Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Anthony Browne and Alan Whitehead

Thursday 8th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

6. What steps he is taking with the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero to improve the allocation of resources between the production of sustainable aviation fuel and other uses of biomass.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Anthony Browne)]

In developing the biomass strategy and our forthcoming low-carbon fuel strategy, my Department has worked closely with the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, whose policy paper on the biomass strategy was published last year. Sectors that are harder to decarbonise, including aviation, should be priority uses for biomass. We are continuing to work across Government, and with industry experts, to ensure that policies that increase the supply of sustainable aviation fuels deliver on our climate change commitments.

[Dr Whitehead]

As the Minister will know, the sustainable aviation fuel mandate will come into force in 2025, but meanwhile the Government have not yet responded to consultations on how it will work, and there is no real-world fuel sourcing analysis or plan that would take account of the changing nature of municipal waste arising from the already allocated uses of municipal and agricultural feedstock for purposes other than the production of SAF. What steps is the Minister taking to develop a realistic plan for feedstock availability and use?

[Anthony Browne]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s question. As I have just said, we will shortly publish the low-carbon fuel strategy, which will set out the different sources of low-carbon fuels. We will publish our response to the SAF mandate by the spring. A great deal of detailed analysis and work is being done in relation to different fuel sources. We will also publish a revenue certainty mechanism to ensure that we have a UK SAF industry. We engage regularly with the industry on this, and it is very confident about and supportive of the Government’s policies. We do have a detailed plan, and I want to commiserate with the hon. Gentleman, because I am sure that as Energy Minister he too had a plan, but the Opposition’s plans seem to have been U-turned today.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Anthony Browne and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

Q I think Springfields has a series of difficulties in the continuation of its nuclear fuel and nuclear rods business. What difference would the construction of Sizewell C make to its viability as a future supplier of nuclear fuel rods and associated activities for the UK market and, indeed, the international market?

Michael Waite: As you say, Springfields has been fuelling the majority of the UK’s nuclear fleet for almost 75 years. It is the exclusive supplier to the advanced gas-cooled reactor fleet, which will all have retired by the end of this decade. Whether Sizewell C moving forwards under a RAB would mean a supply of fuel from Springfields has yet to be determined. From a Westinghouse perspective, we see RAB as part of the solution for enabling further nuclear projects after Sizewell C. Certainly, the 2035 zero-carbon targets for the electricity generation sector require there to be further projects., If we could start a project at Wylfa and deliver our AP1000 technology under RAB, that would absolutely take its fuel from Springfields for the life of the facility and secure the life of the plant.

[Anthony Browne (South Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Q I am interested in the allocation of risk between companies and consumers. Obviously, one of the problems with the contracts for difference model is that you bear the construction risk, the political risk and so on, whereas with the RAB model you do not. If there are cost overruns, is there a risk that the consumer ends up paying for it rather than you and that you do not have the right incentives to control costs?

Julia Pyke: The first thing I would say is that, of course, it is very important that the developer remains incentivised to minimise construction spend consistent with building safely and to time. The introduction of the RAB model will enable Sizewell to move ahead, so, primarily for consumers, not only will they need the electricity that Sizewell can produce but electricity bills will reduce when it comes on, because the alternatives to nuclear as the producer of electricity when the wind is not blowing and so on will cost more. Overall it will reduce consumer bills. It is, as you say, very important that we get the incentive regime right so that, although risk is shared with consumers, developers are always incentivised.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Anthony Browne and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Not a happy state of affairs, is it?

Tom Greatrex: Well, I hope that there will be clarity on that and other aspects of what has been announced by the Government in recent announcements as we proceed.

[Anthony Browne]

Q I have a simple, open question for all three of you. You all run trade associations, effectively, and you will have gone through the Bill in detail and looked at what you like and do not like. Are there any gaps in it? Are there any things you think should be in there that are not in there? We heard earlier, for example, about how, if there are overruns, you allocate the risk between consumers and investors and construction companies. That is obviously not covered in this Bill, but what gaps do you think there are?

Tom Greatrex: The Bill sets out a framework for a mechanism that we as the industry welcome. We think it is very important to be able to facilitate development of new projects. There are levels of detail that are not covered in the primary legislation, and I think you have touched on some of those in relation to exactly how aspects of risk sharing will be undertaken and the role of the regulator, which will be Ofgem—the expertise available to that body, and the fact that transitioning into being able to undertake what is effectively a new role is going to be significantly important. I am not sure those would necessarily be in the primary legislation, but there are aspects of this where there will need to be further information and development before a regulated desktop-based model can be used for nuclear development.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Q Stephen, do you have any views on that?

