Post Office Card Account

Debate between Andrew Love and Steve Webb

Tuesday 16th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Post Office card account was always intended as a stepping stone to a transactional bank account, which is a gateway to other financial services. The basic bank account agreement with the nine banks is to be welcomed, but there is still incredible suspicion in the marketplace about transactional bank accounts. What more will the Minister do to persuade POCA holders that it is in their interests, as well as in the interests of everyone else, to move to a transactional bank account?

[Steve Webb]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. We are testing and trialling approaches to try to work out which sorts of accounts are most suitable for which people. It is important to understand the revolution that universal credit will bring in, because people will get the whole of their benefits—tax credits, and potentially help with housing—and they will have to budget from that one relatively large sum. An awful lot of work is going on to trial which sorts of accounts work best for which sorts of people, but over the coming years we will clearly contact people of working age to indicate to them the merits of a transactional bank account.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Andrew Love and Steve Webb

Tuesday 25th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Steve Webb]

It is good to see a packed House for this vital pensions Bill. The amendments are in two groups that correspond broadly with the Bill’s two main themes—the new definitions of pension schemes and pension scheme benefits, and budget pensions flexibilities.

[Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)]

May I invite the Minister to apologise to the Chamber? I estimate that on Report there are 33 new clauses, 62 amendments, and one new schedule. Does he think that is rather a lot for us to cope with?

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[Mr Love]

The Minister rightly talks about the safeguards introduced for people who want to transfer from DB to DC schemes, yet he does not think there is a need for a safeguard for people who do not access the guidance guarantee. Should not there be some safeguard for them, because they could lose substantially as people transferring schemes?

[Steve Webb]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. Our first strategy is to ensure that the guidance guarantee is accessed by as many people as possible. We are placing a legal duty on schemes and providers to flag up the guidance guarantee to people, both in wake-up packs and when people approach schemes to access their money.

The hon. Gentleman raises the issue of people who do not access the guidance—and indeed those who do, come to think of it, although particularly those who do not. The FCA will have more to say on the requirements on schemes and providers when people approach them having not accessed the guidance. There is already a general duty on providers to “treat customers fairly”, but the FCA will have more to say on whether that safeguard goes far enough, or whether further safeguards are necessary. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that point.

As well as the changes in relation to transfers from unfunded public sector schemes and transfers of defined benefit rights, which I will deal with in a moment, new clause 24 and its accompanying schedule amend the existing transfer rights in the Pensions Schemes Act 1993 to ensure that the new flexibilities operate as intended. We will do that by extending the current transfer rights for those with “flexible benefits” up to and beyond their schemes’ normal retirement age, and applying statutory transfer rights at benefit categories, rather than at scheme level. Amending the transfer rules will ensure that individuals with uncrystallised flexible benefits will have the option to transfer their rights to another pension scheme.

Those amendments will also give individuals greater flexibility by giving members a statutory right to transfer at benefit category level, rather than at scheme level. Where an individual has more than one category of benefits under a scheme, they will now have an option to transfer out of a particular category of benefit, or their entire pot if they wish to, provided they have ceased to accrue rights in that particular category of benefit. Amendments 28, 49 and 50 make minor consequential change in respect of new clause 24 and new schedule 1.

New clauses 25 to 30 and Government amendment 29 address the implications of the new flexibilities for public service pension schemes. Regarding new clause 25 and, for Northern Ireland, new clause 28, following further policy development, that clarifies that the ban on transfers is limited to transfers from unfunded defined benefit public service pension schemes to schemes from which flexible benefits can be obtained. Further, the amendment ensures that the changes are delivered in the Pension Schemes Act 1993, rather than in regulations made by HM Treasury.

Additionally, new clause 26—new clause 29 for Northern Ireland—implements a safeguard for transfers out of funded public service pension schemes that is similar to that available in the private sector for reducing transfer values in specific circumstances.

New clause 25 restricts the right under the Pension Schemes Act 1993 to transfer from one pension scheme to another, so as to prevent a member of an unfunded public service defined benefit scheme from using that right to transfer to another pension scheme in which they can obtain flexible benefits. New clause 28 does the same for Northern Ireland. The new clauses also allow the Treasury—and in Northern Ireland, the Department of Finance and Personnel—to make regulations providing for exceptions to the transfer ban.

