(14 years, 2 months ago)
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It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Streeter.
The UK and Morocco go back a long way, and it is my great pleasure to have this opportunity to discuss the Government’s policy towards one of this country’s greatest friends and allies. Fortunately, unlike France and Spain, Britain has avoided the acquisitive behaviour that so complicates their history with Morocco, with a single, brief exception in 17th-century Tangier. Our amicable relationship has been enhanced recently by the appointment of King Mohammed VI’s esteemed and able cousin, Her Highness Princess Lalla Joumala Alaoui, as ambassador to London.
In 2013 arises an opportunity to cement the relationship further, with the 800th anniversary of the first official contact between the two countries. In 1213, King John sent an emissary to petition support from Sultan Mohammed Ennassir. It would be a great pity if that opportunity were lost, and I am interested to hear what proposals the Government have to celebrate the occasion or, if they have none, whether they will give the matter some serious thought.
On Friday, Morocco goes to the polls, and they will be keenly watched in the South West Wiltshire constituency, a division with more Moroccan residents than any other outside the M25. The election will cement the “new constitution project” for a citizen-based monarchy, accepted in a referendum with a remarkably high turnout on 1 July. A polling station for that was set up in Trowbridge in my constituency, which I had the great pleasure of visiting. The new Parliament will have the task of giving statutory expression to the will of the people as expressed in the referendum. The way it conducts itself will be important in facing down the critics, the more considered of whom cite scope for interpretation of caveats to the clauses in the new constitution, the reliance of the new constitution’s articles on what are called organic laws, which have not yet been written, and recourse to special commissions chaired by the King to determine much of the change anticipated.
It is important to set the context for this year’s historic referendum and general election. Morocco has, to a large extent, stood apart from the violence and disorder of the Arab Spring. The present King, Mohammed VI, has ruled for 12 years and is generally credited with liberalising his country and shifting it towards a constitutional democracy within the historic and religious constraints of a society that remains deeply conservative and traditional. His regime contrasts sharply with that of his father, Hassan II, who presided over the post-colonial period during what became known unflatteringly as the years of lead. It is significant that King Mohammed, early in his reign, pardoned thousands of prisoners, set up an arbitration body to compensate families of opposition leaders who had disappeared and caused credible elections to take place. There has been a marked improvement in the position of women, with a quota for the Parliament that will be the envy of many in this House. The rights of women have been enhanced by the King’s family law, and he has insisted that the Berber language should be taught in primary schools, a measure that complements his move towards regional autonomy in Morocco, including western Sahara.
In June, King Mohammed laid out his proposals for the referendum. The King surrendered his right to appoint a Prime Minister and uprated the status of the premier to Head of Government, with the consequent right to dissolve Parliament. The King lost the right to appoint regional leaders. The new constitution endorsed by the referendum explicitly upholds human rights, promises religious freedom, prohibits torture, backs freedom of thought, opinion and expression, permits free assembly and peaceful demonstration, and should facilitate a more free press. It calls for gender equality, and gives the minority Berber language official status.
There is an interesting version of the separation of Church and state in the differentiation of the powers of the King as Head of State and as commander of the faithful, which may be of interest to those in the UK who are concerned about the established Church, and the Monarch as supreme governor. The proposals overhaul the judiciary, and even offer an ombudsman service, but reaction in the west has been mixed, with The Economist leading under the mean-spirited headline, “A very small step”. However, it is, without doubt, a step in the right direction, and one that I am sure the Minister will support.
Perhaps because of the peaceful evolutionary change that is under way in Morocco, the country has avoided much of the mayhem seen elsewhere in north Africa. It is true that there were significant protests in Moroccan cities early this year, but as far as we can tell, they were less intent on regime change than in other countries involved in the Arab Spring. The relatively few protestors who took to the streets of Rabat, Tangier and Casablanca in the run-up to the general election focused on the Makzhen or palace elite. That is said to represent a road block to reform, which organisations such as the Brookings Institution maintain is happening too slowly. If there is a criticism of what is going on in Morocco at the moment, it usually involves the rate of change, rather than the direction of travel.