Professor Thomas: I think the problem is not the need for a special administrative regime to rescue things if it all goes badly wrong in the construction phase. I think the problem is the RAB mechanism that is putting consumers’ money at risk, and if we look at the impact assessment, we are looking at a plant that will not be completed until something like 2037 to 2041, so I will be paying into this plant for quite a long time and I probably will not live long enough to see any power from it. The special administrative regime is a way to try to solve a problem that is better solved by simply not using this RAB mechanism.

[Anthony Browne]

Q If we are in an existential crisis of climate change—if it is the biggest threat that we face as a species—should we not use every tool in the toolbox to combat it? Why would you rule one of them out? That is a question for Doug Parr first, and then Mycle Schneider.

Doug Parr: I do not think I have ever made any secret of the fact that there are attendant risks that come with nuclear that do not apply to other forms of zero-carbon and low-carbon generation. What I would ask, in the light of the climate crisis—it is not an insignificant challenge that you have put there—is why UK Governments of all colours have continued to emphasise nuclear policy over and above other ways of cutting emissions. For example, the last time I saw figures on Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy civil servants and where they were working, there were more people working on nuclear than on renewables and clean building heat put together, so when it came to two of the big-ticket items that are going to be absolutely essential—lots of renewable power and lots of clean heat for buildings—there were fewer civil servants working on those than on nuclear.

Nuclear is a bit-part player in this. All sensible, cost-effective models show that nuclear will not be a big piece of the pie, in terms of delivering what we need to deliver, and there are considerable problems with delivering heat, as members of the Committee will know. There are some substantial issues with delivering the amount of renewable power that we need, yet what we have is a Bill for delivering nuclear, and more civil servants working on it than on other things. I emphasise that this is a distortion that has been in place over years, and it is becoming quite problematic, because every time people are working on nuclear and not working on these other things—not putting energy and money into other things—we lose our ability to deliver what we need to deliver.

Environment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Anthony Browne and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 12th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Hon. Members will see that under clause 38, when the Office for Environmental Protection

“gives an information notice or a decision notice, applies for an environmental review, judicial review or statutory review or applies to intervene in a judicial review or statutory review, it must publish a statement”.

What is curious about this clause is that while it states at the beginning that the OEP “must” publish a statement, the next subsection says that that does not apply

“if the OEP considers that in the circumstances it would not be in the public interest to publish a statement.”

My concern is this: in what circumstances would it not be in the public interest to publish a statement; and why is it only for the OEP and no one else to decide that it should not publish such a statement? I would like to hear from the Minister what she considers those circumstances to be and, if the OEP so decided, what would be the criteria upon which that decision would be taken?

[Anthony Browne (South Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

When we last met we all agreed that the OEP should have as much independence as possible. I fully support that. What I find confusing about the hon. Gentleman’s argument is that he is talking about reducing the OEP’s ability or flexibility to do what it sees fit, and he is trying to set down in law exactly what it should do in different circumstances. Surely we should appoint an independent regulator, make sure that the best people are running it and—as much as one can—let it decide whether to issue a notice or not. This would limit its independence.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman will have accepted already that, throughout the passage of the Bill, we have tried to assert robustly—this is accepted on all sides—that the OEP should be truly independent and should undertake its activities in that spirit of independence. We have tried to point out that a number of measures in the Bill would undermine that independence by putting constraints on the way in which it acts.

Secondly, we have tried to ensure that the OEP is set up in such a way that it is fully transparent and organisationally accountable for what it does. Those two things go together: the OEP should be fully independent, and it should be set up in such a way that that independence is based on accountability and transparency in its actions. Clause 38—I remind hon. Members that this is a clause stand part debate, not an Opposition amendment—appears to suggest that the OEP has an option to be less than transparent in its dealings with the public in relation to public statements. That is a substantial caveat on a requirement. It is a “must”, not a “may”. It “must” publish those statements, but the caveat is that if the OEP thinks that it is not in the public interest, it does not have to do so. On the face of it, that is resiling from the second principle that I set out: that the OEP should act in a publicly transparent and accountable way.

What I want from the Minister is either an explanation of why that subsection has been placed in the Bill or to know whether there could be a potential challenge to the subsection, which appears to enable the OEP to decide, regardless of any other criteria, that it feels something would not be in the public interest. If the OEP decided that it would not be in the public interest to publish a statement—so no such statement would appear and people would not know even that a statement was about to come out—what would be the potential challenge, and what machinery exists elsewhere in the Bill that one may not yet have seen that would enable criteria to be applied to how the OEP considers what is in the public interest or otherwise? All hon. Members will agree that if the question of public interest is subjective and internal to an organisation, that is not necessarily a good test of what the public interest might be considered to be.