New clause 26 introduces a new safeguard that gives Ministers a power to designate a funded defined benefit public service pension scheme and in that way require the reduction of cash equivalent transfer values in respect of transfers from that scheme to pension schemes from which flexible benefits can be obtained. New clause 29 does the same for Northern Ireland. The use of the power will be restricted to cases in which the relevant Minister considers that transfers, either singly or in combination with other factors, increase the risk or amount of taxpayer intervention in the scheme.

The new clauses provide a power which, when used, will require the reduction of transfer values in respect of transfers requested after a scheme is designated, and completed before the scheme is no longer designated. The new clauses time-limit the use of the power and place an obligation on the scheme trustees or managers to alert the relevant Minister should they believe either that the power needs to be used or that, having been used, it is no longer needed.

We intend that the level of the reduction to be applied should be set out in regulations made by the Treasury, and new clause 26 also provides regulation-making powers for the Treasury to determine the amount of the reduction that should be made when a pension scheme is designated. Additionally, in the case of certain Scottish schemes, the power to designate a scheme is to be conferred on Scottish Ministers. New clause 29 makes parallel provision for Northern Ireland. In respect of parliamentary and ministerial schemes in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the new clauses give that power to the relevant trustees or scheme managers. Finally—that is an interim “finally”, not a final “finally”, by the way—new clauses 27 and 30 make amendments to pensions legislation that are consequential to new clauses 25, 26, 28 and 29.

I should like to explain the thinking behind these measures, Currently, only a small number of transfers take place out of the public service pension schemes to defined contribution schemes, but the introduction of the flexibilities might make transfers out to defined contribution schemes more attractive for some. In unfunded public service pension schemes, there is no fund of assets with which to finance transfer payments. Instead, they are funded from contributions and through general Government expenditure. So for every extra pound paid out in transfers, the Government will have a pound less to spend that year on public services. We have estimated that if 1% of all public service workers reaching retirement took their benefits flexibly, it would cost the taxpayer £200 million a year, and we do not think it fair to ask the taxpayer to meet those up-front costs.

Unlike with unfunded schemes, there is a pool of assets to support the payment of pensions in funded public service pension schemes, which can be used to meet the immediate cost of transfers out. Our expectation therefore is that, in the vast majority of cases, allowing greater flexibility in the funded public service pension schemes will not impact on public finances. However, it would be inappropriate for the Government to provide these freedoms to members of public service pension schemes and provide no back-stop protection to taxpayers, should transfers—either singly or in combination with other factors—contribute to a scheme needing support from local or national taxpayers to meet the cost of its liabilities. This is aligned with the position the Government have taken on the unfunded pension schemes, in which we have taken the decision to ban such transfers in the light of the cost risk to the Exchequer, and ultimately the taxpayer. Should a situation arise in which there is a risk to the taxpayer, this new safeguard will give Ministers and scheme managers the appropriate tools to address it.

The Government intend to legislate for some limited exceptions to this ban, and these provisions give the Treasury powers to make regulations providing exceptions to the transfer ban. It is intended that the Treasury will prescribe certain limited circumstances in which a transfer will be permitted. We will announce further details in due course, but we are considering options such as some specific circumstances under Fair Deal. Amendment 29 removes clause 36 and, as discussed earlier, new clause 25 is the replacement provision.

Moving on to the treatment of draw-down and to the Pension Protection Fund assessment, which are covered by new clauses 14 to 23, we are introducing changes to allow occupational pension schemes to offer the new forms of access to pension saving being created by the Taxation of Pensions Bill. In future, schemes will be able to offer more options for decumulation, including draw-down pensions and lump sums. Schemes will be able to offer options to allow all or part of money purchase funds, as defined under tax legislation, to be designated for draw-down after the minimum age—generally 55—is reached. They will also be able of offer members the option to take one or more lump sums from their money purchase funds after the minimum age has been reached.

We are making changes to pensions legislation to allow occupational pension schemes to offer flexibilities to members, and to ensure that the flexibilities operate as intended in relation to cash balance benefits when schemes wind up or enter the Pension Protection Fund assessment period. Cash balance benefits involve guarantees about the amount of a member’s accrued fund and cannot easily be designated for the payment of draw-down. For draw-down funds to operate as intended, cash balance benefits need to be turned into money purchase benefits before designated as “draw-down”. New clause 14 limits draw-down to money purchase benefits.

