Nuclear Test Veterans: Medical Records

Debate between Andrew Murrison and John Hayes

Tuesday 28th November 2023 Westminster Hall

[Dr Murrison]

It is difficult to prove a negative, but the overall conclusions of the researchers from Brunel University are clear. In the interests of transparency, it is worth pointing out that it was a fairly small study and also the first part of a series of reports that we anticipate from Brunel University. We will have to see what transpires, but the headline response published in July last year should be reassuring for those who believe that their exposure between 1952 and 1967 caused generational problems to their families.

I turn to the subject of compensation raised today, albeit fairly briefly. With respect to that matter, the Department published its policy on ionising radiation back in 2017. The statement was validated by the independent medical expert group, which provides evidence-based medical and scientific advice to the Ministry of Defence, ensuring that our decisions reflect both contemporary medical understanding on causation and the progress of disorders. In its sixth report, published in September 2022, IMEG again reviewed the evidence, including the findings of the fourth report of the longitudinal study. It concluded that no changes to the Department’s policy statement were required on the basis of the evidence available. 

However, nuclear test veterans who believe that they have suffered ill health due to service still have the right to apply for no-fault compensation under the war pensions scheme, which applies to anyone who served before 6 April 2005. War pensions are payable in respect of illness or injury as a result of military service, with a benefit of reasonable doubt always given to the claimant. Decisions are medically certified and take account of available service and medical evidence, and they also carry full rights of appeal to an independent tribunal. Additionally, there is a range of supplementary pensions and allowances payable, including for dependants. Each case will be considered on its own merits.

Some specific concerns were raised about the handling of individual medical data. I can confirm that there is a formal complaints procedure under the Data Protection Act 2018. On requests made for medical data under the freedom of information legislation by relatives of deceased veterans, I hope hon. Members will appreciate that I am unable to comment due to ongoing legislation.

[Sir John Hayes]

We now know that tests were done, presumably because there was a view that there might be an effect of the exposure to radiation, otherwise there would not have been blood and urine tests. Veterans’ inquiries about that were, as the Minister put it, “curiously” not answered on earlier occasions. So the question remains: why, who and when? Which Ministers—they may still be in this House or possibly the upper House—refused to provide that information, on what basis and when? The Government can presumably provide that information now with a degree of notice.

[Dr Murrison]

There is a list of 150 files of data that the Atomic Weapons Establishment said in September that it holds, and they contain reference to blood and urine. I have a list here; it is in the public domain and I am perfectly happy to give it to my right hon. Friend. What I am not clear about is what the bulk of those files actually say and what is in them. All I have are the subject headings. Some of them are pretty anodyne, to be honest—they are proceedings of various symposia, which presumably are available elsewhere—but some are tantalising and refer to test results. I would like to see what those documents look like. I have not seen them so far, and I certainly intend to examine them myself. More than that, I think it is reasonable for officials to trawl through them again to be absolutely clear why that which is not currently in the public domain—which I suspect is quite a lot of this—is not, and why it should not be.

There has to be a very good reason why this data is not in the public domain. Clearly, these tests happened overseas, and there may be very good reason why this material was not placed in the public domain, but it is now up to 71 years old, so given the level of public interest, it seems reasonable at least to ask why these documents, so tantalisingly put before us through the Freedom of Information Act in September this year, are not in the public domain in their entirety. I undertake to find out why that is. Wherever I can possibly do so, I will ensure that that material is placed in the public domain, with the usual caveats. For example, if there is personal information in them, which I do not expect from what I have been told, there are clearly some restrictions on the publication of that, but if it is simply sheets and sheets of dosimetry and urine and blood test results, I cannot see why that should not be available. I will certainly make it my business to examine that in the days ahead if that is of any help to my right hon. Friend.

The Government are committed to doing everything we reasonably can to support our nuclear veterans, as indeed we are for all our veterans. That includes acknowledging the profound contribution they have made through medallic recognition. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport for majoring on that. He knows very well that last November the Prime Minister announced that all nuclear test veterans will be eligible for a commemorative medal. To date, some 1,600 veterans have received the medal, whose design features an atom surrounded by olive branches. I am delighted that, as he said, there will be a reception today at Admiralty House, which I will attend, co-hosted by the Secretary of State and the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. We will witness a further 15 nuclear test veterans receiving their honour.

