Leveson Inquiry

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Thursday 29th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My hon. Friend is right to raise this issue. The point I am making is that putting in place underpinning may well turn out to be not as simple as having a one or two-clause Bill. We would have to start defining what the body is, what the body does, what powers it has and what the extent of it is, rather as there is in the Irish system. Once we have done that, we would be in danger of finding that we have put in place a statutory Act on the press that is then very, very easy to amend. My point is that this House of Commons should pause, stop and think before taking a step of that magnitude.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I would have some sympathy with the point the Prime Minister makes about the Data Protection Act if that was all Leveson said about that Act. However, he goes on to talk about creating a commission which would have a broader base, including people from the media. Does that not counterbalance some of the Prime Minister’s legitimate concerns about the Data Protection Act recommendations? Perhaps there is an argument for doing the same thing with Ofcom, too.

[The Prime Minister]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s points. My reading of this is that what is being recommended is to stop some of the exemptions from data protection that journalists currently have but to put in place a public interest defence at the end. I am advised that that could have a very bad effect on investigative journalism. Again, I think that, instead of just waving through what could be a very profound change, it is worth stopping, talking and having cross-party discussions about this. That is why I do not think anyone, by rights, really can stand up today and say, “I accept the Leveson inquiry in full.” They would not be doing their duty as legislators and as politicians if they did not actually have a look at what this means.

Hillsborough

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Wednesday 12th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I am sure that with his experience of Bloody Sunday and the Saville inquiry, the hon. Gentleman is completely right to say that the families will need a lot of support and help as they digest what is in the report. The commonality, as it were, of the two things, is that a Government should not make an apology just because something bad happened some time ago. The apology should be in respect of the fact that there is new information that injustice took place and was allowed to lie for far too long, and that false stories were got up about what happened. That is why an apology is not only right, but the necessary and correct thing to do, and that is where there is common ground between the two issues raised by the hon. Gentleman.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

On behalf of my constituents who lost family members and friends, I thank the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition for the dignified way in which they have dealt with this very difficult statement.

One of the first questions raised with me by a constituent when I was first elected some 20 years ago was this: who gave the authority to start the misinformation through the police to the media and so on? Is the Prime Minister satisfied that he can identify those persons, and those persons who were subsequently involved in the cover-up to protect the person who started the misinformation? That is a key question. The hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey) put it exactly right: there ought to be prosecutions on that point.

[The Prime Minister]

The hon. Gentleman asks the right question. It is necessary to study the report. The families have long believed that, although the Taylor inquiry came to the correct conclusion about police culpability, there was then a move engineered by some police officers—I believe there is evidence in the report about this—to try to put forward an alternative narrative, which was wrong, deeply insulting and very hurtful. That and new evidence on it is contained in the report, which is worth while.

Prime Minister’s Adviser on Ministers’ Interests

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. Gentleman also serves on the Committee, and I am grateful to him for his participation. He makes his point extremely well. Witch hunts start when there is a suspicion that the Prime Minister is seeking to protect a Minister from an investigation. That is when the media—and, indeed, Her Majesty’s official Opposition—tend to jump on the bandwagon.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

I want to express my full support for the motion and for the Committee’s report. There are certain questions that many people will ask, and they need to be put on public record. To whom should the independent adviser be directly accountable, and who should appoint him if we are to ensure the maximum degree of genuine independence?

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. Gentleman raises a salient point. The manner of the adviser’s appointment was mentioned in the report, although I am not going to address it directly today. In 2003, before the post was established, the Committee on Standards in Public Life originally recommended that the appointment should be made through the public appointments process and overseen by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. That has not happened. It did not happen with the appointment of Sir Alex Allan, and we have been highly critical of that fact. We believe that there should be an open public appointments process for this role, as there is for any other significant public appointment.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Wednesday 8th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Of course, we are putting extra resources into the NHS, but there needs to be a clear series of tests—as there is now under our plans—before any facilities are changed or closed. That is about ensuring that there is GP backing for what is proposed, and ensuring that any such changes will improve the health of the area. I will happily look at the issue that my hon. Friend raises, and ensure that the Department of Health engages on it with him.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Q4. Four police authorities, including one that I share with the Chancellor, have just started buying Hyundai cars imported from Korea. Add to that the Thameslink fiasco and that of the Olympic tickets—when will we see some leadership from the Prime Minister on public procurement in this country?

