Submarines and Frigates (Plymouth)

Alison Seabeck Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Westminster Hall

[Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View) (Lab)]

I congratulate my neighbour, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile), on securing the debate. He made a strong argument for base-porting frigates in Plymouth and gave a detailed explanation of not only Britain’s position in the world, but Plymouth’s role. Those arguments have been made, tried and tested under successive Governments, but let me focus on base-porting.

The hon. Gentleman’s predecessor, Linda Gilroy, fought long and hard on the issue of base-porting, and so, too, have the trade unions in the dockyard and the naval base. As a result of the close synergy between what happens in the dockyard, which is now under Babcock’s marine division, but which was previously under Devonport Management Ltd, the unions have frequently voiced the view that base-porting is vital to not only the dockyard’s industrial base, but the city as a whole.

The importance of retaining the work that the frigates bring and the economic benefit that the crews and their families generate cannot be understated. No local MP will have attended a meeting locally or with Ministers at which base-porting was not on the agenda. The issue has certainly always been raised by the outgoing dockyard works committee chair, Roger Darcy, who knows just how big this issue is for Plymouth. I would like to take this opportunity to thank him for his hard work and commitment over 47 years—this is his last year in post.

Perhaps I can describe the position in which we find ourselves following the strategic defence and security review, or at least the position we think we are in, given that the turmoil in the middle east has called into question whether we have the right priorities. The frigates Cumberland, Chatham, Campbeltown and Cornwall have, in some cases, had to respond to the demands placed on them by the Government and NATO despite being en route to be decommissioned and scrapped. We must be clear that we have the right resources in the right places, and that we can apply force or the threat of force effectively against our enemies wherever that is needed. I agree with the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport that the strategic defence and security review should be revisited.

The naval bases are undoubtedly an important part of our capability and significant strategic assets. That said, there is a recognition that we should have three naval bases. The maritime change programme announcement under the previous Labour Government effectively confirmed that position, as did the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in the run-up to the general election. The hon. Gentleman suggested that the Labour Government had effectively said that all the frigates would go to Portsmouth, but that is incorrect—it was still a matter for debate, and it has ever been thus. What we really need is clarity, and I hope that we will get some from the Minister.

The naval bases are assets in which the nation has invested billions of pounds over decades, so it is crucial that the best and most efficient use is made of them. Is optimum use being made of Devonport? It has 4 miles of waterfront and 640 acres of landside space, whereas Portsmouth has only 3 miles of waterfront and 297 acres of landside space. Portsmouth—I am sorry to make this comparison, but it is important—must share its space with a substantial flow of commercial shipping, including busy cross-channel services. It is also due eventually to become the home port to the two aircraft carriers, the Type 45s and minesweepers.

We have just had the announcement that the replacement for HMS Endurance—the MV Polarbjorn, which is soon to become HMS Protector—is to be base-ported in Portsmouth. Why? That, too, is not a sensible decision, given all the expertise in Plymouth and the clear link to all the meteorological, survey and hydrographical work that happens there. We also have expertise in civilian science at the university and Plymouth marine laboratory, which could support and benefit the base-porting of that vessel in our city.

We need to have the Type 23 frigates, and eventually some Type 26s, to ensure that dips and troughs in the work stream at the dockyard can be filled and that Babcock does not have to reduce the full-time work force below a core level that can retain the skills that are vital to support the fleet. Plymouth also has the capacity to provide naval personnel with adequate accommodation, some of which is new and refurbished, at the naval base and HMS Raleigh.

Plymouth loses out every time, and never on the grounds of capacity, skill or added value, all of which we always offer. We can hope that a Minister will be brave enough at some stage to take on the Navy top brass in Portsmouth and to support Plymouth’s case. A Treasury Minister might also work out that it actually saves the Treasury money if vessels are based in the most cost-effective and efficient naval base in the country, and that any diminution of the Royal Navy’s commitment to Plymouth has a massive socio-economic impact on the region. Plymouth is very peripheral; we need the naval base and the work that it brings, and we need the frigates tied up there.

The hon. Gentleman touched on the fact that academics are undertaking work on the socio-economic impacts, and I urge the Minister to seek that work out before finally reaching any conclusion on base-porting. I support the suggestion that MPs from the area should talk to him about the report when it reaches its first stage.