As for the protests organised by the 20 February organisation and so on, it is difficult to know what significance to assign to them, given that Morocco is caught in a pincer between economically inspired unrest in Europe and the Arab Spring in north Africa and the middle east. It is also reasonable to point out that stridency among émigrés, which is generally a barometer for unrest in troubled countries, has certainly not been experienced in respect of Morocco. I get the feeling from my Moroccan community, many members of which return regularly to Morocco and certainly have family there, and through the British Moroccan association to the Moroccan Community Association, whose meetings on the parliamentary estate I attend, that the reforms that are under way are welcomed and appropriate.
In recent years, there has been significant security and judicial co-operation between Morocco and the UK. Clearly, the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel present a threat to the west, and desertification makes it more likely that populations will move north. The Government of Morocco give every indication of appreciating the threat that that poses to peace and concord within their borders, and the danger of being seen as a repository of criminality threatening southern Europe.
In the summer, the Foreign Secretary and the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mr Fassi Fihri, signed a memorandum of understanding on deportation on the grounds of terrorism and national security, but the detail was left out. Can the Minister explain the practical consequences of the memorandum now, how he sees it developing, and within what time scale?
It has been reported that the streams of intelligence from north Africa have reduced in recent years and months, probably as a result of political developments, the disappearance of old lines of communications with, thankfully, vanishing regimes and general chaos in the region. If so, it means that Morocco’s significance has increased. Indeed, attacks in Casablanca and Marrakesh and the involvement of Moroccan nationals in the 2004 Madrid bombings notwithstanding, terrorist activity in and linked to Morocco has been limited, and commentators have suggested that that is due in part to effective intelligence gathering and co-operation with western agencies.
I appreciate that the Minister cannot be specific in this forum, but can he comment on the development of intelligence co-operation with Morocco? As Tehran continues to act as the bully boy of the middle east, what significance does he attach to Moroccan good sense in cutting off diplomatic relations with the monstrous Iranian regime in 2009 after it started to spread its fundamentalism to the peaceful and moderate Sunni kingdom?
There are major threats to Morocco from challenging frontier security issues, and difficult-to-regulate migration. The barely governed space of southern Algeria, Mali and Niger, and vast area of the western Sahara offers a potential nest to fundamentalist terror organisations, including al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. To what extent does the Minister believe that Morocco’s ability to engage in intelligence and security has been degraded by the Binyam Mohamed episode?
Although the UK does not provide direct bilateral aid to the western Saharan people, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid office certainly does. The UK provides direct assistance to help to promote stability and to alleviate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, and I was informed before the election that the Government were working on the EU to direct EU stability instrument funding to help to address the security situation. Can the Minister offer a progress report? What progress has been made in establishing a new embassy in Mali and political offices in Mauritania, as heralded in January 2010 by the then Minister of State at the Foreign Office?
The previous Government showed interest in the Moroccan imam training scheme in marginalising the religious fundamentalism that is the cause of so much trouble elsewhere. The scheme was exploring whether UK imams might train in Morocco, and I wonder whether there has been any progress on that.
In 2010, the House was informed that bilateral defence activity was “modest but important”, and the most significant seems to be Exercise Jebel Sahara, which is run regularly in the region of Marrakesh. Can the Minister say how he anticipates bilateral defence activity being developed, and for what purpose?
Helped by Morocco’s association agreement with the EU, the EU accounts for 60% of Morocco’s exports, 80% of tourism receipts and most of its large income from foreign remittances. Given the strong prospect of a double-dip recession in the eurozone, depression in southern Europe and the country’s wide and growing trade deficit, it seems likely that the pressures on Morocco from the young, educated unemployed will increase with every chance of an escalation in civil unrest and potential for terrorists to feed off poverty and grievance. Morocco is a relatively small trading partner for the UK, in contrast with, for example, France, but what measures are being taken to improve trade in goods and services between the two countries, and how does the Minister believe that might help to avoid the turmoil elsewhere in the region with its attendant security threats?
In January, I had an Adjournment debate on the western Sahara, when the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), responded. Can the Minister provide an update on the Government’s contribution to steering this central issue for sub-regional stability to a safe place? What has Baroness Ashton and the portentously named EU External Action Service been up to? If we must have it, it might as well do something useful in the EU’s near abroad, which the western Sahara most certainly is.
