Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Fourth sitting)

Alison Thewliss Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Liam Byrne]

Q That is very useful. Finally, the folks from Lloyds bank, and others, described how easy it is to move money through a network of banks and then consolidate it into a final bank, from which bad people may take their money out. We were worried about the way in which proxies in particular could be used by bad people to help with this kind of mechanism. In the Bill, we have a definition of “person with significant control”, which is someone with about 25%. Is that too high?

Angela Foyle: It is based on the Financial Action Task Force standards on beneficial ownership, which looks to people who own 25% or more, in some cases, or more than 25% in others. It is one of those challenging issues because, in relation to things such as proxies, often it is not the about the levels that a person owns, it is the fact that x purports to be the person who holds it, when actually they actually do so on behalf on y, which can be very difficult to track through.

Many people look below 25% in any event just to make sure. Particularly with sanctions, they will have a look there. But 25% is a global norm and changing it might cause other challenges. This is the question: are you satisfied that you understand who the people that you are dealing with are, and who is behind them, at all times? It is not necessarily a question of whether it should be 20%, 5% or 25%. It is a hard one for me to answer because I work with 25%, but I will generally have a good look around to see what else there is.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

Q In your evidence to the Committee, you said that you wanted Ministers to amend the legislation to ensure that accountancy firms are in the scope for indirect information-sharing provisions. Will you tell us a bit more about why that is important?

Mike Miller: Indirect information provision essentially relates to a third-party database which would allow the easier sharing of information between financial firms. The ones that are already mentioned include banks, crypto exchanges and various different entities that could be privy to malicious financial movements, essentially. The accountancy sector has not been included in that, so for the purposes of a lot of the work that we are doing about the open sharing of information with law enforcement, between bodies, between other firms, it would be helpful for the streamlined moving of information. It would certainly help accountancy firms to identify more quickly, and thus reduce the likelihood of, any bad transactions taking place. An accountancy firm could avoid getting embroiled in things it does not wish to get embroiled in if it had pre-emptive access to any intelligence—that may have been discovered by a bank, for example, looking in more detail at specific financial transactions than accountancy firms tend to—that indicated that it should not be doing business with particular entities.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you, that is useful. As one of the organisations under the OPBAS umbrella, how do you feel that is going with anti-money laundering supervision because there has been some criticism of that regime and its efficacy? Looking at the 2019-20 figures, I understand that you cancelled 10 memberships and issued 39 fines totalling £117,000 to members. What does that stand at now, and is it an effective deterrent?

Mike Miller: I do not have the up-to-date figure with me today, but I can come back to the Committee with that in writing. Generally, in OPBAS, we are obviously very supportive on the need to have professional bodies for oversight of regulation for anti-money laundering. There is obviously a Treasury consultation going on into the potential restructuring of OPBAS. We have been working closely with it to ensure that our members are represented, but also so that it will be the most effective oversight that it can be.

ICAEW is the largest supervisory body in that space. We are very proactive in taking a risk-based approach. We cover a lot of firms, and it is necessary that a lot of those inspections are carried out based on where we assume there is a higher level of risk of illicit financial transactions. Whether that should be changed is obviously something that we will come back to in the consultation.

We have been speaking regularly to Treasury and other groups. They are collecting intelligence to try to determine, I think, some concrete proposals before they put it out to consultation, but we are very supportive of OPBAS. We continue to work closely with it and have a strong supervisory body in place for the PBSs.

[James Daly (Bury North) (Con)]

Q Under the Bill exemptions from the main money-laundering offences would apply in two sets of circumstances. One is when a regulated business ends a business relationship with a client or customer and hands over property worth less than £1,000 for that purpose. The second is where a regulated business is dealing with property for a client or customer and prevents access to property of equivalent worth. Do you have any view on those exemptions and how they would potentially affect your profession?