In addition, the Government will bring forward regulations to allow modification of scheme rules to convert cash balance benefits into money purchase benefits, where the member wants to exercise draw-down. Schemes will need to convert cash balance benefits into money purchase benefits, and new clauses 15 and 16 contain regulation- making powers for this conversion process. They are fall-back powers, as no scheme is currently offering the extended forms of access and we have no evidence of how such conversions might be undertaken. If there is evidence that schemes are not offering fair value for cash balance benefits in conversion or as a lump sum, we will bring forward regulations to impose requirements.

If an occupational pension scheme is underfunded at wind-up, assets relating to non-money purchase benefits shall be distributed according to a specified priority order. Members therefore see a reduction in their benefits in accordance with that priority order. New clause 17 contains provisions about the conversion of benefits during wind up. We want to prevent some members from avoiding any reduction to Pension Protection Fund levels of compensation. Therefore, we want to prevent members from converting non-money purchase benefits to money purchase after a scheme begins to wind up. If we did not do that, there would be a risk that benefits converted to money purchase would be discharged in full, to the potential detriment of other members.

If schemes offer the new decumulation options, we need to set out how rights under the scheme are treated if the scheme enters the PPF. Our provisions restrict what can be done with non-money purchase benefits when a scheme is in a PPF assessment period. New clause 17 prevents the conversion or replacement of non-money purchase benefits with money purchase benefits. New clause 18 restricts the payment of lump sums to those that would be payable if the scheme transferred into the PPF. Crucially, a scheme needs to be in as steady a state as possible while it is assessed for transfer into the PPF, so that its overall financial position can be determined. In addition, if members were able to transfer or discharge their benefits, this would delay the process and deplete the assets available to be transferred with which to pay compensation to other members. There are no restrictions on the payment, transfer or discharge of money purchase benefits. New clauses 19 and 23 replicate these provisions for Northern Ireland.

In new clauses 31 and 33, we introduce several definitional terms that will apply to a number of areas we are amending under part 4 of the Bill. New clause 31 introduces the definition of a “flexible benefit”, which will determine whether the requirements relating to independent advice, draw-down, treatment of lump sums and transfers will apply to that form of benefit or not. New clause 32 contains definitions of “cash balance benefits”. which are a form of benefit that will fall within the scope of flexible benefits. Those definitions seek to ensure that where a member’s pension saving results in a cash amount, as opposed to an income amount, they are able to access those benefits flexibly. The definition of “flexible benefit” is intended to include all those benefit categories that fall within the scope of the flexibilities introduced by the Taxation of Pensions Bill. The definition includes money purchase benefits, cash balance benefits and a residual category of benefits which are neither money purchase nor cash balance benefits for the purposes of pensions legislation, other than the provisions relating to pensions in the Finance Act 2004. This residual category may include a benefit structure which provides a sum of money at the member’s retirement date but is also subject to an additional guarantee, such as the option of a guaranteed annuity rate offered before the member becomes entitled to receive their pension. New clause 33 also defines a range of terms to ensure that the flexibilities apply to the right individuals, both members and those who may be entitled to survivor rights, as well as at the right points in time.

Government amendments 56 to 72 relate to the smooth running of the pensions guidance service and ensure that the legislative framework works as it should. They fall into three groups, the first of which comprises those aligning definitions with the ones used in the rest of the Bill. The second group comprises those ensuring that those delivering guidance work together effectively and share information. The third group comprises the consequential amendments. I outlined earlier the new definition of “flexible benefits”, which is used in this Bill to refer to money purchase or defined contribution schemes. Amendments 56 and 57 introduce the language of flexible benefits into the high-level definition of pensions guidance. Amendments 30, 58, 67, 68, 69 and 72 are necessary as a consequence of these definitional changes.

On information sharing, amendment 60 inserts new section 333EA in new part 20A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Subsection (1) provides for a duty on designated guidance providers and the Treasury to co-operate in the giving of pensions guidance. Subsection (2) provides for a gateway to share information. Ensuring that delivery partners and the Treasury are under an obligation to work together and, importantly, that they may share information with each other, subject to the usual data protection requirements, is important. It ensures a well-integrated and well-functioning guidance service; allows delivery partners to learn from each other and for evaluation of the overall service; and, finally and most importantly, facilitates a smooth journey for consumers through the service. The remaining provisions in this group make minor or consequential changes, principally to ensure that the guidance framework slots into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. They include amendments 61 and 63.

