Carbon Dioxide Transport and Storage Revenue Support (Directions and Counterparty) Regulations 2024

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle Excerpts

Monday 13th May 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jones, spoke about a war on carbon. Of course, that is a war we should not be having to fight. The arrival of these regulations is an expression of failure over decades. We have continued to dig up and burn coal, oil and gas, and now, having done all that damage to the natural carbon capture and storage—the best possible form of it, which nature has done for us over hundreds of millions of years—we are trying to find a mechanism to undo some of that damage. Yet what we are doing here is establishing an expensive, top-down framework for a technology that does not yet exist at any scale and which, if successful, will create natural monopolies.

This novel industry has zero customers and no guarantee that there will be any in the future. It will be heavily dependent on the Government to adopt an energy and industrial strategy down a route that makes the carbon capture and storage industry possible. It is heavily centralised, risky and expensive, which must be contrasted with the decentralised, readily available and readily deployable technologies that exist as an alternative to CCS. What the Government are proposing with these regulations are huge subsidies for decades, in the hope that at some point there will be economic developments that will start to reduce the cost to the taxpayer. This means that our situation is a bit like the problem we have with incinerators, whereby we build incinerators with contracts to supply them with waste for decades and then have to generate the waste. The Government are really combining science fiction with dinosaur thinking here.

I feel some sympathy for the Minister, because these regulations have landed in your Lordships’ Committee in a rather unfortunate week. To quote the Energy Mix website, referring to the carbon capture and storage industry,

“Industry Navigates Very Bad Week”.

This article reflects two developments in Canada, where Capital Power has cancelled a 2.4 billion Canadian dollar carbon capture and storage project at its Genesee generating station, saying that it is “technically viable” but “not economically feasible”. It also reflects, as the Canadian national organisation Environmental Defence said,

“the latest failure in carbon capture’s terrible track record”.

This project had already received 5 million Canadian dollars from the Government of Alberta and was being set up for further tax breaks and support from both the federal and provincial Governments. It is just not working.

The other bad week to which the website referred concerned figures that have come out of Boundary Dam Unit 3, a project worth 1 billion Canadian dollars. It promised to capture 90% of the CO₂ that was being generated but, in fact, its capture rate has been only 57%. This gives me a question to ask of the Minister—and perhaps of the Labour Front Bench—about the regulations before us and the Government’s plans: if there are contracts promising a certain rate of capture but that rate of capture is not met and they fail to deliver what is promised, with the potential to cause considerable damage in this new industry, what will be done? I note that the Toronto Globe and Mail is saying that there are

“continuing tensions between industry and the federal government about the extent to which public dollars will be used to provide”

for this industry.

With that in mind, I note the Minister’s comments in his introduction. I also note paragraph 5.10 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the directions, eligibility and counterparty regulations and paragraph 5.9 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the directions and counterparty regulations, both of which refer to the importance of information being deployed publicly, as well as the Minister’s comments about commercial confidentiality. In so many areas of public provision, we have seen real problems with people hiding behind a total lack of transparency arising from that coverall of commercial confidentiality. Can the Minister assure me that that will not happen in this case?

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to both of these SIs. I note that neither of them has been subject to any report by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.

Both SIs relate to carbon capture, usage and storage—CCUS—and are broadly welcomed on these Benches. I will not partake in any debate on CCUS today. It is a suite of technologies that enable the mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions from large point sources, such as power plants and refineries, and the removal of existing CO₂ from the atmosphere. In short, CCUS is one vital tool in the toolbox to help us reach net zero.

The Government envisaged building a competitive, self-sustained CCUS market in the UK. I note that, as of today, no commercial-scale CCUS projects are up and running. CCUS could provide economic growth potential as part of the transition to net zero—£1 billion of government money has already been made available for investment in four potential clusters, which aim to be capable of storing 20 to 30 megatonnes of carbon dioxide by 2030—but CCUS has had a slow and slightly rough start in the UK.

