance with the extant legislation.

I am aware of recent cases highlighted in the media, most notably the case concerning US airman Jacob Wulfson, which raised concerns regarding the extent to which the right decisions regarding jurisdiction for prosecution had been made. Section 3 of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 already sets out the limited circumstances in which jurisdictions should be transferred from the UK to a visiting force. The decisions on whether or not to do so are made independently by the relevant police force or the Crown Prosecution Service in response to any request from a visiting force. The Government are committed to identifying and applying the lessons arising from the issues raised in these cases. This includes the application and operation of jurisdictional arrangements under the Visiting Forces Act 1952 and how these are implemented across the criminal justice system.

In particular, I welcome the action taken by the chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, who has written to all chief constables in England and Wales to remind forces of their responsibilities under the Visiting Forces Act 1952. I understand that the National Police Chiefs’ Council is also considering whether further formal guidance for police forces is required to reinforce the principles of the existing legislation.

As I said, I am deeply concerned by the reports of how jurisdiction was handled in the Wulfson case. Victims of such serious offences need to be supported, and their cases treated with the seriousness, dignity and compassion that they deserve. This includes ensuring that jurisdiction for alleged offences is only ceded to a visiting force where absolutely appropriate under UK law and the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance. I have directed my officials to work with the Home Office, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and any other government departments as required to ensure that the Ministry of Defence is assisting in that outcome. I hope that provides some assurance to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Bennett, and the noble Earl, Lord Minto. I have no doubt that these discussions will continue, but we understand the seriousness of the topics that have been raised and the need for us to consider how we can deal with this.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I wonder if I could ask a brief question, because it is relevant to my response to the Minister’s contribution. Is there currently an agreement between the UK and the USA, as is described in the Visiting Forces Act and referred to elsewhere? Other countries have it. Is there already such an agreement about protocols for the sort of case we have been discussing this evening, along with other details that are not relevant? I will leave my question at that.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am concerned about misinforming your Lordships on legal matters. When I take legal advice, I will write as to the correct answer to that. I will copy in other Members of your Lordships’ House and place a copy in the Library.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who spoke in this debate. Earlier, I should also have thanked the Centre for Military Justice, the Guardian and the women I spoke to. I was glad to hear the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Unsurprisingly, we agree almost entirely on the problems. I also agree with her that we will not let this go, whether it goes beyond the passage of this Bill or not. I am grateful too, to the noble Earl, Lord Minto, for his comments. I am particularly pleased that he agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and me that it is clear that sexual attacks on UK soil are not part of Section 3 of the Visiting Forces Act, where the exceptions might be. That is extremely helpful and I am very grateful to him.

I particularly want to thank the Minister for his extremely well-constructed and considered speech. What is really important is that we find a solution. I agree with the Minister that there is provision in the Visiting Forces Act, so his exposition of that was really important. Our problem, as a Parliament, is that we need to resolve the problem that the victims faced. That is why I am very grateful for his comments about the Police Chiefs’ Council and the guidance it is looking at offering. The one organisation that does not seemed to have a role in any of this at the moment is the CPS. It clearly needs to, as there are issues other than taking the statement of the victim, making sure they seek medical help, and all the other issues I outlined in that specific case. There is also the question of charging levels, which would then affect what happens and whether there might be a reason why the case should be considered elsewhere.

I will conclude, because these were only probing amendments on my behalf and that of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. I wonder whether it would be helpful to have a meeting between Committee and Report with the Minister, somebody from the Home Office who can talk about the policing side and the Police Chiefs’ Council, and somebody from the CPS. What both the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and I are trying to achieve is a formal framework that means that one police force cannot do something different from another, and that, as the decision goes up the CPS, the more serious it gets, it should not necessarily stand with a junior prosecutor at the CPS in a particular area. That is how it becomes easy to say, “Yes, okay, take over this case because it will decrease our workload”. That is clearly the argument the US Air Force at Lakenheath were using. On that basis, and given the hour and the number of groups we still have to go through, I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 53 withdrawn.

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[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I think we generally agree that our country needs our Armed Forces, including the reserves and the cadets, more than ever. We need to encourage people to join, and we need to look after them when they do. We ask them to risk their lives on our behalf. If we do that, we should ensure that they have the appropriate legal protection.

There used to be a common-law principle of so-called combat immunity. That meant that the courts did not get involved in measuring the responsibility for what occurs in the heat of battle. Aggression that may, with the benefit of hindsight, be seen to be excessive should not be analysed, many years later, in the studied calm of a courtroom, with lawyers employing slippery words such as “proportionality”. This is to say nothing of so-called blue-on-blue or friendly-fire incidents, which are inevitable from time to time.

I would not want to give our Armed Forces a free pass legally; they would not want one. The law of armed conflict is necessary and well established. The Geneva conventions and the accumulation of international conventions and treaties are generally described as international humanitarian law, which is generally respected. What worries me, as it does the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, is the ECHR and its incorporation into our law by the Human Rights Act 1998. It has brought the law into places where it has no business.

