Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Report stage
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I also thank the Minister for having listened to the points that were made in our previous debates about the importance of ACSPs’ verification statements being made publicly available and for making this comprehensive suite of amendments. Indeed, I think he has gone further than my original amendments on the subject and the Bill is considerably strengthened as a result. I am extremely grateful.

Perhaps I may add one quick word in support of Amendment 93 from the noble Lord, Lord Agnew. A very high number of the ACSPs are going to be authorised and regulated by HMRC, and it is an unfortunate truth that such regulation is not the principal function of HMRC. Accordingly, that regulation has been somewhat light-touch. I ask the Minister to reassure us that considering how HMRC carries out this role will be an important part of the forthcoming consultation on AML regulation? The only requirement to become an ACSP is to be regulated for AML, so we need to make sure that regulation is robust and that only genuine, suitable persons are therefore authorised.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and congratulate him on this suite of amendments. I know that my noble friend is keen that this should be a really landmark Bill and that he has worked really hard to listen carefully and ensure that it is as robust as it can be. I know his dedication to this matter, and I thank him for it.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I add my support to my noble friend Lady Stowell’s Amendments 87, 88 and 89 and congratulate her and her committee on their work. I also support Amendment 80 from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and Amendments 105 and 106 from the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. As I said at Second Reading, this is a vital issue that must be covered in this Bill. In this group, we are discussing threats and lawsuits whose intention is to silence, intimidate or censor critics such as investigative journalists. So often, as the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, explained so well, they stem from economic crime.

This issue is not just about actual lawsuits. As others have said, often the matter will start with a threatening letter or even a phone call, which is enough to stop journalists or investigators from pursuing inquiries. That is why so few SLAPPs have come to court. I respectfully disagree with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier on whether the few cases are any indication of whether this legislation and these amendments are required. These threats and vexatious potential lawsuits threaten not just journalists, campaigners, authors or academics but everyone’s rights in this country. They limit the rights of the public to have matters exposed, such as bribe-taking, poisoning water supplies with toxic chemicals, or general economic wrongdoing, which falls squarely within the remit of this Bill. Our courts are supposed to be there to protect ordinary people and small companies without large resources against those with more power, money and influence. Without these amendments, that protection will be fundamentally weakened when we have an opportunity to strengthen it.

I am not a lawyer, but Amendment 80 seems sensible to me. I believe that the Law Society supports judiciary-led gatekeeping. Amendments 87, 88 and 89 from my noble friend Lady Stowell seek to remove the incentives to issue these kinds of threats by introducing properly meaningful fines and intend that payments should not be able to come from the proceeds of economic crime. Again, that seems eminently sensible. I will listen carefully to my noble and learned friend but, equally, I urge him to listen carefully to the powerful arguments across all sides of this Committee and either accept these amendments or introduce his own.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether I can speak to this, being neither a journalist nor a lawyer. I am very sympathetic to what these amendments are trying to do. It must be right to try to prevent the abuse going on. However, I confess to feeling some niggling doubts. Journalists do not get everything right, and there are those who are not above embellishment or exaggeration. The balance of power is not only one way. A small company or individual may well find themselves up against a large media organisation, for example. Whatever we do, we must not make it harder or more expensive for innocent parties to defend themselves from unfair reporting, pre-emptively if necessary.

There is a balance to be found, and I am not yet convinced that these amendments quite reach it. That said, I agree that there is a problem with the current situation. It is being abused, and we need action sooner rather than later. So let us have the discussion and get something into the Bill. If not now, when?

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 30th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to support Amendment 32, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to which I have added my name. I should add that I also wholeheartedly support Amendment 8, but I will restrict my comments to Amendment 32.

While there seems to be general support for the introduction of this new type of pension—collective money purchase schemes, or CMPs; I am going to try very hard not to call them CDCs as we go through this—they are not without risk. As we discussed at some length in Committee, one of the greatest risks that is often raised in respect of CMPs relates to intergenerational fairness. Indeed, at the extreme, in a situation where no returns are being earned but pension levels are maintained for existing pensioners, the pensions being paid would be dependent on the funds being put by new joiners, as in a Ponzi scheme. That is very extreme, as I say, but it demonstrates that there is the possibility of one cohort being disadvantaged by the treatment of another cohort. If existing pensioners are paid too much, those currently paying in will suffer, and if the scheme is overcautious in what it pays out to pensioners, pensioners will suffer and current workers will gain.

