Oral Answers to Questions

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

First, I am quite prepared to make changes to the incentive regime in our prisons if it proves necessary to do so. I am absolutely clear that prisons should be places that rehabilitate, not places to which people have any desire to go back. It is equally important, however, that we have within our prisons proper processes to ensure that prisoners are trained and given work experience. One of the achievements of the current Government over the last few months is that we have seen a steady increase, under the stewardship of the previous Secretary of State, which the current ministerial team is now taking on, in the number of hours worked by prisoners in our prisons. That has got to be right.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

8. What plans he has to introduce a payment by results scheme to reduce reoffending.

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Grayling)]

By 2015, I intend to apply payment by results to the majority of rehabilitation work conducted with offenders in the community. Providers will be commissioned to rehabilitate offenders, and those who are successful at reducing reoffending will be rewarded. I will announce detailed proposals shortly.

[Amber Rudd]

Studies such as the recent report from the Prison Reform Trust show that women have higher rates of reoffending. Will my right hon. Friend update the House on plans to divert women from custody in the first place, particularly those with short sentences?

[Chris Grayling]

I do agree. One of the first prisons I visited was Holloway. I saw at first hand the very different challenge we face with women offenders. One of the earliest steps I took was to separate ministerial responsibility for men and women in our prisons, asking the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) to take on the role of Minister with responsibility for women in prisons, and to look at whether we are getting the regime right and how we should adapt it to reflect the very different challenges we face with women in our prisons.

Oral Answers to Questions

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Tuesday 18th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Lady is right; I have not yet had the chance to do the test, but I have to tell her that I fancy my chances, because I understand that the pass rate is something like 99%. For her reassurance, the pass rate for those prison officers who are over 60 is something like 98%. It is worth making the point that most of our constituents would regard it as sensible that prison officers, who have to do difficult, challenging and sometimes very physical work, are fit enough to do it.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Grayling)]

Delivering an effective justice system is a key priority of this Government, so I am delighted to have been appointed Secretary of State for Justice and I am grateful to all hon. Members who have welcomed the new team. I am pleased to have such an experienced team who bring a wealth of legal knowledge to their portfolios, building on the excellent work of their predecessors. I should also tell the House that I have agreed with the Chief Whip that, on occasions, when necessary, the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Mr Evennett), will provide support to the team and the House. Our shared goal is to focus relentlessly on a rehabilitation revolution, improving our system so that it both punishes and reforms offenders.

[Amber Rudd]

There are British girls at risk of being taken abroad to be subjected to horrific, permanent violence. I know that the Ministry of Justice has been working with the Home Office on a draft declaration against female genital mutilation for at-risk girls to carry in their passports. Will my right hon. and hon. Friends ensure that the most robust legal language possible is used to maximise the document’s deterrent effect and better protect British girls?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mrs Helen Grant)]

I know that my hon. Friend has worked long and hard for many years to stamp out this abhorrent practice and that it affects a large number of women and girls in Britain today. I assure her that I will look very carefully at the language of the declaration to make sure prior to its being signed off that we will achieve optimum effect.

Defamation Bill

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to take part in this Second Reading debate about a Bill that has been long and careful in the making, and I pay particular tribute to the pre-legislative scrutiny process that has been used. There is an increasing tendency in this Parliament to use that mechanism, which I welcome, because it gives not just parliamentarians but interested members of the public and experts outside the House ample opportunity to have the fullest input into the development of important legislation.

In Public Bill Committees there are already sessions that allow for the giving and taking of evidence, but, admirable though they are, one is always left feeling that more time was needed, far too many things were left unsaid, far too many questions were left unasked and unanswered, and, however good the sessions were, more were needed.

The pre-legislative process allows for valuable time to be allocated, for more evidence to be submitted, for freer debate and discussion and for the Government to listen maturely, to reflect and to respond. It avoids the striking of false positions, the entrenchment of unsustainable positions and the to-ing and fro-ing that is sadly all too often associated with the passage of Bills through this House.

In this Session a number of other pieces of legislation will be subject to the procedure, and that is good and welcome, particularly in areas where consensus and a striking degree of cross-party co-operation, understanding and support are needed. In this area, where we are talking about the reputation of the individual versus the right to freedom of expression, it is essential that this House speaks as much as possible with one voice.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is testament to the need for this Bill, and to the way in which it has been handled and prepared, that there is so much unity among Members and among parties on the need to do something and to address the issue urgently?

[Mr Buckland]

Very much so. As I said, the Bill has been long in the making—some would say, generations. The right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) reminded us that in the 160 years since the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 there have been only two subsequent pieces of legislation—pieces of legislation that have dealt with the law in a piecemeal way.

The Defamation Act 1996, as some who were Members when the measure was passed will recall, dealt with a particular context and a particular case. A former Member, Neil Hamilton, found that his case was stayed by the court because it was felt that the defendant newspaper could not prepare its defence adequately without infringing parliamentary privilege. That resulted in section 13 of the 1996 Act, allowing a Member of either this House or the other place to waive for the purposes of the defamation proceedings

“the protection of any enactment or rule of law which prevents proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or place”—

parliamentary privilege.