Voting arrangements for the Moroccan elections this Friday are based on Moroccan ancestry, rather than residency or citizenship. That means that a large Moroccan ex-pat community is potentially involved, although the arrangements are rather more complex than for the referendum held in the summer. There is certainly confusion at the bewildering array of parties on offer, and I regret that the very good polling stations that we saw for the referendum will not be available again on Friday. Nevertheless, I am sure that the Minister will take a keen interest in the outcome and in the Government who emerge, who will be headed for the first time by a Prime Minister who can be said to be truly head of the Government.
In a similar vein, the Minister will have noted that at the Inter-Parliamentary Union assembly at Berne in October the Speaker of the Moroccan House of Representatives, Mr Abdelwahed Radi, was elected president. Will the Minister join me in welcoming this important totemic step as Morocco moves towards a commendable new settlement based on constitutional democracy?
(14 years, 3 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Mr Hague
It is absolutely not my brief to defend the Bahraini Government in their handling of the situation. There are allegations about those doctors and nurses, and some in Bahrain argue that they were not going about their jobs but doing other things. It is not for me, however, to state those allegations or to agree with them. Those people should have been tried, if they needed to be tried at all, in a transparent way, in a civil court and with, of course, a fair judgment at the end. Therefore, we welcome the decision that they should be retried, and we will all watch very closely how that retrial takes place and what the verdicts are.
The Foreign Secretary is right to draw attention to the elections being held in Morocco next month and to their importance. What significance does he ascribe to the far-reaching constitutional reforms announced as part of the referendum held in July in that country? Does he agree, as he has before, that Morocco offers a beacon of hope in a region that has been blighted by conflict and violent disorder over the past several months?
Mr Hague
Yes, I do agree. The King of Morocco has shown a determination to be ahead of the curve in the demand for change, in his own country and throughout the region, and that should be strongly welcomed. I will visit Morocco shortly to see for myself what is happening and to discuss those matters in more detail. It is part of the excitement that we should feel about what is now possible in north Africa. If we just imagine Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and, we hope, Egypt as more open societies and economies, we find that the possibilities for their citizens in terms of freedom and economic progress are a tremendously exciting development in world affairs.
(14 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI certainly do. This is an argument that needs to be had right across the world. Recently in Australia, there was a big attack on the aid programme to Indonesia—again, it is substantial—which is designed to ensure proper secular, state-run education, so that youngsters do not only get their education in fundamentalist organisations. It is enormously important that we sustain that programme for the future of that country, the largest Muslim country, as it is for the future of Pakistan, the second largest Muslim country. That is essential not only for the long-term security of the region but for international security. I was encouraged by the comments of the Foreign Secretary on that subject, and I hope that the Secretary of State for International Development will enlarge on them in his response.
Turning to the middle east and north Africa, it has been rightly said that the death of bin Laden was a serious setback for al-Qaeda, but the most telling blow has been the Arab spring, with its demands for democracy and more open societies, and certainly not for al-Qaeda’s dream of a return to mediaeval brutality. We should be realistic about the various elements that are involved in that movement and the possible course of developments.
I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on his Mansion House speech. I notice that he recycled quite a bit of it in his speech this evening. That is obviously part of the Government’s commitment to be greener. However, the speech bears repetition. As he rightly said:
“Demands for open government, action against corruption and greater political participation will spread by themselves over time, not because Western nations are advocating them but because they are the natural aspirations of all people everywhere.”
In that context, we should recognise that the events in the middle east and north Africa are not isolated. A tide has been sweeping around the world.
In spite of some disappointments, we should reflect on how much progress has been made around the world over the past couple of decades. Most countries in south America have emerged from military dictatorship, are overcoming their ruthless, destructive guerrilla groups and are building a better future. Interestingly, in his famous Chicago speech in 1999, Tony Blair referred to the need for
“more effective ways of resolving crises, like that in Brazil.”
