(2 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the excellent speech by the hon. Member for Crawley (Henry Smith) in proposing new clause 2. I pay tribute to his commitment to this cause, which has been a long-standing one for him and his constituents. I wish to put on record the Opposition’s support for the new clause, which seeks to rectify the long-standing injustice in British nationality law that affects a relatively small number of people—Chagossian people, descendants of the Chagos islanders, who were forcibly removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory in the 1960s. The fact that British citizenship does not automatically pass to second and third generation Chagossians despite some of them migrating to the UK with their British parents as very young children is nothing short of a scandal. I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will support new clause 2.
Whereas the hon. Member for Crawley is seeking to rectify an injustice, the Nationality and Borders Bill does the opposite and seeks to create chaos and injustice. I will focus my comments on part 1. Clause 9 provides the Government with dangerous and unprecedented powers to deprive UK nationals of citizenship, without warning. We are wholeheartedly opposed to this. Through clause 9, the Government seek to amend the long-standing position under the British Nationality Act 1981 that an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their nationality. It exempts the Government from giving notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship if authorities do not have the subject’s contact details or if it is not “reasonably practical” to do so. The Government’s proposal also allows such secret deprivations to take place solely on the basis that the Home Office deems it “in the public interest” or in the interest of “foreign relations”. Effectively, this means that the Home Secretary can strip someone of their citizenship without informing them because it would be internationally embarrassing for her to do so. This abhorrent proposal therefore enables the Government to remove basic fairness, on top of an already dangerous power.
Like many measures in the Bill, there is no practical reason for this change. Present rules already allow for citizenship deprivation letters to be delivered to an individual’s last known address. The real purpose of this rule appears to be to introduce measures that remove the right to appeal. These measures make lawful previously unlawful citizenship stripping. They ask Parliament to pretend that an unlawful decision was lawful all along. It is shameful and Orwellian in equal measure.
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could cast his mind back to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, where, for the first time, people who had acquired British citizenship through birth were made subject to citizenship deprivation powers. So what he has just commented on was brought in and voted through by a Labour Government. Could he address that point?
As I mentioned, any reasons to strip people of citizenship are given on notice, but this deprives people of the right to—
I do not agree with the principle of it: it should be done on notice.
Clause 9 means that individuals will not be able to challenge deprivation of their nationality as they will not be aware or told that they are no longer British citizens, and the time limit for appeal may run out before the individual becomes aware that their rights have been stripped. As Reprieve has pointed out, under these proposals, a person accused of speeding would be afforded more rights than someone at risk of being deprived of their British nationality.
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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The hon. Member makes an excellent point. It is the loss of those safeguards after the Policing and Crime Act introduced RUI, in effect to replace bail, that I am highlighting in my speech. It is easy to understand why this has happened: huge reductions in police and Crown Prosecution Service resources under austerity make it extremely difficult for evidence to be collected within the timeframes imposed by bail conditions.
I am a former criminal legal aid defence solicitor, and in preparing for the debate I spoke to a number of colleagues still involved in the area. They say that people can be in the RUI process for more than 12 months, but from the start, when a statement is taken by the police, to the end, 12 months later, the statement and evidence are the same—nothing happens between the two dates. Therefore, a charging decision could have been made right at the start rather than after a prolonged wait. I would welcome the hon. Member’s comments on that.
I agree with the hon. Member, who is entirely right about the taking of the statement, which provides the potential for charging early on. However, there is an issue with collecting digital data held on phones and other devices, which may need investigation. I will come to that.
Decreasing police resources make it increasingly difficult to complete investigations within a 28-day period as required under bail. When introducing RUI at Second Reading of the Policing and Crime Bill, the then Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), said:
“In the case of pre-charge bail, it is apparent that a significant number of individuals have spent an inordinate amount of time on bail only to end up not being charged or, if charged, found not guilty. Of course, the police and prosecution need time to assemble and test the evidence, particularly in complex cases, before coming to a charging decision, but we need to recognise the stress caused when people are under investigation for prolonged periods, and the disruption to their lives where they are subject to onerous bail conditions.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 45.]
However, the added time flexibility in the justice system given by release under investigation is coming at a dangerous cost. The available data indicates that tens of thousands of dangerous individuals are being investigated for a crime under no conditions and with no time limit. Victims can be targeted again by a perpetrator, and some case studies demonstrate that that is happening.
The super-complaint from the Centre for Women’s Justice detailed case studies of victims of domestic violence and rape. A woman in Yorkshire reported her ex-husband for repeatedly raping her during their 13-year marriage. He was released by the police after interview with no conditions. He forced his way into her house at 2 am, held her hostage for five hours, cut her with a broken glass and tied her to a table.
The Law Society has also uncovered examples. A solicitor’s client, who had been arrested for rape and bailed, was accused of a further sexual offence against the same complainant. They were placed under RUI for the original rape accusation due to bail not being extended. Let us consider that for a moment: an alleged rapist is left entirely free to contact, intimidate and even attack their victim again. That is an utter failure of the system. Here is another example: an individual in the west midlands was arrested for murder and then placed on bail, but after the bail expired they were placed under RUI. Again, a potentially extremely dangerous individual is left entirely free to commit a crime or intimidate witnesses.
