Defence in Scotland after 2014

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Thomas Docherty

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman raises that point. In fact, I have been flicking through the press cuttings for today which had something to say on the matter. The Scottish edition of The Times has the headline, “Businesses get ready to leave in event of independence vote”. The Scottish edition of the Daily Mail says, “An uncertain future is our biggest worry, say business bosses”. The Herald says, “Business leaders ‘concerned about uncertainty over referendum’”. I do not think it needs me to say what that all adds up to. Taken with the remarks of business leaders from all sectors currently, and I suspect increasingly as we approach 18 September, it means that our concerns over jobs in Scotland in the event of independence are mounting almost by the day. I know that the hon. Gentleman, as the Member of Parliament for an area that depends heavily on our defence industry, will feel extremely strongly about this and will continue to make representations on it over the next six months.

[Thomas Docherty]

Further to that point and the point the Minister made about that work of fiction, the Scottish White Paper, was he as surprised as I was that the only mention of Rosyth in the whole document was as a possible future supplementary naval base? There is no mention at all about ship maintenance. Would he care to speculate on why the SNP would do that?

[Dr Murrison]

I have given up speculating about the SNP, but I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is somewhat odd, even in the simple 19 pages on defence in this remarkable 649-page document, that Rosyth should feature so poorly. That is truly remarkable and I think the hon. Gentleman’s constituents are entitled to draw their own conclusions from that.

I believe that Scotland should continue to benefit from every pound spent on UK defence. We of course have one of the largest budgets in the world at £33.5 billion this year. The £2.5 billion grudgingly conceded by Mr Salmond for both defence and security simply pales in comparison.

As part of the UK, Scotland will continue, as it has done for 300 years, to play an integral part in all aspects of UK defence. As UK citizens, Scots will continue to be employed in world-class armed forces, and Scotland will continue to be home to critical high-end military capabilities across the defence piece. In fact, on our current plans, the defence presence in Scotland will increase over the coming years. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) has pointed out, by 2020 Scotland will be home to one of the Royal Navy’s main bases, including all of its submarines—I will come back to submarines in a moment—as well as to one of the British Army’s seven adaptable force brigades and one of three Royal Air Force fast-jet main operating bases.

At a time when the overall number of our regular armed forces personnel is necessarily decreasing, the number based in Scotland is set to increase from about 11,000 now to 12,500 by 2020, which is about 8.8% of the UK total.

UK defence generates economic benefits for communities throughout Scotland though jobs, contracts and support services. Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde is the biggest employment site in Scotland, with about 6,700 military and civilian jobs, increasing to 8,200 by 2022.

The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife has eloquently described the importance of defence to the east coast, and every constituency in Scotland has people whose livelihoods depend on defence and that are subsequently at risk.

Scotland, as part of the UK, will continue to benefit from a strong, established global network of international relationships and alliances that would be unavailable to an independent Scotland, at best for years and possibly indefinitely.

[Dr Murrison]

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman, who has anticipated my next point, which is that the UK has geopolitical influence that few states of a similar size can match. That influence would be put at risk in a dramatic way were this country to be split in two. Together, undoubtedly we punch well above our weight. Apart, we would certainly be diminished, with substantial geopolitical consequences that would reach far beyond these shores. It is interesting that many of our partners are watching this situation very closely indeed—even more closely, I have to say, than many of our own citizens on these islands—because they fully understand what is at stake in September.

Because we are together, the UK is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a leading member of the European Union and a founder member of NATO. It is central to the “Five Eyes” community. The benefits for Scotland’s defence industry as part of the UK are especially important to the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife, as he has pointed out.

