Britain and International Security

Andrew Gwynne Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker]

I accept that point. Of course the situation in Syria is complex, as I stated earlier. All I say to the House is that we will consider any proposals that the Defence Secretary brings forward and, like the right hon. Gentleman, we are united in tackling Islamic extremism and terrorism. There is no difference between us on that. When the Defence Secretary comes forward with proposals—if he does—we must consider them and see whether we can support any such action. That is all I am saying.

I was speaking about Britain’s global role and how we cannot remove ourselves from that responsibility. We are uniquely placed: a P5 member, a leading EU country, the second largest contributor to NATO, a founding member of the G7 and—this is often missed out—a central partner in the Commonwealth. We are the only country that is part of all those things. That is not overblown rhetoric, jingoism or national chauvinism. We must be confident in the role that we could, should and will play. By the end of the decade we will have taken the decision to renew the nuclear deterrent, which we support, delivered new attack submarines, and be close to the regeneration of carrier strike. We are still a significant military force, and that is allied to our considerable political influence in the decision-making bodies of the world, and the defence engagement that we undertake in all regions by advising, supporting and training our friends. Such work is often unrecognised but it is crucial none the less. We must also accept that our armed forces have been shaped by more than a decade of conflict, and the British public have become far more sceptical about the use of military force. The case for our military must be made by us all.

Our highly capable armed forces are vital to the UK and its interests. Indeed, military power is not an alternative to, but acts as a support for, political solutions. Our armed forces project power on a global scale and deter potential enemies. The lesson of history is that deterrence, alongside politics, is the best course of action. In the modern world we must treat defence and security as separate sides of the same coin because we must do all we can to prevent a latent threat from becoming a patent one. We must ensure that we have responsive, high-tech armed forces with the capability to respond to emerging interconnected threats in an unpredictable security landscape, including hybrid warfare.

[Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)]

As well as top-quality armed forces we also need the best security services, both at home and abroad, so that we can build up vital intelligence and utilise our armed forces to their best ability.

[Vernon Coaker]

My hon. Friend makes an important point about intelligence. We in this House are proud that our intelligence services are some of the best in the world, and the Defence Secretary will know about the work that our intelligence services are doing across the world to keep us all safe—the rest of us will not know so much, but no doubt attacks and various other terrorist outrages across the world are being thwarted. We must ensure that our intelligence services have the best possible support and resources.

This is a time of multiple and complex global challenges —a far more uncertain security landscape than was envisaged in 2010 by the coalition Government in their national security strategy. Countries such as Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, Yemen and Libya are being torn apart by internal conflict, helping to incubate groups such as ISIL and other ideologically affiliated groups from whom we face a growing terrorist threat. From Vladimir Putin’s Russia comes growing hostility, with military breaches of sovereign territory that we hoped had been consigned to Europe’s brutal past. Who among us believed that we would ever see the day when once again actions appropriate to the cold war era would be taking place within eastern Europe?

Alongside that, humanitarian crises are causing death and human misery with growing regularity and increasing scale, with migration not only a result of instability but a cause of it. We are all aware of the threat that climate change and resource scarcity will play in the coming years in causing instability and potentially sparking conflict, and new emerging threats such as those involving cyber seem to grow at an exponential pace. Our defence and security policies need to navigate that unpredictable and changing landscape by offering certainty and stability.

One part of the debate that gets little coverage or discussion is the renewal of the 2010 national security strategy, which is critical. I do not criticise the Government for failing to see into the future, but the fact that the 2010 strategy fails to mention many of the threats that we are now discussing shows the difficulty of this situation. For example, Russia and ISIL are not mentioned in the 2010 strategy, and the concept of hybrid warfare is not addressed either.

Let us be clear: the process must identify the threats the country faces. From that, we should identify the military capabilities needed to defend us from such threats. The debate is crucial but the Government need urgently to address the lack of transparency and sense of importance. The relationship between the national security strategy and the SDSR is vital. The strategy was a welcome innovation, but it is time to build on it.

