Future Capability of the Armed Forces

Baroness Antrobus Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Antrobus (Lab)]

My Lords, I appreciate that this debate has already focused, and I am sure will continue to focus, on the challenges facing our Armed Forces—issues around funding, the defence investment plan and, of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, eloquently argued, the role of our reserves. I declare an interest, as my husband is a reservist.

However, in the context of a strategic defence review that put NATO first, and a defence investment plan which headlined our NATO commitment as its first priority in stepping up UK leadership, I want to focus on our Armed Forces’ nuclear deterrent capability. Sir Adam Thomson, former UK permanent representative to NATO, gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on Monday and made an important point that I wish to amplify in this Chamber.

The UK is one of only two European nuclear powers, and the only one that has committed its nuclear capability to NATO. In the DIP, our Government set out their key investment commitments, including to the UK nuclear deterrent. The plan committed to over £20 billion more investment in the defence nuclear enterprise over the next four years, compared with the previous four, to modernise the UK’s nuclear capabilities and the facilities that deliver them, including new submarines. This is a commitment that contributes significantly to European deterrence against our adversaries.

It also recommitted, following the original June 2025 announcement, to joining NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission. This will see the Royal Air Force, in the form of the acquisition of F35A combat aircraft, returning to the airborne nuclear role it relinquished in 1998. In the last 12 months, I have reconvened some of our now-retired RAF “Cold War warriors” from the Tornado, Jaguar and Nimrod aircraft forces to distil lessons from that era. Although there are many differences—the weapon will not be a UK weapon, the technology has changed vastly, and the likely readiness commitment will be significantly less—there is also much to learn from the past. I, of course, say that as a history scholar.

The Chief of the Air Staff and the Chief of the Defence Staff have both talked about the need for the RAF to rediscover its “nuclear IQ”. Those who joined the RAF during the Cold War were fully aware that they were joining a nuclear-armed force and that they might be stationed at a nuclear-armed base, regardless of their branch or trade. Now, the RAF is constituted almost entirely of personnel who joined after the Cold War, during the era of wars of choice. Similarly, politicians and the public have lived through the decades of expeditionary warfare.

This future airborne capability—the theme of today’s debate being, of course, future capability—will add an important rung to the escalation ladder. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, wrote in a recent paper, co-edited with Daniel Skeffington,

“the stronger …the ‘ladder’ … – through the possession of credible capabilities on a sliding scale between small arms and strategic weapons – the stronger the deterrent effect”.

To conclude, there are many challenges facing our Armed Forces, but I hope that my noble friend the Minister will agree that we should find, in Sir Adam’s words, “fresh ways” to emphasise the importance of our nuclear deterrent to the UK and to our NATO allies in Europe.