The scale of our defence spending is a key factor in sustaining those indigenous defence industries. The Ministry of Defence spent more than £20 billion with UK industry in 2011-12. Over the 10 years from 2012-13, it will spend almost £160 billion on new equipment and data systems. That spending sustains a substantial industrial footprint in Scotland, from complex warships to the latest high-tech innovations in aerospace engineering, defence electronics and electro-optical systems in companies based throughout the country, employing thousands of people in high-skill and relatively high-salary positions. Many of our prime contractors—Babcock, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Selex ES, Thales, Raytheon and QinetiQ—have sites in Scotland. The defence sector in Scotland employs about 12,600 people, with 4,000 jobs in Scottish shipyards being directly linked to the aircraft carrier programme alone.

The SNP may be able to marshal arguments in support of independence, beyond its cynical offer of free child care, but even its ex-parliamentary candidate Colonel Stuart Crawford asked rhetorically whether the Scottish Government White Paper would provide at least some answers. In the event, we were left little the wiser from its 649 pages.

John Swinney’s secret admission that his defence budget would be less than the £2.5 billion asserted by the SNP is interesting, but let us generously assume that that is the figure. That would be for both defence and security, presumably including intelligence and cyber, but it is only about 7% of the UK’s combined budgets for defence, intelligence and cyber, and it is significantly less than Scotland’s population share—if we are counting, which we are not.

It is not clear what level of security and protection the £2.5 billion would provide, but it would for sure be less than Denmark’s or Norway’s. The SNP plans are simply unaffordable, and I can only conclude that it would end up with its starting point of 7,500 soldiers. So much for restoring all Scotland’s historic regiments. Confounding Colonel Crawford’s hopes, the White Paper seems to offer more questions than answers.

It is clear that an independent Scottish state would have to wait in line for membership of the international organisations that the Scottish Government have hitherto believed Scotland would automatically join. If it wished to be a member of NATO, all 28 member states would need to agree unanimously to its accession, which is hardly likely, given the Scottish Government’s attitude to the strategic nuclear deterrent that lies at the very heart of the alliance’s strategic concept. It seems unlikely that the “Five Eyes” community would really bang on the door of a newly independent Scotland.

Companies based in an independent Scottish state would no longer be eligible for contracts that the UK chose to place, or to compete domestically, for national security reasons under article 346. All our complex warships are designed and built within the UK for reasons of national security, so as a foreign country, Scotland would no longer be eligible. Where companies in Scotland could continue to compete, they would be bidding in a cut-throat international market dominated by major economic powers. The sustainability of the defence industry in Scotland and the thousands of jobs that depend on it would therefore be cause for considerable concern.

The Scottish Government have shown a little bit of leg in the 19 pages on defence in their 649-page doorstopper, but there is no link between their defence wish list and the budget proposed to cover it. Their £2.5 billion—remember that that is our generous assessment—would be nowhere near enough to pay for their stated requirement and, like the hon. Gentleman, who is eagle-eyed, I notice that the figure does not cover their 2012 plans for conventional submarines, which were not mentioned in the following year’s White Paper. The Scottish Government say that they would have expensive platforms, such as Type 26 frigates, Typhoon jets and maritime patrol aircraft, and presumably the wherewithal to process and act on the data that MPAs generate, and would continue to operate all current major military bases, but the sums do not add up.

That is not to suggest that an independent Scotland could not build a defence force. Of course it could. However, what the Scottish Government are saying about what that force would be like is simply not credible—it is incredible. Whatever defence force an independent Scotland could develop, it would not come close to replicating the level of defence and security that comes from being part of the UK, which defends the country not on a regional basis, but as a whole.

[Thomas Docherty]

The Minister is making a compelling speech. I do not know whether he has had the chance to look at the evidence of Air Vice-Marshal Nicholl to the Defence Committee. He said that if he were to start again as a young, aspiring pilot, he would not wish to join a separate Scottish air force, because he would not have the same opportunities that he had in the Royal Air Force. It was a Scot who said that. Does the Minister agree that a problem for the SNP is how it would recruit people? Why would people want to serve in the services if there were such restricted opportunities?