In 2010, the Government trumpeted their rejection of strategic shrinkage, yet in the past five years it is said that Britain has lost influence in Europe and the wider world. The Defence Secretary argued just a few weeks ago that we are more engaged than we were in 2010, but we all know that, wherever we go and whatever the reason, it has seemed to our friends and allies that we are less globally relevant than we were five years ago.

The argument barely needs rehearsing, but the previous Government presided over a strategic defence and security review that was strategic in name only. They began by asking what could be cut instead of focusing on ensuring that we have a strong, high-tech armed force equipped for the many emerging and interconnected threats of the 21st century. This time, we should ensure that there are no last-minute deals or rushed decision making based on inadequate thinking. We should not be afraid to debate the future of our country in an open and inclusive way. We might not agree, but the argument is important. I believe there is a great deal of consensus about our global role.

We should ask the important questions on the regeneration of the carrier strike, and the operation of the two carriers and what that means. We should ask questions about the regeneration of the maritime patrol aircraft, which is essential; and the need to refresh Army 2020 and Future Force 2020. It will be interesting to hear what the Defence Secretary says over the next week or two about the future of the reserves, and whether there has been a change of policy. Is the policy on the integration of the reserves with the regulars the same as it was a year ago? Army 2020, Future Force 2020 and the upgrading of our ISTAR capability are major issues that we will need to address, alongside recruitment to 77 Brigade and the need for forces who are able to combat new forms of hybrid warfare. In short, we need to fill the strategic vacuum at the heart of the Government.

The Government have put us on the road to an EU referendum and we need to have a debate about the security aspects of that vital relationship. How can we ensure that NATO not only remains relevant in European security in the 21st century, but develops a coherent and effective response to Russian aggression on our continent? In that regard, the stakes could not be higher. With Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, its upgrade of its nuclear arsenal and its bellicose rhetoric towards NATO, we have seen a dramatic shift in the strategic balance on the continent of Europe. Let us be clear: we must convince our allies to do more. The debate has mainly been about resources, but it should also be about our willingness to defend one another and to live up to our treaty obligations, especially article 5—and, yes, that means having a frank discussion about our country’s commitment to the 2% NATO target.

The MOD is scrabbling around Whitehall this year looking for pots of cash to include in our defence spending. It is redefining £800 million of war pensions. The Defence Secretary said on Monday, as he has said many times in the past, that spending plans will be set out in the autumn. Can he guarantee that, this year, the reductions he has been asked to make by the Chancellor will not result in any reductions in the training activity of our armed forces? Where threats are identified, they need to be addressed and appropriately resourced. That is how we expect an SDSR to be run.

Briefly on other parts of the world, I recently visited Japan, where there are growing concerns. Do we need to consider our strategic interests in that area? How do we build on our burgeoning relationships with Japan and how do we renew our deep links with Australia, New Zealand and Canada?

On Monday, the Prime Minister mentioned that the G7 wanted to create a kind of clearing house to ensure that countries that need assistance receive help from the nation most able to give it effectively. How will that work? What role can the UK play to ensure its success?

At the end of the previous Parliament, the Defence Committee produced a series of excellent reports on the SDSR. The third report came up with more than 70 questions that the SDSR should address. That would be an excellent starting place for a more wide-ranging debate.

In 1998, Robin Cook and George Robertson toured the country, holding in-depth seminars with expert panels, where the public could engage. The process may have taken longer and might have been more unwieldy from a Whitehall perspective, but it produced a piece of work that is unrivalled as an assessment of the UK’s role in a global context. So far, we have not seen that ambition from the Government. I call on them today to open up a wide-ranging dialogue with the British people about the future defence of our country.

I said that we stand once again at a crossroads as a nation. A few weeks ago, the Washington Post wrote that Britain had resigned as a world power. The Defence Secretary claims we are doing more than we did five years ago, but it is not good enough just to assert it—we need to demonstrate it. The Prime Minister has called ISIL an existential threat to the UK. The Government need to live up to their rhetoric. Britain remains a global power. The SDSR is a chance for us to refresh, renew and rethink our strategy as a nation. We should and must take that chance.