Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Andrew Love and Steve Barclay

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Love]

I will comment on the commission’s thought processes on some of the issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned. He will remember, as we all do, the evening on which we set up a special parliamentary vehicle in the wake of the LIBOR rate-rigging scandal. Since 2008, there have been a variety of critical events, including the credit crunch and the recession. All that led to a catastrophic decline in the reputation of the financial services sector. Trust in bankers sank to an all-time low, and frankly LIBOR was the last straw. This was truly shocking behaviour on an unprecedented scale. Something had to be done, and the focus was very much on our terms of reference on standards and culture.

As a result, the commission had to answer some tough questions, and the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) has posed some of them: why had so few bankers been held to account for their failings? Why had it appeared that bankers pocketed the gains, but passed on the losses to the taxpayer? Why were customers who should have been treated fairly treated in the exact opposite way—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Cathy Jamieson) raised? We tried to answer those questions through three themes that came out in our report. The first theme is individual responsibility.

When all the head bankers came before us, we were genuinely shocked to hear that they denied any responsibility for what happened in their banks. Whether it was ignorance of the serious failings happening under their noses, or because there was collective decision making, the result was the same: no one could be held to account. That, we discovered, was the result of the failure of the approved persons regime, which did not attribute responsibilities to senior staff, who, as a result, could not be held to account.

Two steps are proposed to try to address that problem. First, we have already mentioned the new senior persons regime, designed to ensure that the most important responsibilities are assigned to specific individuals, who will more easily be held to account for them. Secondly, for a much wider group—not every employee, but those who could do serious harm to the bank, or its customers, due to their customer-facing position—we propose a new licensing regime, with a set of banking standard rules that enable them to be held to account.

However, for people to be held to account, we need more effective sanctions, and that is the second theme of the commission’s report. Identification of those responsible under the new regime will provide a stronger basis for the regulator to enforce existing civil penalties, such as fines, restrictions and bans. One of the great difficulties was assigning responsibility; we hope that individual responsibility will address that.

Given the seriousness of the wrongdoings—an issue mentioned in earlier contributions—the commission is recommending two new, far-reaching powers. New clause 2 does not address this point, but under certain conditions, the regulator should be able to impose a full range of civil sanctions, unless the person can demonstrate that reasonable steps were taken to prevent or mitigate the failing. In effect, that does what new clause 2 suggests: it reverses the burden of proof, but only under certain conditions.

[Stephen Barclay]

In essence, the hon. Gentleman is describing the purpose of new clause 2. Earlier, I alluded to the fact that there is a condition that militates against the effectiveness of the new clause: the tool can be used only if there is a successful prosecution, which gets in the way. As much as I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller), does the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love) agree that we need to be careful about changing the law retrospectively, particularly on custodial sentences? One of the issues that we are addressing today is how we get it right for the future, and what the sanctions should be.

[Mr Love]

Personally, I oppose retrospective legislation. It was not considered by the commission, which does not make any recommendations on it. I suspect, however, that none of its members would be in favour of addressing these issues in that way.

The other change is the much publicised criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank, which normally carries, as has been suggested, a custodial sentence. Importantly, we have laid down preconditions before a charge of that nature can be brought. There must be a cost to the taxpayer—the bank has turned to the taxpayer to bail it out; or there are consequences for the financial system—stability is critical, and anything that destabilises the system should be subject to a criminal sanction; or there is serious harm to customers. We think that we have framed a big change in the law. Bankers continually ask why they are singled out as the only commercial group that can be charged in that way. It is a delicate balance, and I hope that the Government will look seriously at what we are trying to do.

The third area I want to touch on is remuneration and incentives. The reality is that rewards have been huge, and still are huge for a more limited supply of senior bankers. That incentivises excessive risk taking and, occasionally, misconduct. The commission concluded that risk and reward are still misaligned, particularly when making pay awards over a short period. It therefore sees advantages in making a significant portion of remuneration variable, rather than fixed. We do not have much sympathy for the European solution in relation to that, but we think that reform is necessary in this area. More variable pay should be deferred to take into account changing circumstances at the bank at which the banker works, with power for the regulator to extend the period for up to 10 years. To those who say that that is a long time, many banks have a good year, but then some less good years, and the commission wanted to recognise that that can go on for an extended period.

Regulators should be able to limit or prohibit sales-based incentives. We were shocked at the way in which sales-based incentives were used to create the mis-selling scandals of PPI and interest rate swaps. There was a cascading group of incentives from senior management through to the customer-facing end of the bank, and we think that that made a major contribution to the problems that arose. We want to give the regulator much stronger powers. Where a bank requires taxpayer support, the regulator should have discretionary power to cancel all deferred compensation. It is shocking that, as happened in some banks, they were still paying remuneration to employees after the bank had taken on taxpayer funds.

The issues of conduct and remuneration that I have raised lie at the heart of what the commission thinks needs to be done in respect of culture and standards. These recommendations have been much debated and discussed. We have done everything we can to make them practical and realisable, and I hope that, when there is an opportunity to debate them in the other House, or when they come back to this place, the Government will give serious consideration to those recommendations.