[Dr Murrison]

We have to imagine what Scotland’s defence force would look like with £2.5 billion or less. It would be very small indeed. It follows that the high-tech, high-end capability to which I have referred will simply not be available in Scotland. It seems inconceivable that the sort of men and women who join our armed forces would be attracted to such a proposition. I fear that the air vice-marshal is correct in his assertion. I hope that people in Scotland who are tempted by a career in the armed forces are not faced with the conundrum of whether to join a Scottish defence force or the armed forces of the United Kingdom. That would be a great pity for them and, potentially, a huge waste of talent. Traditionally, Scotland has provided some of the very best people in our armed forces. The loss to defence in this country in the event that Scotland went independent would be felt not least in the manpower and capabilities that those men and women provide.

Scotland’s defence and the UK’s best interests will be served by a strong no vote on 18 September. I suspect that the SNP knows that and would dearly like to park defence and security, so that it can focus on things like free child care, which it already has the power to grant, even if that will be pre-empted by tomorrow’s statement. I do not think that it is by chance that there are no SNP Members here tonight. They are concerned about their defence and security offer to the voters of Scotland on 18 September and would like to talk about something else. I do not intend to let the Scottish Government get away with their obfuscation and litany of half-truths on one of the major determinants of nationhood. My helpful advice to the SNP—I do try to be helpful where I can—is to admit that Scotland’s defence and its defence industry would be a casualty of independence and, in the six months remaining to it, to campaign on something else.

Question put and agreed to.

Dalgety Bay

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Thomas Docherty

Tuesday 17th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

The MOD has consistently made it clear that as the default position it will accept its legal responsibilities, but that it wants to go beyond that and make sure—without the intervention of expensive lawyers who will wrap us up for years—that we take action by negotiation with all interested parties so we can get a plan that will satisfy the right hon. Gentleman and his constituents. Our position in respect of liability has not changed at all.

In its draft report, COMARE says that

“we recommend that, in conjunction with all stakeholders, an evaluation of the means of remediation should be instituted immediately considering efficacy, practicability and cost.”

I wish to conclude this evening by saying that we could not agree more. To go back to my opening remarks, I sincerely hope very much that while the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath has been assiduous in bringing this matter to the House—I commend him for that—he will not have to be here for a fifth time in another six months.

[Thomas Docherty]

Further to the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) and I have made to the Minister about submarines, will he take the opportunity to give real cast-iron guarantees to my constituents and those of my right hon. Friend that there will be no attempt to move on these submarines until this is all joined up going forward?

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Gentleman is talking about the submarine dismantling project and will be aware that there are seven hulls currently at Rosyth awaiting dismantling. Their cores have been removed; he knows that. The pressurised vessels that contain those cores remain, and because of the exposure to radiation over the years they have become intermediate level waste and need to be disposed off responsibly. The hon. Gentleman will probably be aware—because Babcock has briefed MPs and the councils—that Babcock is not interested in storing the intermediate level waste. It is difficult to see how this becomes a relevant factor in the context of Rosyth.

I am very grateful for the opportunity to come here to talk about Dalgety Bay again. I hope that I have made it clear that I take a personal interest in this; I hope the right hon. Gentleman is reassured by that. I will do my utmost to make sure that this process is moved on as swiftly as possible

Question put and agreed to.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Thomas Docherty

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Gentleman will also remember that Bernard Gray was a special adviser to his party. In that context it is quite important to note that the report was produced by a supporter not of the Conservative party but of his party.

The gap between the programme and the budget in May 2010 was a truly grotesque £38 billion. Also grotesque is the disarray over how to deal with the crisis among those who masterminded it. We heard examples of that today from the shadow Defence Secretary. He says he supports only £5 billion of Government cuts, but the shadow Chancellor says that the Labour party would keep all the remedial spending reductions that the Government are making. The figure of £5 billion is interesting because the shadow Defence Secretary also said today that it would be invidious in advance of a general election to try to work out what the requirement would be in personnel and equipment. It is therefore difficult to work out how he came up with the £5 billion figure, even assuming it is correct. The isolation of the Opposition is increasingly apparent as even the United States reins in its defence spending to deal not with an incoherent defence budget but with a crippling federal budget deficit.