Brazil is now a roaring economic power, and it has just celebrated the election of a new successive social democratic President. The countries of eastern Europe have returned to their European home, having thrown off the shackles of their corrupt, vicious, incompetent communist leaderships and the Warsaw pact. They have willingly joined NATO and the EU. Indonesia, which I mentioned in response to the right hon. Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce), is the world’s fourth most populous state and the largest Muslim state. In 10 years, it has gone from being a military-backed dictatorship to being a vibrant democracy with a rapidly expanding economy. It is now a G20 member and an effective partner against terrorism. There has been a seismic, historic shift in the international landscape, and we should recognise and welcome that.
That is why we fully supported and support the Government’s decision to join international partners to enforce United Nations resolutions 1970 and 1973 in Libya. Those who query resolution 1973 and this country’s rapid decision to act must consider how we would have felt, and how the world would have reacted, if Gaddafi’s tanks and death squads had poured into Benghazi over that weekend and killed people, to use his words, “like rats”. In this day and age, that would all have been carried out on 24-hour TV in real time.
While giving support, it is our responsibility, as a Parliament and as an Opposition, to scrutinise carefully the Government’s conduct and effectiveness in fulfilling the task. We need from the Government a clearer and better articulated strategy. Frankly, we need them to explain how their self-imposed cuts to our expeditionary capability will enable them to implement the policy. The article that the Prime Minister wrote with the French and US Presidents in April said:
“So long as Gaddafi is in power, Nato and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds”.
It is incumbent on the Government to be clearer to this House and to the British people about how they propose to bring about such a resolution of this situation, especially in the light of the comments over the weekend.
It was asked earlier, but I think it needs to be asked again, what is meant by “infrastructure targets”. If it means command and control posts within a military structure, I understand that. I think it is arguable—I hope that the Attorney-General would back me—that that is perfectly within the bounds of the UN resolution. If, as some commentators have suggested, it means industrial infrastructure, and particularly electricity infrastructure, we have considerable doubts. Even in Kosovo, which was a major operation, the object was to immobilise the transmission systems not to destroy them, because after military operations are over, there is a need to reconstruct the country. It is difficult to do that without adequate electricity supplies. It is therefore important that we have clarity on what is meant by infrastructure. One meaning is perfectly within the current programme, but otherwise we have considerable questions and doubts.
It has to be clear that there is continuing international and regional support for our strategy. I can see no UN mandate for ground troops to move into Libya, and I think it is fair to say that there is no chance of getting such a mandate at the Security Council and no prospect of regional support. We must recognise that there is little appetite among the British public for such a course of action, and I suspect that the situation is similar in the United States and France.
I hope that the Secretary of State for International Development will update the House on the considerable efforts of his Department, with others in the international community, to assist the 750,000 people who are estimated to have crossed from Libya into neighbouring countries, and to get supplies to people in parts of Libya that are under siege from Libyan Government forces. I do not underestimate the task, but we need to know how we are tackling it, because it is substantial and urgent.
What are our realistic options across the middle east and north Africa? Although it is true that we are one of the few countries with the strategic capability to provide meaningful intervention, we must recognise the constraints imposed by our existing commitments elsewhere, the clear problems of overstretch, and the cuts made in the strategic defence and security review, which are increasingly seen as ill advised and outdated. Whatever action we take will be in conjunction with others, and not only our key strategic ally, the United States, but increasingly the EU, or at least key European allies. It has become clear, particularly in the last week or so, that a stretched United States has self-imposed limitations. Our European deliberations will have to consider that, and our response will have to be shaped accordingly. It is true that we could take a position of splendid isolation and say that those issues are nothing to do with us, but developments would continue in north Africa and the middle east. Although we should not overestimate our ability to shape events, we should not underestimate it either.
A key area is to develop capacity for the emerging democratic forces and parties in the countries concerned. It would be tragic if the principal beneficiaries of the new democracies were the remnants of the old dictatorial parties or underground fundamentalist Islamist groups. We should draw on the experience of eastern Europe, where post-communist parties were able to exert disproportionate influence because of their well-developed corrupt networks. I am sure all parties hope that the Westminster Foundation for Democracy will play a major role in building capacity for democratic parties.