The revenue, directions, eligibility and counterparty SI establishes the process by which the Secretary of State can direct a carbon capture counterparty to offer to contract with an eligible carbon capture entity. It also sets out the requirement that certain information must be published by the counterparty in respect of contracts entered into, as well as the requirement on the counterparty to notify the Secretary of State promptly if it is likely to be unable to perform its functions. This instrument concerns the implementation of industrial carbon capture business models, or ICCBMs—there must be a better acronym—which are intended to support the ambition set out in the net-zero strategy to deliver carbon capture, usage and storage, or CCUS, in four industrial clusters. The ICCBMs have been designed to incentivise the deployment of carbon capture technology by industrial and waste users who often have no viable alternative, as the Minister set out, and are similar to contract for difference schemes.

My questions on this SI relate to the future review and scrutiny of those contracts. As they are commercial contracts—I note that they are in the public domain, but some of this may not be made public—and are signed off by the Secretary of State, can the Minister explain what, if any, further parliamentary scrutiny there will be of these processes? These contracts are for new and in some cases yet unproven technologies, so how will value for money be ascertained and reported back to Parliament in future, especially given that the SI allows for the amendment of those contracts in future and no statutory review is envisaged? I welcome the response to the consultation and the changes, including the use of the term “energy recovery generating station” and around the exclusions and support.

Because of time, I will not go through all that the SI on carbon dioxide transport and storage does. It seeks to help establish first-of-the-kind infrastructure in the UK to transport and permanently store the carbon dioxide that has been captured. It provides Exchequer-funded revenue support to mitigate the financial risks of the initial investors. The investment in this infrastructure is welcome, and I recognise the need for it, but what level of financial support is envisaged at this stage? If none is required now but money is perhaps required at some later point, can I ask if and how Parliament might be consulted on that and what limits are in place on those future financial investments in this scheme? If more money goes in, how will that be reported and noted by Parliament?

My other questions relate to parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the new types of technology and new contracts—what they are delivering and whether they are delivering value for money, how they are monitored and how Parliament gets future say in scrutiny of them.

Finally, in relation to both SIs, the process is delivered via commercial contracts, and both SIs allow for alterations and a requirement on the parties to inform the Secretary of State if the counterparty is unable, or likely to be unable, to fulfil its role as entered into. What, if any, dispute resolution mechanisms exist here between the department and the contractors? I am particularly interested in what legal dispute resolution mechanisms exist to give adequate oversight of this process to Parliament before any potential legal disputes end up in court.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. Before I get into the detail on particular questions, I will talk about the general issue, particularly as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, of CCUS and the principle. Obviously, that was a Second Reading speech for the legislation rather than for this particular statutory instrument, but let me explain why I think the noble Baroness is both misinformed and wrong.

First, most informed opinion disagrees with the noble Baroness on this, including the Climate Change Committee, which told us in its advice that CCUS is essential and not an option if we are to reach our decarbonisation goals. She said many other things that were incorrect. To take an example, she said that CCUS had never been tried and was unproven. Again, that is incorrect. There are many operating CCUS plants in the US. I witnessed one in Alberta, Canada, last year and, only last week, I was in Iceland to see the opening of the largest direct air capture greenhouse-gas removal plant in the world. It has an operating CO₂ ejection system into the basalt rock, which has been working successfully for many years.

So, the technology does work and is proven. We are attempting it at a greater scale than many other countries, but that is a fantastic business opportunity for the UK. We are privileged to have fantastic, tremendous storage potential in the North Sea, where we can store not only our own emissions but possibly those produced by other nations and Europe as well. This has the potential to be a massive revenue earner for the UK, generating potentially tens of thousands of jobs and millions of pounds of contributions. There are a number—dozens—of really innovative UK companies that are experimenting and working in this area. There is great export potential for the UK, and potentially many jobs—or rather, there are hundreds of jobs already.