[Thomas Docherty]

I think I am right in saying that the US is still increasing its defence spending, not cutting it. Is that correct?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Murrison]

No, I do not think it is correct. America has made it clear that over the spending period it will have to reduce its defence spending.

[Thomas Docherty]

Slowly.

[Dr Murrison]

Well, the rate will decline—of course it will.

We gained some insight into how the disconnect between programmes and the ability to pay for them arose last summer when Lord Levene delivered his verdict on the MOD. His revelations dovetailed disquietingly well with Gray’s. He found a “bloated top-level defence board” supervising a

“department with overly bureaucratic management structures, dominated by committees leading to indecisiveness and a lack of responsibility.”

Last year, the armed forces covenant was written into law for the first time, as the Prime Minister said it would be. The covenant is not just about the compact between troops and the public. It also concerns the deal between troops and the high command. Those in charge betray the covenant if they allow the kind of shoddy, top-level management evidenced by both Gray and Levene. However, we still have nearly 500 one-star officers and above—a whole battalion of senior officers on packages well in excess of £100,000. Defence Medical Services is a good case in point. To oversee the care of a patient population less than half the size of Wiltshire we require one three-star, five two-star and 15 one-star officers who serve not as doctors, dentists or nurses but as administrators. Our top medic in Afghanistan is not among them—he is just a colonel. I commend the Government for the remedial measures announced before Christmas to reduce the number of starred appointments, both uniformed and civilian.

More generally, I note that although there here have been and will continue to be compulsory redundancies, the package is so reasonable that there has been disappointment among many of those not selected, as there was during previous rounds. From experience, I bear testament to that.

It is of course reasonable to flex personnel from one trade to another—a contention, I think, of paragraphs 67 to 70 of this week’s Defence Committee report—but the majority of pinch-point trades are so specific by rank or extent of retraining necessary that it would actually be quite difficult to do so. Flexible though our young people are, we simply cannot ask an infantryman to become an Intelligence Corps linguist, a pharmacist at the rank of captain or a Cat. A nuclear watchkeeper.

In our collective defence, NATO remains paramount. However, I share widespread concern that we are moving towards a two-tier alliance, with some players benefiting from the cover but not paying the premium. At next week’s meeting of Defence Ministers in Brussels, will the Defence Secretary continue to press our allies to meet their proper financial responsibilities? Present at the meeting will be those who press for an increasing EU defence identity as part of the security and defence policy. Naturally, that has nothing to do with defence, which only the UK and France come close to funding properly.

The latest turn of the screw comes from a European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009, which proposes something called synchronised armed forces Europe. SAFE is a beguiling but deeply ironic acronym. Under SAFE, alarmingly, British servicemen would owe allegiance to the supranational European Union. One of its cheerleaders, the German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, told the Munich security conference in February 2010:

“The long-term goal is the establishment of a European army under full parliamentary control.”

Of course, that has nothing to do with improving our collective security; instead, it draws from a hubristic, maladroit pan-European political project that has brought us to the brink of economic catastrophe. The immediate concern about SAFE is that it would quite deliberately remove the capability of the two European nation states still able to act independently to project force worldwide on their own, or with partners of their choosing, in pursuit of the national interest.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Andrew Murrison and Thomas Docherty

Monday 10th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I am very pleased. I am a member of the Warminster branch of the Royal British Legion and I rarely disagree with it. It has done a great job in its honour the covenant campaign. I am very pleased that it agrees with me, and I have no doubt that it will make representations to that effect.

The Government have been spot-on in the way they have approached the covenant in this Bill. I have given a great deal of thought to what we should be doing in respect of the military covenant. As my hon. Friend the Minister knows, we considered the matter at great length when in opposition, and the debate was always about the form in which it would find its way into legislation.