I am listening with great interest to the right hon. Gentleman. I am slightly concerned that he may not have learned the lessons of the past, in particular with respect to Iraq, where a thoroughgoing programme of de- Ba’athification stripped out the whole of the middle class and political class, making reconstruction far more difficult than it might have been. Does he not think that we should be cautious about completely stripping out individuals who may have been associated in some small way with an unsavoury old regime?
The hon. Gentleman has misunderstood what I was saying. I fully agree that the de-Ba’athification programme and the disbanding of the Iraqi army contributed substantially to many of Iraq’s problems. I am turning that point around and saying that I do not want the established networks of the old corrupt parties or the well-organised networks of the Islamist groups, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, to have a free field.
What I am talking about is not taking such people out of the structure but ensuring that emerging democratic forces, which by definition have been underground but are not organised in a Leninist fashion, can develop the capacity to compete on an equal playing field. They will then be able to play a proper role and not be outgunned—literally, sometimes, but certainly in finance and capacity —by other parties, which would have a detrimental effect. I am talking about building alternative capacity rather than moving along the route that the hon. Gentleman describes. That is the best prospect for the future of democracy in the countries in question.
(14 years, 9 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Mr Hague
The national transitional council has organised itself over the past five weeks. It has a president in Mr Jalil and an executive prime minister figure in Mr Jabril, and it is seeking other adherents and allies in Libya—and not just in the east, where it is based, in Benghazi. In recent days, towns in the west—on the western border—have also declared their adherence to the national transitional council. It is making a genuine effort to include people in its work beyond its current base and operations. It believes in the territorial integrity of Libya and in being able to bring the Libyan people together in future. I think it does have a political plan and a plan for a political transition, but the behaviour of the regime’s forces at the moment prevents it from carrying that out.
It seems fairly clear that the western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps are being used as a recruiting ground by General Gaddafi, yet the Polisario Front maintains an office in many western capitals, including London. What pressure can we put on the Polisario formally or informally to make it very clear that any co-operation with Gaddafi is unacceptable and highly unlikely to help its cause?
(14 years, 10 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Mr Hague
As the hon. Gentleman can imagine, we discussed Côte d’Ivoire, but also Libya at great length. Mr Ping was clear that the African Union also felt that Gaddafi should go—the vast majority of African Union leaders have no disagreement with us about that. Some African nations might disagree, but the vast majority of the African Union believe that it is inevitable and right. I have encouraged Mr Ping to engage more closely with our work in the contact group. Indeed, I have invited the African Union to the contact group meeting in Doha at the end of next week. It will have to decide at its meeting in Mauritania this weekend whether to attend the Doha meeting, but I see no obstacle to the African Union’s joining in a meeting, where the United Nations is present. I think that we have established this morning a closer working relationship on those matters.
In 2003, in planning for the reconstruction of Iraq, the UK Government gave too much weight to the opinions and insights of Iraqi ex-pats, émigrés and defectors. Will my right hon. Friend ensure that we do not make the same mistake, as the rats leave what we hope is Gaddafi’s sinking ship?
Mr Hague
Yes, I think my hon. Friend makes an absolutely fair point. All those people have important insights and opinions, but we must remember that there are many people left, for example, those who want to leave the regime but cannot or dare not. Some people are lying low and others have been in office in the past and not been seen around in recent years. All their opinions will be important, too. We fully take the lesson to which my hon. Friend refers.
(14 years, 10 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Richard Ottaway
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I shall allude obliquely to the point that he has made. While he was making his intervention, I had the opportunity to consider further the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope). I can inform him that I decided that the report should remain silent, rather than making any recommendation on whipping.
The point that I was about to make is that we want co-operation with the European Parliament, and, in our proposals, it would be a full member of the proposed conference. Like it or not, the Lisbon treaty has made the European Parliament a more powerful actor in certain areas of EU external relations. Whatever our views on the European Parliament, it would be in everyone’s interests for national Parliaments and the European Parliament to work together in this context, but—and it is an important “but”—decision making in the common foreign and security policy remains intergovernmental, and inter-parliamentary scrutiny of that decision making must reflect that. That is the basis of the proposal put forward in the report. National Parliaments would remain clearly in the lead, with the Parliaments of the rotating EU Council presidency countries chairing the proposed conference and taking organisational responsibilities.