[The Prime Minister]

The most important thing in police procurement is that police forces get together and procure together to cut their costs. We have all lost count of the times spent wandering through police stations and seeing countless different types of vehicle, all costing a large amount of money. What the public want is police on the streets, not money spent on unnecessary procurement.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for what he is doing in Bedford. This Government recognise that it is going to be small businesses that will provide the growth, jobs and wealth that this country needs. That is why we have an agreement with the banks to increase lending to small businesses, why we are providing extra rate relief to small businesses, why we are giving the smallest businesses a holiday from new regulation and why we have got the one-in, one-out rule for new regulation. I applaud all efforts at a local level to give small businesses the mentoring, help and support that they need to grow.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Q6. Responding to the Science and Technology Committee’s report on forensic science, a Home Office Minister has said:“We don’t agree with the committee’s report. It mis-states a number of very significant points.”Given that the Home Office’s financial case was 50% adrift, and that it has now agreed with our argument that the national archive should be protected, will the Prime Minister urgently intervene and review the decision to close the Forensic Science Service? The country and the profession are now losing key scientific staff.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

Yes, we were consulted, and our response was that, on the basis of our understanding of how the closure was to be carried out, the Director of Public Prosecutions was satisfied that the quality of forensic science available to the CPS would be maintained.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

You were given duff information.

[The Attorney-General]

In view of that intervention, I would simply add that the current position is that the closure process has been monitored and the DPP remains satisfied at present that in no case has the closure of the FSS had any impact on his ability to carry out prosecutions within the CPS.

Scientific Advice (Emergencies)

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Thursday 15th September 2011 Westminster Hall

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve for the first time under your chairmanship, Sir Alan, and to be opening the first debate that the Select Committee on Science and Technology has held in Westminster Hall during this Parliament. The occasion is tinged with regret, shared by all Committee members, because it is the last time we will have with us our excellent Clerk, Glenn McKee, who has served the Committee brilliantly. We wish him well in his new career. I think it is a punishment that he has been sent to the Select Committee on Communities and Local Government, but that is another matter.

This is a particularly important report. It was published in March 2011 and it looks at the Government’s use of science in emergency preparation and response at a national level. We built on two of our predecessor Committee’s reports—one written in 2006 entitled “Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making”, and one entitled “Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy,” which was published in 2009. This is a complex area and we tried to consider four different case studies: looking backwards over two events that have occurred, looking forwards at one event that is certainly going to occur, and looking at an event that has a potentially high impact but low probability. I will cover those events during my contribution.

In the first case, we looked at the 2009-10 H1N1 flu pandemic, otherwise known as swine flu. In the second case, we looked at volcanic ash and the disruptions that occurred to our air space last April. Looking forward, we considered the potential for cyber-attacks, which are a very real threat. The event that has potentially high impact but low probability is the occurrence of solar flares, which are caused by adverse space weather and have the potential to disrupt electrical systems. Again, I will cover some of that later.

Hon. Members might wonder why we chose those four case studies. Obviously, the first two—swine flu and volcanic ash—were the most recent emergencies that the UK had experienced and were very high-profile events, both here and abroad. In addition, both events relied heavily on science and engineering to provide answers to very important questions—for example, who should be vaccinated against swine flu or how much volcanic ash an aircraft can fly through safely.

We then chose the other two risks that could lead to an emergency in the UK. People are obviously more familiar with cyber-attacks than with the space weather event. Fortunately, we have not encountered either on an emergency scale. However, the name of the game is to be prepared; we wanted to see whether the Government were prepared and what they were doing to be ready for potential events.

I would like to make a couple of personal observations. I welcome the degree of co-operation that we had from Government officials, particularly those from the Cabinet Office, the lead Department. I have been involved with issues to do with information assurance and the cyber security world for a number of years, so I found it very refreshing that there was an acceptance that such matters had to be dealt with on a much more collegiate basis than was historically the case.

These things do not just belong to Cheltenham and the dark arts down there; there are serious issues and we must engage every citizen in looking after their personal data and their security. A cyber-attack could clearly be targeted at something such as a bank or a utility, which could have a serious impact on the nation state. We are not talking about a traditional warfare target, but such an attack could nevertheless be very effective.

It is clear to me that the Government take planning for emergencies seriously and recognise the need to draw in scientific advice. However, it is never safe to say that there is no scope for improvement. Our inquiry identified some weaknesses that we regarded as serious. I will start at the beginning of the emergency planning process: the national risk assessment. That is a comprehensive and, in some parts, classified assessment of the most significant emergencies that the UK could face over the next five years. Its counterpart is the national risk register, which is the unclassified bit that gets into the public domain.

There are broadly three stages to the risk assessment: the identification of hazards, the assessment of risk, and risk comparison. If I were a fly on the wall in some Departments, I imagine that I could hear some very interesting discussions about what is scientifically plausible and what ought to go into the realms of science fiction. As Chair of the Select Committee, I get all sorts of letters from people who postulate things that do not quite add up to the laws of physics as I understand them, so I guess that the Government face the same problems.

For every risk that makes it on to the national risk assessment—whether we are talking about attacks on the infrastructure or pandemic disease—the Government produce a reasonable worst-case scenario, which is a prediction of the worst that might realistically happen, rather than a prediction of what will happen. Unsurprisingly, that is a difficult concept to convey to the public and the media.