At the time, I was a little uncertain about the passage of that provision, which seemed to represent yet another piecemeal approach to a fundamental right that has been exercised ever since article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1689—parliamentary privilege. Another Committee of this House has considered parliamentary privilege carefully, and there may well be legislation to deal with it. In doing so, I would urge the utmost caution. Reform and refinement of such a basic and well-understood principle could lead to further confusion and potential court interference. It is essential that all of us in this place and in the House of Lords understand that changes to parliamentary privilege, whether in the context of the 1996 Act or subsequent proposals, could lead to the erosion of that privilege, which would be a regrettable and undesirable outcome.

In my view, section 13 of the Act should be repealed, and we should consider instead a more general right of waiver that not only would apply to defamation but to a range of court actions in which Members of Parliament or Members of the House of Lords may become involved. This Bill could have taken that step, but I quite understand Ministers’ desire to get on with the job in hand and to avoid being potentially sidetracked by questions of privilege that may have to be returned to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

There is always tension in the minds of parliamentarians between wanting, quite naturally, to see as much detail as possible in primary legislation, because not only is that an accountable and democratic way of dealing with things, but it allows for full and fair debate, and the need to allow for flexibility through the use of secondary legislation. The hon. Lady’s point is an important one. Often in this place, in our enthusiasm to make primary legislation as prescriptive as possible, we fall foul of the danger that I highlighted just before her intervention.

The evolution of the law of reputational damage is interesting to note. In the 19th century, damage to reputation was seen as a very significant factor indeed. Reputation was seen as part of the property of an individual and something to be highly valued. It is interesting to note that at that time, when the privacy of the rich and powerful was easily protected—much more easily than it is now—the only windows into the private lives of the rich and influential were trials for libel. The evidence would be heard, sometimes by a shocked jury. Notable members of society would be brought to court to give evidence. The Prince of Wales gave evidence in a trial in the 1890s during the famous baccarat scandal. That arose from a libel action.

We have a somewhat romanticised view of libel, which stems to a large degree from the Oscar Wilde trials. It is important to remember that the first trial involving Oscar Wilde was the prosecution for criminal libel of the Marquess of Queensberry. It was not a civil case, but a criminal one. Through what would be regarded, on any objective analysis, as the clever advocacy of Sir Edward Carson, that criminal prosecution failed and, famously, the tables were turned on Oscar Wilde. We all have views about the injustice that was meted out upon that gifted poet and author. His words echo down the years and are a reproach to a generation that sought to criminalise the acts that were the subject of those trials. Those trials have contributed to the romance that surrounds libel trials and the involvement of juries.

That is why, although the interventions on my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor about the right to trial by jury were interesting, I believe that clause 11 is an overdue measure that reflects the reality of the modern situation when it comes to civil libel trials in England and Wales.

[Amber Rudd]

What can my hon. Friend say to reassure us that the noble and proud tradition of trial by jury, which is held so much to heart by British people, will not be lost through this proposal?

[Mr Buckland]

I am grateful for that question. I think that we can reassure ourselves and the people whom we serve by saying the following: when the liberty of the individual and the criminal law are involved, the right to trial by jury should be preserved and enhanced. That is why I was pleased by the provision in the recently enacted Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 that rolled back restrictions on the right to trial by jury in criminal fraud trials. However, we are dealing here with the civil context. If damage to reputation is so important as to merit trial by jury, why is not physical personal injury equally worthy of it? There is a utilitarian argument that demands a system using scant resources and taking scant time, which means that we should be very cautious about extending jury trials to a whole range of civil cases.

I believe that the removal of libel cases from the right to trial by jury leaves us with only malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and a limited number of other civil cases in which one can argue that there is a legitimate public interest in still involving juries in making decisions about the acts or omissions of public authorities. Malicious prosecution cases could involve an act of a prosecuting authority, and we should bear in mind the power that such an authority has vis-à-vis the individual. False imprisonment cases may involve the acts of police officers or a police force in unjustly imprisoning an individual.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

I shall not disagree, because my hon. Friend supports my point that, in many ways, privacy and defamation are inextricably linked.

I made the point about support for codification of the law on privacy because I believe in Parliament. I come from a legal background and have spent many years dealing with cases in the courts of this land, but I believe it is incumbent on legislators to take a lead and to represent the people of this country by saying, “The law needs updating. It needs to be brought into the 21st century and it needs to reflect the reality of life.” On a daily basis, individuals—famous, infamous or obscure—find that their fundamental rights to privacy are being interfered with, intruded upon and trampled over, not just by an over-mighty press, but by individuals who use social networking tools and the internet, as we have heard.

[Amber Rudd]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill will help to protect the privacy of Mrs Trellis of Acacia road, to whom he rightly referred? Does not the Bill partly cover such issues?

