Thursday 27th January 2011

(13 years, 11 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Andrew Murrison Portrait Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
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I must first declare my interests, which are entered in the overseas visits section of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am also chair of the all-party group on Morocco and the parliamentary link for the British Moroccan Association. I have been in touch with Western Sahara Campaign UK and Polisario and am grateful for their insights. I should make plain at the outset my admiration for Morocco, its history and people, and I am proud to represent the largest Moroccan expatriate community outside London.

I will spare the House the history and background of the Western Sahara dispute, which should be taken as read. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (David T. C. Davies) and the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) wish to speak in the debate, and my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr Offord) would have liked to contribute, as he attended the recent visit to Morocco and Western Sahara, but unfortunately he is unwell.

It seems to me that there are broadly three options for Western Sahara: the status quo, which has been described as “untenable” by the current UN special envoy, Christopher Ross; independence, which is unrealistic, according to Peter Van Walsum, the previous UN special envoy; and autonomy, which is the option we are left with. I will go through those options one by one.

I agree with Christopher Ross that the status quo is not an option. It is not an option for the inhabitants of the Tindouf camps or of the wider Maghreb, who continue to pay the price economically and socially. Violence in and around Laayoune in November, apparently whipped up by grievances over Sahrawi social conditions, left 11 officials and two civilians dead. We are told that the fingerprints of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are not on that, just as there is no confirmed evidence of its complicity in the unrest in Tunisia and Algeria. Nevertheless, the status quo in Western Sahara offers an opportunity for fundamentalist terror groups to move out of their operating bases in the vast, barely governed spaces of Mali, Niger and southern Algeria.

There is no firm evidence of links between the Polisario and AQIM. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Algeria would be keen to support an organisation with formal links to AQIM. Nevertheless, the potential for fundamentalist terrorists to feed off poverty and grievance is clear. We simply cannot be complacent. In December, an arms cache attributed to AQIM was discovered by the Moroccan authorities in Western Sahara. It is vital that we shrink the space available to insurgents. We must always be vigilant for the sorts of opportunities that have been offered elsewhere.

I agree with Peter Van Walsum that independence is no option at all. We understand that the American and French Governments are at least sympathetic to Van Walsum’s position, and the UK considers Western Sahara’s status to be undetermined and disputed and has lined up behind the official UN position. Van Walsum was apparently replaced as UN special envoy because he said that independence was not realistic, which rendered him unacceptable to Polisario. Even if we agreed hypothetically with the principle of independence, we must consider whether it is practical or achievable. It would mean a country the size of Britain with a population smaller than that of Bristol. How could its Government guarantee internal and external security in a highly challenging environment without relying indefinitely on benign or malign foreign agencies? Would we be comfortable with such an entity becoming the client state of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, which many human rights campaigners see as militaristic, closed and repressive? We must be careful about supporting the creation of states that are inherently unstable. We must also be cautious because of the security threat highlighted by the terrorism and insurgency centre run by Jane’s. Although it ranks Morocco’s counter-terrorism measures as “moderately effective”, it remains concerned about frontier security and unregulated migration.

In Europe, we are not disinterested bystanders. We have a stake in getting this right. Since the UK’s treaty obligations have rendered our borders porous, for practical purposes the southern Mediterranean coastline is our frontier. The recent trouble in Tunis and Algeria does not read across directly to Morocco, but in the Maghreb and in Egypt we have seen significant civil unrest in recent days, which is a reminder of the fragility of countries with young populations, high youth unemployment and poor living standards.

The third option is autonomy. In April 2007, Morocco unveiled its autonomy plan for Western Sahara. In part, it represented a compromise and, in part, it reflected wider governance changes involving the greater devolution of powers within Morocco itself. The UN Security Council, in its resolution of 30 April 2010, noted the proposal and commended the

“serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution.”

In 2009, that was backed by the majority of US Congressmen and, in 2010, by the majority of the Senate.

America, which prides itself on being Morocco’s oldest ally, has been understandably supportive. It knows very well the benefits of a federal model and has in its history incorporated, annexed and otherwise acquired territory on a grand scale. The plan that remains on the table would establish a Sahara autonomous region within the Kingdom of Morocco. It would have considerable autonomy and certainly move in the direction of the UN’s support for what it calls

“self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara.”