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[Mr Love]

I apologise to the Minister for asking this now. He was going at such a pace that I did not catch up with him until he had moved on to a separate set of amendments. I want to press him on the guidance amendments. Will guidance be rationed to a once-only offer, or will the Financial Conduct Authority introduce some flexibility in that regard?

[Steve Webb]

Obviously, that issue is not spelled out in the Bill, but it is important none the less. What we envisage is that people will contact the guidance service, which by then will have a brand, an identity, a phone number and all the rest of it, and will make an appointment if they want face-to-face or telephone-based guidance. Obviously, they can access the website as many times as they like, but if they wish to have face-to-face or telephone-based guidance, it will be at a set time on a set date. There will be a period between the initial contact and the guidance appointment for the gathering of information to make the session more useful. Coming out of that session will be documentation and signposting for further sources of information, guidance and, if they wish, regulated financial advice.

Clearly, we want everybody to be able to access the guidance, so the core model is that a person does that once. But the Pensions Advisory Service has a business as usual role anyway and it is inconceivable that, even if a person has had their formal guidance session with the service and then rang it up the next day with a question, it would put the phone down on them; of course it would not, so there would be flexibility. Clearly, we need to think further on that. We need to reflect on the fact that if someone has a guidance session and then has additional needs, is a formal second guidance session appropriate or necessary or are there other ways of dealing with those needs? The core model is one session, but other resources, such as signposting, are available on tap. We are considering whether further flexibility could be introduced.

I hope that I am near to conclusion. I ran through the relatively minor and consequential amendments that come towards the back of the Bill and that are relatively uncontentious. On the title of the Bill, amendment 1 amends the title of the Bill to include

“provision designed to give people greater flexibility in accessing benefits and to help them make informed decisions about what to do with benefits.”

That change is to reflect more accurately the content of the Bill in the light of the new amendments on the pension flexibilities.

In sum, these new provisions are designed to ensure that the guidance guarantee works as effectively as possible; that the various rules on transfers do not act to the detriment of people who are left behind in the schemes; and that the process is properly overseen with the provision of independent financial advice. They also spell out who pays for the help, and whether or not it is taxed. The provisions help to flesh out some of the detail of this important policy, and I commend new clause 7 to the House.

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[Steve Webb]

I am very happy to relay to the Exchequer Secretary that my hon. Friend is seeking such a meeting.

We believe that reliable and high-quality guidance will be available. The right hon. Member for East Ham asked about those on lower incomes. The irony is that in the bad old world it was the people in the middle who were completely stuck. If someone had a tiny pension pot, they could take the cash, and if they had a big pension pot, they had choices and draw-down and probably paid for some advice. It was all those poor souls in the middle who just ended up having to buy an annuity faute de mieux. This new reform gives new options and new choices to those on lower and middle incomes who have not had them before, so it seems to us that we are being fairer to those in that group. They can buy an annuity if they want to, but we are giving them new options, so we do not think we have any problem with that test.

The right hon. Gentleman asked finally about the issue of costs to the Exchequer. He will be aware that these are being updated at the time of the autumn statement, so we will be providing fresh estimates of the tax implications of the changes and the public expenditure implications, but I would say that in its July long-term fiscal report the OBR did not assume any impact on public spending from these reforms. I do not think that by that it meant there would be nil, and I do not mean there would be nil, but think of the context of long-term pension spending, the very substantial reforms we have brought in to the state pension age, the new single tier pension and the multiple tens of billions of pounds-worth of reforms—we are not talking anything like that in respect of the implication for public spending of these new freedoms.

Will there be somebody who blows the lot and claims a means-tested benefit? Yes, there will—having said which, we already have rules in place for those who artificially dispose of their capital, as the right hon. Gentleman well knows. So there are safeguards. We may find that public expenditure is saved; we already know from survey evidence that pension saving is more popular as a result of our freedoms. If more people decide to save for their retirement through pension saving and have more income and wealth in retirement, we may save money. We do not expect a substantial impact on public spending, therefore, although I am not saying it will be zero. We will provide updated estimates at the time of the autumn statement.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about who will pay for the guidance and he seemed to think there was some confusion. I do not think there is any confusion. The £20 million that the Chancellor has identified is seed-corn funding to get the thing going, and it is already being spent as we speak—on designing the website and getting things started. Once it is up and running there will be a levy on the financial services industry. The FCA has already put out a consultation on exactly how that will fall.

