European Union Bill

Andrew Percy Excerpts

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

It is a pleasure to come back for a third day of excitement this week, talking about Europe. I thought that when I left the European Parliament, I might be able to ditch that part of my life and move on to something interesting. It seems to wear one down, like a terrible weight around one’s neck.

I want to see whether I can tidy up a few parts of the Bill which, I believe, could be helped. Currently the European Union is not party to the European convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the ECHR. The Lisbon treaty, however, introduced what is now article 6(2) of the treaty on the European Union, which provides that the EU will accede to the ECHR. This accession agreement—in effect a treaty between the EU and the states party to the ECHR—is being negotiated.

Article 218(8) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union provides that once negotiated, the accession agreement must be concluded, for the EU’s part, by unanimity in the Council. The same article states that after adoption by the Council, the EU decision concluding the agreement must also be

“approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”

before it can come into force.

Under current UK law, this approval may require an Act of Parliament. Clause 10, however, where this matter currently resides, requires only a resolution of approval in each House. Indeed, the definition of parliamentary approval in clause 10(3) does not seem well suited to the approval of a decision adopted by the Council under article 218(8), because the resolution of approval specified concerns approval of a draft decision.

Until the article 218(8) TFEU conclusion has come into force, the EU cannot accede to the ECHR. This is a complicated treaty between the EU and the ECHR and warrants a great deal of scrutiny. It will have a number of indirect effects on the United Kingdom.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

I, too, wish we could be free of the European Union, but that is a debate for another day. Does my hon. Friend agree that, given where we are on prisoners’ voting rights, as well as the growth of rights under the ECHR and the controversy surrounding that, we need to ensure maximum parliamentary scrutiny of decisions such as the one that he is describing?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Indeed. I know that there is to be a Backbench Business Committee debate on the matter in the not-too-distant future, in which I hope that Members across the House can voice their concerns about that ruling.

I return to the proposal to move one part of the Bill from clause 10 to clause 7. I was speaking about the indirect effects on the United Kingdom that the accession of the EU to the EHCR might have. When the accession takes place, the EU will be able to be taken to the European Court of Human Rights, which will undoubtedly lead to more cases, more cost and impact and, most importantly, more jurisprudence on EU law.

I am seeking not to upgrade the requirement for scrutiny, but to maintain the present level. Furthermore, I am concerned that in clauses 6 and 7, a few article 48(7) ratchet decisions are not caught by the Bill. Such decisions would be those applying to the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure where the EU treaties currently require a special legislative procedure, and the existing special legislative procedure does not require unanimity in the Council. In other words, while a switch in EU legislative procedure would be taking place, it would not involve abolition of a veto because a veto did not exist in the first place. However, the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure entails the European Parliament having co-decision rights with the Council. It can table amendments to a proposed law and veto the Council’s desired law. In general, a switch to the ordinary legislative procedure would take EU decision making further out of the hands of national Governments and give greater power to a supranational institution.

The article 48(7) ratchet clauses not covered by the Bill would confer new co-decision rights on the European Parliament in a few areas of EU law that I shall list now, and many more. Article 23 provides that every EU citizen has the right to diplomatic protection. We had a debate on what that might mean to the individual. I am speaking now about our power to scrutinise such decisions. Article 182(4) allows the Council to adopt, through qualified majority voting, but only after consultation of the European Parliament, specific EU research and development programmes. These must accord with the multi-year EU framework programme for research and development that is decided through the ordinary legislative procedure, but the decision on specific programmes sets their duration, the precise financial contribution by the EU—essentially by us—and the detailed rules for implementation. Furthermore, article 349 provides that the Council can adopt legislative measures on how EU treaties apply to areas known in wonderful EU parlance as the outermost regions. The way in which such specific decisions are dealt with in the Bill would be a retrograde step for democratic control, hence my amendment.

European External Action Service

Andrew Percy Excerpts

Wednesday 14th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to contribute to this important debate. It is important to understand what we are creating. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies)—who I see has gained some new recruits to support him on the Back Benches—obviously takes a different view from others on how we should approach the Lisbon treaty.

The phrase “We are where we are” has been used a number of times in the debate. If we had a blank sheet of paper, I am sure that we would not create the Lisbon treaty in its current form, but I was not in favour of the dome, either— I thought it was unpopular and a wrong concept—but it was built, and then we decided to change it and make it actually work. If we choose to opt out of the EU, as some colleagues on both the Government and Opposition Benches might wish, we will certainly change our relationship with the EU and Europe from one perspective, but we will also alienate many countries, and we will then be unable to influence their approach to the EU.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

The issue, however, is that many of us have a problem with the creation of this external service. We have not got into a discussion about whether we should be a member state of the EU. The fact is that many of us have grave concerns about this measure, and that is what we have been talking about today.

[Mr Ellwood]

I do not disagree with my hon. Friend. The point I am stressing, however, is that, as has been said, we could be in a stronger position if we were to move British personnel into the organisation and change it into something actually worth having—and that is what I would like.

I do, however, have some grave concerns about EU spending at present. A great example of that is the Galileo satellite system. It has cost about £4 billion so far, and the Foreign Office budget is, I understand, about £2 billion, so there would be some huge savings straight away if we were to get rid of that system. I also mentioned in an intervention the concerns we have in respect of NATO and the European Defence Agency. They have not been answered today, and I would be grateful for the opportunity to speak to my hon. Friend the Minister about the clear overlap that there is in respect of those two organisations. When I was serving in the armed forces in Bosnia, the EU was trying to create something of a European army, and that is wrong. The cornerstone of our defence in Europe is NATO, and we should not try to duplicate it.

I intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, about Ambassador Ušackas who has now been sent to Afghanistan to represent the European Union. I have a question: if the EU starts sending diktats or directives on how Afghanistan should be approached, that might overlap with the direction we are receiving as a member of the international security assistance force, and—