Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Tuesday 25th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

My hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice, is right. This is about the attribution of blame and fault, and no more than that. Indeed, the protections in place for the vulnerable party remain just as they are. It is often the vulnerable party who suffers most from the need to attribute blame, because that can be difficult. In the context of domestic abuse, for example, it is striking how the likes of Women’s Aid have been very supportive of these measures because of their concern that there might be women trapped in marriages who do not want to attribute blame because they feel that may result in a further deterioration in the relationship.

The truth is that when a marriage or indeed a civil partnership has sadly broken down and is beyond repair, it stops benefiting society and the people involved. At worst, continuing in a legal relationship that is no longer functioning can be destructive to families, and the law ought to deal with the reality of marriage breakdown as constructively as possible. The current law does not do that. The requirements of the divorce process at present can often give rise to a confrontational position, even if the decision to divorce is mutual. The incentive to make allegations at the outset, to avoid otherwise waiting for two years’ separation, becomes ingrained. Divorce is traumatic, and children are inevitably affected when their parents separate—that goes without saying. I agree that marriage has long proved its worth for bringing up children, but the reality is that not all marriages last. The law should deal with that reality as sensibly as it can. When a marriage has failed, we have to take a serious look at how to reduce conflict for everyone involved, not least for children. Research shows that it is conflict between the parents that has been linked to greater social and behavioural problems among children, rather than necessarily the separation and divorce itself.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

I very much welcome the proposals in this Bill. Getting rid of the fault-based approach to divorce and the conflict is a good thing, as is ensuring that people do not have to wait for two years. Does the Secretary of State agree with me and with Resolution, the organisation for family lawyers, that we also need to provide earlier advice for cohabitees who believe that common law spousal rights might exist for them? Legal advice on whether such rights exist would be beneficial. Does he agree that including provision for early advice in the Bill would be welcome?

[Mr Gauke]

Obviously, this Bill’s focus is on divorce for those who are married. There is a point about advice where we can have a wider debate. I will focus my remarks today on the contents of the Bill and the argument I am making about the problems with fault in the current divorce system, and I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s support on that. Clearly, there is a debate to be had as to how we can provide support to couples, be that about reconciliation or in other contexts.

Whatever family structure children grow up in, they benefit most from stable, loving and caring relationships with parents and other close family members. We are clear that when parents have taken this difficult decision, children’s best interests are served by minimising conflict during and after the legal process, to support co-operative parenting and positive parenting relationships. This Bill is in the best interests of children whose parents are divorcing. It will therefore remove the harmful requirement for wives, husbands and civil partners in England and Wales to hurl blame or to go through the waiting limbo of separate lives. It will help them move forward more amicably and constructively. It will make a genuine difference to many thousands of children and families who each year, sadly, experience divorce.

It is 50 years since the Divorce Reform Act 1969 gave rise to the law we now have, and few of us will have known anything else. Some among us will have divorced under this law. All of us will be conscious of the bitter experience of friends and constituents who have. Even so, the existing law is not always understood. It allows divorce only on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The court cannot hold the marriage to have done so unless it is satisfied of one or more of what the law calls “facts”. Three of the five facts—adultery, behaviour and desertion—relate to conduct of the respondent. The other facts are two years’ separation and five years’ separation, the difference being that two years’ separation requires both parties to agree to the divorce—the same applies to civil partnerships, except that the adultery fact is not available. But the fact someone chooses does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the real reasons the marriage or civil partnership broke down. Those reasons are often subtle, complex, and subjective. Who, if anyone, was responsible is a question that can be answered honestly only by the people in the marriage.

We are probably all aware of situations where a couple have sadly grown apart over time and jointly agree to divorce The current law does not allow them to do so, unless they are first financially able to live apart for two years. They might be forced to present events in a way that serves the system; minor incidents become stretched out into a pattern of behaviour to satisfy a legal threshold, which then bleeds over into how a couple approach negotiations over arrangements for children and finances; or there may be a coercive relationship, where one partner is desperate to divorce but is too scared of the consequences of setting out the evidence of their partner’s unreasonable behaviour to the court. It should be enough that the relationship has irretrievably broken down.