The Strasbourg jurisdiction in this area has become exorbitant. It has held, for example, as the noble Baroness said, that the European—yes, European—Convention on Human Rights applies to theatres of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Reference was made to Al-Skeini. There is also a case called Al-Jedda. These cases brought about, among other things, the persecution of our troops by lawyers such as Phil Shiner, a lawyer eventually imprisoned for his deeds but not without causing immense damage expense before his imprisonment. The causation, I fear, is clearly established by the decisions of human rights lawyers to rely on the convention in an inappropriate way.

The rights embodied in the convention are in themselves wholly unexceptionable, but the living instrument approach has meant that judges have approached its application in what might be described as an open-textured way, resulting in real uncertainty as to what our troops are entitled to do legally. Article 2, on the right to life, has, for example, been held to justify a claim against the Ministry of Defence in connection with the supply of Land Rovers: it is the case of Smith v Ministry of Defence.

For some time now, the think tank Policy Exchange has focused on the so-called problems of lawfare. Tom Tugendhat MP, now shadow Foreign Secretary, wrote a paper some time ago, entitled The Fog of Law. It remarked on all these facets, which are causing such a difficulty for our troops.

We have now reached a position where our troops are embarrassed in front of allies, and we are accused by our allies of legal freeloading when lawyers try to explain our legal position. Lawyers are conservative in the advice that they give, if not in their politics. The result is that our troops are vulnerable to legal attack, and their leaders may well become inappropriately circumspect in their approach, in the light of the legal advice that they receive.

The amendment attempts to give our reserves and all our troops proper protection from the incursions of the ECHR. I ask the Minister, for whom we all have great respect, to explain whether the Government consider that the current state of the law is justifiable and whether it is truly in the interests of our servicemen and servicewomen or, indeed, in the public interest.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to both the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for their introduction to the amendment and for explaining it in detail. I am not a lawyer, so forgive me for not being able to respond to some of the cases that the noble Lord raised. From these Benches, we have complete sympathy with the principles of sorting out this lawfare issue, because it is clearly a problem.

Having listened particularly to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, our concern is whether, under the terms of Article 15 of the ECHR, even this level of derogation is permissible. She quoted from paragraph 1 of Article 15 but not from paragraph 2, which says:

“No derogation from Article 2”—


the right to life—

“except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7”—

torture, slavery and retrospective criminal penalties—

“shall be made under this provision”.

That paragraph means that it is not possible for the UK to derogate.

I just wondered whether, when the noble Baroness was Minister, there were any discussions with the Council of Europe on this issue, rather than a particular court case. We cannot be the only country affected. It may be that it is particularly bad in the UK. I understand that—not just from Article 15 of the ECHR itself, but from the Government’s independent review of the Human Rights Act in 2021, which referred to the progress of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, referred to. It is explained that the amendment was withdrawn partly because of the very strong feelings in your Lordships’ House. It referred specifically to this point in Article 15 of the ECHR, and the then Government decided that they could not continue with the amendment. Having asked the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, the question, which is perhaps slightly unfair because she is no longer a Minister, I ask the Minister whether any further discussions have been had with the Council of Europe on this problem. As we know, the ECHR is a living document, and if there are issues it is quite probable that the members would agree to some changes—perhaps expanding the level of articles that can be covered by a derogation.

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[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

I support Amendment 61 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, requiring an independent review of Armed Forces recruitment and retention. At this late hour, I will just say that, at a time when there are nearly a million young people not in education, employment or training, we cannot even recruit 10,000 a year, and our Armed Forces are well below the relatively tiny strength at which they are funded to be. This suggests that something is seriously wrong with the recruiting process, and the report needs to be done.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I shall briefly speak to Amendment 62. My noble friend raised the point about it being important for veterans to be able to have their details in their hands. The NHS guidance for veterans specifically notes that it takes several months for the full records to follow the veterans, and if veterans have complex health issues but no information, the GPs that they see are in deep trouble.

On amputees, importantly, unlike many amputees in the civilian world, most amputees in the military world also have a significant number of other injuries. There is already an issue about amputees in the civilian world having to have repeat PIP tests, but it seems sensible to look at this area.

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

Briefly, my Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has raised some important issues in these amendments. Between 1999 and 2025 there were only seven years in which more people joined the regular forces than left them, and the strategic defence review was blunt enough to call the result a workforce crisis.

I might add one further point on retention. Retention in the Armed Forces will not be improved by prosecuting veterans who served in Northern Ireland fighting the IRA. My noble friend Lady Goldie has already mentioned the adverse impact that the Government’s policy is having. Retention will also surely be improved by delivering the investment in the forces housing that the Government have promised. These are two actions that the Government could take immediately to improve retention and recruitment: drop the widely despised Troubles Bill and deliver the housing investment now, rather than pushing the funding further back, as they have done in the defence investment plan.

I completely concur with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about medical records. That needs tidying up pretty quickly and would definitely help. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.