[Mr Buckland]

There is an element of crossover, but the Bill does not go far enough in addressing fundamental issues of privacy. Some provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 give a nod to the law on privacy, but the Act comes to a rather inelegant conclusion by allowing freedom of expression to have a greater priority over the right to privacy. I defend to the death the freedom of expression—that is why I came to Parliament, thanks to the good grace of the people of my constituency, who have given me this opportunity—but we must get the balance right. The Act does not faithfully reflect the reality of human rights: there is no hierarchy of rights, and each right must be balanced against others. Certain rights are unqualified, but most rights have qualifications. There is no hierarchy of public rights—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker and hon. Members on both sides of the House for that very warm welcome.

I rise to speak, having had the enormous privilege of sitting among significantly more distinguished colleagues from this House, including the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), and indeed from the other place, on the Joint Committee that considered this Bill when it was subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny during the last Session. Let me indicate from the outset in a non-controversial way that the Bill enjoys my support as it enjoys the support of the official Opposition and of all parties.

Like other hon. Members, I have little doubt that the Bill is capable of being improved in Committee, where it will no doubt be debated appropriately, properly and, I hope, at length, particularly in respect of certain Joint Committee recommendations that the Government have not adopted. As it stands, the Bill supplies some, if not all, the certainty required regarding the deficiencies in our libel and slander law previously identified by the noble Lord Lester and others. For that reason, if for no other, I welcome the Bill’s support across the House, as I welcome the Opposition’s decision not to divide the House on the Second Reading of a Bill that evidently does and certainly should enjoy cross-party support.

This Bill is perhaps not the most eye-catching piece of legislation in this Session and perhaps not even the most eye-catching piece of reform in the arena of the ongoing debate on the balance that needs to be struck between free speech on the one hand and other fundamental rights on the other. For reasons that I will attempt to explain in the course of my remarks, it is none the less important.

Let me begin with the problems—not merely those inherent in the existing law, but those of a more fundamental nature concerning any law that seeks to address defamation, whether in this jurisdiction or elsewhere. The first of those problems is naturally the fact that the mere existence of a law of defamation is an intrusion into the area of free speech. Not one Member of this House can possibly begin to doubt the importance of free speech both as a principle of general application in any mature society and, more important, for the health of our democracy and our democratic institutions.

The powerful need to be held to account. They need to be answerable to those in whose name they seek to exercise power. They need to be exposed to hypocrisy or inconsistency, where necessary. Most certainly, as we all know they need to have the balloon of pomposity associated with their position punctured from time to time, perhaps even frequently, and without remorse. That is the nature of free speech. As I say, surely no one can doubt its importance.

But there are other important rights that need to be addressed in a civilised society—even if, on this point at least, I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) that there is no hierarchy of rights and that there ought not to be. The right to a true reputation is particularly important to well-being, given the importance attributed to character in human affairs. The right of those who have not opened up their private lives to scrutiny to keep their affairs private is equally important. That is a right that used more ordinarily to be respected without the need for intervention of the law, but recent events and recent experiences point to those in the media no longer being able to respect that without appropriate restraints. Finally, there is a right not much talked about thus far in our debate—the right to redress, speedily and efficiently, when either of the rights I have already mentioned is dealt a blow from which in an age of immediate global communication neither may recover unless effective solutions to set the record straight are also available.

What the Bill is designed to achieve, as the preamble tells us, is to amend the law of defamation. In so doing, I understand it to be the Government’s aim—it was certainly the aim of the Joint Committee on which I sat—not only to balance the competing rights to which I have drawn attention, but to bring the law more into line with the world in which we now live. In that regard, the potent mechanism of the common law, able as it is to develop and deal with new situations, is not always enough. Occasionally, as in this area, development can run behind the times because of the lengthy processes associated with litigation and as a result of the disincentive afforded by cost to litigants who find themselves in novel situations. When that happens, it is for Parliament to act, triggered where appropriate by a Government’s legislative programme. That is necessary because it is not always the case that we can outsource the change that the common law might deliver, which would require litigants to dip into their own pockets to seek the intervention of the courts to adapt the law to their needs.

That, as I perceive it, is the position in which we find ourselves in relation to the law of defamation. The genuine and general support that Lord Lester’s Bill enjoyed both within and without Parliament demonstrated precisely that. Lord Lester and those who assisted him are to be commended for their initial efforts in this area in the last Parliament, even if they did not bear fruit. This Government, I have to say, are to be commended for having taken forward that work, having established a distinguished Committee—personal exceptions apart—to consider the matter, and having now brought forward appropriate legislation to address the issues in an area that is, as I have already indicated, unlikely perhaps to attract either headlines or even much credit.

[Amber Rudd]

We have heard much about this Committee and its various members, including my hon. and learned Friend. Is it correct that the Committee was unified on most of these points? It appears that the House is unified on the Bill, but did the Committee find itself unified on its key points?

[Stephen Phillips]

I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for her intervention. My recollection—it is only that—is that the Committee was unanimous on almost all points. I think there was one division—and one only—on the final report; I see my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) nodding. Unlike with the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon sat, there is considerably more cross-party agreement in this area.