I do know where people are coming from when they say the requirement to prove a fact is useful, because they think that someone must be held responsible for the break-up of the marriage and that this requirement lets the court determine blame for that. The court, however, cannot do so, and the law does not require it to. Instead, making allegations or having to live apart in a marriage introduces conflict or makes it worse—this conflict can continue far beyond the legal end of the marriage and hurt children’s life chances. That is the reason for this reform.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (First sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I think we had better move on.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Q I have a technical question about the Bill. Clause 6 gives the Lord Chancellor wide-ranging powers to amend primary legislation. Are you comfortable about those powers? The clause is titled “Minor and consequential amendments” but that is a bit of a misnomer.

David Hodson: I think there is an agreeable difference between the Law Society and Resolution here. We would like to see any material changes to the expectation of the structure set out in primary rather than secondary legislation. We are keen for the public, at the end of this process, as the measure goes through Parliament, in either a few weeks—some would think that is too rushed—or in a few months, when there is an opportunity for public debate, to understand what the divorce process is all about. The 1996 measure did at least allow the public to have a discussion about what it was like. We are not having that discussion at the moment, partly because this is going through fairly quickly and partly because it has not got into the public arena, so we would be very keen to say this: if the Ministry of Justice has any concerns about bringing any of these aspects forward, it should put them in the primary legislation.

There is another reason. At the moment, clause 1 does not read well. I mean no undue criticism of the drafter, but nobody could pick it up and read it. I tried to do that on Thursday at lunchtime and I really struggled. It is not a progressive process, it does not use straightforward language, and you cannot see it. Nigel and I have had a happy disagreement, but when is the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage? In terms of what we need to have within this structure, I agree with Nigel that we do not want to clog it up, but there are some crucial elements that we think should be brought into this legislation, as opposed to having—dare I say?—Henry VIII-type powers. Henry VIII is probably not the right person to bring up in the context of divorce, and Henry VIII-type powers probably should not be in, of all things, this divorce legislation.

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

Q To pick up on something that you said, Mr Hodson, the reality is that the language of applicant and respondent is important because it gives control to the person—I am thinking particularly of women who are trying to leave an abusive relationship. If it is changed, how do they maintain control of the next stage of the process, which clearly this Bill does not cover, in terms of the finances and protecting their children and ensuring that they are in control of the timetable and, indeed, the outcomes on that side of things?

David Hodson: It is totally unaffected by that particular provision. Domestic violence and children proceedings are under another piece of statute. They would often be dealt with by a different judge on another occasion. None of the financial elements would actually overflow into those two, so there is absolutely no prejudice whatever.

In terms of the timetable for the three months, a person might want to bring an application for interim financial provision. One reason why we have so many fault-based divorces in this country is that, in some instances, people need financial help and they can get it under our law only against what we used to call ancillary relief. Some countries have free-standing provision—I think Sir James Munby is coming, and it would be interesting to ask him. I think he supports free-standing financial provision—so you do not need a divorce. Many people apply for a divorce as a route to applying for financial provision. They would not be prejudiced in any way by having this litigation-free zone. They could apply straight away, which must be right.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (Second sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Maynard]

The only point I will make to colleagues is that, just as we had judicial separation in clause 2, clause 3—and indeed, clause 4 for that matter—refers to civil partnerships and the Civil Partnership Act 2004. It once again takes all the elements I referred to in clause 1 and translates them on to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 so that that is also up to date from where we are currently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 4 and 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

We support the Bill very much. We had some concerns about the powers that the Lord Chancellor would have in relation to clause 6, but given that they are so limited in scope, we do not propose to object to them. However, we do not wish it go unnoticed that we have concerns about Ministers having—I will not call them Henry VIII powers in relation to divorce proceedings—draconian powers in pushing forward legislation that would remain as primary legislation. I will leave it at that. We do not oppose this clause, but I wish to put on record that we have wider concerns about Ministers’ powers.