This is not theoretical. We only need to look at what is happening in the Netherlands to see that the question of whether to cut benefits when returns are not as good as expected is a real and current issue. In a standard defined contribution scheme, the risk is not pooled, so the issue does not arise. In a defined benefit scheme, the matter is dealt with by the employer making up the difference. However, in a CMP, there is no possibility of that happening. If you want to maintain the level of pensions when returns are low, the future pensions of those still contributing will be impacted and vice versa, so the issue of intergenerational fairness is specific to CMP schemes.

It is also worth pointing out that CMPs have implications for not only intergenerational fairness but fairness more generally. For example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, if someone wants to transfer their fund out of a scheme, how do you value their share? The benefits that arise from the scheme are uncertain, being targets only, so if you value a transfer based on the target benefits, which seems to be what is proposed, that will not take account of the risk that those benefits may not be achieved. In that situation, the person transferring out is getting a better deal than those staying, unless that risk is taken into account in the transfer valuation. The issue is complicated further because of the pooling of longevity risk in a CMP. For example, if someone has just a couple of years to live, there would be a strong incentive for them to take their money out to the detriment of those staying in.

Given that fairness is the single most commonly raised risk that relates to CMPs, it is curious that there is no explicit mechanism in the Bill to deal with it. In our previous discussions, we were pointed in the direction of Clause 18 to see how the matter is dealt with, but in fact that clause sets out only how benefits and so on will be calculated and says that regulations will be made in that respect; nowhere does it mention the critical question of fairness. I imagine that that is because it has been based on other pension legislation, which, as I said, does not suffer from this risk.

Amendment 32 introduces as very simple means by which to ensure that intergenerational fairness and fairness more generally must be assessed by the trustees. Given the importance of this issue, I urge the Minister to consider it really seriously.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I have enormous sympathy with the aims of the two amendments in this group. Amendment 8, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake, Lady Sherlock and Lady Bowles, was expertly moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and deals with situations where a pension scheme may not have enough money to meet its obligations and there is a risk that it will need to draw on the funds in the members’ pension pot rather than have money coming in from outside.

As I mentioned in debate on earlier stages of the Bill, I am particularly concerned about the situation where a scheme has had a triggering event or is winding up and may not have sufficient administrative budget to cope with, for example, a significant IT failure in which member records are lost or transposed from one to another so that it is an enormous job to unscramble each member’s entitlement. The costs of that work can be significant; if no reserves are in place to meet those costs and the employer is in financial difficulties, what will a CMP scheme be able to do to fund the costs of sorting out the records? It is true that the aims of the CMP scheme as set out in the Bill will be to have central estimated assumptions for guiding benefit adjustments to ensure that there is no difference of treatment between different members, but on the particular issue that I am referring to and that Amendment 8 refers to, the continuity strategy outlined in the Bill is supposed to have money to meet a triggering event, including its costs, but may not do so.

Therefore, as I understand it, the thrust of this amendment is to ensure that the Pensions Regulator requires a separate capital buffer, or that an insurance arrangement will cover the costs incurred in winding up, or that, in exceptional circumstances, the costs required to administer the scheme are met other than from members’ funds. When we set up this new regime, it is important that we make sure that we cater for eventualities that we do not expect to happen but which we know could in theory happen. Having seen with defined benefit schemes the devastating impact of scheme wind-up without sufficient resources and the amounts of money taken out of defined benefit schemes when an employer has failed or walked away from the scheme—those cases have reduced the amounts available for pensioners, in some cases to zero—there is a real need to look at some catastrophe insurance, disaster-type insurance or capital buffer of some kind to make sure that we have catered for that before it happens.

I think it would be wise for my noble friend to consider what else might be done over and above what is in the Bill. I also look forward to her answer to the specific question asked by noble Lords about what would happen in practice should a scheme require money that does not currently exist within the fund, other than in members’ entitlement pots, to cover the costs of wind-up. Of course CMP does not give each person an individual pot, but if the overall assets have to be raided to meet these costs, their pensions will be impacted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 50 I will also speak to Amendment 51 in my name. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, for their support and the Minister and officials for the time they have given to discuss the issue on a number of occasions.