The Bill of course comes at an interesting and even opportune time, as, indeed, we are all aware. A mile or so down the road—a little less far than the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) suggested—Lord Justice Leveson is sitting in a far more high-profile environment, examining the culture, practices and ethics of the media. The legitimacy and desirability of what an untrammelled free press has recently been up to, for which we as politicians bear some measure of the blame, has rightly been called into question by recent events, which few can have viewed with anything other than horror and disgust.

As we have heard in this debate, another Joint Select Committee of this Parliament in the previous Session, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon sat, has now reported to both Houses on the subject of privacy and the use of injunctions. New technologies have thrown up new challenges in a number of areas. That they are being addressed piecemeal, although not entirely desirable, as hon. Members have indicated in their contributions, is understandable. That they are being addressed at all is a matter for congratulation, I venture to suggest, for all concerned. Where precisely we will find ourselves at the end of the process is no doubt a matter of debate, but the overall aim is clear: to preserve free speech while respecting other competing rights and the responsibilities that each of those rights entails. For my part, I merely add that this is unlikely to be the end of the process. As the report of the Joint Select Committee on which I sat indicated, there is still work to be done on the issue of parliamentary privilege, just as there remain loose ends to be tied up in relation to those parts of the common law of blasphemy and sedition which remain part of our law.

Thus far, I have dealt in generalities, but the greater raft of problems—at least in terms of number, if not seriousness—relates to the specific difficulties encountered with the mechanistic aspects of the law of defamation. The second issue with which it is necessary to grapple in any reform in this area is, therefore, the cost that is associated with defamation litigation and, when necessary, court proceedings. The evidence taken by the Committee demonstrated that those costs were prohibitive to the defence of reputation by the majority; but, even more important, they are inimical to free speech itself.

Few individuals, save perhaps the very brave such as Dr Ben Goldacre, have been prepared to put their lives and fortunes at stake and raise their right to express the truth above their own financial security and that of their families. As anyone who does not enjoy the luxury of parliamentary privilege is all too well aware, the powerful have deep pockets and frightening lawyers with heavy notepaper and even heavier language. The costs associated with defamation not only prevent ordinary people from defending reputations that are so easily damaged in an age in which anonymous posting online can wrongly create a rapist or a paedophile at the click of a mouse, but prevent public figures who lie, cheat and steal from being revealed for what they are.

How, one is driven to ask perhaps all too often—even if rhetorically—have the individuals who have been involved in many of the scandals that we have seen in the past got away with it for so long? The truth, frequently, is that they had, and continue to have, good lawyers who are adroit at putting those who might otherwise hold them to account through the preventive mills of cost and stress. Any reform of the law of defamation needs not only to take account of that, but to address cost at each and every turn. Yes, legitimate reputation is important in a civilised society, as is the prevention of false accusations which damage it; but such protections ought not to be purchased through prevention of the exposure of that which ought to be in the public domain, something which is perhaps all too often a result of the chilling effects associated with any defamation litigation. Indeed, as the Committee concluded in its report,

“the reduction in the extremely high costs of defamation proceedings is essential to limiting the chilling effect and making access to legal redress a possibility for the ordinary citizen.”

This is, none the less, an appropriate moment at which to pause and recognise a fact that—given the evidence taken by the Committee and the views of many commentators—may be obvious, at least to practitioners: the fact that the true problem with the costs associated with defamation proceedings is driven not by substantive rules but by procedure. Any significant reform to reduce cost is therefore not something that can be exclusively, or even primarily, driven by Parliament. As has been pointed out by Members on both sides of the House today, what we need are reforms of procedure to provide new and effective procedural mechanisms that will level the playing field as between those with deep pockets and those without them.

Much, in general terms, was achieved in that respect by the reforms of civil procedure for which we are eternally in the debt of Lord Woolf, but I should like the Minister to state categorically that the Government, in the person of the Lord Chancellor, will instruct the Civil Procedure Rule Committee—if, indeed, they have not already done so—to review the civil procedure rules relating to defamation proceedings, as well as the pre-action protocol, in an attempt specifically to strengthen the parts of the overriding objective that are directed to addressing the cost associated with litigation and the necessity of ensuring equality of arms between litigants.

The third difficulty, which both the Committee and the Government have sought to address, is one that I have already mentioned: the difficulty posed by technological and other advances. The last statutory intervention in that regard was made in 1996, under the Administration of Sir John Major, mention of whom is, perhaps, opportune today. Even I can remember vaguely what the world was like then, and it was different. For a start, there was no Human Rights Act—legislation on which, as many know, I have my own strong views, but which, in terms of general principle, has had a significant effect on the law of defamation by recognising privacy rights that have been used as a back door to circumvent free speech protections developed in the arena of defamation over centuries. That affords yet another reason why the 1996 Act is, at the very least—I put it neutrally in deference to my hon. Friends—problematic. We had human rights in this country before the Act was passed, but we did not recognise them in the way that we have now, which has enabled judge-made law in one area to trespass on the will of successive Parliaments and higher courts in others.

What is even more important in the present context, however, is the fact that when Parliament last considered this issue in 1996, the internet was in its infancy. Nothing was known of how matters would develop.

