Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow those eloquent remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I will focus mine on the proposed removal of the statutory presumption of parental involvement as set out in the Bill. As your Lordships know, unsafe child contact has led to a number of terrible tragedies. I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the Minister at the beginning about the tireless and courageous work of Claire Throssell, who lost both her sons in the most tragic of circumstances.

I hope that we can all agree across the House that when thinking about child contact, we are broadly trying to achieve two things: first, that the contact arrangements for children decided by the family courts protect those children and the resident parent from harm; and secondly, that children should retain contact with both parents where it is safe to do so. My concern is that this Bill alone will not achieve either the former or the latter goal. It is not clear how the Government will protect children from harm without losing sight of the problem that the statutory presumption of parental involvement sought to address in the first place—that too many children lose contact with a parent after separation. We need to have confidence that the Government’s approach will deliver both safe contact and long-term involvement where appropriate.

The intention of Parliament, expressed by the Children’s Minister in the other place in 2013, was that

“having both parents involved in the child’s life is the right course where it is safe and in the child’s best interests”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/2/13; col. 56.]

The question now is whether the presumption contributed to unsafe decisions, whether it led to longer-term safe contact with the non-resident parent and what will best protect children in its place. Sadly, we do not have data that allows us to come to a firm view on any of these points. The Ministry of Justice’s 2025 review raises serious concerns, rightly, about unsafe contact and the pressure towards parental involvement, but it is not conclusive about the contribution of the statutory presumption. It states:

“The apparent high incidence of orders where there were indicators of risk suggested that the courts were ordering direct contact between children and parents who have caused or pose a risk of harm … Evidence around judicial decision-making suggested that the presumption was not routinely referenced by judges and magistrates when they made decisions about contested child arrangements orders. When it was referenced, the presumption was highlighted as only one of a number of factors the court must consider when making child arrangements orders”.


The report notes that the dataset used was at best patchy and the judgment sample was heavily concentrated in just one court.

The review also stated:

“The lack of a clear evidence base about the long-term outcomes of different forms of involvement ordered by the court was concerning”.


That same data desert on outcomes for children following their involvement in family court proceedings remains.

Today, I urge the Government that we must not legislate for unproven changes for children without a plan to test and evaluate those changes. These limitations do not diminish in any way the seriousness of the evidence that children have been exposed to unsafe contact, but the review itself acknowledges that the presumption is not the driving force behind the courts’ “no stone unturned” culture. What gives the Minister confidence that the repeal will change the unsafe decisions identified, and what further changes in practice are needed alongside it? If I may, I will suggest some options that I hope he can comment on when he closes, or perhaps he will write to me.

First, surely it is critical that such a determination must be based on the social work assessment, where one is required. Secondly, the consistent and proper use of practice direction 12J must be widely encouraged. Thirdly, there should be a proportionate use of fact-finding hearings. The removal of the presumption must be accompanied by leadership and culture change within the family justice system that prioritises these things and does not assume that the removal of a legislative provision will result in safety for children, because we all know that it will not. We also know that it is far harder to achieve that culture change than it is to amend a piece of legislation.

I am optimistic about what the new child-focused courts can achieve, but their success will depend on the quality of implementation. As an example, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and I were privileged to visit the specialist domestic abuse court in Westminster and witness the work of the Standing Together partnership, which really highlighted the importance of high-quality implementation. Although the family court and the criminal court models are, of course, different, the importance of specialist expertise is common to both. Will the Minister therefore set out the plan for training, funding and supporting the specialist domestic abuse services on which the child-focused court model depends? How will that competence be assessed, and who will be accountable where that specialist support is not available? How will that provision enable or otherwise the promised 40-day timescale for the filing of welfare assessments in the child-focused courts?

Finally, I urge the Government to establish a baseline before repeal takes effect, and commit to an independent evaluation reporting to Parliament on children’s safety, their experience of proceedings, and whether safe and beneficial relationships can be sustained. We need to know more than just what orders the court makes; we need to know what happens to the children who are affected by them.