The House must take seriously its responsibility to communicate issues of risk to the public and should work with communities to help to improve public understanding of what risks really are. Certainly, some of the red tops are not exactly famed for being proportionate and level headed in these circumstances—indeed, some of the broadsheets are not immune to criticism about being sensationalist when it comes to reporting risk. My first plea, to the broader community, the science community and journalists, is for there to be an improved and responsible way of communicating what risks actually are.

I will give an example of where the worst-case scenario can fall down. During the flu pandemic in 2009, the Department of Health held a press briefing. The media immediately reported the worst-case scenario—that there could be up to 65,000 deaths in the UK. At that time there had been 30 deaths, and at the end of the pandemic the total number was just over 450. That was a terrible tragedy for anyone involved, but the irresponsible communication of information by some journalists had the potential to cause panic. The result was a sense that things had been exaggerated by the Government.

No Minister, and no one else in a responsible position, could have withheld the 65,000 figure. The then Secretary of State for Health, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), was provided with the data; he could not have withheld that information from the public, but we must ask ourselves whether there was a better way of communicating it. Focusing on the most likely scenarios might give us a better way of doing that. Yes, a Minister must say, “These are the extremes”, but we need to persuade reporters of the most likely scenario rather than the extreme possibilities.

It was not just the communication of the reasonable worst-case scenario that was the problem. The reasonable worst case was a 2% fatality rate, which meant that 2% of those infected would die. That was based on evidence from the 1918 Spanish pandemic. However, avian flu—bird flu—has an alarmingly higher fatality rate. We heard that it was simply not possible for the NHS to plan for such a scenario, so 2% was used. Our Science and Technology Committee was greatly concerned that the reasonable worst case was based not on the best available evidence, but on the need to determine how much to spend on planning.

I am pleased that the Government agreed that more could be done and that a review is under way to consider the reasonable worst-case concept. I hope that the Minister will tell us when we can expect the conclusions of the review and how the Government plan to try to develop the concept so that it becomes an accepted way of working aimed at reducing panic and concern when such events occur, as they inevitably will.

On the national risk assessment, we were disappointed to discover that the Government chief scientific adviser, Professor Sir John Beddington, had not been directly involved with the NRA, and had not had much involvement with the horizon scanning activities building up to it. We found that surprising; it appeared that the guy appointed to co-ordinate the best available science policy for the Government was not being brought in at the early stage of such an important field of activity. Of course, the co-ordination involves every scientific discipline; it is not just pure science. It involves statistics, engineering, behavioural science and a whole range of other issues. Science should be central to identifying, assessing and comparing risks.

Risk assessment must be informed by many sources of scientific advice, but clearly the Government’s own chief scientist should be part of the process at a high level. We came down quite strongly on this matter and proposed ways of increasing his involvement with the Cabinet Office and, specifically, the NRA. We have had partial success in getting our recommendations accepted by the Government.

As I said, the NRA is classified and not available to the public, so we ourselves cannot see how well science is being used. That was one factor influencing our recommendation that an independent scientific advisory committee on risk assessment should be set up to review the NRA. That would make Parliament and the public more confident that the process is as evidence-based as possible. At our follow-up evidence session in June, we heard from the Government that there will indeed be such a committee. I will be interested to hear from the Minister what progress has been made in forming that committee.

Risk assessment is the foundation underpinning a good emergency response. What happens when that foundation is missing was unfortunately demonstrated by the 2010 volcanic ash emergency; that took the Government by surprise, because it had not been considered a likely emergency and therefore little or no preparation had been done. It was not part of the NRA, and in fact the risk of disruption to aviation from natural hazards was removed from the NRA in 2009.

I have not been able to find anyone who admits to taking responsibility for that, but just a year later there was quite a serious emergency. That will tie back into some of the things I will be saying later about the need for greater transparency. Having spoken to a lot of earth scientists with expertise in the Icelandic area, I am certain that they would have been knocking at the Minister’s door as soon as they saw that such events were taken off the register. Within the earth science community, it has been an accepted fact that there was the potential risk of massive explosions in that area.

Once such information was in the public domain, I would have expected the Civil Aviation Authority to tie it together and come up with some conclusions and advice for the Cabinet Office. However, something went wrong. I do not suppose that I have to ask the question; I bet the Minister will not be leaving the issue off the NRA again. I suspect it will be there in the next published register later this year.

As a consequence of the lack of planning, airspace over the whole of the UK and many parts of Europe remained closed for a whole week while engineers figured out what was acceptable and what ash concentrations were safe for planes to fly through. At the time, the only available guidance was to avoid the ash: “If it is visible, do not fly through it”—hardly scientific and hardly a comforting policy for people sitting nervously in planes. It was a very expensive mess that cost airlines millions of pounds and stranded Britons all over the place all over the world.

When we were again disrupted by another unpronounceable Icelandic volcano in May, more specific guidance and protocols were in place to deal with it. That was a testament to the work of the CAA, which led to work within Europe to update the requirements for operating in and around volcanic ash.