Both these amendments relate to a similar concern: shareholders of companies with pension deficits removing excessive value from companies and thereby increasing the risk relating to their pension schemes. We had a long discussion about this in Committee, so I shall try not to duplicate that too much, but I will briefly explain the issue for those coming to this for the first time. I suggest that events since Committee have conspired to make the matter more rather than less relevant.

The Bill introduces a requirement that the regulator should be notified in advance of notifiable events and that the notification should be accompanied by a description of how the notifiable event might impact the pension scheme and what is being done to mitigate that impact. The Bill does not say what those notifiable events will be; they are to be prescribed in future.

However, it is understood that the Government intend these to be, first, the sale of all or a material proportion of the assets or business and, secondly, the granting of security on a debt in priority to a debt of the scheme. An email I received from the regulator describes the purpose of the notifiable event regime as being to act as an early warning system so that it is alerted to corporate actions that may have a detrimental impact on the scheme and that it may otherwise not have been aware of.

The easiest way for shareholders to remove value from a company is through either a dividend or a share buyback. While the regulator will be able to find out about these after the event, it has no way of seeing them in advance. Once the money has gone, it is too late; it is very hard to recover, especially if it has gone abroad. We have seen high-profile examples of companies going under after large dividends have been paid, leaving pension schemes with deficits—BHS and Carillion being just the two most high-profile ones. It is not a theoretical risk and, sadly, recent events have made such situations only more likely.

The Government rightly argue that we should not restrict the payment of normal, reasonable dividends; I completely agree with them. Restricting the payment of normal, non-excessive dividends could have a negative effect on the company and therefore on the pension scheme. Anyway, many dividends end up in pension schemes. It is only excessively high dividends, compared with the deficit repair payments, that I am trying to catch here. Even then, I am asking only that they be notified in advance so that the regulator can consider whether they have a negative impact on the pension scheme. I am not trying to block them, despite some noble Lords wishing that were the case.

Secondly, the Government also rightly argue that we should not overburden the regulator with too many unnecessary notifications. Again, I agree with them, so I have changed the amendment we discussed in Committee so that Amendment 51 now allows the regulator to set the level of dividend at which it should be notified. Share buybacks are a less common action, so I suggest that they should always be a notifiable event.

Amendment 50 simply says that any company with a pension deficit should notify a share buyback to the regulator in advance. Amendment 51 says that a company with a deficit should notify the regulator in advance if the dividend is bigger than the deficit repair contribution and the deficit repair period is longer than a period to be specified by the regulator.

It is interesting to note that if a company borrows more than £50 million under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme, the Government forbid it to pay dividends, make a buyback or pay a bonus. They have taken that view presumably because they are worried that if it pays a dividend or a buyback it will increase the risk of non-payment of the loan.

By contrast, we are allowing companies that owe large sums to their pension schemes and deferred salaries to their employees to pay whatever they want without even a notification. That feels slightly like “one rule for us”. I do not think that the Minister will accept these amendments, and I would prefer not to push them to a Division. The Bill allows the Government to prescribe events as notifiable events in the future. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, has kindly confirmed to me that the Government will keep the issue of dividends and share buybacks under review, and take appropriate action if they or the regulator feel that they are becoming a potential problem. If the Minister could kindly confirm that understanding for the record, I will not seek to divide the House over these amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for moving these two important amendments. I have added my name to Amendment 50, which requires share buybacks to be notified to the regulator if a company is responsible for a pension scheme in deficit.

The case for accepting this amendment seems quite overwhelming. The noble Lord has been extremely reasonable in only requiring notification of a buyback. Equity buybacks are sometimes used by companies to distribute to shareholders what is considered surplus cash where management believes that it has no better use for that money. That suggests that sometimes, management believes that the current share price is undervalued. Of course, the buyback improves reported earnings per share and flatters financial statements, but these measures are sometimes used as a yardstick to determine top executives’ pay or bonuses. Many receive a large element of their compensation in the form of stock options, and a buyback can offset the dilution of existing share values and any potential reduction in earnings per share that might otherwise come from their options. Therefore, buybacks could be considered a ploy to boost reported earnings per share or share price levels.