That is why this is a stand part debate: it is a question to the Minister, rather than a suggestion that this clause be removed.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. That underlines what we know is right in our hearts. If we reduced this to a few lines on a piece of paper, we might have to start making them distinctive in order to define what we are talking about. This amendment tries to ensure that such structures are regarded as part of the natural landscape.

[Anthony Browne]

The hon. Gentleman makes the valid point that many historical monuments have become part of the landscape. The UK is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. After 40,000 years of continuous human habitation, there is virtually nothing left that is not touched by the hand of man. I fully support the desire to protect monuments and so on, but the Bill is about protecting the environment. There is a separate legal framework for protecting monuments. I am worried about confusing the objective of the Bill, and worried that the OEP will be tasked with protecting monuments—when there is a separate legal framework for that—rather than protecting the natural environment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point but it is not a question of the OEP having to take on the mantle of English Heritage, or a national monuments commission, and assiduously sweeping the leaves off ramparts and other things. Hon. Members will see that clause 41 is simply a meaning clause: it defines what we mean elsewhere in the Bill. It is important inasmuch as it provides a serious context in which other measures in the Bill can be seated. That is its only function. When we are seating those meanings within other parts of the Bill, it is important that we are clear about the extent of those meanings or indeed the limits of those meanings. That is all that the amendment seeks to do. It does not seek to do anything more, and does not give the OEP any obligation as far as these monuments and buildings are concerned, nor the changes in the landscape to which I refer. The hon. Member can rest assured that there would be no duty of care on the OEP, and it is merely a matter of including that in the definition.

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[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member is right to the extent that land does extend under the water, otherwise the seas would drain fairly rapidly and we would be in a bad state. According to the hon. Member’s definition, we are conjoined with every other country in the world. The clause does not say that we must have a definition of “natural environment” that includes that—it stops in terms of what is on our land and what is not under the sea, as far as land is concerned. Arguably, the fact that it includes water could be defined, as the hon. Member suggests, as including everything on that land that is under the sea. It is nevertheless our responsibility—there are different areas of concern expressed in international treaties about territorial waters and various other things.

[Anthony Browne]

I completely and utterly support that the definition should cover the marine environment. My question to the hon. Member is why he picks on the marine environment as the one point of clarification needed in “land…air and water”. My hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth has talked about some aspects of the land, but does it cover soil? Does the hon. Gentleman want clarification on that? Does it cover underground waterways, for example, which are big in my area? The big issue in South Cambridgeshire is the aquifer, which is definitely under the ground. Does it cover cave systems? Is “air” just the air we breathe when we talk about air pollution, or is it also the ozone layer and so on? We could carry on with multiple long definitions and a long train of different qualifications, but I think that would create legal uncertainty for lawyers to interpret. The Bill is very generic—“land…air and water” covers everything that is important.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to go down a detailed path of discussing subterranean water outlets. I assume, because water is within our land mass, that those would be covered by the elision of land mass and water, which is suggested by the clause. Without going into a lengthy disposition about how far under the ground water might be counted as being covered under this arrangement, we can rest assured that those matters are not a serious issue of dispute.

That is why I do not want to go into enormous detail. The amendment is straightforward and short. It proposes several words that would put the matter to rest. It just states in a modest way that the definition should include the marine environment, so that if anyone is in any doubt, there it is in the Bill. That is all we are suggesting. There is no side to that. There are no additional consequences. It merely says we should be clear that that is what it includes. I think we all agree that it should include that.

This morning, we were treated to a quote from the explanatory notes, which indicated that the marine environment should be included, but it is not. We are just doing a modest labour in the vineyard by attempting to ensure that when people say something, they mean what they say. The best way to ensure that people mean what they say is to say it. That is what we propose to do on the face of the Bill.

Environment Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Anthony Browne and Alan Whitehead

Thursday 5th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

It is not a question of undermining the integrity of the OEP at all. As the hon. Gentleman says, it does not exist yet, although bits of it are gradually coming into existence and may materialise in corporeal form in due course. It is therefore not easy to say that anyone in this room is undermining its performance and actions. We are talking about whether the framework within which it functions will work well or not. It is incumbent on us to ensure that, as the OEP comes into existence, the framework is as good as it can be and that the lines of its relationship with Parliament and Ministers are as clear as they should be. We are not undermining what the OEP will do; we are trying to support it by clarifying, before it is under way, what the boundaries are, how they work and who is expected to do what. That is not clear in this passage of the Bill.