At one end of the spectrum, we could be fairly didactic in what we mean by the military covenant. We could make it a bean-feast for lawyers, but that is completely against the spirit of the military covenant. It derives from Harry Levinson’s work in the 1950s and ’60s, in which he identified something called a psychological contract: a contract that was moral and that was understood, but that was not actually laid down in any form of written covenant, promise or undertaking. It is absolutely right that we should do nothing that would destroy the military covenant as part of that type of covenant. A couple of Members have mentioned the fact that this is not simply a deal between Government and officials and the rank-and-file. It also involves the general public. If we were to start putting it in a didactic contractual form, that would degrade that particular element of the deal that we understand by the term “the military covenant”.

That seems to be the view of most commentators. At the Royal United Services Institute in June 2008, Christianne Tipping said:

“This debate must continue but it must not attempt to specify that which is incapable of specification—the psychological contract is more powerful than the legal one.”

I agree. It could be said that the military covenant is at the extreme end of the psychological contract spectrum, but it is, nevertheless, part of that deal, and it is important that we treat is as such.

I welcome the annual report. The shadow Secretary of State was a little parsimonious in his praise for it. It will certainly maintain the profile of this issue. The devil is in the detail of course, in that the nature of the annual report is crucial—what it contains, how it is presented, and how it is debated. It is important that we know what the items in the report will be. We know what some of them will be, but this issue goes much further than that, of course. We must also address issues such as kit, the way we deal with the bereaved, and coroners courts. As has been mentioned, they have caused a great deal of grief over the past few years, and it would be extraordinary if they were not dealt with as part of this annual report.

It is also important that we listen to the views of third parties. They will undoubtedly comment on this, and they are also very important in the implementation of the military covenant. Government must not do that alone. If they were to do so, they would completely ignore the general public and the voluntary sector, which are another element that must be party to the military covenant. It would therefore be interesting to know what involvement from third-sector partners is envisaged in this annual report.

It is also important that the report is dovetailed with any other relevant reports there might be, such as from the service complaints commissioner, the continuous attitude survey or the external reference group. We need to know, as well, the extent to which personal functional standards subsequent to the armed forces overarching personnel strategy have been satisfied, and we need to incorporate the views of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

While I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s comments about external scrutiny of the armed forces annual report, does he not agree that it is vital that the House itself scrutinises the work of the MOD? Does he also agree that every year after the report is published the Defence Committee should invite the Secretary of State to appear before it to face further scrutiny?

[Dr Murrison]

I believe the Secretary of State does so in any case, but that is, of course, a matter for the Chairman of the Defence Committee, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Chairman will be only too delighted to oblige.

It is important that we thrash out what we mean by the covenant and the deal we are prepared to strike in recognition of it. On the one hand, it might be a “no-disadvantage” covenant, by which I mean that people will not be disadvantaged by their military service. On the other hand, might it mean a “citizen-plus” covenant, in that people will get a bit extra in recognition of the fact that they are serving or have served, or are related to someone who is serving or has served, in the armed forces? It is important that we do that.

We could envisage the “no-disadvantage” covenant as being what we might aspire to at the moment, and the “citizen-plus” covenant as being the sort of model that applies in the United States. Certainly, the “no-disadvantage” covenant appears to be what people have in mind in things such as the service Command Paper. The term is used in that publication and also by Professor Hew Strachan in his recent report on the military covenant. Furthermore, of course, that covenant is a great deal more attainable, and we can take a closer view of what it actually means, if we use the benchmark of not disadvantaging people by virtue of their service. A “citizen-plus” covenant, however, is more difficult and invites calls of “Me too!”, in particular from other public servants who say that these days they are just as much on the front line. We could argue that point.

It is important that the annual report contains an outcome measure. We need to know what we are looking at in order to make an assessment of whether the Government have done what they should be doing in honouring the military covenant. What do success and failure look like? It is important that the document is subject to rigorous independent scrutiny, not least by the Defence Committee. The report will be subject to the media spotlight and the analysis of third parties, so it needs to be a comprehensive and detailed document, unless it is simply to become, in the fullness of time and potentially under another Administration, simply a tick-box exercise.