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[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

This is a timely debate. The Bill might be uncontested, as we have heard from many Members, but it is not uncontroversial. Free speech and freedom of expression have been brought to the forefront by the Leveson inquiry, which is happening a mile down the road. In this House, we know that there is a fine balance to be struck in weighing the right to freedom of speech and expression against the right to privacy. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State said in his opening remarks, when it comes to the law on defamation it is vital that we get the balance right. Every Member who has spoken has mentioned the difficulty of getting it right. The solution is not a simple one and great care and caution must be taken.

I, like many other Members, believe that our libel laws are outdated and have made it far too easy for the rich and powerful to suppress and stifle criticism. Even many small-time bloggers, journalists and academic professors are afraid to tackle important issues for fear of being sued—a sad reflection of the current law’s unintended consequences. The Government’s reforms seek to redress the balance, maintaining the importance of free speech while giving people the opportunity to defend themselves against unfair and malicious allegations.

We have heard a lot today about libel tourism. I appreciate that there are mixed views on the matter and on how much of a problem it is in the UK. Some Members have felt that it is overstated, others that it is not, but I think we all agree that it is a problem that London has been labelled in such a way. It is crucial to emphasise that not only the number of cases reflect the problem caused by the libel tourism tag. The threat of proceedings can be used to stifle much-needed investigative journalism, regardless of whether a case is ultimately brought.

I agree with the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), who spoke so eloquently about libel, that it is important that everybody from every walk of life should have access to protection from libel. Libel tourism is hardly an attractive label to be attached to the UK. Here we are, in the mother of Parliaments, standing up for our country, and we do not want to hear that label used. We have so many wonderful attractions in this country—and, dare I say it, in Hastings—so let us try to lose the tag as a destination for libel tourism as we tackle the issue of defamation. I therefore strongly welcome the provision in clause 9 to tighten the test applied by the courts in cases brought against people who are not domiciled in the UK or the EU.

I support the provisions in clause 11 on the presumption against a jury trial in defamation cases. Of course, I understand the importance of trial by jury in most cases, where it provides a fair hearing for all concerned. Many Members have spoken about the importance of maintaining the true and honest right of British citizens to be tried by their peers, but the existence of the right for either party to opt for trial with a jury has its problems. As we heard earlier, it can often impede settlements, create additional costs and increase the length of cases which, on average, take about 12 months from the issue of court proceedings to trial.

The outdated law surrounding privacy and defamation is highlighted by the online traffic that many Members have discussed. Our internet hosting sites are a particular example. Twitter and Facebook especially have driven a significant rise in online libel claims. For example, last year a county councillor was ordered to pay £3,000 in damages and costs to a political rival over false claims made on Twitter. Operators of websites, both large and small, are also at risk of action against them in respect of comments posted by a third party. It is almost impossible for many websites, such as social networking sites, to police that. The owner of a book store would not be prosecuted for a sentence contained within a book sold at the shop, so why should online sites be fearful of such action being taken against them?

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent point about how a bookshop should be treated, but unfortunately that is not what happens at the moment. Bookshops are subject to libel cases about books they are trying to sell, which they have no ability to defend.

[Amber Rudd]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. That is a broader point about some books, but there are quite a lot of books that are not subject to such analysis. I am sure that the Minister will address that point later.

At the moment, internet hosting sites are obliged to remove allegedly defamatory material from their website when they receive a complaint, often without knowing whether the comments are defamatory. That is an attack on free speech and the Bill addresses that issue. The provision in clause 5, which offers website owners a new process governing the responsibility for publication on the internet, will undoubtedly give websites greater protection against a threat of legal action. I am sure that is welcomed by Members on both sides of the House.

Above all, I welcome, as I know my constituents in Hastings and Rye will, the clarity that the Bill will provide in an area that remains unsettled and unclear to many.

Let me mention clause 13, which repeals the Slander of Women Act 1891.

[Michael Ellis]

My hon. Friend is making some very powerful points. The Slander of Women Act 1891 will be repealed by clause 13, as she says, and that tallies well with the Government’s proposals to repeal a number of pieces of outdated and outmoded legislation. Does she feel that that rarely used piece of legislation should be repealed in such a way?

[Amber Rudd]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intelligent question. The Act provided that slander imputing unchastity or adultery to a female is actionable per se. Although I naturally support adequate protection of women across the country, I think that goes a little too far. The Act does not apply to Scotland, so it is about time the rest of the UK followed suit.

I am confident that the Bill will redress the balance in the defamation rules towards freedom of speech in a way that is just and fair. The reforms are well overdue and, as we have heard this afternoon, widely supported by the public and the rest of the Members of this House. I therefore commend the Bill to the House.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

At the conclusion of many hours of copious debate on the Floor of the House and in Committee, I pay tribute to members of the Bill team from my Department, who have been working throughout on this marathon Bill, and to my two colleagues, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) who, I am glad to say, carried the burden of the day in Committee and most of it on Report as well. I am grateful to them all.

It is an enormous Bill representing a major reform of the criminal justice system and the justice system generally. It is overdue and the Government have made a good start on sorting out some of the problems facing the justice system. I shall mention briefly the legal aid reforms, which have been debated again today. They are extremely important. They make substantial savings and I acknowledge that we have had to make some difficult choices.