We need joined-up government when we look at these issues, because the implications of not base-porting in Plymouth are serious. I urge the Minister to talk to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Treasury, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Communities and Local Government, because they will pick up the tab if the wrong decision is taken.

There is strong case for keeping the Type 23s, as well as for basing some future surface combatants in Plymouth. The Minister must be concerned that surface fleet sailors will be lost if vessels are moved out of the city of Plymouth, because they may want to leave the service rather than uproot their families. That view is expressed in a good article in Warships magazine, which also suggests that Plymouth might feel

“betrayed by a coalition of idiots”.

I hope that the Minister will prove that view wrong by showing eminent good sense and deciding to ensure the ongoing base-porting of frigates at Devonport.

The article, which was published in March, goes on unfairly to attack civic leaders in Plymouth for their lack of commitment to protecting the future of the naval base. However, leaders from our city have brought Plymouth’s case repeatedly to Whitehall on a cross-party basis, most recently just before the recess. We were seen by the Secretary of State, and although we were given reassurance, there was no commitment.

It would be wrong for the Government, in five years’ time, to allow Devonport to be reduced back to a home for amphibious ships that have been mothballed and for decommissioned frigates and submarines that are waiting to be sent for scrap. My fear is that Plymouth could then be closed shortly afterwards. Perhaps the Minister will tell us today that that will not happen. When will we know when the decision will be taken? Will he confirm that he will take the time and trouble to talk to colleagues across the Government for whom his decision could have significant cost implications?

Clearly, the discussions that I and the hon. Members for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport, for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray) and for South West Devon (Mr Streeter) have with the city about future developments at the dockyard are extremely important, but the decision ultimately rests with the Minister, and I hope that he will make the right one.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to participate in the debate under your chairmanship, Mrs Brooke. It is also a great pleasure to see my hon. Friend the Minister in situ to respond to the debate, and I am sure that he will be as typically robust in responding in government as he was in opposition.

It is a particular pleasure to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) on initiating the debate and on ranging so widely in his approach to it. We would err if we focused entirely on basing without considering, as he did, the larger issues of the state of the Royal Navy, the country’s strategic requirements from it and the amount that the country feels it can spend on it.

I want to start, however, by taking up some of the comments made by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck), who rightly said at the beginning of her speech that events in the middle east have rearranged the strategic furniture, as it were. She will not have been surprised by that, given that the odds are, strange to relate, usually very great that it will come as a surprise when some sort of conflict breaks out in that way. When conflicts have yet to break out, and still more when we are already fighting in such conflicts, it therefore behoves us not to be too dogmatic and rigid as we make arrangements for the Royal Navy and, indeed, the other armed services.

[Alison Seabeck]

I am merely pointing out that such conflicts come as a surprise, but is it not always the Navy that seems to be the first responder?

[Dr Lewis]

I will try to be as non-partisan between the services as possible but, following the hon. Lady’s provocation, I cannot resist pointing out that the Navy would have been an even quicker responder to the Libyan crisis had we not decided shortly before that blew up to take our last remaining aircraft carrier out of service. I have raised that issue a number of times, particularly with the Foreign Secretary, who on the most recent occasion informed me—I am sorry that he has such a low opinion of my knowledge of things nautical—that an aircraft carrier would not have been necessary because a Tornado could not be flown from it. I am reassured to know that the Government are well aware of which aircraft can fly from aircraft carriers and which cannot, but I do not hesitate to say that if we had had an aircraft carrier in commission when the events in Libya blew up so unexpectedly, I would have bet the farm on the fact that that particular warship—an aircraft carrier—would have been the first to be dispatched to the Mediterranean in response. It is very unwise to make decisions in peacetime, and still more unwise to make decisions when we are involved in not one but two conflicts simultaneously, that will bind us rigidly into circumstances that we might regret when the strategic situation changes as unexpectedly as it almost always does.

Let us consider the position with regard to frigates and submarines. I have never hesitated to say that the 1998 strategic defence review was a well thought-out document. The problem, as we know, was that the plans it outlined were not fully funded, although at least one had the feeling that a theory was being set out, which meant that some sort of balance was understood and some sort of flexibility was retained. We did not take the view that because our circumstances in the world were more limited in terms of the interventions we could make, we should reshape our defence forces in such a way that we would be incapable of responding to an unexpected crisis as we had responded in the past.