It is all very well having scrutiny, but if it does not lead to action, it is fairly pointless. Will my hon. Friend note that, on 19 February 2009, the European Parliament decided, by resolution, to have something called Synchronised Armed Forces Europe, which would introduce something that looks remarkably like a military covenant that has been codified? This links into the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison). As we debate these subjects in the House, and as we do so even more in the future, our debates could be eclipsed by what is going on in Europe, yet the House has not, to my knowledge, debated the decision of 19 February 2009.
Richard Ottaway
I think I follow my hon. Friend’s point. My point is that unless we get our act together so that Parliaments across Europe adopt the proposals, there will be no counterweight to what is coming from the European Parliament, to which he just referred.
Richard Ottaway
The hon. Gentleman makes his point eloquently. It is an important subject. Perhaps 10 years ago, this debate would have taken place in a packed Chamber, which illustrates how the world has moved on in considering some of these issues.
In support of the point made by the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes), I note that Guido Westerwelle said at the Munich security conference in February last year:
“The long-term goal is the establishment of a European army under full parliamentary control.”
I share the dismay that today’s Chamber is not full with Members concerned about such remarks being made by very senior politicians in Europe, and particularly in Germany.
Richard Ottaway
My hon. Friend makes his point well and I rather share the sentiments behind it. For the benefit of those who bring up illustrations of the weight that the European Parliament places on these issues, however, may I draw attention to some of the details of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report?
(14 years, 11 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Mr Hague
We have discussions with our partners in NATO and in the European Union, and indeed more broadly in the Arab world, about this entire crisis, about the future of Libya and about the future of the entire region. Obviously, the mission into eastern Libya that we are describing was a United Kingdom-only mission, and not subject to discussion with other nations.
If the European External Action Service has a point, it is surely to engage in a timely fashion in its very near abroad. Is my right hon. Friend aware of any action being taken by Baroness Ashton in advance of this Friday’s meeting beyond cancelling a few visas and imposing a few trade sanctions?
Mr Hague
Baroness Ashton has recently visited a number of states in the region, including Egypt and Tunisia. It will be important for the European Union, including Baroness Ashton and her organisation, to play a role in what we are calling on the European Union to do in changing its policy to one of greater openness towards the countries of north Africa and to providing incentives for them to move towards economic openness and political reform. I hope that all the nations of the European Union, and its organs, will take part in that.
(14 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate my right hon. Friend on the tone he has struck with emerging and potential Administrations in north Africa, but there are countries in the wider region that are embarked upon a process of political evolution, not revolution. What can Her Majesty’s Government do to help them?
Mr Hague
We do, of course, work closely with those Governments. The evolutionary approach is a much wiser one, and, indeed, had the Egyptian leaders taken that approach in recent years—or even recent months—I think they would have been in a much stronger position over the past few weeks. That point has not been lost around the region, and some nations have introduced important political and economic reforms. Jordan is one of them, as I mentioned earlier, and Bahrain is another; it has already held three sets of national elections. That is not to say everything in all these countries is exactly as we would desire it, but they are embarked on a process of evolution and developing more open political systems, and we should welcome and support that.
(15 years ago)
Commons ChamberI must first declare my interests, which are entered in the overseas visits section of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am also chair of the all-party group on Morocco and the parliamentary link for the British Moroccan Association. I have been in touch with Western Sahara Campaign UK and Polisario and am grateful for their insights. I should make plain at the outset my admiration for Morocco, its history and people, and I am proud to represent the largest Moroccan expatriate community outside London.
I will spare the House the history and background of the Western Sahara dispute, which should be taken as read. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (David T. C. Davies) and the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) wish to speak in the debate, and my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr Offord) would have liked to contribute, as he attended the recent visit to Morocco and Western Sahara, but unfortunately he is unwell.
It seems to me that there are broadly three options for Western Sahara: the status quo, which has been described as “untenable” by the current UN special envoy, Christopher Ross; independence, which is unrealistic, according to Peter Van Walsum, the previous UN special envoy; and autonomy, which is the option we are left with. I will go through those options one by one.
