Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 20th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I offer Motion E1, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, my wholehearted support. I also say in passing that I wholeheartedly support Motion G1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

The Minister has once again explained that the mandation powers are intended to backstop the voluntary Mansion House agreement. She has tabled an amendment that simply limits the amount of assets the allocation of which may be mandated to no more than 10% by value and 5% in the UK, with the UK to be defined later. The Mansion House agreement is a voluntary agreement. If the Government have a mandation power, they are basically saying, “If you do not do this, we will force you”, which would mean that it is not, in reality, voluntary. The trustees would be forced to act against what they believe is in the best interests of scheme members. Why else would they not want to invest in these apparently fantastic assets?

Under the Bill—and the Minister’s amendment in lieu does not change this—the only exemption to that would be if the trustees could prove that the mandated asset allocation would cause,

“material financial detriment to members of the scheme”,

not just that it would not be in their best interests, but would cause material financial detriment. It cannot be right to force trustees to invest in a way that they would feel would cause any financial detriment, let alone material financial detriment, even if limited to just 10% by value.

The Minister’s amendment still does not put any restrictions around the type of assets or, indeed, specific assets that can be mandated. Here I very much disagree with what she said earlier. It does not limit it to the assets in the Mansion House agreement. Despite the proposed new subsection (5A), which requires the regulations to describe the examples that are listed in subsection (4), these remain just examples. Subsection (5) remains very clear that a qualifying asset does not have to be one of the examples. The Minister’s amendment does not change that in any way. I do not agree that the deletion of subsection (8) has any such effect. The Bill will now just be silent on the allocation of assets within the 10%. There is nothing here that stops mandation in a single asset type or class.

There is nothing here to prevent any future Government mandating any assets they please. While the Minister might point to the report that the Secretary of State must publish under subsection (12), which, among other things, sets out how the financial interests of members would be affected, it is important to note that that applies to only the first set of such regulations under this subsection. Any further future mandation, perhaps under a different Government, is subject to no such safeguard, just the negative process. Such assets could be mandated for any reason they wish to give. As an example, what if Nigel Farage were to find himself in a position of influence? He is a well-known enthusiast for and investor in cryptocurrencies. There is nothing in this Bill that would stop him mandating that the relevant funds should have 10% invested in cryptocurrency. Any Government could use this power to mandate whatever pet project they wanted. Let us be clear that the definition of assets in the Bill is sufficiently wide that it could be mandation into specific assets, specific projects, rather than a class, if that is what they wanted to do.

Even if it is to be used only as a backstop to the Mansion House agreement, is that such a good thing? Let us look at the example assets set out in the Bill. One is private debt. You do not have to be an avid reader of the financial pages to know that there are growing concerns about whether private debt may be the cause of the next big financial crisis. Many investors are trying to get out, which is why many large funds are now restricting redemptions. When someone like Jamie Dimon starts talking about cockroaches, we should take notice. Any sensible pension fund would be treating private credit with huge caution at the moment, but this is specifically one of the asset classes that the Government want to encourage and mandate. Government mandation of asset allocation has no place in the regulation of pensions. The fiduciary duty should remain sacrosanct. I urge all noble Lords to support the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, in her amendment.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has just said. I declare my interests as a non-executive director of a pension administration company and a board adviser to a master trust. I support all the amendments in this group, but I shall speak particularly to Motion E1 so ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

A fiduciary obligation is one of the highest standards of duty in common law, yet this Bill would override the best judgment of trustees. Although the 5% and 10% amendment laid by the Government is welcome, it does not deal with issues such as those outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. If trustees do not believe that the case for, for example, private assets is strong enough, they will still have to buy them or they will not be able to participate in auto-enrolment. This is not incentivisation. Incentivising financially, perhaps via tax reliefs, would change the calculation of the potential outcomes, but mandation does not do that.

The dangers of mistiming are clear. A McKinsey study published in February shows that, for example, private equity is under structural strain with constrained liquidity, valuation uncertainty and returns that have been weaker. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, outlined, the same applies to private credit, particularly that held in open-ended fund structures. In infrastructure, we have recently seen the returns offered for solar power degraded from in line with RPI to in line with CPI, which has put international investors off some of the infrastructure opportunities in the UK.

If the Government persist in their idea that closed-end funds, which are much more appropriate and have their own diversified, expertly managed portfolios of qualifying assets cannot qualify, that simply further reinforces the idea that the Government does not know best and that it is not safe for this House to authorise the Government to mandate these investments. Not all pension funds have the in-house capability to manage alternative or illiquid assets. Just being large does not give them instant expertise. Australian and Canadian funds have taken decades to build up this kind of ability. A strict time limit simply does not and cannot fit with the requirements that the Government seek to impose on pension schemes. I hope that noble Lords will stand firm in the resolve to send this back to the other place.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, before I start, I apologise to the Grand Committee for failing to be here to speak a previous amendment. It was unavoidable, unfortunately. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for stepping into the breach. I have had an exciting afternoon moving from R&R to pension schemes. I apologise that I am afraid I am going to be in the same position next week, so it will not be me speaking to my Amendment 119. Anyway, there we go.