Angela Foyle: I am not so sure the first one will affect us, at £1,000. The second one may facilitate certain activities for our insolvency practitioners, particularly where they are appointed in circumstances where they know that there has been some form of fraud—be that tax fraud or what is often called “fresh air invoicing” or invoice discounting fraud, where there is a set amount of money that is known to be tainted—because, currently, all of the assets of the insolvent entity can often be tainted, and defence against money laundering applications have to be made for each and every transaction done. By having that, they will be able to ringfence certain amounts that they know to be tainted—they would obviously do investigations to ensure that they have got that amount correct—and then deal more quickly with creditors and others with the remainder of the funds. In that sense, we certainly welcome that amendment. It is one that we raised with the Home Office, alongside the banks and, I believe, the Prison Service may have wanted it as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q To be a bit more specific, what more do you suggest should be in the Bill?

Peter Swabey: For me, it should reference the role of the company secretary. I have a slightly wider issue than that. The Companies Act 2006 got rid of the requirement for a company secretary in all companies. That was deregulatory—that was fine—but we now rely much more on the reporting that companies do and the filings that companies make, so I believe there should be a requirement for a company secretary, not just in public companies, as there is now, but in larger private companies that also have to meet some of these requirements.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q We heard earlier about some of the deficiencies in the way that documents are delivered and uploaded to the Companies House website, and how they can be used thereafter. Are there practical improvements that could be made to improve that situation, both at your end of the process, in the filing, and for the use of those documents at the other end of the process?

Peter Swabey: Yes, I think there are. We have regular engagement with Companies House and that is one of the things that it is seeking to tackle already, but will also seek to tackle through the powers and resources that it will hopefully get as a result of the Bill. It would great if everything that has to be filed at Companies House can be filed electronically. There are still a number of things that cannot be. Again, that may be changed as a result of the changes that Companies House are making to their system but, as we stand at the moment, there are things that cannot be filed electronically.

In terms of use, there is a question that companies sometimes get feedback on from shareholders, which is on the availability of information, particularly about retail shareholders, and particularly for those companies that have large registers of members. Individuals on this Committee, or me, or whoever—their name and address might be at Companies House in respect of a holding of 100 shares in a company. If it is a big public company with millions and millions of shares, that is probably not that helpful. There are people who buy copies of the register for commercial purposes. It would be quite useful to tighten that up.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q We have heard an awful lot about deficiencies in the register in terms of the information that is on there and the practical difficulties that that causes for companies who wish to interrogate the information for their own due diligence. Is that an issue you have come across?

Peter Swabey: Yes, I think it is. It is an issue in a couple of ways. We just heard about the challenges in correcting deficient information. There are a number of plcs that have reported that their registered office address has been used for companies of whom they have never heard. If you are a plc with a large number of subsidiary companies, that could quite easily be overlooked by people. As somebody said in the last session, that is then used to give credibility to the potentially fraudulent company that is being set up. Being able to fix that more quickly is certainly an advantage.

[James Daly]

Q One of the things we have talked about with every witness—you will probably give a similar answer, Mr Swabey—is that we all want to see Companies House resourced to be able to carry out the requirements in the Bill. One witness this morning made reference to the sheer volume of companies and legal entities that are registered at Companies House on a daily basis. If one of the consequences of the Bill is that registration at Companies House takes longer because people have to go through the regulations and comply with other duties, is there any consequence to that?

Peter Swabey: I think it makes it a little more difficult for some people. I am a company secretary, so I would argue that you simply have to plan it all a bit better, and perhaps think about some of that a little more in advance. It will mean that some corporate transactions that you can currently deal with very quickly by simply having a meeting in a room and agreeing that so-and-so and so-and-so are the new directors will now have to go through a process. We are all hoping that, as promised, Companies House will manage the verification process for new directors expeditiously so that that will not hold things up unduly, but it is an additional factor to bear in mind.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you very much, Ms Belton, for joining us to give evidence today, and thank you for all you do as well. In terms of the scale of economic crime and how much needs to happen nationally and internationally, what gaps do you see in the legislation as it currently stands that stop the UK from being able to tackle economic crime on the scale that we need to?

Catherine Belton: There is a very simple answer to this, though I should basically preface all my answers by saying that I am not an expert on the Bill like some of my colleagues, such as Oliver Bullough. I have not studied it deeply, but what I can speak to is the urgency of these reforms, because of the threat posed to our national security. There is also a dire need to push through the anti-SLAPP legislation.

All these deep-pocketed oligarchs are essentially taking advantage of our system and are able to outspend not just journalists but financial watchdogs acting in the public interest. They are outspent and intimidated out of pursuing any real investigation into financial misconduct. They know from the outset that they may lose.

