Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Andrea Leadsom Excerpts

Monday 14th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Justine Greening]

The OBR makes an independent fiscal forecast and assessment of the economy. The Treasury may or may not agree with that forecast and assessment, but the point is that it is done entirely independently of the Government. Rightly, however, it will remain the prerogative of Ministers to decide policy. That is the clear distinction we have set out throughout the Bill.

We needed to make sure that we have official forecasts for the economy that the public can trust, even if that means we end up giving away some of our powers as Treasury Ministers. As my right hon. Friend the Chancellor has said, we need to fix the Budget to fit the figures, not fix the figures to fit the Budget. That is why the OBR was established, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies has said it is a “welcome” innovation.

To enable the OBR to get to work immediately, it initially operated on a non-statutory basis. It was headed by Sir Alan Budd, a highly respected fiscal and macro-economic expert in our country. The interim OBR produced an independent assessment of the economy and public finances both ahead of, and at, the Budget in June. We gave it direct control over that forecast, with full access to all the data, assumptions and economic models. It made all the key judgments and decisions underpinning the economic and fiscal forecasts. Great strides were also made in transparency. More information was published than ever before. That fact was noted by both the Treasury Committee and the IFS.

[Andrea Leadsom (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

As a member of the Treasury Committee, may I say that it was incredibly valuable to be able to challenge the OBR members who were present and Government Ministers? From our point of view as representatives of Back Benchers, the process was very useful.

[Justine Greening]

I welcome that helpful intervention. My hon. Friend will no doubt be aware that the Treasury Committee inquiry into the OBR described Sir Alan Budd as an “exemplary” witness. In putting together this Bill, we took on board the Committee’s points, and I am sure my hon. Friend will be happy about the unprecedented role the Committee will play in appointments to the OBR.

The final task of the interim office was to provide advice on how the permanent, statutory OBR should be established. I am happy to report to the House that the Bill is designed in line with the detailed recommendations made by Sir Alan Budd in his letter to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor. We have now moved to permanent arrangements. This Bill enshrines in statute provisions to ensure the OBR’s independence. Robert Chote has been appointed as the OBR’s first permanent chair. His appointment was confirmed by the Treasury Committee. He is supported by Graham Parker and Steven Nickell, whose appointments were also confirmed by the Committee.

The permanent Budget responsibility committee led on the production of the OBR’s economic and fiscal outlook, published in November. In addition, the resources made available to the OBR have been increased. There has been a transfer of technical forecasting capacity from the Treasury to the OBR, and a transparent, multi-year funding settlement has been agreed for the spending review period. The OBR has also moved to a new external location outside the Treasury building.

Let me now turn to the detail of the Bill. We debate this Bill after the constructive scrutiny the other place has given it. The other place welcomed the Bill. Part 1 includes provisions on the new framework for fiscal policy. Clause 1 sets out the need for the Treasury to produce a charter for Budget responsibility setting out the formulation and implementation of fiscal policy. In particular, the charter will set out the Government’s fiscal objectives and the fiscal mandate, and a draft of the charter is available to Members alongside the Bill.

Clause 2 requires the Treasury to produce a Budget document on an annual basis. The detail of exactly what needs to be covered within the annual Budget document is set out in the charter. The Bill also repeals the legislative aspects of previous Governments’ fiscal frameworks, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, a pointless piece of declaratory legislation that would have made no improvement in fiscal planning, instead merely setting up another set of targets that Ministers would assure us they were going to meet right up until they missed them.

Clause 3 provides for the existence of a statutory body called the Office for Budget Responsibility. Clause 4 sets out the main duty of the OBR, which is to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances. This is a broad remit, which means that the OBR will not be limited to forecasting alone. At a minimum, the remit of the OBR means it must produce the following: assessments of the likelihood that the Government will meet their fiscal mandate alongside each forecast; a sustainability report at least once a year; a report on the accuracy of its forecasts at least once a year; and full economic and fiscal forecasts at least twice each year. Beyond these tasks, the OBR will be able to undertake any research and analysis pursuant to its remit.

Clause 5 describes how the OBR is to fulfil its duties. Crucially, it includes a set of principles—objectivity, impartiality and transparency—to guide the OBR in fulfilling its remit. It also requires that the OBR must not analyse or develop non-Government policies. Analysis is rightly the domain of the OBR, but, as I have said, policy making is the responsibility of publicly elected Ministers. These principles protect independence. Clauses 5 and 9 also put in place explicit provisions for the OBR to have complete discretion over the way it carries out its statutory duties, giving it full access to the information it requires to do so. The remaining clauses in part 1, as well as schedule 1, set out further detail of the operation and governance of the OBR.