At one point during the years of the Labour Government, a naval base review was carried out. My hon. Friend the Minister will recall that we, as the shadow defence team in opposition, were adamant that it would be most unwise to rely on only two naval bases in the entire country, one of which would be in Scotland and the other in either Portsmouth or Devonport. In particular, we had regard to the argument put forward so eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport in his introduction to the debate: if we put all our eggs in one basket, or all our ships in one or two ports—one at one end of the country and one at the far end from that—we will be in danger of the basket of eggs getting smashed or the ships getting bottled up. We therefore argued strongly for retaining the ports at Devonport and at Portsmouth, and it would be a grave mistake to change that argument now. If we believe that it is strategically wise, strategically necessary and, I would say, strategically essential to continue to have the potential to use both Devonport and Portsmouth as naval bases in the future—I can never emphasise enough that we cannot predict the future—it follows that we must spread out our assets to ensure that both ports remain viable. I have no prejudice as to which assets should be in Portsmouth and which should be in Devonport, but some assets should be in each of the two ports.

The Labour Government took office in 1997, and when their SDR was undertaken we had a total of 35 frigates and destroyers. The deal done in the SDR was that in return for the great future promise and asset of two large aircraft carriers, the number of frigates would be modestly reduced from 35 to 32, and the number of attack submarines—nuclear-powered, but not nuclear-armed—would be reduced from 12 to 10. We know what happened over the years: the number of frigates went down successively from 35 to 32, as predicted, and then to 31 and 25. If I remember correctly, at the last count the figure had gone down to 19. It is true that during that period six new Daring class—Type 45 —destroyers came into play, and they are, of course, much more powerful, potent and potentially lethal, so one could argue that they are a much better deterrent than the destroyers they replaced. However, one should fight shy of getting into the position that Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of State for Defence, got into of saying that because a new warship is so much more powerful than the warship it replaces, the number of “platforms”, as they used to say—the number of ships to the rest of us—becomes irrelevant. That is not true, because no matter how powerful a warship is, it can be in only one place at any one time. Unfortunately, but necessarily, the activities of the Royal Navy often have to take place in many places simultaneously. At the moment, we are considering what we should do in relation to events in Libya.

There is something else that slightly bothers me: I lost count of the number of times that Conservative spokesmen said in opposition that although we could not be sure whether we would spend more money on defence until we saw what the books actually said about the economics, we would definitely keep expenditure on defence in line with the commitments undertaken. I often stood up and said that we would need either to spend more on defence or to reduce our commitments. In reality, as we know, we are very stretched indeed as a result of the ongoing commitment in Afghanistan, and we now find ourselves suddenly with an additional commitment in Libya. After some prodding, the Foreign Secretary conceded that its cost, on which I was rather aggravatingly pressing him, would be met from the Treasury reserve, but all signs are that the commitment to a Libyan no-fly zone will not prove decisive in ousting Colonel Gaddafi, even though it may prove, and arguably has proved, effective in preventing him from initiating the wholesale mass slaughter that he was not only ruthless enough but stupid enough to announce to the world that he intended to visit on the citizens of Benghazi.

If those two statements are true—first, that the no-fly zone will not be enough to oust Gaddafi and, secondly, that it will nevertheless be effective in limiting the massacre of innocent civilians, which was our purpose for intervening—the logical consequence is that the commitment will go on for a considerable time. The Government will have to think hard about what they are prepared to spend on defence.

The Government cannot meet the costs from Treasury reserves indefinitely. We all know what then happens: we tend to get ourselves into the situation encountered by Tony Blair, who said towards the end of his time as Prime Minister that spending on defence had remained roughly constant at 2.5% of gross domestic product throughout the decade of Labour rule, but then added the crucial words, “if the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan are included.” In other words, the cost of those two wars was effectively being counted as part of our basic expenditure on defence. Such a thing will always happen.

The Government must think clearly about whether to put the economic case at the top of their agenda or whether to put up there instead the ability to intervene, as we have intervened in Libya. They cannot have it both ways. Many countries, including in Europe, would doubtless love to be able to intervene to stop massacres in Benghazi, but they do not do so—or not more than minimally—because their simple view is, “Well, we’re very sorry but we’re too small, too ineffective, too weak and too poor, and we cannot afford to maintain the armed forces necessary to do that sort of thing.” That is fair enough.