It should be remembered that although the buyback may increase earnings per share, it does not increase the fundamental value of the company. Even more worrying, sometimes, companies engage in buybacks funded by increased borrowing. One of the reasons given for taking on the increased debt to fund such a buyback is that it is more efficient, because the interest on the debt is tax-deductible, unlike with dividends. However, clearly, this will reduce the financial resilience of the company when the debt must be repaid or the gearing level rises, leaving less money available to fill a pension deficit.

A company’s financial difficulty results from lack of cash, not lack of profits, and for a company which sponsors a defined benefit pension scheme with a deficit, the buyback would allow shareholders to enjoy rewards at the expense of pensioners. Ultimately, if the cash has gone into buying shares, it is no longer available to fill the deficit. The buyback itself cannot be argued to generate future growth, because a company’s investing its cash in the business would be a reason to suggest that it will be better off as a result of that decision. However, where spare cash is simply given to shareholders to boost share prices and potentially boost management remuneration, this requires some oversight by the regulator.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I want to speak briefly in support of Amendment 63. I have also added my name to Amendment 65. As the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has just outlined, consumer protection has to be paramount. There has to be significant concern that, once a dashboard is up and running, we will need to learn lessons before further activity takes place. If we have a public service dashboard for a minimum of a year, we will have chances to learn lessons that otherwise might not be learned—particularly in light of such issues as data concerns, types of protected benefits and requirements for MaPS guidance. I am most grateful to the Minister for accepting the concept of requiring MaPS advice or guidance before any transfers. This is an important issue. I therefore hope that the Government will recognise the necessity of ensuring that private dashboards do not start before the public dashboard has been tried, tested and reported upon in Parliament.

The principle of Amendment 68, tabled by my noble friend Lord Young, is right. I would just advise caution on the issue of data accuracy and the lack of data standards, and the fact that it may simply not be possible for a dashboard and the data to be ready in the timescale he is suggesting, but the thrust of it and having an end date is absolutely the right way forward.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden [V]]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. This amendment is very simple. It seeks to ensure a period of a year from the establishment of the publicly operated dashboard before competing commercial dashboards are allowed to operate. This may seem a small point, but it is quite important. Dashboards are a new concept and will include large amounts of sensitive and complex data from many sources. We do not yet know how they will used, whether the current design concepts are suitable in practice and whether changes will need to be made to ensure that they operate well and safely. Therefore, it must make sense for the system to be tried out in one place, with proper controls, and reviewed and reported upon, before we open it up to the commercial world. This period of a year will allow us to see how a dashboard is used and whether any unforeseen problems and consequences arise.

I am grateful to the ABI for its commentary on the amendments to this Bill, but I am afraid that I disagree with it on this matter. The ABI is right that making dashboards as accessible as possible is desirable, but that must be done in a way that ensures that unforeseen consequences are avoided. As I mentioned in an earlier debate today, a bad dashboard is worse than no dashboard. A year’s grace period to ensure that what the noble Lord, Lord Young, called the plumbing is working well, and to make any tweaks, seems a common-sense safeguard.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 45, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. In Committee, I tabled a similar amendment but am happy to support his more robust version. I remind the House of my interests as a chartered accountant.

It is good to see that the Government have tabled Amendments 37 and 38, which would reinstate for another 15 months the power that the Government already had to improve the regulation of connected party pre-packs but which they allowed to lapse, possibly unintentionally. That amendment is most welcome but it does not address the urgency of the situation: the fact that we are facing a substantial rise in insolvencies very soon. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, memorably described it in Committee as a storm that is bound to come.

It is inevitable that we will see many more pre-packs to related parties in the coming months. Another high-profile potential related-party pre-pack is being talked about just today: Go Outdoors, which is owned by JD Sports. As we have heard, many may well be entirely appropriate and even a good thing, However, they lack transparency and we are likely to see many others, such as the Quiz transaction, which the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, so graphically described in Committee, which are nothing less than a rip-off of creditors. We need something to deal with the immediate risk, not just a power to take action which might or might not be used for another year, or even at all.