I am a lawyer and I have many friends who are practising lawyers. When I was given this post, I wondered whether I would retain any friends in the legal profession by the time we got to Christmas. I am glad to say that I have, but some difficult decisions have been taken at the expense of some members of the profession, who have already suffered reductions in their fees as a result of the previous Government’s changes, and have probably had a bigger reduction in their fee income, I concede, than almost any other group in the country. So let us acknowledge that there are people facing consequences as a result of what we have done, but it was much overdue.

We have, as we keep saying, the most expensive legal aid system in the world. It has gone far beyond what could be afforded. The previous Government made repeated attempts to reform it and kept consulting on reforms and making changes. Even then they found, by the end of their period of office, that real-terms spending on legal aid had gone up quite substantially, compared with when they took office.

What we have done is not just a cheese-paring exercise across the whole field of legal aid. We have gone back to first principles and asked what it is essential that the taxpayer pays for to assure access to justice on truly important matters for that section of society that must have access to justice in the public interest, so that we can all be assured that people get the protections that they are entitled to under our constitution. That is what we have debated, one by one.

I believe that the package that we have come up with will make substantial savings. As I was saying to the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) a few moments ago, the idea that we are launching some assault on access to justice and depriving people of access to justice is nonsense. We are not affecting the right. There is no change in the Bill to any particular course of action. Legal aid is available, but it is available to the poorest people for those really essential matters that affect their life, liberty, home and so on, and we have got it back under control.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

I know that the Secretary of State is aware of my concerns regarding the advice agencies that provide such vital support to the vulnerable, and I know that additional money has been provided for those agencies. May I press him to give us more detail about this so that we can be reassured that those advice agencies, such as my own in Hastings, will be able to continue their good work?

[Mr Clarke]

Those who can remember Second Reading will know that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon and I kept stressing that we accept the need to maintain the funding for many voluntary agencies, particularly citizens advice bureaux, which give not only legal advice, but general advice to people suffering from problems of debt, housing and so on, which we all know are bound to get worse in these rather difficult times. A total of £20 million has been allocated to these bodies this year and we are looking ahead at how to continue that support.

I should point out that our legal aid changes will not take effect for a couple of years, so none of those bodies has lost any legal aid funding at the moment. What we are doing is finding money to make up for reductions in grant to those bodies that are largely from local authorities. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner (Mr Hurd) is about to announce how we will distribute the £20 million. I know that he is in touch with my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye (Amber Rudd) and expects to be able to make the announcement imminently so that we can get on with that.

I have left the debates on legal aid to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon because, as everyone has seen, he is a walking expert on the subject. There seemed to be no point in my taking part in debates on amendments and having to turn to him if a particularly difficult question was asked. However, I have been present throughout the debates and listening to how Labour Members have tackled the matter. They seem to have lost all touch with common sense. When in government they were reducing expenditure on legal aid, or trying to and failing. In their manifesto they committed to reducing spending on legal aid, stating:

“we will find greater savings in legal aid.”

As recently as January this year the leader of the Labour party said, in relation to reductions in legal aid:

“Labour has shown it is ready to make difficult cuts that we believe are necessary for the long term health of our economy.”

As far as we can work out, the various amendments tabled by the Labour party in the course of our debates on the Bill would add £245 million to the legal aid bill, compared with the Government’s proposals.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

Let me first set out the scope of what we are talking about. Clinical negligence spend through legal aid in 2009-10 was about £17 million, consisting of around £1 million for legal help and around £16 million for representation. Closed-case volumes for legal representation in clinical negligence in 2009-10 were just over 2,300. It is estimated that removing clinical negligence from scope will save around £17 million per annum on legal help and representation, taking account of the exceptional funding regime and the estimated income from the supplementary legal aid scheme. Continued spend of £6 million through exceptional funding of the £16 million currently spent on representation in clinical negligence is foreseen. NHS figures for 2010-11 show that 82% of clinical negligence cases, where the funding method is known, were funded by means other than legal aid. That is the current situation.

The NHS Litigation Authority figures for 2010-11 show that of 2,002 legally aided claims, some 718 were claims for children, which represented 36% of claims funded through legal aid. Annexe B of the Government’s impact assessment on the reforms to conditional fee agreements sets out estimated savings of £50 million to the NHS Litigation Authority as a result of abolishing recoverability of success fees, and after-the-event insurance premiums.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

On the impact assessment, have the Government assessed how many children who would previously have qualified for clinical negligence aid will no longer qualify when the changes go through?

[Mr Djanogly]

That is hard to say, because it depends on the extent to which children will come within the scope of exceptional funding, but we believe that the figure for exceptional funding will be £6 million, and that a significant proportion of that would be related to children’s claims. I will return to that.

The figure does not account for the NHS Litigation Authority paying after-the-event insurance premiums for policies covering the cost of expert reports in some cases. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) made that point very well. Based on figures published by the compensation recovery unit on claims settled, clinical negligence cases made up just over 1% of personal injury claims in 2010-11.