I speak in support of Amendments 111, 161 and 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to which I have added my name. To be honest, I support all the amendments in this group that seek to remove the asset allocation mandation powers, which is probably the most controversial part of the Bill. The trustees or managers of pension schemes have an obligation to act in the best interests of scheme members. That is their fiduciary duty. It is not their job to carry out government policy and they should not be forced to act in a way that they may believe is not in the best interests of scheme members. That is the clear implication of mandation. If the assets that the Government wish to mandate are so suitable or attractive for the relevant scheme, the trustees would presumably already be investing in them. If mandation is required to force trustees to invest in such assets, it implies that they have decided that they are not suitable assets for the scheme. That drives a coach and horses through the whole fiduciary principle. As we will come to in a later group, personally I would feel very uncomfortable about taking up a trustee role in such circumstances.

It begs a range of questions. Who will be liable if the mandated assets perform poorly? The Bill is silent on this. Why should scheme members take a hit because of government policy? Are the trustees liable for any below-par performance? Why do the Government feel they know better than professional managers and trustees? I do not see any evidence at all that the Government are a better manager of investments. Who will decide on the asset allocation, and based on what criteria? There is nothing in Bill that sets out the purpose or criteria for the asset allocation: just some examples, including private equity, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, mentioned, which will be looked at in a different group. All the Bill says specifically is that the allocation may not include securities listed on a recognised exchange. How will the impact be measured and reported? The Bill does require the Secretary of State to publish a report setting out the expected impacts on scheme members and UK economic growth, but there are no reporting requirements on the actual outcomes.

Surely it would be better to try to understand why pension schemes are not currently investing in these so-called productive assets. What are the barriers to them doing so? That is not a rhetorical question; I would very much like to hear why the Minister thinks this has not been happening. What is, or has been, stopping the pension schemes investing in those assets they believe are so desirable? Surely, the better answer must be to try to remove those barriers, to make the assets more investable, rather than mandating, perhaps by refining regulation or adjusting tax—Gordon Brown’s dividend tax raid has, I am sure, quite a lot to do with this—or taking whatever other actions may be required to remove or reduce the identified barriers. Mandation is, frankly, the lazy option. We should identify and deal with the root causes if we want a sustainable solution.

The Government say they do not intend to use the mandation powers and, in some ways, that is worse than using them. The powers are there as a stick in the background, to force trustees to invest as they want, but without giving the trustees any of the protections that might exist if they could at least show they were acting as required by law. In any case, as a matter of principle, Governments should never take powers that they have no intention of using. This mandation power drives a coach and horses through the fundamental fiduciary duties of trustees. The Government say they do not intend to use it; it should be removed.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I echo the words of noble colleagues in the Committee about the dangers of the Government mandating any particular asset allocation, especially the concerns about mandating what is the highest risk and the highest cost end of the equity spectrum at a time when we are aware that pension schemes have probably been too risk-averse and are trying to row back from that.

What is interesting, in the context of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is that I was instrumental in setting up the Myners review in 1999, which reported in 2001, under the then Labour Administration. As Chancellor, Gordon Brown’s particular concern was about why pension funds do not invest much in private equity or venture capital. That was the remit of the review. The conclusions it reached were that we needed to remove the investment barriers, to change legislation, to encourage more asset diversification, to have more transparency and to address the short-term thinking driven by actuarial standards—at the time, it was the minimum funding requirement, which was far weaker than the regime established under the Pensions Regulator in 2004.

So this is not a new issue, but there was no consideration at that time of forcing pension schemes to invest in just this one asset class. The barriers still exist. In an environment where pension schemes have been encouraged, for many years, to think that the right way forward is to invest by reducing or controlling risk and to look for low cost, it is clear that the private equity situation would not fit with those categories. Therefore, I urge the Government to think again about mandating this one area of the investment market, when there are so many other areas that a diversified portfolio could benefit from, leaving the field open for the trustees to decide which area is best for their scheme.

I am particularly concerned that, as has been said in relation to previous groups, private equity and venture capital have had a really good run. We may be driving pension schemes to buy this particular asset class at a time when we know that private equity funds are trying to set up continuation vehicles—or continuation of continuation vehicles—because they cannot sell the underlying investments at reasonable or profitable prices and are desperately looking for pools of assets to support those investments, made some time ago, which would not necessarily be of benefit to members in the long run.