I agree with Christopher Ross that the status quo is not an option. It is not an option for the inhabitants of the Tindouf camps or of the wider Maghreb, who continue to pay the price economically and socially. Violence in and around Laayoune in November, apparently whipped up by grievances over Sahrawi social conditions, left 11 officials and two civilians dead. We are told that the fingerprints of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are not on that, just as there is no confirmed evidence of its complicity in the unrest in Tunisia and Algeria. Nevertheless, the status quo in Western Sahara offers an opportunity for fundamentalist terror groups to move out of their operating bases in the vast, barely governed spaces of Mali, Niger and southern Algeria.
There is no firm evidence of links between the Polisario and AQIM. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Algeria would be keen to support an organisation with formal links to AQIM. Nevertheless, the potential for fundamentalist terrorists to feed off poverty and grievance is clear. We simply cannot be complacent. In December, an arms cache attributed to AQIM was discovered by the Moroccan authorities in Western Sahara. It is vital that we shrink the space available to insurgents. We must always be vigilant for the sorts of opportunities that have been offered elsewhere.
I agree with Peter Van Walsum that independence is no option at all. We understand that the American and French Governments are at least sympathetic to Van Walsum’s position, and the UK considers Western Sahara’s status to be undetermined and disputed and has lined up behind the official UN position. Van Walsum was apparently replaced as UN special envoy because he said that independence was not realistic, which rendered him unacceptable to Polisario. Even if we agreed hypothetically with the principle of independence, we must consider whether it is practical or achievable. It would mean a country the size of Britain with a population smaller than that of Bristol. How could its Government guarantee internal and external security in a highly challenging environment without relying indefinitely on benign or malign foreign agencies? Would we be comfortable with such an entity becoming the client state of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, which many human rights campaigners see as militaristic, closed and repressive? We must be careful about supporting the creation of states that are inherently unstable. We must also be cautious because of the security threat highlighted by the terrorism and insurgency centre run by Jane’s. Although it ranks Morocco’s counter-terrorism measures as “moderately effective”, it remains concerned about frontier security and unregulated migration.
In Europe, we are not disinterested bystanders. We have a stake in getting this right. Since the UK’s treaty obligations have rendered our borders porous, for practical purposes the southern Mediterranean coastline is our frontier. The recent trouble in Tunis and Algeria does not read across directly to Morocco, but in the Maghreb and in Egypt we have seen significant civil unrest in recent days, which is a reminder of the fragility of countries with young populations, high youth unemployment and poor living standards.
The third option is autonomy. In April 2007, Morocco unveiled its autonomy plan for Western Sahara. In part, it represented a compromise and, in part, it reflected wider governance changes involving the greater devolution of powers within Morocco itself. The UN Security Council, in its resolution of 30 April 2010, noted the proposal and commended the
“serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution.”
In 2009, that was backed by the majority of US Congressmen and, in 2010, by the majority of the Senate.
America, which prides itself on being Morocco’s oldest ally, has been understandably supportive. It knows very well the benefits of a federal model and has in its history incorporated, annexed and otherwise acquired territory on a grand scale. The plan that remains on the table would establish a Sahara autonomous region within the Kingdom of Morocco. It would have considerable autonomy and certainly move in the direction of the UN’s support for what it calls
“self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara.”
Some have even said that the powers over matters excluding foreign affairs, defence and the national judiciary exceed those devolved to Scotland and Wales. My hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth might wish to comment on that in due course.
There are, however, problems. Enumerating the Sahrawis, the Sahrawi diaspora and the resident Moroccan population is a challenge that seems almost overwhelming. It failed completely in 2000, but the job has to be done under both the independence and autonomy options. The only way we get out of it is if we are prepared to accept the status quo.
The Moroccan Government have said that they will not entertain a referendum with independence as an option, but unless we exclude those people who have migrated since 1975, with the presumption that if we do so they will not enjoy the citizenship of any Western Saharan state, it seems unlikely that such a referendum will result in support for independence. That suggests that for Morocco the question of independence as an option is one mainly of principle, rather than avoidance.
