Release Under Investigation

Debate between Bambos Charalambous and Andy Slaughter

Wednesday 5th February 2020 Westminster Hall

[Bambos Charalambous]

I agree with the hon. Member, who is entirely right about the taking of the statement, which provides the potential for charging early on. However, there is an issue with collecting digital data held on phones and other devices, which may need investigation. I will come to that.

Decreasing police resources make it increasingly difficult to complete investigations within a 28-day period as required under bail. When introducing RUI at Second Reading of the Policing and Crime Bill, the then Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), said:

“In the case of pre-charge bail, it is apparent that a significant number of individuals have spent an inordinate amount of time on bail only to end up not being charged or, if charged, found not guilty. Of course, the police and prosecution need time to assemble and test the evidence, particularly in complex cases, before coming to a charging decision, but we need to recognise the stress caused when people are under investigation for prolonged periods, and the disruption to their lives where they are subject to onerous bail conditions.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 45.]

However, the added time flexibility in the justice system given by release under investigation is coming at a dangerous cost. The available data indicates that tens of thousands of dangerous individuals are being investigated for a crime under no conditions and with no time limit. Victims can be targeted again by a perpetrator, and some case studies demonstrate that that is happening.

The super-complaint from the Centre for Women’s Justice detailed case studies of victims of domestic violence and rape. A woman in Yorkshire reported her ex-husband for repeatedly raping her during their 13-year marriage. He was released by the police after interview with no conditions. He forced his way into her house at 2 am, held her hostage for five hours, cut her with a broken glass and tied her to a table.

The Law Society has also uncovered examples. A solicitor’s client, who had been arrested for rape and bailed, was accused of a further sexual offence against the same complainant. They were placed under RUI for the original rape accusation due to bail not being extended. Let us consider that for a moment: an alleged rapist is left entirely free to contact, intimidate and even attack their victim again. That is an utter failure of the system. Here is another example: an individual in the west midlands was arrested for murder and then placed on bail, but after the bail expired they were placed under RUI. Again, a potentially extremely dangerous individual is left entirely free to commit a crime or intimidate witnesses.

How can that be acceptable? I argue that it is not. The bail system is not perfect by a long stretch, but allowing possibly tens of thousands of dangerous criminals to be entirely free to reoffend before a trial is dangerous—especially for the victims of domestic violence. It is a sad but known fact that virtually all domestic abuse-related crimes are of a repeat nature. It is therefore essential that bail conditions are used to safeguard victims while an investigation is ongoing, yet the big reduction in the use of bail and the huge increase in RUI means that highly dangerous offenders are released while investigations are ongoing. As Women’s Aid points out, there is absolutely nothing to stop highly dangerous domestic abusers contacting their victims or going to their homes.

Again, it is clear that part of the problem relates to a severe lack of resources and cuts. Because the initial bail period is only 28 days, an extension must be approved by a superintendent. That procedure imposes a big administrative burden on police forces, who, it seems, therefore avoid using bail altogether and instead release suspects under investigation. Unless the police are given sufficient resources to investigate crimes, the use of RUI will continue to spiral.

It is clear that RUI is creating a situation where vulnerable victims may be made more vulnerable and their lives placed in danger, but, looked at from the other side, its use is also grossly unfair to those accused of committing a crime and yet to be found guilty. They are essentially left in limbo for long periods—sometimes more than a year—with no updates or no indication from the police about if or when the case will progress.

I recently spoke to a barrister in my constituency who said she has a client who stands accused of serious sexual violence along with others. The allegation was made within 24 hours of the incident in 2017. All the suspects were arrested and interviewed within a matter of weeks, and they were all released on RUI. The investigation continued, but the defendants were not charged until the beginning of 2019. The trial has been fixed for a date in 2020, almost three years after the allegation was made. There can be little doubt that both the complainant and the defendants will be affected by that significant and serious delay.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on drawing our attention to this matter. He is eloquently showing why RUI is almost totally failing to achieve anything. Has he worked out what it is intended to achieve? From what he has said so far, it appears simply to be a way to take pressure off the police as a consequence of their not having the resources to investigate crimes.

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I think that was the intention. At the time, there were significant cases where bail was constantly extended, so it was designed to allow the police to investigate further, but it has had an adverse effect and needs to be reformed.