Before I turn to how the Government respond to emergencies, I want to touch briefly on the issue of space weather. Changes in the sun’s atmosphere affect the space environment near to Earth. Events could involve injections of plasma—particles of radiation from the sun. Solar activity changes according to a cycle of approximately 11 years. Many scientists believe that we will have a solar maximum next year, coinciding with the Olympics. There is long probability, but there would be high impact if something went pear-shaped. If a small event occurs, taking out a few transformers and, just as the starter’s gun for the 100 metres is being fired, no transmissions occur from any broadcaster in the UK, we would be somewhat embarrassed. That is clearly a long probability event, but one of enormous political and economic significance. We cannot simply ignore these events.

One problem is that when one looks back at the history of similar events, comparisons are a little difficult because we have become so much more reliant on electrical gadgets and devices. I do not suppose there is anyone in the Chamber who does not have a mobile phone with them, and nobody in the Chamber who is not entirely reliant on electronic technologies. In 1989, an event caused Quebec to lose its power grid for approximately nine hours. That was a serious event, and one that could easily happen again.

The earliest well-documented event took place in 1859, recorded as the Carrington event, when telegraph systems were taken out. It disrupted systems all around the world, and that was before we became so reliant on electricity-based technologies. We do not really know what the effects of another Carrington event would be on, for example, the national grid, satellites, the global positioning system, computer chips or avionics. It is reasonably well known that some satellite technologies are built to higher standards now. I suspect that most of the military technologies that I have looked at have the capacity to be taken out of harm’s way, or are sufficiently well shielded, but an awful lot of infrastructure is not.

The Committee’s interest in space weather coincided with work that the Government were doing. Sir John Beddington had started work almost at the same time. Our inquiry kept being told that this was work in progress and that we should expect space weather to appear on the 2011 national risk assessment register. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether that has happened.

No matter how good an assessment is, we cannot prevent some emergencies from occurring. In any emergency that requires scientific input, a scientific advisory group in emergencies is set up—its acronym is, appropriately, SAGE—to advise Government and Cobra, central Government’s crisis management committee. SAGE should be the funnel for scientific advice from all sources—I stress all sources. The membership of each SAGE committee will vary according to the emergency, but most members will be scientists. The Committee felt that improvements could be made in the pre-identification of possible SAGE members, at least for every risk that is on the current risk register. We felt that that could save valuable time in bringing the right people together should an event occur. Indeed, that recommendation was accepted by the Government.

SAGE is a relatively new mechanism. With every emergency for which a SAGE committee was set up, lessons have been learned and improvements made. Things are moving in the right direction. It was disappointing to find, at the start of our inquiry, that information on the SAGE committees for swine flu and volcanic ash was more or less hidden from public view. That does not help us learn lessons. We have to be totally transparent, returning to the points I made earlier. It is also quite odd, when you consider the importance of communication and openness in an emergency, that SAGE committees have not worked in an open manner.

We found other problems. The independence of SAGE from Government was ambiguous. Scientific advisory committees really should be independent of Government to ensure that their advice is impartial. We also heard concerns from some scientists who were members of SAGE committees. They felt unable to talk to the media, thus depriving the media access to the real experts. There are problems in communicating some of these issues, and some experts are very good at communicating risk to the public. All in all, the Committee was pretty unclear about the rules governing SAGE. Our recommendations can be summed up in two points: be more transparent; and publish guidance on how SAGE should operate and stick to it. That way we will know what to expect. We were told that guidance would be produced this summer; the Minister might like to update us on progress. Putting those concerns aside, overall SAGEs have been a useful mechanism for getting scientific advice to Government quickly. Adjustments need to be made, but we were not calling for a major rethink. Sometimes a subtly different approach is needed for different events.

Nine days after our report was published, a massive earthquake and tsunami hit the north coast of Japan, causing massive loss of life and severe damage to infrastructure. Japan will be dealing with the consequences of that tragedy for some considerable time. An immediate concern was the integrity of the Fukushima nuclear power station and the risks it posed to human health. We watched with interest as the UK Government and a new SAGE committee swung into action to assess whether there was a need to evacuate British nationals. This time—this relates to the point I made about lessons learned—the SAGE committee had a higher public profile. Sir John Beddington was very prominent in briefing both the media and Britons in Japan via teleconferences. A few months down the line, it is clear to me that the UK’s reaction has been proportionate and evidence based. SAGE played a crucial part in that. I would like to think that our work influenced the positive way in which the Government and SAGE worked during that emergency.

My final point is on cyber-attacks. We were slightly limited by the classified nature of some information, but we took some fascinating evidence in this case study. It was the only risk examined that could be the result of malicious human activity. The Stuxnet worm, which targeted Iran’s uranium-enrichment programme, was a real-life example of how organised and structured cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure could succeed, and cyber-technology, unlike some conventional weapons, can be copied.