How can that be acceptable? I argue that it is not. The bail system is not perfect by a long stretch, but allowing possibly tens of thousands of dangerous criminals to be entirely free to reoffend before a trial is dangerous—especially for the victims of domestic violence. It is a sad but known fact that virtually all domestic abuse-related crimes are of a repeat nature. It is therefore essential that bail conditions are used to safeguard victims while an investigation is ongoing, yet the big reduction in the use of bail and the huge increase in RUI means that highly dangerous offenders are released while investigations are ongoing. As Women’s Aid points out, there is absolutely nothing to stop highly dangerous domestic abusers contacting their victims or going to their homes.
Again, it is clear that part of the problem relates to a severe lack of resources and cuts. Because the initial bail period is only 28 days, an extension must be approved by a superintendent. That procedure imposes a big administrative burden on police forces, who, it seems, therefore avoid using bail altogether and instead release suspects under investigation. Unless the police are given sufficient resources to investigate crimes, the use of RUI will continue to spiral.
It is clear that RUI is creating a situation where vulnerable victims may be made more vulnerable and their lives placed in danger, but, looked at from the other side, its use is also grossly unfair to those accused of committing a crime and yet to be found guilty. They are essentially left in limbo for long periods—sometimes more than a year—with no updates or no indication from the police about if or when the case will progress.
I recently spoke to a barrister in my constituency who said she has a client who stands accused of serious sexual violence along with others. The allegation was made within 24 hours of the incident in 2017. All the suspects were arrested and interviewed within a matter of weeks, and they were all released on RUI. The investigation continued, but the defendants were not charged until the beginning of 2019. The trial has been fixed for a date in 2020, almost three years after the allegation was made. There can be little doubt that both the complainant and the defendants will be affected by that significant and serious delay.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I think that was the intention. At the time, there were significant cases where bail was constantly extended, so it was designed to allow the police to investigate further, but it has had an adverse effect and needs to be reformed.
In another case study, my constituent said that she has a youth client who has been subject to RUI for more than 15 separate investigations. It has not been possible to find out the details of each RUI or the status of the investigations. Accordingly, her client could end up being charged after he turns 18 in relation to allegations that date back to when he was 16. If that happens and he pleads or is found guilty, the court will not be able to impose any youth sentences such as referral orders or youth rehabilitation orders. Under the law, we have an important principle of innocent until proven guilty. It is not reasonable for suspects or victims to have to put up with such delays. Again I repeat: justice delayed becomes justice denied.
Data from police forces that have provided it shows that the average time people are subject to RUI is shockingly long, ranging from 114 to 228 days. There are cases where RUI has gone on for years. Let us pause for a minute and consider the impact of that on suspects—let us remember, they remain innocent until proven guilty. They are left unaware of what is happening with their case, whether they remain a suspect or whether the police are even investigating their case. Such uncertainty creates enormous stress, which can impact on personal and family lives as well as employment.
The Law Society has unearthed case studies that illustrate that. In one case, an elderly man was interviewed about allegations of sexual abuse in a care home in 2015-16 and released under investigation. He received no updates on the case despite five letters from his solicitor to the CPS. The man, now aged 82, was finally told at the start of June 2019 that he would not be prosecuted. Unsurprisingly, the length of the process placed extreme strain on the man and his wife, who is seriously ill.
As I said at beginning of the debate, some straightforward changes to the system could be implemented. I am glad that the Government are embarking on a review, and I was heartened to hear that they today agreed to commence their consultation on pre-charge bail. It is pleasing to see that, in the consultation document, they recognise the impact of longer investigations, the need for better resourcing and the need for regular updates to victims and the accused on RUI. I would be interested to know more about their proposed new framework following the consultation, and I hope that my speech today is considered part of that consultation.
Does the hon. Gentleman feel there is any merit in going back to the system that I well remember—of giving the custody sergeant the right to charge for certain offences? The question, which the hon. Gentleman is eloquently putting across, is about the delay in investigations. In my experience, an investigation can be done in the first 24 hours in the vast majority of cases, as very little changes. X says Y has done it, and Y says, “I haven’t done it,” and that is it for the majority of cases. The idea that most cases are extremely complex and need weeks, or even months, to be reviewed is not correct. In my view, we should go back to the old system, where the custody sergeant was able to assess the evidence there and then. From my experience over many years, that did not do justice any harm whatever.
The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point. We need to review the process that takes place before charging, but we now live in an age where more information has to be collected from phones and digitally, which takes up a fair amount of resources.
It is vital that the following issues are taken into account by the Government. First, it is essential that RUI incorporates time limits. It is understandable that the bail system needed reform. Time limits attached to bail have often been unrealistic in terms of dealing with huge amounts of digital and social media evidence, which is now often relevant to cases. It has been suggested to me by a senior police figure that a longer and staggered time period, with different levels of approval, might make bail work better. However, it is still essential that time limits of some kind are brought into the RUI system so that victims and suspects are no longer left in limbo. For these time limits to work, it is also vital that the police, the CPS and criminal lawyers are properly resourced.
Secondly, while the promised increase in police numbers by the Government is welcome, there must also be proper resourcing for the collection and sorting of evidence, especially where it is stored digitally or where forensic analysis is required. The Government must ensure that procedures and funding fit for the 21st century are in place.
Thirdly, it is imperative that certain categories of crime are excluded from the RUI system. It is entirely inappropriate for suspects accused of domestic violence, violent crime or sexual violence to be placed under RUI.