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[Mr Jones]

The hon. Gentleman is right to recognise the work that is done at Lympstone. He and my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck) mentioned the economic contribution that the dockyard makes not only to Plymouth itself but to the surrounding area; some 25,000 individuals are directly employed by the dockyard and there is a knock-on effect on local business. In addition, I have seen for myself the support that exists for the excellent university.

My hon. Friend rightly paid tribute to the trade unions at the dockyard which, over many years, have campaigned for the dockyard and ensured that its case is put to both Tory and Labour Governments. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport mentioned the cross-party nature of the campaigning that has been carried out by the local authority. When I visited Plymouth, I was very impressed with the way in which the members of the local authority, irrespective of political party, spoke with one voice for Plymouth and the dockyard.

The previous Labour Government conducted a naval base review, in which the decision was made to support Faslane, Plymouth and Portsmouth. However, there were those who said that we should put all our eggs in one basket at Portsmouth, as the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) mentioned. I am sure that there are many who still say that and the Minister will have to address those pressures in the coming weeks. It has been said, perhaps unfairly, that some of the naval top brass prefer Portsmouth to Plymouth because it is nearer to London.

The review was supposed to bring some stability to the future footprint of the Royal Navy in the UK, which is important. Earlier, we mentioned forces accommodation. When I was the Minister responsible for armed forces accommodation, I was conscious that we needed long-term investment in the naval estate. However, that is difficult, especially if the sword of Damocles is hanging over a site—whether it be a naval base, an RAF base or an army base—because there is a tendency not to invest. We have certainly seen that at Faslane and other places. The delay by the previous Government in making a decision on the long-term basing of submarines meant that investment did not go into armed forces family accommodation. If we want our armed forces to be ready for deployment and to fight in difficult situations, it is vital to have good family accommodation and support. For far too long, we have thought of the families as secondary to the fighting forces. They are, in my opinion, integral and important. That is particularly relevant for the Royal Navy because individuals are away at sea for many months. It is important that, while they undertake their duties, they are content and feel that their families are being well looked after.

The naval base review agreed that HMS Ocean, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark would be based at Plymouth along with the hydrographic survey ship and the Type 22s and Type 23s. More importantly, there was also a 15-year agreement with Babcock Marine on the dockyard itself. When people look at the arguments for or against Plymouth or Portsmouth, they should consider the fact that the dockyard at Portsmouth has not been viable since 1984, when it was closed. That is an important argument for retaining Plymouth. We need a dockyard capability not only for nuclear but for the refit of existing frigates and other service ships.

With the decommissioning of the Type 22s under the strategic defence and security review, there will be very little left at Devonport. The current review will consider whether the dockyard has a future. However, as the hon. Member for New Forest East so eloquently put it, to put our eggs in one basket would be a mistake. The arguments that were proposed by the previous Government in their base-porting review are relevant today. Although the SDSR is a defence and security review, it is basically led by the Treasury. Having dealt with the Treasury on a number of occasions, I am sure that it will be breathing down the neck of the Minister to ensure that it gets every last pound from any decisions that are made to free up money in the short term.

[Alison Seabeck]

If the defence review was, as we all believe, Treasury led, does my hon. Friend not find it surprising that the Treasury does not seem to be listening to the wider socio-economic case about the implications for Plymouth, given the huge cost implications of making the wrong choice?

[Mr Jones]

I agree with my hon. Friend. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport suggested that that review is being presented to Government. I urge my hon. Friend and the hon. Gentleman, along with the trade unions and the local council, to make the case strongly to Government. However, I have to say that I sympathise with the Minister. Under any Government, the bottom line is that the Treasury will look only at the budget of the Ministry of Defence. My hon. Friend is right to make the wider case. Closing a dockyard might save money on the defence budget, but in terms of the overall spend to Government, it would cost money in the long term.

I was impressed with the way in which Plymouth, and particularly the university, tried to diversify into other naval-related and maritime sectors. Such efforts would be taken away if the dockyard were closed and the effects would be felt for many years to come. I come from a region which unfortunately saw the end of naval shipbuilding on the River Tyne under a previous Conservative Government, so I am not sure whether this Government will take much cognisance of the wider effects that such closures will have on the region or its capabilities.

The danger that we face is that the Treasury, which is leading the decisions in the SDSR, will make short-term decisions that will have long-term implications. If we were looking for an example of where a short-term decision could be made and we could get things wrong, this would be it.