Another sticking point is the extension of the UN mandate to include human rights. I think my Moroccan constituents would concur with the sentiments of two precepts in that respect, one secular, the other divine: “Be sure you’ve sorted the beam in your own eye before the mote in your brother’s”; and “Don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good.”
There was outrage here when the US tried to suggest that there should be UN human rights monitoring in Northern Ireland, so we can begin to see how Morocco, a proud country, should also resist, particularly when it perceives that its eastern neighbour with a more questionable record is left alone. The major human rights movements have a presence in Western Sahara, and both Malcolm Smart of Amnesty and Eric Goldstein of Human Rights Watch say that they have not been restricted in investigating the November violence. Morocco has come a long way, but perhaps the time has come in the interests of facilitating a lasting settlement for it to swallow hard and allow human rights monitors, thus defusing the claims of its opponents.
Morocco has earned much respect for its autonomy plan, and Rabat might do well to accept an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, or MINURSO, but it would be ludicrous if that happened without including the Tindouf camps in southern Algeria, where light desperately needs to be shone on darkness. The UK has a money interest, as it has contributed to the €165 million in humanitarian aid through the European Community humanitarian aid office, with the promise of more to come. We should worry, in the context of reported hardship in the camps, about aid money that might not end up where it is supposed to, because aid falls into disrepute when that happens—whether it is bilateral or through the fingers of Brussels.
We have a duty to ensure that we know much more about the camps, and who and how many people are in them, if that money is to continue to be spent safely and effectively. The King of Morocco has issued reassurances to the refugees of the camps and undertaken to treat them well, and we understand that there has been a significant trickle back to Western Sahara, a process that is likely to develop as confidence is built up on all sides.
Can the Minister say what actions the UK has taken to ensure the safety of the high-ranking Polisario official, Mustapha Salma? We have only unconfirmed reports that he has taken refuge in Mauritania, and his family are allegedly unable to be united with him, as they are confined to Tindouf. What are we doing to clarify the position with Algeria? Whatever our position on the autonomy plan, we must recognise that Mustapha Salma’s bravery, in defying Mohammed Abdel Aziz in order to support proposals that he believes are in the interests of his people, is admirable. His witness is a substantial contribution to what I believe to be gathering support for the autonomy plan.
So far, the UN special envoy process has presided over the status quo. Christopher Ross convened a meeting in December in New York and another last weekend, the outcome of which was another fixture for Geneva in February. We understand that that will focus on how family visits from the camps can more readily be achieved. What is the Minister’s view on monitoring in the camps? How can the UK help to facilitate the safe passage of refugees who wish to visit family members in Western Sahara?
What have Baroness Ashton and her EU External Action Service been doing to move matters on? If we have to have it, it might as well do something useful. Given that Morocco counts as Europe’s near abroad and that it has an association agreement with the EU, what progress has been made on security, migration and welfare?
Given that MINURSO’s mandate is up for reaffirmation in April, what discussions have the UK Government had with the permanent members of the UN Security Council on the Moroccan Government’s autonomy plan? What is the Minister’s attitude to that plan? I hope that the UK Government can join France and the US in being sympathetic.
(15 years ago)
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The hon. Gentleman, who speaks with considerable experience of election-monitoring work, is right. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has discussed this very issue with the French Foreign Minister in the past couple of days, and our Government and other European Governments have been making that point to Baroness Ashton and her team. When the hon. Gentleman reads her statement, he will see that one thing she is offering is robust EU support for election-monitoring work.
It is very clear that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and similar organisations are attempting to capitalise on the current situation. What assessment has the Minister made of that and of any potential threat to the United Kingdom, given the porous nature of our borders with Europe and the clear and present danger posed particularly to France, Spain and Italy?
The advice that I have received to date is that there is no evidence that extreme groups that are linked to or similar to al-Qaeda have played a significant part in the uprising inside Tunisia. Nevertheless, my hon. Friend is right to say that we need to be on our guard against the spread of extremism and terrorism throughout the entire Maghreb. That is yet another reason why we should support reforms, ensuring enduring political stability in those countries in the future and that people in those countries do not believe they should turn to terrorism because they have no other way of seeking to change the society in which they live.