The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport asked why the medals are not presented formally. I understand where he is coming from and note that lords lieutenant sometimes undertake medal presentation ceremonies, but I think that, in this case, there was an imperative to get medals out of the door so that veterans could have them by Remembrance Sunday, and we have achieved quite a lot of that. As far as we could make out, that was the wish for the bulk of the veteran community. In general, however, I would support the hon. Member’s contention that it adds to the expression of gratitude represented by a commemorative medal if it can be presented personally. That will not be the wish of every veteran—of course it will not—but it will be for many, and, in general, I support point made by the hon. Member.

Our appreciation of the contribution of nuclear test veterans does not stop there and, indeed, the hon. Gentleman rightly said so. We are also investing in projects to further our understanding of the experiences of all who were deployed between 1952 and 1967, which will include funding for academics to record the life stories of veterans across the UK. I hope that colleagues will join me in encouraging all members of that unique community who reside in their constituencies to come forward and share their front-row experience of one of the defining operations of our time.

Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe

Debate between Andrew Murrison and John Hayes

Monday 7th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady. The information that I have is the information that she has, as we do not have consular access to Nazanin. I read the newspaper reports, which I suspect that she has read, and I am deeply troubled by them.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The plain truth is that Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was abducted and imprisoned illegally. The latest information that we have is that at the health hearing in Iran at which she appeared she complained that she had been deprived of her medication, was sometimes held in solitary confinement, and was suffering from deep anxiety. She fears separation from her five-year-old daughter, who is to return to England for schooling.

I say to my right hon. Friend—a personal friend, whose integrity is beyond question and whose determination is well known—that there are lessons to be learned from the recent Australian experience. Two Australians have been released. Will he enter into discussions with the Australian Government to discover what steps they took to ensure that release? No stone must be left unturned in the defence of British citizens at home or abroad.

[Dr Murrison]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his kind remarks. The truth of the matter is that Iran does not recognise dual nationals—that is the difference. The case to which he referred concerns an Australian-British national. Nazanin is a British-Iranian national. As far as Tehran is concerned—we can argue the point, but it will not do us much good—Nazanin is an Iranian national, which is why it will not allow us to have access. I regret that very much, and we push back on that all the time, but, very sadly, that is the position adopted by the Iranians.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Andrew Murrison and John Hayes

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hayes]

As you know, Mr Speaker, practice makes perfect, and we have two days to perfect all we do and say.

We open the debate on the Bill with a group of provisions that address a matter which lies at its very heart. Throughout the lengthy consideration the Bill has enjoyed in its draft form and its final form, the issue of privacy, and the balance between security and private interest, has been frequently considered and debated. The balance that lies at the heart of our considerations and the proposed legislation is critical to the acceptance we need to engender for a Bill that is in the national interest.

The word “balance” was used by the hon. Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson) during the Committee’s scrutiny of the Bill. He talked about the balance between national interest and personal interest— in my terms, the defence of personal privacy and the underpinning of the common good. For me, communal wellbeing and individual fulfilment are inseparable, and the national interest can only be defined as the people’s interest. It is right that we should consider how that balance is reflected in the words before us. The issues of privacy and oversight are central to our considerations, and the Government are determined to ensure that the Bill reflects the concentration on those two matters.

We are clear that, in considering and passing the Bill, we must do more—more in respect of checks and balances, more in respect of safeguards and more in respect of oversight, and that is indeed what we have tried to do in the provisions we are considering. It is important to understand that privacy is at the very core of the Bill—it runs through its very fabric. The protection of private interests and the protection of the public are at the heart of all we seek to do.

In Committee, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) tabled a new clause to strike a balance on this issue in sympathy with my view that privacy is woven throughout the Bill’s provisions. I have concluded that he was right to emphasise the need to make that palpably clear on the face of the legislation; to seek to reinforce the determination that I have described to protect private interest. It seemed to me that he was also right to suggest that that should be an overarching aspect of the Bill—in other words, that we should, explicitly, at the outset of this legislation, make it clear that privacy matters in the way that I have described. He therefore suggested—indeed, he has tabled an amendment today, too—that we add to the Bill just such an overarching emphasis on the defence of private interests.