Over Christmas last year, my right hon. and hon. Friends were exercised by the air bridge between the UK and theatre. Perhaps that is a demonstration of a facet of the military covenant that could be covered in the annual report. I find to my great horror that similar problems arose this Christmas. It was a high-profile incident because it involved Katherine Jenkins and James Blunt and their failure to go to theatre to entertain the troops. Will the annual report cover theatre-specific elements of the disgruntlement of our armed forces? The Minister knows full well—we talked about this a great deal in opposition—that paramount in that list of disgruntlement tends to be things such as the air bridge and rest and recuperation.

Organisations such as the British Limbless Ex Service Men’s Association point out that people owe their allegiance to the nation, not to localities by and large, and that the covenant is a country covenant, not a county covenant. It is important, when considering elements of Professor Strachan’s report, which is excellent in almost all respects—particularly his important point about the community covenant—that we recognise that people owe their allegiance nationally and expect the covenant to be honoured nationally as well. It would be a pity if we entered into some sort of postcode lottery in how we regard our duties to the men and women of our armed forces. I represent a constituency in a military part of the country, and as a community we are fully apprised of our duties towards the men and women of our armed forces. Some parts of the country, however—perhaps because men and women of our armed forces are less prominent there—are less inclined that way, so it is important, given that this is a national covenant, that we view this nationally, not parochially.

It is also important to recognise that the covenant cuts both ways. It is a duty that the country and the Government owe to the military, but in turn the military owes a duty to the public and the Government, and it is important to assess—in my view, as part of this annual report—whether that duty is being satisfied in all respects. Everyone in this place admires our armed forces greatly—many of us have served in them—and I am second to nobody in my admiration for the men and women who serve this country so gallantly. However, there will be detractors and those who say, “It is all very well talking up the military covenant, but we also need to understand that the public have expectations of the men and women of our armed forces.” It is important to include in the report, therefore, if only to gainsay it, that we have to look at areas where the public have been let down, as well as at areas in which we have let down our armed forces. I put that down as a point for consideration in Committee.

I turn to later clauses of the Bill that broadly speaking provide for the discipline elements. Clause 6 deals with the performance of the Ministry of Defence police. I have always had cordial relations with the MOD police, who work closely with their county colleagues, but, in a similar manner to the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes North, one would have to ask all the time why we have a separate MOD police force. If we are going to consider in Committee the service police—our Front-Bench team made a generous offer to do so—perhaps we might also look at policing in the round within the MOD, which of course would include the MOD police. It is important that police forces benchmark their performance. The MOD police force is a particular force with a different profile; what it does is subtly different, and its arrest and conviction profiles are very different from those of county forces, and we have to ask all the time, particularly in an age when we are looking for efficiency savings, whether the current model is the correct one. I make no judgment on that, but it might be something that the Committee should look at and take a view on.

Clause 5 deals with the appointment of provost marshals and asserts that only provost officers should be provost marshals, which struck me as slightly odd. At a time when we are looking for ways of making heads of police forces lay people, it seems a little odd—it sits uncomfortably with it—to insist in the Bill that in all circumstances provost marshals should be provost officers.

I am always a little wary when it comes to extending anybody’s powers—in this context, the powers of service police—unless I am faced with a good reason. That must be our starting premise. However, I do not have a good reason for why we need to extend the powers of service police. Although I am perfectly willing to take Ministers’ words for it that it is necessary, we will have to tease out in Committee why we need to extend the powers in the way described.

Clauses 9 to 11 and compulsory testing have been discussed at length by the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and in an authoritative fashion that I cannot match. However, I start to get concerned about compulsory testing, particularly when it involves health care professionals. This is an ethical minefield and something that no doubt will need to be explored in Committee.