We have sought to reflect the theme of independence in the constitution and governance of the OBR. In line with the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund, the OBR is established with its own legal personality and will operate at arm’s length from Ministers as an executive non-departmental public body. The OBR’s executive functions will be undertaken by a three-person Budget responsibility committee. The members of this committee will be appointed by the Chancellor. To support independence, the Bill makes provision for the Treasury Committee to veto all appointments and dismissals. That statutory veto bestows on the Committee more power than it has over any other public appointment. The Chancellor has said that he is giving the Committee this veto to ensure that there is no doubt that the individuals leading the OBR are independent and have the support and approval of the Committee.

A chairman will lead the BRC and run the OBR. All staff will report to the chair, and that person will control the “hiring and firing” of the staff. The staff will be civil servants, ensuring that the OBR can recruit from the widest possible pool of expertise. There will also be at least two non-executive members, to provide support and challenge to the OBR. The non-execs will report on how the OBR performs its duty. They will also commission expert peer review of the OBR’s forecast and analysis.

The OBR will report directly to Parliament, with its forecasts and reports laid directly in the House, as was the case with the autumn forecast in November 2010. Written questions from Members will be passed to the OBR to respond to, and the members of the BRC will be available for Select Committee scrutiny.

The provisions in part 1 represent a permanent improvement to economic policy making and the transparency of government. Britain is now one of the first advanced economies to have an independent fiscal agency that produces official fiscal and economic forecasts. It is therefore no surprise that these reforms have attracted praise from the IMF, and they put us at the cutting edge of international best practice. I hope that the world will look with interest at our policy innovations.

Part 2 modernises the governance of the National Audit Office. The goal of the NAO is to maintain effective independent oversight of spending. The Bill’s provisions will strengthen the NAO at this critical time of scarce public resources. Members will be aware that very similar provisions were included in the previous Government’s Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, which passed through this House with cross-party support. However, there was no time for the other place to consider those provisions at the end of the last Parliament, and this Bill represents the earliest opportunity to bring them back before Parliament. The provisions are aimed at implementing the recommendations made by the Public Accounts Commission following its review of NAO corporate governance.

As a result of this Bill, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General will continue to exist; the CAG will be an independent officer of this House and will be limited to a single 10-year term. The NAO will be established as a new corporate body in its own right. I do not propose to go into great detail on those provisions, given that when they were discussed during the passage of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill the then Chairs of both the Public Accounts Commission and the Public Accounts Committee supported them. I also understand that the new Chair of the Public Accounts Committee has indicated that she is content.

In summary, the provisions in this Bill will bring confidence and responsibility back to our country’s fiscal framework, with stronger institutions and improved governance. They are as crucial for the long term as they are for the short term, and I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Eagle]

I will give way in due course.

The OBR must work hard to establish a reputation for independence after that extremely shaky start, and I look forward to its new head, Robert Chote, demonstrating major improvements in that respect.

[Andrea Leadsom]

The hon. Lady may be aware from reading the Treasury Committee’s report on the original independence of the interim OBR that colleagues on her own side quizzed Sir Alan Budd and others very closely on that point. The Committee’s report makes it very clear that there was nothing to answer, that the OBR had indeed acted independently and that it had not been in hock to the Government.

[Ms Eagle]

Nevertheless, independence has to be perceived to be there too. No matter what individuals behind the scenes know, part of consistency and the whole point of such independence is that it is accepted across the political spectrum and in the country as a whole. If that is not the case, the organisation does not have the credibility that the reform creating it sought to establish. That is why I look to Robert Chote, who has moved out lock, stock and barrel from the Treasury, to begin to establish that reputation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Eagle]

In order to fulfil its duties, the Bank of England produces its own forecasts, which do not always agree with what were previously Treasury forecasts and will now be OBR forecasts. There are also a number of independent forecasters out there with their own view of the situation. Forecasts range from optimistic to pessimistic, and those of us who watch these things learn to take account of that. Regarding OBR forecasts or forecasts of the Bank of England as statements of the unvarnished truth will quickly get us into difficulty.

[Andrea Leadsom]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way again. On a point of clarification, the issue of multiple forecasts came up in the Treasury Committee review, and it was made clear that the OBR takes the Bank of England’s monetary forecasts on interest rates and uses them as its own for its fiscal forecast, so there is no duplication or overlap. One is forecasting the state of interest rates and the other is stating the fiscal forecast.

[Ms Eagle]

Yes, but the Bank of England will also forecast for its own use growth and other aspects which it needs to assess in formulating monetary policy.

OBR forecasts predict that by the end of this Parliament, 110,000 more people will be on the dole under the Government’s plans, compared with our previous plans. Under Labour, the economy was forecast to grow by 2.6%, compared with only 2.1% under the current Government’s plans. The consumer prices index would have been at 1.6%, rather than 2.8%. So the OBR has decided that there would have been higher growth, more jobs and lower inflation under Labour.