Cyber-security has received a huge amount of attention recently, with the publication of the Government’s 2009 “Cyber security strategy of the United Kingdom”. The subsequent formation of the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance was welcome, because so many public and private bodies are tasked with ensuring our security in cyber-space. However, tasking a body with providing direction and co-ordination is pointless if it has no powers and insufficient funding. We recommended that the Government clarify the funding and powers of the new office. Again, we have not yet received a response and would welcome comments from the Minister.

[Stephen Mosley (City of Chester) (Con)]

I apologise for my fleeting visit to the debate. I am on a Public Bill Committee this afternoon but, as a member of the Science and Technology Committee, I thought it important to support the debate.

In terms of cyber-security, so much of the UK’s national infrastructure is dependent on the private sector, so one of the key tasks of the OCSIA is to work with those private sector defenders and providers of our national infrastructure, to ensure that they are well protected. One of the issues in Committee was what powers the OCSIA had to oblige those private sector providers to look after their cyber-security. Perhaps that is an area on which the Minister might enlighten the Chamber later.

[Andrew Miller]

I thank the hon. Gentleman who, in Chester, is my neighbour. He is always posing me challenging questions, but he makes a fascinating point. The threat to national security from cyber-attack is clearly as serious in the private sector as it is in the public sector, and probably more so. That is a great challenge. We cannot have a world in which everyone who worked in a bank would be security cleared to the level that the Minister’s staff are—that is not realistic and it could not be done for every utility. That is why extensive sharing of expertise across boundaries is necessary in the sector, to ensure that lessons from the public sector are learned in the private sector, and vice versa, including sharing information with academics.

The hon. Member for City of Chester must recall one academic witness, a man who was held in extremely high regard by the current Government because he was party to writing a paper for them, when they were in opposition. He said that he did not want to be security cleared, so there are some interesting dichotomies. The Minister needs to contemplate that problem and, I hope, answer the challenging question posed by the hon. Gentleman. In that complex world, without becoming obsessed by security clearance for everyone on the planet, how do we improve information sharing and expertise in and out of and across the boundaries between the private and public sectors?

Soon after the second volcanic ash event, when we were reflecting on the report and talking about some of the information, communication and technology issues, one of the officials said in a meeting I was at that, when the second volcano erupted, they reached for the Select Committee’s report to see how to handle things. I know that that was intended to butter me up a little—I welcome it—but, all in all, the Committee has done a sound piece of work which I hope is taken on board by the Government.

I hope that Members will agree that our inquiry on “Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies” continues to be pertinent to how disasters and emergencies, here or abroad, are handled by the Government. Last winter we had a resurgence of swine flu cases, and we are currently approaching the peak flu season this year again. This May there was another volcanic eruption, which affected our airspace briefly in Scotland and northern England. Severe weather is occurring more frequently, and last winter we had extraordinarily low temperatures that I do not recall having before. Also, as I said earlier, we are approaching the solar maximum. I do not want to scaremonger and create panic. What I want to do is to highlight the fact that the issue is live.

With the right processes in place, and good use of scientific advice and evidence, emergencies can be planned for and effectively managed and information can be communicated to the public. We all in the House would agree that it is our responsibility, collectively, to handle situations such as the ones I have described in a manner that crosses the political divide. I hope that the Minister will agree that we can all learn lessons from each other and we need better ways of working with outside agencies, whether that is people responsible for communicating information to the public or experts who can provide information. I hope that the House will take note of our report and that the Government will act positively on the outstanding issues I have listed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Maude]

My hon. Friend is right, and in the end we have to make a judgment and try to prepare in a proportionate way based on the best evidence available, while acknowledging that that evidence will not always be conclusive. The process set in place through SAGE will try to distil the best view, which is important.

A number of Members have raised points about the communication of risk, which is an important issue and difficult to get right. When communicating risk to the public, it is important not to scaremonger, make people agitated or cause them to behave in a way that is not reasonable. Nor should we devote resources to something in a way that cannot be justified. At the same time, we must never be complacent.

I have thought about the concerns raised in the report and by hon. Members during the debate about the concept of the reasonable worst case. It is difficult to get the form of words right. If the word “reasonable” is inserted, it sounds as if it is a situation that we think will happen. In fact, “reasonable worst case” is not what we believe likely to happen; it is the worst case possible if we remove situations that are absurdly improbable. Pitching that statement correctly is quite difficult.

A number of hon. Members mentioned the Blackett review that will be published in the next few weeks, which we will obviously consider. The Blackett panel looked at the concept of reasonable worst case, which it believes—as do the Government—that it is essential to consider when planning and building capability. It believes, however, that we must think about the use of that concept in communicating risk because it may be that the concept of the most likely case is more useful.