You only have to look at the example of the Serious Fraud Office and its battle against ENRC, which was once listed on the London stock exchange, then delisted and owned by a trio of Kazakh fraudsters essentially. The amount they spent annually on legal cases in the UK was £89 million, which is over the annual budget of the Serious Fraud Office. Though the Bill is of dire importance, without greater spending and funding for our public watchdogs—the National Crime Agency, Serious Fraud Office and other entities—we are going to be stymied from the get-go.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you very much, Catherine. Could you tell us a bit more about why the UK has become the destination of choice for people wishing to use corporate structures for money laundering and other purposes? Could you tell us about the impact that has internationally?

Catherine Belton: The UK, like many other countries, has welcomed capital from places such as Russia with open arms for the past 20 years. It is certainly a place that Russian oligarchs have flocked to, not only because they want to be part of the UK establishment but because they have clearly taken advantage of our lax legislation and regulation compared with the US, for instance. If you are listing a company in the US you face the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, and you have committed a crime if you are found to have lied on your financial disclosures. Here, there seem to be so many loopholes; people can get away with everything.

We only have to look at our Companies House institution to see that there is very little scrutiny of filings that people are making. We have all heard the obvious examples of people not disclosing anything. I think you are a great expert in the use of limited liability partnerships by Russian money launderers. UK LLPs have seen tens of billions of dollars’ worth of illicit Russian cash move through them over the last decade or so.

Most of those money laundering schemes have been overseen by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. It has a money laundering department called Department K, which has overseen all those schemes and has had an involvement in each and every one of them. I am told by security officials in Moldova—where one scheme used LLPs to move tens of billions of dollars of cash into the UK—that essentially the schemes are used not just by Russians seeking to move money to evade customs and tax, but by the Russian Federal Security Service itself, because it sees the greater flows of cash as cover for it to move its strategic cash into our jurisdiction.

I must again point to the need for SLAPP legislation and ask whether that could, or should, be attached to the economic crime Bill as it stands. If we do not enable journalists and financial watchdogs to look at those entities without fear of getting crushed by enormous lawsuits that will cost more than anyone’s budget allows, then we are going to be open to this type of abuse of our system forever. It was only July when Dominic Raab, the Justice Secretary, finally and wonderfully—it seemed like a miracle at the time—forwarded that anti-SLAPP legislation. It was going to allow for an early dismissal mechanism for cases that were clearly an abuse of the law, and aimed at intimidating journalists and financial watchdogs out of reporting matters of public interest—whether financial misconduct or something else. There has been a great deal of turmoil in Government since then, but we are seeing that SLAPP cases have very much not gone away.

The esteemed Chatham House think-tank recently had to remove the mere mention of a Tory donor, who had previously been convicted of money laundering, from a report on the abuses of the UK system by kleptocrats. The past of our Tory donors is something that we should know about, yet Chatham House had to erase its mention of that donor from its report. Staff looked into how much it was going to cost to defend, even though it was clearly public interest reporting. There was not really much to dispute about it, but they found it was going to cost them £500,000 before the case even got to trial, which means there is something so deeply wrong with our system, and we cannot even begin to combat any of these issues without having these anti-SLAPP measures in place. That is not just for journalists but for the Serious Fraud Office and for other public interest watchdogs.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you; that is very helpful. I just wanted to ask about something else. Bill Browder had suggested a sort of “adverse costs” amendment, to prevent law enforcement companies from not being able to afford to take a case against these people. Would you support that?

Catherine Belton: Yes, for sure. Obviously, the companies pursuing these abusive cases should face having to carry the full cost of the case. I have a colleague at the Foreign Policy Centre, Susan Coughtrie, and she and Charlie Holt of English PEN have been working on a new Bill for this SLAPP reform, and I very much recommend that you speak to them as well. That Bill would provide even tougher requirements for cases to really show a likelihood of success.

What the Ministry of Justice proposed was like a three-step set of criteria for judges deciding whether a SLAPP case is a SLAPP case, and whether it should be dismissed before the costs racked up too highly. One of those criteria was whether the case being pursued had a realistic chance of success and it is very clear that this type of criterion needs to be toughened up. I certainly recommend that you speak to Susan Coughtrie at the Foreign Policy Centre about ways in which to do that.