Basically, the idea is that those firms that will benefit should pay the levy, but we are also consulting on exempting small firms of advisers with low turnover from paying the levy. So unless I have missed something, I do not think there is any uncertainty about who is going to be paying for this: it will not be the consumer directly; it will be a levy on the financial services industry.

The issue was raised—and this phrase has come up—of a second line of defence, and that is an important concept. As we discussed a moment ago, what happens when people have not accessed the guidance, or indeed if they have? The FCA has committed to consider this issue and it will be publishing an update on its requirement on pension providers very shortly. We have had some discussions as to whether that will be by Christmas, by winter or by late autumn, but it will be very shortly, so we will have more information on that. I assure the House that the FCA is taking this issue seriously.

[Mr Love]

Will the Government consult on this, as they have consulted everyone on aspects of reform?

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[Steve Webb]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Together with the Taxation of Pensions Bill, this Bill introduces the latest radical reform of pensions. Its ground-breaking pension reforms were the centrepiece of the Queen’s Speech, and are intended to give people freedom and security in retirement.

The Bill follows the Government’s extensive pensions reform. It is about enabling innovation in the pensions industry better to meet the needs of business and individuals, and about giving people greater flexibility in regard to how and when they access their savings. It will do that in two ways: by encouraging and enabling defined ambition or risk-sharing pension schemes and collective benefits, and by giving individuals new freedom and flexibility in relation to how and when they access their pension savings. It builds on the previous pension reform, including the new state pension and the highly successful implementation of automatic enrolment. Defined ambition legislation is a radical reshaping of pensions legislation to ensure that it remains relevant for future generations. It is intended to reflect, recognise and reinvigorate innovation in consumer-focused product design in shared-risk, or defined ambition, pensions.

The Bill introduces three categories of pension scheme based on the type of promise that the scheme provides for savers during the saving phase about the benefits that will be available to them on retirement. It will also enable schemes in the United Kingdom to offer collective benefits, and to ensure that there is appropriate regulation in regard to such benefits. The crucial point here concerns risk-sharing. The current legislation is based on a binary structure of just money purchase or non-money purchase benefits. While both those types of pension can be the right product for many, is it right that the only future for pensions that our legislation encourages is one that requires either the individual consumer or the employer to take on the full financial risk of such long-term savings? We think not.

Many employers have found the increasing costs of longevity and investment risk too heavy to bear, but if defined contribution schemes are the only alternative, outcomes for savers will be less certain and more volatile than for earlier generations, making it much harder for future generations of savers to plan for later life. That is why the Bill provides for new definitions of private pensions, which include the new defined ambition category and collective benefits.

[Mr Love]

It would appear that the defined ambition scheme has been created to attract employers who have defined contribution schemes. What evidence is there that there is a demand for defined ambition schemes? Is there not a danger that employers with defined benefit schemes will be encouraged to move to defined ambition schemes?

[Steve Webb]

Our view is that the shared risk space will suit firms coming from either direction: from DB or DC. I have lost track of the number of times someone has said, “Such and such a measure was the final nail in the coffin of DB.” There must be no more room for any more nails in that coffin. It is clear that, if we do nothing, there will be no DB outside the public sector—sooner or later there will be nothing. The abolition of contracting out may be a further trigger, but if we do nothing we will just have individual DC, so shared risk says that employers who want to do more—employers who are willing to share some of the risk with their employees—should have a space to do that.

We may catch some firms coming out of DB that were going to go out of DB anyway. We may stop them in the middle, rather than going to the opposite extreme, but we may also find employers who offered DC schemes and found that their employees could not afford to retire because the DC benefits were not good enough, or employees who object to the volatility of individual DC and start saying to their bosses, “I want something a bit more predictable and certain. Can you mitigate the risk?” Therefore, my judgment is that some people will come out of DB and some will come out of DC. That does not undermine DB. The writing was on the wall for private sector DB, to be honest.

On the freedom and choice agenda, as we have discussed, Budget 2014 announced radical flexibilities in how and when people access their pension arrangements. The Government undertook a consultation. The response was published in July and draft tax clauses for technical comment were published in August.