Governments will always be anxious about having a figure in their possession that they have not shared. That was the case with swine flu, and I understand the concern of the Health Secretary at that time. The Government did not want to suppress a figure that might have been arrived at properly, even though it proved to be way off beam. These difficult issues need to be tackled in a serious and measured way and it would be useful to have further discussion and debate once the Blackett panel has completed its review. We must get this issue right because, when emergencies happen—as they will—it is important to have some kind of shared understanding across the political spectrum, and between the Government, Parliament and the media, about the way the concepts in question have been used and the need for responsibility when dealing with facts and estimations.

My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central (Gavin Barwell), who could not stay for the end of the debate because he had to be elsewhere, talked about the figures changing in the course of the swine flu epidemic. The truth is that in an emerging epidemic, there are very few cases on which scientists can make assessments; there is very little epidemiology to go on. Arguably, it is better to be honest about the possible worst case and plan for the worst; and then if events turn out very differently, at least that is better than their turning out much worse than predicted. I was asked whether we had used the reasonable worst case approach for the Fukushima event. The answer is yes, that did happen.

On the difficult issues about trying to get right the communication of risk, I am grateful for the Select Committee’s insights. The Blackett panel will produce its conclusions in due course, and we will share them and continue to have discussions and debates.

I was asked what progress had been made in response to the concerns that the Select Committee raised, which I understand, about the role of the Government chief scientific adviser in national risk assessment. Work is under way to set up an independent scientific advice group for the NRA, which will be in place in time for the 2012 NRA. The draft 2011 NRA has been sent to the Government chief scientific adviser, and he will respond to me and my officials in due course. Obviously, it is important that that assessment has the benefit of his detailed scrutiny. We are taking the conclusions and recommendations in the Committee’s report seriously and acting on them.

The Chair of the Committee, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller), asked when SAGE guidance would be published. We are aiming for later this year. We are building in steps that are being taken in the light of the inquiry and the reflections in this debate.

I was asked about transparency. We agree that SAGE should operate on the principle of openness and transparency. The membership, minutes and key scientific advice papers for all three recent SAGE activations, which were in relation to the Japanese nuclear event in and around Fukushima, the volcanic ash eruption and the swine flu epidemic, have all now been published online. Everything is being taken forward, I hope, in the right spirit.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock (Stephen Metcalfe) asked about international collaboration. We work closely with international organisations—the European Union, the UN and so on—and with global leaders in this field. For example, the Singapore Government are a serious leader in this area, and we work with them. We also work with other countries with which we share risks. For example, we work closely with the Netherlands on the risks associated with North sea flooding. There is also ad hoc joint work and research on community resilience and behavioural issues. We work on that with the United States, Canada and the Australians. International collaboration is therefore very important. There is a huge amount of expertise, and it is in the interests of all countries that we benefit from one another’s knowledge, expertise and assessments.

I was asked about volcanic eruption as a risk. I assure hon. Members that the possibility of volcanic eruption is certainly not being omitted from the 2011 NRA. There are two risks in the risk assessment, one of which is a severe, gas-rich volcanic eruption that could reach toxic levels at both ground level and flight altitude. Obviously, that is less likely to occur but would have very significant impacts. We acknowledge that the volcanologists are saying that the likelihood of further volcanic eruptions is higher. We are obviously taking that into account. There is a higher likelihood of a much less severe volcanic ash-rich eruption. A great deal of knowledge was gained from the experience of the eruption last year, and a lot of action has been taken on the back of that.

[Andrew Miller]

Before the Minister moves on, I am curious to know how information held in other Departments is brought in. Obviously, there is a significant role in some Departments through the Civil Aviation Authority and so on, but the Ministry of Defence also has enormous expertise. Years ago, I was in the Caribbean with the Royal Navy when the volcano on Montserrat blew. The helicopter pilot at that time said to me, “Mr Miller, you can’t get any closer to take photographs because these things fall out of the sky if they get the slightest bit of dust in their engines.” There is a huge amount of information that is very old, but that we have failed to centralise. What is the right hon. Gentleman doing to shake up other parts of the machinery to get all that information together?

[Mr Maude]

That is a very good question. Are Government always perfect at ensuring that all the information and knowledge is harvested and garnered from all parts of Whitehall and well beyond, including all the agencies and organisations? No, not by any means. A big part of the role of my officials in the civil contingencies secretariat is to try to ensure that we bring that body of knowledge together as best we can. One would hope that in an event like the volcanic ash eruption, the Ministry of Defence would be intimately involved—I am sure that it was—in assessments and decision making. However, it is a perfectly good question. It will not always be perfectly answered, but we are conscious of the need to maximise the bringing together of all the knowledge on this front.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock and others talked about space weather. That is potentially a big hazard with really serious impacts. We need to deal with it in a thorough way. The truth is that more work is needed to understand what the wide range of impacts would be from a serious event. The Department of Energy and Climate Change is engaged with National Grid, the energy emergencies executive committee and the British Geological Survey to consider the implications of a severe space weather event for the electricity system as a whole, including the potential impacts on generator transformers and further consideration of the transmission network. We in the Cabinet Office will continue to work with other sectors that could be impacted to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the vulnerability. Work on that issue continues.