I confess that I struggle to understand why the Government find it so difficult to accept this amendment, which would introduce at least some independent review and transparency into this murky area of insolvency practice. The main argument put forward by the Minister is that the insolvency profession is highly regulated with strong professional standards, and that we can rely on it to ensure that all transactions are appropriate. But that is self-evidently not the case: there are so many past examples of inappropriate pre-packs that it is clear that we cannot just rely on the industry to police itself. Conflicts of interest are legion. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, explained in Committee and has repeated today how insolvency practitioners can, and do, tick the boxes by spurious marketing of the business, thereby covering the administrators’ derrière—what used to be known in my accountancy days as CYA.

The Minister explicitly recognised the concerns about connected party pre-packs at Second Reading and has done so again today, which is very welcome. He has also argued that making referral mandatory would be an additional burden on business at a difficult time. But the pre-pack pool aims to give an opinion with just half a day’s work and at a cost of just £800 to the connected party—not really a significant burden. He also asked in Committee whether it is right to restrict the required opinion to one source of supply, but that is rather like the old joke: why is there only one monopolies commission?

Why are the Government finding it so difficult to accept this amendment? Perhaps they do not believe that the pre-pack pool is the right answer. Did the Minister disagree with Teresa Graham, who produced the report for the Government that led to the creation of the pool, when she said recently:

“To see the demise of the pre-pack pool would be utter folly”?


The letter that the Minister sent to the pool, and his answers to questions in Committee, were certainly less than fulsome in their support. If that is the case, there is an easy answer for him. The immediate solution is, first, to make referral to the pre-pack pool mandatory now, as this amendment suggests. With one short amendment, at a stroke we will have instantly made independent review compulsory, improved transparency and reduced the risk to the moratorium as well. There would be no new bodies or processes; it would have minimal cost and bureaucracy. It would not in any way inhibit those situations where the proposed pre-pack is appropriate.

Subsequently, if the Government still do not believe that the pre-pack pool is the right long-term solution, they have the power to propose something better at any time within the next 15 months under their Amendment 37. We have the best of both worlds: an instant, simple solution and the luxury of time to create something better. I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 45. If he does not, then I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, will test the opinion of the House. We have a clear duty to prevent creditors being ripped off in this coming storm.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I will be brief. I very much support the wise words of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I welcome Amendments 37 and 38, and I cannot quite understand the reluctance of the Government to agree to this amendment; I know that there has been significant discussion on it.

Clearly, any pre-pack can have positive effects, but the transparency and oversight issues, particularly in the current emergency environment, surely require some modicum of independent oversight. We have the pool ready to go and are in a position where we could anticipate problems, rather than trying to deal with them after they have arisen, when it is too late for the small creditors that could be so damaged by the egregious practices that we in this House have all heard about, and many noble Lords have previously explained.

I hope that my noble friend can give sufficient reassurances to the House on this issue. However, I will support Amendment 45, should that not be possible.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I metaphorically rise to support Amendment 57 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and to speak to my very similar Amendment 61. Both relate to pre-packs.

The Minister said yesterday that pre-packs are

“a useful tool that allows businesses and jobs to be saved.”—[Official Report, 16/6/20; col. 2092.]

I do not think that anyone disagrees with that. Equally, few disagree that pre-pack deals with related parties involve clear conflicts of interest and raise serious transparency concerns—speaking of which, I can now see noble Lords, which is a great benefit. Indeed, at Second Reading the Minister directly recognised these concerns.

The 2014 Graham report, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, very clearly set out its findings that related party pre-packs often involve limited, if any, marketing and on average achieve worse outcomes for creditors. There is truth in the perception of creditors being dumped while directors sail on unharmed with their phoenix company.

The Pre Pack Pool was created in 2015 to introduce an element of independent review into connected party pre-packs. The hope was that this could be a voluntary process, but, sadly, this has not worked; only around 10% of pre-packs have been referred. I am afraid this confirms my slightly cynical view of how the insolvency industry works in practice. The Government had the power to fix this, as we have heard, under the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, pointed out, this expired two or three weeks ago.