Although I accept that the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport is a strong advocate for the armed forces and would argue for a larger defence budget, I have to say gently to him that it is naive to pin his hopes on an increase in the defence budget after 2015 saving his dockyard. The Treasury will not reopen facilities once they are closed and will not invest in new capacities. Its policy will be one of entrenchment rather than expansion. Both he and my hon. Friend must ensure that the case for Plymouth is put very strongly and effectively.

In closing, we are already seeing the effects of the short-term decision not to have any carrier-based air strike force for 10 years, in terms of our inability to deploy air power in Libya effectively and swiftly. Certain Ministers in the Ministry of Defence are recognising that it is now time to look again perhaps at the SDSR and to do so not only through the prism of the Treasury. We must realise that, if we are going to be a nation that wants to project power around the world—both naval influence and other types of influence—a strong, effective Navy is an important part of that aspiration. In addition, a well financed and strategically thought out defence policy is a cornerstone of any such aspiration.

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[Mr Howarth]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The SDSR sought to reflect the position that we found ourselves in. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View was perfectly right to refer to the Treasury. Inevitably, the Treasury had an influence on the SDSR. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport made the point at the start of the debate that government is a question of priorities. This Government is not a Conservative Government; it is a coalition Government and the priorities were set by the Cabinet. The good news is that the Ministry of Defence took a lesser hit than many people imagined it would, and that is in large measure thanks to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who ensured that the MOD did not fare as badly as some people had feared.

My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East said that he wants me to be robust, and I will be. He is absolutely right to say that we face a dangerous world. That is what we said when in opposition, and the world is just as dangerous—if not more dangerous—than it was then. However, the cupboard is bare and we have had to allocate our resources as best we can. He also made the fair point that the 1998 strategic defence review was itself never fully funded, and therefore last year, when the Chancellor came to allocate the Budget across the Departments, the Ministry of Defence was hobbled by the fact that it was already underfunded for what it was trying to do—we took a double hit, one might say. These are challenging times, and the SDSR has had, and will continue to have, an impact on all areas of defence, but I can assure my hon. Friend that we are determined to maintain a strong and capable fleet that preserves our long and glorious naval tradition.

Nowhere is there greater evidence of that than at Devonport, which is the largest naval base in western Europe, stretching along four miles of coastline. The naval base and the associated dockyard employ approximately 12,000 people and are an important part of the local economy. The dockyard has been privately owned since 1997, and operated by Babcock Marine since 2007. Babcock also manages naval base support services in Devonport. Devonport contributes to the UK’s defence capability through its vital role as the only facility in the UK able to carry out the deep maintenance of submarines, and it undertakes the long overhauls that all submarines must undergo at least once during their service life. As well as that unique role, it carries out valuable work on the support and maintenance of complex warships, and is a centre of excellence for sea training and for the UK’s amphibious capability.

Babcock Marine, along with BAE Systems Surface Ships, is one of our key maritime industrial partners, and the Department works closely with it to ensure that Devonport and the other naval bases and dockyards have the level of work they need to sustain them, ensuring that critical skills, such as high-end design, systems engineering and combat systems integration are not lost, and that we continue to maintain the ability to carry out such work in Britain.

[Alison Seabeck]

Given that the Minister is standing in for the Minister with responsibility for defence equipment, support and technology, this is possibly an unfair question: under the business agreement—which was signed and is generally very welcome—how firm a commitment is expected from the companies, whether BAE or Babcock Marine, to continue to operate in Portsmouth, Plymouth or Faslane? The Minister might want to come back to me later on that.

[Mr Howarth]

As I understand it, the decisions are based on where the case for the best enterprise can be established. The agreement is between Babcock Marine, BAE Systems Surface Fleet and the Ministry of Defence, and the idea is to allocate the work around the three bases. As I shall say again in a moment, repeating the Prime Minister’s assurance, all three naval bases, including Portsmouth, will be maintained, for the very reason that everyone has been articulating: to maintain the capability and not to put all our eggs in one basket. That is the basis upon which the decisions are made, but I could invite my hon. Friend the Minister with responsibility for defence equipment, support and technology to drop the hon. Lady a note about it, if that would be helpful.