While Opposition Members were speaking, a thought came to my mind. Clinical negligence forms about 1% of the wider personal injury market. The last Government ended legal aid for personal injury claims, except in relation to clinical negligence. I am looking for help from Opposition Members because it is bizarre to hear them defend their position with such vehemence and conviction when their party scrapped 99% of this category. Let me develop the point.

Labour Members seem to be saying that if a drunk driver hit someone and caused brain damage, the injured person would not get legal aid. But if the same victim were brain-damaged to the same extent by a negligent doctor, they seem to be saying that that person should get legal aid—[Interruption.] If I have missed something, I am all ears. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) may want to explain why I am wrong. The Opposition must find some consistency in their position.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Wednesday 29th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

The Bill falls into two distinct parts, despite its tripartite title: first the reforms to sentencing and the punishment of offenders, and secondly the changes to legal aid.

On the first part, I welcome the key changes. The public need reassurance that this Government can protect them from crime and tackle the issue of reoffending, about which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) spoke so well. I particularly welcome the work for prisoners’ reform. Locking up offenders is fine, but how much better to have them repaying their debt by working, and increasing their own motivation and appetite for work on exit. Part of that must be the crackdown on drug abuse inside prisons. I completely agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) when she pointed out how many people recently have expressed their concern and outrage at the concept of drug-free wings in prison. Our ultimate aspiration must be drug-free prison. That, above all, will help people avoid offending. I welcome this tough but fair Bill, which addresses the problems of drugs and worklessness in that respect.

Turning to the legal aid side and the cuts in the civil sector, the Government have provided much evidence of the disproportionate costs of legal aid in this country, and I do not doubt it. I agree heartily with the strategy of discouraging too much litigation, particularly at a cost to the public purse. But surely the challenge that we are setting ourselves is to fillet out areas of waste while leaving intact the essential service of legal aid for the most vulnerable.

I wonder whether the cuts as currently set out fall too harshly in an area that has as its sole objective the support for people who are least able to speak up for themselves. As the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) said, that area is not replete with fat cat lawyers; it is mostly populated by men and women who are committed to helping the most needy in their communities. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] As we know, not everyone is able to speak up for themselves. We talk of telephone lines and of self-representations at tribunals, which are things that MPs could do, although naturally we hope not to be in that situation, but which many people who are less educated simply cannot.

I therefore ask the Government to consider carefully the issue of taking welfare benefits out of scope. That phrase needs some explanation; when talking to colleagues I have found that not everyone understands it. What it means is professional advice going to people who need it, regarding their welfare claims on the ground. It sounds trivial but it is absolutely not. This is about critical sums of money for families who need every penny—and, by the way, most of these situations do not involve a lawyer.

In Hastings, three agencies have come together. They have a contract for £270,000, and last year they gave face-to-face service to 1,500 people—detailed advice and support, often including accompanying them to tribunals. Make no mistake: we need those services. I am told that 56% of those who attended that service had long-term illness or disability, and of those 69% had mental health issues. Where will they go? I hope we shall have an answer, because although we have had some encouraging comments from Ministers we need reassurance that there is somewhere for those people to go if that service is taken away.

Last year, the Hastings advice and representation centre supported 250 benefits appeals, of which it lost only two, which clearly demonstrates the value of that work and the fact that it takes things on only where there is a real case to answer. If we knew that the Department for Work and Pensions made only good decisions and that the reforms to universal credit which we are so looking forward to had come through and the system worked 100%, I would have no doubts about supporting the cuts to that aspect of legal aid, but at the moment we know that is not the case, and while that problem exists we must have a system to support these people.

I am not saying that there are no cuts to be made—oh no. We have a major deficit to sort out and we must make these cuts. The Law Society has made some suggestions; I have another. I would like to look very carefully at the funding of trivial human rights cases, in which lawyers have spent huge sums on establishing largely technical violations of the European convention. For instance, how much money was spent last year by the last Government on legal aid for prisoners? Can we have less legal aid for prisoners and more for the most vulnerable in our society?

Sentencing Reform/Legal Aid

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

No. I shall have to write to my hon. Friend with that information, but I am grateful for his welcome. I do not know whether anyone would oppose this, but it is plainly wrong to make legal aid ordinarily available to people who, by definition, are squatting in properties for which they do not have a legal claim.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Although I acknowledge the need for cuts to legal aid, may I share with the Secretary of State my concerns about local advice agencies, which sometimes provide essential local advice to the most vulnerable? Will he work closely with his ministerial colleagues to ensure that some provision is made for such agencies to continue?

[Mr Clarke]

I will take back to my ministerial colleagues the fact that several respected Members have made that point quite strongly in the course of these exchanges. We are discussing it, and we know that we have to respond to it. On the question of which Department will eventually announce the outcome, I am not quite sure, because several Departments are involved, but we are all seeking to find a solution to it.