The only other time when there was a major event was in 1859—the Carrington event, which has been mentioned. That was a very different world. There have been other events, but they tend to be localised. The likelihood of such an event is therefore not high, but it is real and we need to address it in the best way we can.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock asked whether we were participating in the European Space Agency’s space situational awareness programme, which runs until 2012. We have subscribed to it. It defines the steps that need to be taken on space surveillance and space weather. The UK Space Agency will engage with the potential space weather user community and data service providers to assess the relative priority of funding space weather activities within the ESA space situational awareness programme. That will obviously need to be reconciled with competing demands for other programme opportunities and existing financial commitments, but no clear conclusion has yet been reached. However, we are very aware of the risk, and a great deal of work is going on in relation to it.

I turn to the question of cyber security, which is obviously a serious matter. It was identified in the strategic defence and security review as a high risk, and a significant budget has been attached to the national cyber security programme; as Minister responsible for the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance, I have oversight of that programme. Our approach is to ensure that we invest in building capability, as capability is relatively scarce. We have an affordable centre of excellence and expertise at GCHQ.

This is a question not only for the Government but for the whole economy. We discern a marked range in the degree of preparedness of private sector companies on cyber security. Some are highly developed, but it is not only companies focused on internet activities that are vulnerable; it goes much more widely than that. Some companies that ought to be concerned about cyber security do not take it as seriously as they should. Over the coming months, we will be encouraging them to address it seriously. It should be on the agenda of every risk and audit committee, to ensure that it is properly understood and dealt with.

In a few weeks’ time, I shall be publishing the Government’s cyber-security strategy and I hope that it will receive attention and be debated by the House. These are most important matters, and we must do our best to get them right.

[Andrew Miller]

I am fairly confident, following Sir Edmund Burton’s report on the missing Royal Navy laptop, that part of the Government’s response will be about awareness and the training of personnel. Will the Minister confirm that that will happen throughout the civil service machinery? It is no good saying that it belongs only to permanent secretaries or techies in the back room, because it affects us all. There has to be a serious campaign in the public sector to ensure that people understand how serious these challenges are.

[Mr Maude]

The hon. Gentleman is right, and I do not dissent for a second. Most of it is about being reasonably alert and aware, and taking common sense steps, but higher levels of vulnerability to cyber attack and cyber crime require a highly sophisticated response coupled with great awareness and agility. Information assurance and not allowing data to go amiss are mostly to do with basic standards of care and alertness.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s thoughtful and serious report. It has been good to ventilate these matters. I assure the House and the Committee that we continue to take these matters seriously. We will continue to engage and interact with the Committee as we take these matters forward.

[Sir Alan Meale (in the Chair)]

We have had a full and frank debate. I am informed that it can continue for another five minutes if the Committee Chairman wishes to raise any other matters.

[Andrew Miller]

I am grateful to all who contributed to the debate, including my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith), the Opposition spokesperson, and the Minister.

To a great extent, this area transcends party politics. Frankly, given some of the surveys published today on the public’s perception of Members of Parliament, people might reflect on the fact that, just occasionally, we work in a collegiate manner towards a common goal. In this case, the common goal is improving safety and security for our citizens. It engages the best scientific brains, both here and further afield, and all political parties are committed to it as a serious priority. I hope that we can continue to work in this positive manner, and address some of the big questions and “what happens if” challenges thrown up by the national risk assessment.

A few detailed questions remain. Once the Minister has seen the transcript of our proceedings, I hope that he will do us the honour of providing a more detailed reply—something that is a little challenging in this environment. I hope that his reply will form the basis of a continued dialogue between the Committee and the Cabinet Office on this important work.

Question put and agreed to.

Libya

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

May I follow the point on migration raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart)? One thing that became clear during the previous regime was that many of the people who have ended up in Lampedusa and Malta originated not in Libya, but from other countries, sponsored by an illegal criminal network in which Gadaffi no doubt had a role. That means that such places have huge numbers of cases that are difficult to manage. How will the Prime Minister manage that situation, and will he assure the House that he will open a dialogue with the NTC to ensure that those criminal routes are closed down straight away?

[The Prime Minister]

I certainly will do that. First, it is important to get this into perspective: we should bear it in mind that we still get more asylum claims from the countries of northern Europe than we get from the countries of southern Europe. Secondly, we have a relationship with Malta. Clearly, it cannot afford to have embassies all over the world, and we use our embassies in countries such as Niger, Mali and elsewhere to try to help the Maltese to return people to their country of origin. As the hon. Gentleman says, many people coming through Libya are not from Libya.