Some have even said that the powers over matters excluding foreign affairs, defence and the national judiciary exceed those devolved to Scotland and Wales. My hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth might wish to comment on that in due course.

There are, however, problems. Enumerating the Sahrawis, the Sahrawi diaspora and the resident Moroccan population is a challenge that seems almost overwhelming. It failed completely in 2000, but the job has to be done under both the independence and autonomy options. The only way we get out of it is if we are prepared to accept the status quo.

The Moroccan Government have said that they will not entertain a referendum with independence as an option, but unless we exclude those people who have migrated since 1975, with the presumption that if we do so they will not enjoy the citizenship of any Western Saharan state, it seems unlikely that such a referendum will result in support for independence. That suggests that for Morocco the question of independence as an option is one mainly of principle, rather than avoidance.

Another sticking point is the extension of the UN mandate to include human rights. I think my Moroccan constituents would concur with the sentiments of two precepts in that respect, one secular, the other divine: “Be sure you’ve sorted the beam in your own eye before the mote in your brother’s”; and “Don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good.”

There was outrage here when the US tried to suggest that there should be UN human rights monitoring in Northern Ireland, so we can begin to see how Morocco, a proud country, should also resist, particularly when it perceives that its eastern neighbour with a more questionable record is left alone. The major human rights movements have a presence in Western Sahara, and both Malcolm Smart of Amnesty and Eric Goldstein of Human Rights Watch say that they have not been restricted in investigating the November violence. Morocco has come a long way, but perhaps the time has come in the interests of facilitating a lasting settlement for it to swallow hard and allow human rights monitors, thus defusing the claims of its opponents.

Morocco has earned much respect for its autonomy plan, and Rabat might do well to accept an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, or MINURSO, but it would be ludicrous if that happened without including the Tindouf camps in southern Algeria, where light desperately needs to be shone on darkness. The UK has a money interest, as it has contributed to the €165 million in humanitarian aid through the European Community humanitarian aid office, with the promise of more to come. We should worry, in the context of reported hardship in the camps, about aid money that might not end up where it is supposed to, because aid falls into disrepute when that happens—whether it is bilateral or through the fingers of Brussels.

We have a duty to ensure that we know much more about the camps, and who and how many people are in them, if that money is to continue to be spent safely and effectively. The King of Morocco has issued reassurances to the refugees of the camps and undertaken to treat them well, and we understand that there has been a significant trickle back to Western Sahara, a process that is likely to develop as confidence is built up on all sides.

Can the Minister say what actions the UK has taken to ensure the safety of the high-ranking Polisario official, Mustapha Salma? We have only unconfirmed reports that he has taken refuge in Mauritania, and his family are allegedly unable to be united with him, as they are confined to Tindouf. What are we doing to clarify the position with Algeria? Whatever our position on the autonomy plan, we must recognise that Mustapha Salma’s bravery, in defying Mohammed Abdel Aziz in order to support proposals that he believes are in the interests of his people, is admirable. His witness is a substantial contribution to what I believe to be gathering support for the autonomy plan.

So far, the UN special envoy process has presided over the status quo. Christopher Ross convened a meeting in December in New York and another last weekend, the outcome of which was another fixture for Geneva in February. We understand that that will focus on how family visits from the camps can more readily be achieved. What is the Minister’s view on monitoring in the camps? How can the UK help to facilitate the safe passage of refugees who wish to visit family members in Western Sahara?

What have Baroness Ashton and her EU External Action Service been doing to move matters on? If we have to have it, it might as well do something useful. Given that Morocco counts as Europe’s near abroad and that it has an association agreement with the EU, what progress has been made on security, migration and welfare?

Given that MINURSO’s mandate is up for reaffirmation in April, what discussions have the UK Government had with the permanent members of the UN Security Council on the Moroccan Government’s autonomy plan? What is the Minister’s attitude to that plan? I hope that the UK Government can join France and the US in being sympathetic.