[Anthony Browne (South Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I completely support the OEP’s independence, but I am confused. At the moment, the OEP can decide whether it publishes a report, but the hon. Gentleman’s amendment proposes that it must publish a report, which presumably reduces rather than increases its independence of action. When it does a report, it might decide that there are certain things that it does not want to publish for certain reasons—we do not know, because we cannot pre-empt it. The hon. Gentleman is saying that it has to do something, which surely reduces its independence.

[Dr Whitehead]

With respect, independence has nothing to do with an authority not doing what it should do or just deciding that it cannot be bothered to do something or other. That is not independence, but sloth. We would expect the framework for an independent body to support its independence by giving it a framework within which to work that makes sure it can work as well as it should—by determining on what lines the expectations about what it does should be determined, and, indeed, how the public will see that independence in action. Our suggestions would not downgrade or undermine the independence of the OEP. On the contrary, they would help it to act in the best possible way as an independent body.

[Anthony Browne]

There are many reasons why an organisation such as the OEP might not want to publish a report, other than sloth. As a former journalist, I am all in favour of openness—I think everything should be as open as possible—but there might be reasons for wanting a private, or non-public, investigation, and the amendment would remove the ability to decide to carry out a private investigation. It would curtail the OEP’s course of action and reduce its independence. I think everything should be public, but I can certainly see that there are scenarios where the OEP might decide to do something that it did not want put in the public domain. The Opposition would remove that course of action.

[Dr Whitehead]

There are a number of existing laws, protocols and arrangements for all public bodies that give them, in certain circumstances, discretion not to do certain things, such as in relation to national security or the revelation of individual contracts—there are all sorts of things of that kind. Guidelines already allow that discretion.

I do not think that the idea that a Department should, under normal circumstances, publish reports to elucidate matters for the public, where those existing areas of discretion in the law do not apply, is in any way undermined. That is part of the process by which we express our confidence in that public body in the first place as a body that operates transparently and in concert with the Minister and Parliament to get the relevant matters out on the table and discussed and that can demonstrate that it is doing that. That is a perfectly appropriate way to ensure that the public and indeed this place are confident about its independent operation. I am not, therefore, sure that the point made by the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire, well-intentioned as I think it was, has a great deal of substance in relation to the clause.

Environment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Anthony Browne and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed—Secretaries of State come and go, just as Presidents of the USA come and go. Nevertheless, while they are there, Presidents can appoint justices of the Supreme Court who are always there. Although the member of the Executive has gone, the effect of their actions remains—in this example, with the judiciary branch in the US. In principle, that is what could happen as far as this construction is concerned in the Bill. A Secretary of State who comes and goes could appoint, without involving the parliamentary process, somebody who will outlast the Secretary of State in that position.

[Anthony Browne (South Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I am a member of the Treasury Committee. We do a lot of selection hearings and most of them are agreed through parliamentary processes. We find we end up doing an awful lot of selection hearings, and we have spent a huge amount of time doing them, on the board of the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Policy Committee and so on. We end up having discussions about whether we want to do all these hearings. Do we do them in this way or that way? Do we do reappointment hearings? We retain flexibility around that, because it is done through the parliamentary procedure.

It seems to me that the danger of setting down in legislation that all non-executive members should be appointed on the consent of the two Committees is that we bind their hands into the future. They may decide that they want to do it in some other way. We retain more flexibility for the Committees if they do it through parliamentary means.

[Dr Whitehead]

Well, yes is the answer. We are trying to bind those Committees to some extent to do the right thing, as far as those appointments are concerned. The hon. Gentleman who has experience on the Treasury Committee and other hon. Members who have experience on Committees will know that Committees take their responsibilities seriously. I have been party to that sort of discussion in Select Committees that I have served on in the past. They take their responsibilities very seriously. They take the issue seriously. They do it very carefully and make sure that the result of their deliberations is as good as it can be. That is something that I am absolutely fine with; I do not wish to fetter that in any way.

However, the hon. Gentleman and other Members also know that that has not always been the case with Select Committees. Indeed, in my time in Parliament, is has largely not been the case. The process of deciding upon the appointment of members of various organisations via a Select Committee hearing is a relatively recent innovation. That came about not as a result of legislation but as a result of Select Committees pushing their own authority within the parliamentary system.