Public Confidence in the Media and Police

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

In his speech, the Prime Minister reminded us of his previous incarnation working for ITV. That reminded me of the first broadcasting measure that I considered while in opposition last time round, when the technical director of ITV told us what was happening about convergence. I do not often agree with the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) but I support his early-day motion, which I willingly signed because it is important to deal with the issue on a multi-media basis. The world in which we live—indeed, the world in which we lived in the early 1990s, though no Member of Parliament had adequately recognised what was happening—means that the nature of our relationship with broadcasters and the providers of other media outlets has fundamentally changed. That is a hugely important aspect, on which the House needs to reflect.

A couple of issues have cropped up that, I think as a result of that observation, are increasingly important. We need to ensure that during the inquiry, all records, particularly electronic records, are made available at all stages. I was disappointed to hear, in a response earlier, that Harbottle & Lewis have not been given freedom by News International to release documents that have come their way. Putting restrictions on Harbottle & Lewis undermines the credibility of the apology given by News International. I urge my colleagues in the Culture, Media and Sport Committee and the Home Affairs Committee to keep on pressing that one, and push News International to change its position.

I want to focus my remarks on the technical issues of hacking. When, on 6 September 2010, my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) was granted an urgent question,

“To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on the Metropolitan police investigation into phone hacking by the News of the World newspaper.”—[Official Report, 6 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 23.],

a very productive exchange took place. After the Home Secretary’s response, my hon. Friend, responding to three claims, corrected the Home Secretary’s understanding. Claim No. 1 was that there was no new evidence; there was. Claim No. 2 was that people were cleared by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee; they were not. Claim No. 3 was that a single, rogue reporter was responsible; clearly he was not. That was known in September 2010 and that knowledge has developed since.

In questions following the statement I asked the Home Secretary whether she had any knowledge of how many of the—at that stage 91—PIN numbers that had got into the public domain were default numbers and how many were obtained as a result of what, technically, I would call a hacking exercise as distinct from an invasion of privacy, but the answer was not forthcoming. At that time alarm bells should have rung, because the Home Secretary, and certainly her advisers, must have been aware that there were not 91 default PIN numbers available; only a handful of default numbers were used, one each by the major operators and perhaps a couple more in special account situations. At that stage it was clear that a substantial number had been hacked by sophisticated means, not just by knowledge of default numbers.

We knew at that time, from a response given to my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson), the previous Home Secretary, that nearly 3,000 people were on the list of possible hacked victims. We hear that the figure is now 12,800. A substantial number of those operations have clearly been undertaken by extremely sophisticated means, and the seriousness of that point is that it brings us back to several fundamental questions.

First, and very obviously, where did the phone numbers come from? A lot of colleagues who might be victims give their phone numbers out willy-nilly; more fool all of us for being so publicity-hungry. Perhaps we too readily give out our mobile numbers, but an awful lot of people, like the Dowler family, or victims of the 7/7 bombings and other potential victims, have had their basic telephone number—not a PIN number—released by a third party. There is a very serious point, which goes to the heart of part of the investigation—to what extent should we look at the role of the police in releasing those numbers? Some numbers were accessed by using published numbers plus the default system, some were technically hacked at a very sophisticated level, and some must have come from the police.

[Mr Whittingdale]

In the report that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee released, there is a transcript of a conversation that took place between Glenn Mulcaire and the mobile operators, which shows that force is not used; it is blagging, where investigators pass themselves off as someone else and get the mobile company to reveal the PIN number. Obviously, we need to address that problem with the mobile companies.

[Andrew Miller]

The hon. Gentleman is right, because the fourth strand is indeed the way in which the mobile companies operate security. He attended a demonstration that I staged recently on one use of malware. We have a lot to learn in this place, and it is incumbent on us to look at all four strands as part of these inquiries and ensure that we are better informed, to ensure that when we consider legislation in future, we get to the bottom of these extremely serious issues.

My hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East has, by his persistence, done not just the House a favour, but the country. He and I have had disagreements on how technical legislation ought to be formed, but this is one matter on which the House can unite. We should ensure that every strand of inquiry is properly undertaken, and that the subsequent legislation, which will undoubtedly be necessary, covers all those points.

Public Confidence in the Media and Police

Andrew Miller Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my hon. Friend for putting that on the record because it is right. The judgment that my chief of staff reached was backed in advance by the permanent secretary at No. 10 and has been backed subsequently by leading police officers and the head of the Home Affairs Committee.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

The Prime Minister said that it was only on Sunday that he found out about Mr Wallis’s role, but others around him knew of it well before that. Does the Prime Minister not feel let down by them, including by Mr Coulson?

[The Prime Minister]

To the best of my knowledge, the first I knew of it was on Sunday. We are now getting to the bottom of what this informal advice was, and when we have the information, we can make it available, just as we have been transparent about all the media meetings and all the meetings with the moguls about everything else. In the meantime, the hon. Gentleman should have a word with his party leader and ask him to be equally transparent.