In another case study, my constituent said that she has a youth client who has been subject to RUI for more than 15 separate investigations. It has not been possible to find out the details of each RUI or the status of the investigations. Accordingly, her client could end up being charged after he turns 18 in relation to allegations that date back to when he was 16. If that happens and he pleads or is found guilty, the court will not be able to impose any youth sentences such as referral orders or youth rehabilitation orders. Under the law, we have an important principle of innocent until proven guilty. It is not reasonable for suspects or victims to have to put up with such delays. Again I repeat: justice delayed becomes justice denied.

Data from police forces that have provided it shows that the average time people are subject to RUI is shockingly long, ranging from 114 to 228 days. There are cases where RUI has gone on for years. Let us pause for a minute and consider the impact of that on suspects—let us remember, they remain innocent until proven guilty. They are left unaware of what is happening with their case, whether they remain a suspect or whether the police are even investigating their case. Such uncertainty creates enormous stress, which can impact on personal and family lives as well as employment.

The Law Society has unearthed case studies that illustrate that. In one case, an elderly man was interviewed about allegations of sexual abuse in a care home in 2015-16 and released under investigation. He received no updates on the case despite five letters from his solicitor to the CPS. The man, now aged 82, was finally told at the start of June 2019 that he would not be prosecuted. Unsurprisingly, the length of the process placed extreme strain on the man and his wife, who is seriously ill.

As I said at beginning of the debate, some straightforward changes to the system could be implemented. I am glad that the Government are embarking on a review, and I was heartened to hear that they today agreed to commence their consultation on pre-charge bail. It is pleasing to see that, in the consultation document, they recognise the impact of longer investigations, the need for better resourcing and the need for regular updates to victims and the accused on RUI. I would be interested to know more about their proposed new framework following the consultation, and I hope that my speech today is considered part of that consultation.

Civil Liability Bill [Lords]

Debate between Bambos Charalambous and Andy Slaughter

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Andy Slaughter]

There is an element of semantics going on here. We have guidelines at the moment. Judges do not pluck figures out of thin air. They look at the guidelines and hear submissions, or they would have heard submissions when representation was available—it seems it no longer will be—and they make a decision, but they have discretion around the individual circumstances of the case. That is a basic and fundamental principle of law, but one that we are deviating from. I cannot say strongly enough that that is wrong.

To add insult to injury—if I may put it that way—rather than taking the average in the guidelines and having a rough rule of thumb that someone will get a bit more or a bit less than their individual case deserves, or going for an average and calling that a tariff, we are saying that a tariff should be a tiny percentage of the current award. This is nothing but an attempt to say, “We do not wish to pay out money in this way. We wish to diminish both the ability to make a claim and the compensation paid.” Whatever one’s view on fraud, the massive majority of cases will be meritorious and honest cases in which people have genuinely suffered injury.

I will conclude with the words of the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Judge, on Report in the other place:

“What I cannot accept is a solution which means that a dishonest claim is handled in exactly the same way as an honest one. We cannot have dishonesty informing the way in which those who have suffered genuine injuries are dealt with. That is simply not justice. There should not be any idea that an honest claim for a whiplash injury made by the victim of a car accident should be less well compensated than an identical injury suffered by someone at work.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 1600.]

That is what the Government are doing in the Bill and what is so inherently unfair, and they are doing it at the behest of special interests. They may genuinely believe that there is a problem to be resolved with whiplash. I could dispute that—we could go on for a lot longer than we are today—but even if they are right, there are other, better and fairer ways to tackle that issue.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Is my hon. Friend aware that under the criminal injuries compensation scheme someone gets £1,000 for a whiplash injury lasting six to 13 weeks but that under this tariff scheme the proposal is for £470 for three to six months?

[Andy Slaughter]

My hon. Friend, who knows far more about these matters than I do—and more, I suspect, than many on the Government Front Bench—is quite right. He draws attention to the fact that there is no logic in the system.

I feel a bit sorry for the Minister as he has to push these proposals forward; he is normally a very logical and fair man. It is difficult to speak at the Dispatch Box having been given a brief of this quality. When parliamentarians of his stature and of the stature of the hon. Member for Cheltenham, with his spurious points about special damages, are reduced to this level, and when Government Back-Bench Members are hauled in here, as we saw in the previous debate, to make speeches only to be told to stop making them because they are talking such arrant nonsense, one does despair. I hope even at the 11th hour that the Government might take pity on us, listen to the wise voices in the other place and support us on these amendments.