Legal Aid Reform

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Thursday 3rd February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

It is interesting to observe in the remarks made by those on both sides of the House that we are not talking about lawyers. As the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue) said in her opening remarks, this debate is more about trained, local, part-time and sometimes voluntary advisers who step in to help the vulnerable in need of advice. They work in citizens advice bureaux and other organisations in the voluntary sector and, in my opinion, although often not lawyers themselves, they are a rare example of legal provision at a low cost to the public purse.

I accept that reductions are necessary in expenditure and in the deficit that is, as we know, costing us £120 million a day—a point well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry). I am sorry the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw) is not in his place, as I am sure he would challenge me on that and we could have an interesting debate. However, as each of us has only a few minutes to speak, I will plough on. The problem with the proposed cuts is that they will be expensive in the long run and that, as set out, they will not do what the coalition Government have set out to do, which is to protect and help the vulnerable.

I represent a town, Hastings, that is wonderful in many ways but deprived in others. The unemployment rate is high at 5.6%, compared with a UK rate of 3.5%, and we need the support of agencies to advise those on low incomes and the unemployed. In my town, agencies have formed consortia to win social welfare law contracts. They have vocal and powerful advocates who have been to see me. I mention in particular Julie Eason and, from the citizens advice bureau, Dina Christadoulis. They have convinced me of the need for the service that they provide. The average cost of what they provide to clients is £200 or less. Even if what they do takes three times as long, that is the cost—it is really good value. We need to make cuts, but that area of the front line is not the place for them. We should not be taking social welfare out of scope.

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

I agree with what the hon. Lady is saying. If legal aid is to be withdrawn as a source of funding for exactly the kind of work that she describes, does she accept that the Government really must find an alternative source elsewhere?

[Amber Rudd]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that comment. I am speaking up on behalf of the agencies in Hastings precisely because I value the work that they do in helping the vulnerable there. I also make the point, as several Members have done, that removing the funding is not efficient for costs. He is absolutely correct that we need to find another source of funding in order to continue to protect those services.

The advice from those agencies is crucial to the clients, who in many cases cannot represent themselves. The agency I spoke with had kept records that showed clearly that 56% of its clients have a long-term illness or disability and that 68% have long-term mental health problems. I am worried that some of my most vulnerable constituents may really struggle to manage their casework and prepare for a tribunal hearing without the help of legal aid-funded services.

I welcome the simplified welfare system that the Government are working on. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has some excellent proposals that will be coming through, which I hope and believe will make the welfare system much simpler. Until then, we must recognise the situation we are in and acknowledge that errors are made and that vulnerable people who cannot represent themselves must be able to have some representation.

Another benefit of having agencies work with those clients is that they can recognise when there is no case. If we allow individuals to represent themselves entirely, some will clog up the tribunals. The agencies are very effective at discouraging people who do not have a case from progressing with it, so only the cases that merit the sort of attention that the clients are seeking actually get it. In Hastings, for instance, the consortia to which I have referred have not lost an appeal for a client for employment support allowance or incapacity benefit since last April, which is testament to their right choice of clients and their professionalism. Last year they provided a service to around 20,000 clients in my area, and collectively they have more than £270,000-worth of contracts, which represents more than half the advice sector in Hastings.

We all know that local government funding is under pressure, and a key element of the funding it provides is to citizens advice bureaux. Given the cuts to local funding and the proposals for legal aid, I am worried about the future viability of the agencies that do so much work and whose advice is critical in a town with above-average needs. The social welfare contracts account for only 4.5% of the total legal aid bill. The early intervention that they provide is critical; if the advisers get involved early, they can stop things escalating and stop individuals getting to the stage where they might lose their houses.

I urge Ministers to consider the costs and consequences of the proposed changes to legal aid. We need to find alternative sources of funding to support the agencies if they are no longer to receive funds from that source. I associate myself with the argument made by other Members that, unless we find alternative funding, those of us who, like me, are not lawyers will have to train up pretty quickly because of the size of casework that we will receive.

Oral Answers to Questions

Amber Rudd Excerpts

Tuesday 19th October 2010 Commons Chamber

The Secretary of State was asked—

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

1. What recent discussions he has had with ministerial colleagues on drug addiction services in prisons.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Crispin Blunt)]

I have had discussions with Ministers in a number of Departments, including the Department of Health, the Home Office and the Cabinet Office. Those discussions have covered a range of drugs-related topics, including reforming drug addiction services in prisons.

[Amber Rudd]

I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. He will be aware that many prisoners struggle with choosing abstinence over methadone when they want to kick their drug habits, so what action will the Government take to encourage prisoners to take an abstinence-based regimen instead of methadone?

[Mr Blunt]

Our policy is that we should move towards abstinence from maintenance, but it is not the practice that we have inherited. The main programme, the integrated drug treatment system, is relatively new and based around National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse models of care, but the effect in practice is much more about maintaining addicts safely than leading them to abstinence. However, there are very good abstinence-based programmes in prison, such as RAPt, and our goal is to challenge offenders to take responsibility for the harm that they have caused and to accept help to come off drugs. We will therefore reshape existing drug services in prisons to establish drug recovery wings that are based on abstinence, free from drugs, motivate change, support rehabilitation and, on release, link offenders into community services that can continue the progress made in prison.