In one sense, that is perfectly acceptable, but I am seeking to draw a distinction between that process, which has by and large resulted in a good outcome as far as these appointments are concerned, and the fact that it says in a piece of legislation, “That is what is supposed to be done.” There are other pieces of legislation in existence that specify what is supposed to be done, but this piece of legislation does not. I wonder to myself why those pieces of legislation specify those things whereas this piece of legislation does not.

It would not be difficult—on the contrary, it would be very straightforward—to specify in this piece of legislation what is to be done, while agreeing that that is largely what happens in practice in this Parliament. That is a good thing, and it is a sign of our changing unwritten constitution—I emphasise the word “unwritten”. That is why, in a piece of legislation, it is probably necessary to write down what our intentions are and how they are to be carried out in practice by the House in its interpretation of the unwritten constitution of this country.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 155, in schedule 1, page 122, line 15, after sub-paragraph (4) insert

“;but an appointment may be made in reliance on this sub-paragraph only with the approval of the Chair.”.

This amendment requires the Chair’s approval for civil servants or other external persons as interim chief executive of the OEP.

Although it is late afternoon and I do not want to go on the record as being excessively shirty for a long period, I am afraid that discussion of the amendment is part of that shirtiness process. Paragraph 4(4) of schedule 1, which was written as part of the Bill and was not part of the suite of amendments we saw when the Bill reconvened from the Government side, suggests that rules that the chief executive may not be an employee or a civil servant do not apply to the appointment and operation of an interim chief executive.

The constraints on the appointment of an interim chief executive are not there. They could be an employee of the Department, a civil servant, or someone placed by the Secretary of State in that position, when the requirement to underpin the independence of the OEP means that should not be the case for the chief executive proper. That underlines the theme of determined non-independence of the OEP in its early stages, and the Secretary of State’s ability to mould and shape how the OEP works, before it is properly formed.

Amendment 155

“requires the Chair’s approval for civil servants or other external persons as interim chief executive of the OEP.”

Having been appointed, the real chair—not the interim chair—would have the authority to act as a guardian of the independence of the OEP. We have already been through the process of appointing the chair, so at the point at which the interim chief executive might be appointed from within the civil service or the Department, or that might be proposed, the chair of the OEP would not necessarily say that was bad or impossible, but would at least have the authority to decide whether the Secretary of State was doing the right thing. That seems to me to be the least of the requirements that should be placed on this sub-paragraph.

We have discussed the independence of the OEP as it is set up. Having got to the position of having a reasonably independent chair in place, to then not involve the chair in the appointment of the interim chief executive seems perverse. The amendment does nothing except try to ensure that the OEP is visibly independent; Members from all parties can agree to that.

[Anthony Browne]

I used to be the chair of the Regulatory Policy Committee, a non-departmental public body linked to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; I appointed its entire new board. In a previous life, as I have mentioned, I was involved in setting up various other bodies, such as TheCityUK and the HomeOwners Alliance, and I have been involved tangentially in setting up independent bodies as part of the civil service.

I completely salute the support expressed by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and the Opposition for the independence of the OEP. They are doggedly making sure that it is fully independent, and I totally support that; it will function properly only if it is fully independent. However, on the issue of the interim chief executive, I think—to follow the dogged analogy—that they are slightly barking up the wrong tree.

The whole point about the interim chief executive of any organisation is that they are setting it up. They are designing the org chart, saying “Right: this committee will do this, we need to hire these personnel to do that, these are the finances, this is the first draft budget,” and everything else—they are not actually fulfilling the substantive end function of the public body. The Opposition are worried about the timing, and I am worried about the timing too.

What normally, or very often, happens is that an organisation does not go through a recruitment process for an external interim chief executive. The chief executive is normally banned from being a civil servant, which is absolutely right, but we are talking about getting somebody to set the body up and get it going before the recruitment process for the end chief executive, the appointment of the entire board and everything else, which will take a long, long time—I think it took me about eight months to recruit a new board for the Regulatory Policy Committee.

The thing to do is get a civil servant who has experience of setting up bodies. Because of employment rules in the civil service, they can basically just be reassigned and put in place immediately. They can start setting up the organisation and doing all the stuff that needs doing, and in the meantime we can recruit the full, substantive, independent chief executive, which takes longer. When the independent chief executive is recruited, they will then have an organisation that they can work with and can retune and rejig if they want. That is a far better and more efficient way of setting up an organisation than taking the completely purist approach that the first chief executive has to be a fully independent person who is not a civil servant and will not take directions from the civil service.