However, I guess that my question to you would be: “Do you think there is a significant possibility that the anti-SLAPP Bill could be attached to the Economic Crime Bill? Is that something that will this speed up?” It is so vitally needed—more than ever. I mean, it is completely—

[The Chair]

Catherine, I am really sorry to interrupt you—

[Alison Thewliss]

I think my colleagues and I are interested in hearing this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q On the attractiveness of the UK, you have mentioned enforcement, but from your research in this area, what would you highlight as being the weakest points in enforcement?

Professor Jason Sharman: The UK has a combination of a good reputation and lax enforcement. From the point of view of a launderer, that is a bonus: you get double. You get the appearance of probity—other people have mentioned the use of UK companies to open foreign bank accounts—with not much scrutiny and even less enforcement. Transparency is all good and well, but more information by itself does not lead to stronger action against money launderers or corrupt officials.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q There has been a lot of discussion about anti-money laundering supervision, and the effectiveness of the agencies that the Government expect to carry out those duties. Are they the weakest link in the chain, and could more be done to tighten up that anti-money laundering supervision, to shut the door, and to stop these companies from beginning their business here?

Professor Jason Sharman: There is certainly more that could be done. Some of it has been mentioned by other people; more money is the obvious one, but that may be necessary but not sufficient. In some ways, the career structure and career incentives for people who work in these agencies needs reviewing: if they start an investigation and it goes well, they get a small bonus to their career. If they start an investigation and it goes badly, they get a very big, indelible black mark, so in terms of career progression, it is safer for them not to investigate things.

One of the main sources of support has not been fully used: there are a lot of people outside the formal enforcement agencies who are very keen to help in this cause, including journalists and those in non-governmental organisations, as well as in the for-profit sector. That potential has not been tapped, so there are certainly things that the Government and the state could and should do, particularly in terms of regulatory agencies; but the area where I think it is possible to make most progress is probably beyond that.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q That makes sense. Certainly, there have been lots of times when I have been in rooms with a group of people who have solutions to tackle this, and Government should be doing more to make sure that they are listened to. Could I ask about the abuse of limited partnerships, secrecy jurisdictions and things like that? Could more be done to tighten up those rules? It feels as though there is an awful lot of abuse of those corporate structures, and very little scrutiny.

Professor Jason Sharman: It depends what you mean by “secrecy jurisdiction”. A person who has studied this for a long time said this: “People are not surprised when I tell them that the most important tax haven in the world is an island. People are surprised when they hear that the name of that island is Manhattan. People are not surprised to hear that the second largest tax haven is a city on an island. The city is London, and the island is Great Britain.”

We recently formed a shell company with co-authors Michael Findley and Dan Nielson in the United States. It took 137 seconds to incorporate that company. Here, it would probably take you a little longer—it might take you as long as 10 minutes—but you do not really have to show ID in any case, so the barriers are pretty low. If you do not want to use anything as fancy as a limited liability partnership, you can just use a plain old company, and that works pretty well for holding a bank account overseas.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q The Government have talked up the benefits of being able to incorporate companies fast. Do you think there needs to be a bit more grit in the system to allow for scrutiny, rather than speed?

Professor Jason Sharman: I think so. For me, it is telling that in jurisdictions for which incorporations are their lifeblood, such as the British Virgin Islands, it is much slower to incorporate. It takes close to two weeks to incorporate in the British Virgin Islands, and it takes about $1,000. The British Virgin Islands get half of their Government revenue from incorporation fees. They have a real interest in making sure their company registry works well. No one likes red tape and filling out forms, but the idea that you might have to spend a couple of hours instead of 15 minutes, or £50 instead of £12 is, to me, not unreasonable.

[James Daly]

Q Thank you for that, Jason. You have given an example already, but I was wondering about the international context. We have Companies House. Can you give me an example of the equivalent in European countries or America and the difference you perceive between our Companies House and theirs?

Professor Jason Sharman: I feel sorry for British Companies House, because it has been given a lot of work without the resources to carry it out. The mismatch between what is expected of an institution and the resources it has to achieve those ends is greater. Company registries are passive, archival organisations.