This Bill, along with the Taxation of Pensions Bill, will mean that, from April 2015, individuals from the age of 55 will be able to access that pension flexibility if they wish, subject to their marginal rate of income tax, rather than the current 55% tax charge. The Bill will make the required changes to pension legislation. As we have discussed, it includes a guidance guarantee that means everyone with money purchase benefits or cash balance benefits will be offered free, impartial guidance so they are clear on the range of options available to them at retirement. The Bill contains a duty on providers and schemes to ensure that they make people aware of their right to guidance.

The Taxation of Pensions Bill will legislate for the required tax regime changes. The Government will continue to allow members of private sector schemes offering safeguarded benefits—that is, benefits other than money purchase or cash balance benefits—the freedom to transfer to other types of scheme. In the majority of cases where a member has safeguarded benefits, it will continue to be in the best interests of the individual to remain in the scheme.

As we have discussed, there will be two additional safeguards: the requirement to take advice from a financial adviser, and guidance for trustees on using their existing powers to delay transfers and on taking account of scheme funding when deciding transfer values. In addition, the Exchequer will put in place safeguards in general not allowing unfunded public service defined benefit scheme transfers. For funded public service schemes, Ministers will have a power to reduce cash equivalent transfer values.

These are radical reforms that build on the Government’s changes to improve pensions in the UK. We believe that giving people greater choice has to be at the heart of the reforms: greater choice for business on the pensions they offer and greater choice for individuals on how they can access their pension savings. These are important changes to allow the private pensions market to flourish. I commend the Bill to the House.

Pensions Strategy

Debate between Andrew Love and Steve Webb

Thursday 20th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Steve Webb]

My hon. Friend is a distinguished member of the Select Committee, which has scrutinised the issues very effectively. He is quite right that the guidance must come at the right time. We want people to think about their retirement planning much earlier. Certainly, when they are thinking about buying financial products—or, in the jargon, decumulating—we need to make sure that there is someone on their side to give them impartial guidance. We will make sure that that happens.

[Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Financial Conduct Authority is not only a process regulator but a product regulator. Will the Minister ensure that it is seized of the need to look carefully at new, innovative products, because the group of people with whom it is dealing are very vulnerable, and it is important for the regulator to keep an eye on the market?

[Steve Webb]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right that products must be properly regulated. The difference between the current situation and what we propose is that, under our proposals, before going to independent financial advisers, people are guaranteed to have a conversation with somebody who is independent and on their side to talk them through their options. All too many people simply do not get that at the moment, and they risk making the wrong choice as a result. We will put that right.

Benefits Uprating

Debate between Andrew Love and Steve Webb

Tuesday 6th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Steve Webb]

It was entirely right that we went ahead with Labour’s planned cut to the winter fuel payment. We reversed the cold weather payment cut to prioritise the most vulnerable when it is most cold. I make no apology for that. It was important to put the full 5.2% through for people with no wage because of the pressures on household fuel bills and other costs. That is why it was vital that we stood by the most vulnerable even though money was tight.

[Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister take this opportunity to admit that the policies of the coalition have led to a diminution of work incentives? If we are to believe press reports, that appears to be the opinion of the Secretary of State. Was there any consultation with the Chancellor about his autumn statement? Does this not show that the Government are in disarray over this issue?

[Steve Webb]

People are still better off in work. When we have the Secretary of State’s universal credit, that will be even more the case. The hon. Gentleman is focusing on a narrow aspect of the measures that we have taken. Personal income tax allowance increases, the cuts in fuel duty compared with Labour’s escalator plan and the cuts in council tax in real terms will all help people in work and make it pay to work. We have plans to take that further.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Love and Steve Webb

Monday 14th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Steve Webb)]

Our colleagues in the Treasury are establishing a commission to look at public sector pensions, and we have already had a meeting with our colleagues to try to ensure a fair deal both for the hard-working people who work in the public sector and for the taxpayers who are making a very large contribution to those pensions. It is important that the true cost is made transparent, which it clearly is not at present.

[Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)]

T5. At a time when unemployment is forecast to increase to 3 million, this so-called coalition Government have decided to cut 100,000 jobs from the future jobs fund, but will not replace them until next summer. Is that just another example of unemployment being a price worth paying for this Government?