Energy Infrastructure: Chinese Companies

Andrew Bowie Excerpts

Wednesday 12th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)]

The indication that Mingyang will get the green light from the Treasury to supply wind turbine technology to the Green Volt wind farm in the North sea is concerning. Indeed, alarm bells have been sounded by officials in the Minister’s Department and in the Ministry of Defence. This green revolution will come with a “made in China” label. The Government, in collusion with the Scottish National party in Holyrood, are determined to see Chinese companies reap the economic reward.

The Minister’s party says again and again that the transition to renewable energy will reduce our reliance on hostile regimes. Chinese-controlled technology embedded in our critical energy infrastructure is evidently a threat to our security. Can the Minister assure us that she is taking this threat seriously? Can she explain how using wind turbines made by Mingyang reduces our reliance on foreign states?

Just last week I, along with many MPs in the Minister’s party, was briefed by the Royal Navy on the vulnerability of our subsea communications and energy infrastructure. We have seen a pervasive rise in sabotage attacks on subsea cables in the Baltic, affecting our Scandinavian allies. If Chinese-manufactured turbines are installed, security experts have warned that sensors could spy on British seas, defence submarine programmes and the layout of our energy infrastructure. We would be reliant on Chinese equipment and software, and on Chinese suppliers for updates and maintenance, handing Beijing significant opportunity for interference. In the current international climate, it is unthinkable to disregard the security implications of this decision.

Can the Minister confirm that the Government have scrapped the GIGA—green industries growth accelerator —scheme that we launched to build British supply chains in energy technologies? What discussions has she had with the Ministry of Defence about its concerns over our ability to ensure the security of our energy system? What safeguards will be in place to prevent Chinese maintenance ships accessing the turbines for repairs? What guarantees has she had, if any, from our defence and security agencies that this investment will pose no threat to our national security? If such assurances are not forthcoming, will she revisit this decision and put a halt to the madness of allowing the People’s Republic of China to have such a significant stake in our energy system?

[Kerry McCarthy]

When the Minister—[Interruption.] Sorry, I am the Minister now. [Laughter.] The shadow Minister mentioned revisiting this decision, but, as yet, no decision has been made. We are undergoing rigorous processes to consider the role of China in our supply chain and in the investment in our critical infrastructure.

Having been in my position, the hon. Gentleman will know why it is so important that I do not provide a running commentary on individual cases, but I have made it clear that we are taking into account the national security considerations as well as our need for investment in the supply chain. Let me touch on the legacy that we were left by the previous Minister: he was perfectly happy to leave our energy system exposed, with the British people paying the price. The retreat—the “under new management” line that he was parroting earlier this week—would leave us even more exposed to those petrostates and dictators. We are getting on with our clean power mission to end our energy insecurity, and I shall take no lessons from the shadow Minister on energy security given his Government’s record.