I was initially tempted by her approach, as set out in Amendment 60—which, incidentally, should have been in this group—simply to reinstate the power to regulate. However, the Government did not use that power for five years, so I have limited confidence that they would do so in another year. Anyway, as we debated yesterday, this Bill already has more than enough powers to regulate.

The Minister said at Second Reading that:

“If strengthening of professional standards and the existing regulation do not deliver increased creditor confidence in connected pre-pack sales, the Government will look to bring forward further legislation.”—[Official Report, 9/6/20; col. 1728.]


That was very welcome, but fixing this issue is more urgent than that, given the current situation, and, frankly, it is already clear that professional standards and existing regulations are not working. Yesterday, the Minister praised the ethical and professional standards of the insolvency industry, saying that we should rely on those for independence and so on. That is touchingly naive—that might be the first time anyone has described the Minister in those terms.

Just last week, there were three high-profile pre-packs to related parties, which attracted a high degree of negative publicity. Only one was referred to the pool. Sadly, there are likely to be many more in coming months. Surely the Minister agrees that we should make sure these happen more transparently? As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has pointed out, we may lose the Pre Pack Pool altogether if we do not take action. It wrote to the Minister to say that it is not sustainable under the current voluntary approach. The industry is also in favour; R3 has said that it would like to see action.

Making referral of connected pre-pack sales to the Pre Pack Pool mandatory in this Bill seems the obvious solution. It is very simple and could start working immediately; no new bodies need to be created and there are no material costs involved. Everything needed already exists. The Pre Pack Pool takes a very light-touch approach and can act quickly, so I strongly urge the Minister to include a clause to this effect in the Bill. It may not be enough in the longer term and we should continue to monitor pre-packs, but making referral mandatory would at least improve transparency with no material cost or complication. It would be very helpful if the Minister could give us his views on the usefulness of the Pre Pack Pool—whether he agrees it is unsustainable on a voluntary basis and whether he thinks it matters if it ceases to exist.

There is one subtle difference between my Amendment 61 and Amendment 57 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson; mine says simply that a connected pre-pack deal cannot go ahead until it has been referred and the Pre Pack Pool has reported. The noble Lord’s amendment is more robust, saying that the report must also be positive. I would be happy with either approach. We need to improve transparency to prevent creditors being unfairly dumped, however we do it.

[Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I echo the words of previous speakers. I have added my name to Amendment 61 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I also support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has said, either approach would at least give a fighting chance of avoiding the sort of gaming of creditors that we have seen so often in the past. Indeed, when I was first involved in the pensions system in the early 2000s, the insolvency restructuring that pre-packs have sometimes engaged in was widespread as a means of dumping the defined benefit pension liabilities.

I fear that this Bill will pave the way for the same type of activity, to the detriment of the Pension Protection Fund and all employers sponsoring defined benefit pension schemes. Therefore, I urge my noble friend to take these amendments seriously; I plead that he look at the activities of the Pre Pack Pool and move to a mandatory approach, which, as has been so well described, would clearly better protect against the sorts of corporate activity that have so often brought capitalism into disrepute.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd March 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

I am staggered by the numbers on the cost of doing this that are bandied around. As far as I can see, the main work here is formatting data into a consistent format so that it can be uploaded to whichever platform it needs to be uploaded to. Frankly, the creation of a platform is pretty trivial stuff. It is not dramatically different to what happened with open banking in that respect; that was a question of formatting data and ensuring that it was in a consistent format. Do we have any idea of the open banking process costs so that we can compare them—and, if they are dramatically different, ask why?

[Baroness Altmann]

I echo the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. A number of elements of the expense shown in the impact assessment are elements that one would have hoped that the industry would take upon itself in any case. I sometimes need to remind providers that automatic enrolment has been an absolute gift to them. It has brought them 10 million new customers on a plate, with all the associated tax relief money. Surely they need to take an obligation upon themselves to modernise their processes and bring their IT into the 21st century. The standard answer is: “It’ll cost too much”, or, “We’ve got our own system, we don’t want to change to a new one”, but in Australia, the Government mandated a particular system that everybody had to adopt so that there was a common standard. It worked very well. My noble friend suggested that the industry delivery group is working on such a potential procedure, which would be excellent. It would incur costs but it would set the industry up for much more business in future on a long-term, sustainable basis.