One of the mechanisms in place for ensuring that we can maintain the capabilities is the surface ship support alliance between Babcock Marine, BAE Systems Surface Ships and the Ministry of Defence. In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, the alliance meets regularly to discuss the best allocation of support work, so that the work is balanced between various locations. The alliance has been in place since September 2009, and the proof of concept phase has demonstrated the benefits of collaborative working between the Department and the industry, and should lead to the delivery of a more sustainable programme of surface ship support work. I hope that that addresses the hon. Lady’s point.

It is important to emphasise that the Department is not alone in providing employment opportunities in Plymouth. Plymouth city council and local business leaders are actively seeking to attract investment and business into the area, and I hope there will be further opportunities to maximise the benefits to the city from the proposed release of MOD sites. We remain committed to working with other Departments, and with trade unions and local councils, as opportunities emerge.

Moving on to base-porting more specifically, the Devonport flotilla includes HMS Ocean—a landing platform, helicopter and the largest ship in the Royal Navy—on which last year I was privileged to sign a defence co-operation treaty with Brazil. The 22,000 magnificent tonnes of British steel standing there in the harbour were a manifestation of the influence that the military can bring on behalf of our country around the world, and we should not forget that. Also based in Devonport are the active Type 22 frigates, seven of the 13 Type 23 frigates, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark—amphibious landing platform docks—four ships of the oceanographic squadron, and six Trafalgar-class nuclear-powered submarines. That is a substantial portion of our naval fleet, and the flagship of the Royal Navy, HMS Albion, is the first Devonport-based ship in living memory to hold the responsibility of fleet flagship.

The tough decisions that have had to be made as part of the SDSR mean that the Royal Navy’s fleet will decrease in size. As a result, the number of vessels based at Devonport will be reduced, but Devonport’s importance as a vital strategic asset supporting the Royal Navy will not be diminished. As I mentioned a moment ago, the Prime Minister confirmed in the debate that followed the SDSR announcement last year that we are determined to retain all three naval bases, and to keep them busy. We advocated that in opposition, and have kept our word. Any decisions taken on future base-porting arrangements for the Royal Navy’s vessels will therefore take into account the long-term sustainability of all three naval bases.

The SDSR made it clear that the Royal Navy has a bright future, with new aircraft carriers, Type 45 destroyers, new submarines and new frigates, and that maintaining 19 frigates and destroyers was the best option for delivering a sustainable and flexible surface fleet. To implement that decision, the Secretary of State for Defence announced on 15 December that the four remaining Type 22 frigates—HMS Chatham, HMS Campbeltown, HMS Cumberland and HMS Cornwall—would be removed from service. The decommissioning of Cumberland was delayed because of her involvement in supporting enforcement action against Libya under United Nations Security Council resolution 1973, and I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the ship’s crew for their fantastic work during that deployment, which emphasised the versatility of the Royal Navy at its best.

The seven Type 23 frigates based at Devonport, along with the six at Portsmouth naval base, will form the backbone of the Royal Navy’s frigate fleet until the introduction of the Type 26 global combat ship at around the turn of the decade. I am lead Minister for the global combat ship, which we hope to build in collaboration with a number of other countries, and, like my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport, would like to see more of them. We advocated in opposition that although the ships should not be exactly cheap and cheerful, they should not have the sophistication of the Type 45 destroyer, the unit cost of which was £1 billion—simply unaffordable.

[Alison Seabeck]

I understand the need for much more of a workhorse vehicle than an all-singing, all-dancing one; however, lovely as it will be to have the new Type 26s, I hope the Minister will strongly consider the fact that Plymouth has the skills to manage and support some of those vessels into the future.

[Mr Howarth]

I hear the hon. Lady’s representations, and shall duly convey them to the Minister responsible, but I have to say that we are nowhere near making the base-porting decisions on the Type 26.

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[Alison Seabeck]

I understand that that decision is not imminent, but in thinking through the decisions that need to be made, the Department must look ahead. The decision must be part of a bigger strategic vision for the future.

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Lady makes an extremely important point, which I endorse and emphasise for the record. It builds on something that the hon. Member for North Durham said about the Treasury. If we are to have the Future Force 2020 that we seek, it will depend on uplift in financial resources from the middle of the decade. One of the last things that the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff, now Lord Stirrup, said to me was that if we want that uplift in 2015, we must start planning for it now. It is important that we as parliamentarians understand the importance of long- term planning. I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me for latching on to the point that she made about base-porting for the Type 26, but it feeds into a wider argument about defence planning, and she is right to make it.