By underpinning the powers and the sensitive capabilities available to our law enforcement and security services, the Bill provides—as successive Governments have, by the way—an appropriate degree of oversight of those powers. Furthermore, through the change to authorisation, we have, for the first time, and in highly significant—one might even say groundbreaking—terms, struck an important balance between the role of the Executive and the role of the judiciary. That answers the call of those who, on the one hand, made the case in our earlier considerations that it is politicians who should decide these things because they are accountable to the people and those who, on the other hand, felt that that alone was not sufficient and that it was also important for lawyers to play their part in ensuring that decisions made in respect of warranting were reasonable, necessary and proportionate. The core principle—the necessity of proportionality—therefore applies to all such powers. It is underpinned by the changes that we seek to make in the Bill.

In essence, the provisions reflect the collective consideration of the three independent reviews I mentioned briefly in our short consideration of the programme motion. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on the draft Bill, which was published last year, called for the inclusion of an overarching clause dealing with privacy protections, and that call was echoed by the Opposition and the Scottish National party during the Committee stage.

The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill that they would listen to recommendations that would improve this important proposed legislation, and that is just what we have done. We have tabled a number of amendments that demonstrate exactly that willingness to listen and that desire to strike the right balance.

Government amendment 34 relates to clause 10, an important safeguard in the Bill that prevents numerous powers in other legislation from being used to acquire communications data. There are a small number of exceptions to that restriction, and the purpose of the amendment is to ensure that they are clearly limited. The amendment therefore makes it absolutely clear that the use of regulatory powers to acquire communications data is limited to those that are exercisable in connection with telecommunications or postal regulation.

Government amendment 35 extends the oversight provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to all efforts made by prison governors to prevent the use of illegal mobile phones in custodial institutions. That is something that the Interception of Communications Commissioner has previously called for, so I am pleased to be able to amend the Bill to take account of his advice. The amendment will also ensure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has oversight of any interference with electronic communications.

That issue was raised in Committee by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and I said that we would give it further consideration. We have done so and come to the conclusion that her argument is right. Although this tort would apply only to very limited circumstances—indeed, we believe that it has never been used—I accept that in such cases a person should have the power to seek appropriate redress through the civil courts.

Probably the most important amendment tabled by the Government is new clause 5—the privacy clause to which I referred at the outset. It puts privacy at the heart of the Bill in precisely the overarching way that those who scrutinised it prior to and during Committee recommended. It responds, therefore, both to the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee and to the extensive debates held since then. As we have indicated, the protection of privacy is woven throughout the Bill, but we recognise the merit in setting it out at the very start.

I do not want to indulge in hyperbole, but consideration of the Bill has been characterised by an unusual degree of co-operation to get it right across the House. All legislation benefits from that kind of considered scrutiny and co-operation. Legislation that is in the national interest, as this Bill certainly is, is far better for that kind of approach, and that is exactly the approach that the Government have adopted.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is being ever so slightly modest in relation to new clause 5, which is aimed primarily at protecting personal privacy. Clearly he has been listening, since one of the concerns expressed by industry is that interference and hacking may cause a failure of business confidence in IT. Subsection (2)(b) will go some way to protect the interests of such companies and businesses, since it states explicitly that the public authority must have regard to the public interest in such matters, including the viability of those undertakings.

[Mr Hayes]

It is true that such concerns have been expressed. Indeed, as we debate the Bill in further detail, particularly with regard to internet communication records, we will see that the capability of organisations to meet the Bill’s requirements must be met in a way that is not excessively expensive or impossible to implement, and that does not have the sort of unintended consequences described by my hon. Friend. It is partly the response to those overtures that has stimulated the changes under discussion. So it was, as he said, partly about what the Opposition said in Committee, partly about what the three reports said in respect of privacy and the consequences he described, and partly about the extensive discussions we have had with the sector on how these things could best be implemented.