I can understand the noble Baroness’s point—and I agree with her—that we should seek to minimise emissions as much as possible by processes such as fuel switching. But what would she say to those industrial plants that generate CO₂ as part of their processes rather than by heating? What about cement plants, for instance? Does she think that they should just close down? Should they not exist at all? These are the practical issues that, when dealing with policies that affect people’s jobs and livelihoods in the construction sector, we need to have a solution for rather than just airy-fairy academic views. As the CCC said, CCUS will be essential and is not an option. If the noble Baroness wants to make a point, I will be happy to hear it.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

I am not sure whether this is procedurally correct, but the Minister directed the question directly at me. Once we set up these CCUS plants and establish the contracts, as I said with reference to incinerators, we will need to feed them, whereas, if we look at different technologies that are being developed for cement, for steel or electric arc furnaces and so on, the point is to—as the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, said—have a transport modal shift. We need to plan for the shift in operations—in ways of doing things—rather than business as usual.

To address the point about the Climate Change Committee, we come back to the issues around growth and the assumption that we must have economic growth. If we look at social innovation and changing the way in which our society works, we are looking at a very different model for the future than is traditionally presented.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The noble Baroness is addressing issues that I never even raised. Her last point is for a completely different debate. Nobody is suggesting CCUS for transport emissions or steel emissions. Again, the noble Baroness is evading the central issue. Some industries have no choice but to produce CO₂. Anyway, it is a separate issue—let us get back to the debate that we are here for today.

These two instruments are broadly administrative in nature but outline vital operational procedures to enable the Government’s proposed business models for carbon capture, transport and storage. I start with the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jones, who asked for the directions of the counterparty and the register to be explained further. In relation to a direction to the counterparty, the counterparty would enter into and manage contracts at the direction of the Secretary of State and would be the conduit for HMG funding to successful projects. A direction to the counterparty would be a direction to offer to enter into a revenue support contract. The register would be a public register of contracts entered into, and the details that the counterparty would be required to publish are set out in the schedules to the regulations.

The noble Lord, Lord Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, asked about confidentiality. It is appropriate for companies to be able to protect commercially sensitive or privileged information—for example, information that relates to a company’s intellectual property. We expect redactions to be made to published contract information only when there is strong justification for doing so. Any redactions or exclusions in the contract do not, of course, limit what information must be disclosed in that public register.

The noble Lord, Lord Jones, asked for a definition of “cluster”. We would define it as carbon capture projects, onshore and offshore pipeline infrastructure, transport infrastructure and the associated offshore storage site, all located in a defined geographical area. We have two in the so-called track 1 process in the UK: one is the HyNet consortium in the north-west and Wales, and the other is on the east coast and is centred around Teesside and, to a certain extent, Humberside. There are two additional ones in Scotland as well as the Viking consortium, which will be in the so-called track 2 process.

The noble Lord, Lord Jones, asked about funding for CCUS, and the geography. We have announced up to £20 billion of funding for the early deployment of CCUS in the UK and, as I have just said, we aim to establish up to four clusters in the UK by 2030. The noble Lord might be a little more interested in the details of the projects of the HyNet consortium, which is located in north-west England and Wales. From memory, there is one project in Wales; it is at the Padeswood cement plant, which we are negotiating with at the moment. I think I am correct in saying that that is the one. We are currently in negotiations on eight projects and transport storage systems in total across the two clusters. We hope to reach final investment decisions by the third quarter of this year for the rollout and deployment of this technology. We have announced those first two clusters and the track1 negotiation list with, as I have said, eight projects selected through the cluster-sequencing projects to progress to negotiations by—I hope—the third quarter.

In addition, we announced two further clusters in July last year: the Acorn cluster in Scotland and Viking in Humberside. Again, those will be two additional T&S systems. We think that, after the first two, they will be best placed to deliver on our objectives—again, subject to appropriate due diligence, consenting, subsidy control, affordability and value-for-money assessments.

The noble Lord, Lord Jones, asked what the department’s understanding is of a reasonable return on investment. I would say that that is the six million dollar question, but it is probably a bit more than that. Of course, this is subject to ongoing contract commercial discussions with the relevant projects. The noble Lord can be assured that we are subjecting all the negotiations to precise considerations on value for money, subsidy control and affordability. As an indication of the scale of support, we have announced up to £20 billion for the early deployment of CCUS in the UK.