European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Alex Salmond Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Alex Salmond (Gordon) (SNP)]

If this is indeed a significant concession, should it not be added to the Bill so that it can be properly examined and analysed and so that by Report every Member has been able to look at it?

[Keir Starmer]

I recognise the strength of that point. There are of course other opportunities to examine what has been conceded, and to ensure that it might find its way into the Bill. I think it would be sensible to recognise the significance of what has been said, hear a little more detail if we can, and reflect on that during the course of the afternoon. Of course, the Bill does not complete its passage today, or in this House.

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[Mr Jones]

It is very hard to see what meaningful vote could be given if there had been no deal at all. Having said that, I have no doubt at all that in the absence of any agreement whatever, that absence of agreement would be the subject of statements to this House.

[Alex Salmond]

The Minister is inflating and deflating people as he goes along. May we get back to the manuscript amendment? If the concession is as significant as the Minister is leading us to believe, it is really important that it comes forward as an amendment. If the Government are not prepared to make that happen, surely the message to the other place is that what the Minister has said should be encapsulated in an amendment that can be properly re-debated here.

[Mr Jones]

We are debating the issue at considerable length now. I have, on behalf of the Government, made what I believe is a serious commitment and it should be accepted as such. Frankly, in those circumstances, I see no need for a further amendment.

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[Mr Jones]

I am afraid not; I have already been very generous.

I was reminding the House of what the Secretary of State has already done in terms of engagement. He has made six oral statements and there have been more than 10 debates—four in Government time. More than 30 Select Committee inquiries are going on at the moment. Furthermore, there will be many more votes on primary legislation between now and departure from the European Union.

I suggest that the amendments that I have referred to are unnecessary. I reiterate that both Houses will get a vote on the final deal before it comes into force and I can confirm, once again, that it will cover both the withdrawal agreement and our future relationship. However, we are confident that we will bring back a deal that Parliament will want to support. The choice will be meaningful: whether to accept that deal or to move ahead without a deal.

[Alex Salmond]

I rise to speak to new clause 180 and amendment 50, in my name and those of my hon. Friends. I also want to speak very favourably about new clause 110, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). It is the strongest of the other amendments, although I should say that any amendments from this group that are put to the vote will have our support as they are all trying to increase parliamentary supervision of the process.

Before the Minister led us through the dance of the seven veils, I was going to question him on the irrevocability or revocability of article 50. I still think that that goes to the heart of what we are debating. However, I say directly to the Minister, with regard to what he described as a “serious announcement”, that if one makes a serious announcement in the course of the Committee stage of a Bill of this importance, it should be followed by an amendment. If we were here debating the Dangerous Dogs Bill, which I remember debating some time ago, and a serious announcement was made, that serious announcement would be followed by an amendment to the Bill. If that is good enough for a Bill of that description, how much more important is it to have such an amendment when we are debating the biggest constitutional change facing this country for half a century.

[Mr Harper]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Alex Salmond]

Not just now.

We thank the Minister for his announcement and the apparent concession. We do not doubt for a second the seriousness with which he makes his serious announcement, but I think that most of us—including the Minister himself—would think that such an announcement should be followed by an amendment to the Bill so that it could go through the proper processes, with hon. Members being able and willing properly to debate an announcement of such seriousness.

I give way to the former Chief Whip, who seems through these proceedings so anxious to regain his previous elevated position.

[Mr Harper]

I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I am very content being able to speak in the House on these important matters. The reason it might not be sensible to have a detailed amendment is that, as is clear from the range of interventions from colleagues, a large number of scenarios may arise, which will have to be dealt with politically. I do not want detailed legislation that means that this matter goes back to the courts. I want it to be debated in this House, not by a judge.

[Alex Salmond]

At least the right hon. Gentleman is consistent: when he was Chief Whip he did not want detailed amendments either, in case democracy prevailed in these matters. Most people, on hearing a serious announcement from the Front Bench, would expect it to be followed by an amendment, so that it could be properly debated and tested.

[Ms Angela Eagle]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about a manuscript amendment—it would make things a lot clearer for all of us. Does he agree that the announcement that we may have a Hobson’s choice at the end of the process means that there will not really be a proper choice?

[Alex Salmond]

I very much agree with the hon. Lady, and she conveniently leads me right on to my next point.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Alex Salmond]

In a minute or two.

The hon. Lady’s point goes to the heart of the dilemma the House will find itself in, unless we take action to the contrary. It strikes at the question of whether article 50, once invoked, is irrevocable or not. In my point of order earlier, I tried to give a flavour of the Government’s confusion, but it was a brief point of order and I want to give the full flavour of the Government’s confusion.

The Brexit Secretary said in the Exiting the European Union Committee, when asked about this specific point, that

“one of the virtues of the article 50 process is that it sets you on way. It is very difficult to see it being revoked. We do not intend to revoke it. It may not be revocable—I don’t know.”

That is the basis on which we are being asked to take this fundamental decision that will affect the future of this country. We have to know these things, because they will determine the position the House finds itself in.

If article 50 is irrevocable—if after the two years, unless there is a unanimous agreement from the other 27 members of the European Union, the negotiations stop, the guillotine comes down and we are left with a bad deal or no deal—any vote in the House against that sword of Damocles hanging over the House will not be a proper, informed judgment.

[Geraint Davies]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that triggering article 50 on the basis of its possible revocability is like walking down the M4 in the middle of the night and hoping you will not get killed—you might not, but it is better not to walk down there in the first place?

[Alex Salmond]

The hon. Gentleman promised me that he would change the motorway when he next made that point, but the analogy is there.

Of course, the noble Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who drafted article 50, believes it to be revocable. Presumably, he had that in mind when he drafted the article in the first place.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

rose—

[John Redwood]

rose—

[Alex Salmond]

I promised the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), who entered the House on the same day as I did, if I remember correctly, that I would give way to him.

[John Redwood]

I am very grateful. Perhaps I can clarify the matter by saying that the Attorney General was very clear in his submission to the Supreme Court, as was the lawyer on the other side of the case, that article 50 is irrevocable, and the judgment was based on that proposition. Does the right hon. Gentleman therefore agree that it is irrevocable?

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Alex Salmond]

I give way to the former Attorney General.

[Mr Grieve]

The concession of the Government in the Supreme Court was merely for the purpose of those proceedings. I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) that we can derive nothing from that as to whether article 50 is revocable or not. Indeed, there is powerful legal argument that it is capable of being revoked.

[Alex Salmond]

The two Members should talk among themselves before they come to the House with an agreed position. However, both those amazingly talented people are on the Back Benches, so it does not really matter if they have an informed and learned debate after proceeding to agreement. What matters is the confusion on the Front Bench. Whatever they think, the Brexit Secretary did not know whether it was revocable or not.

[Sir William Cash]

The right hon. Gentleman is pursuing this matter relentlessly. Will he explain why he is doing so? I suggest that it is because he knows that the answer to the question he is putting depends on whether the European Court of Justice gets its hands on this matter. That is what it is about, as I am sure he will accept.

[Alex Salmond]

To be told I am pursuing something relentlessly by the hon. Gentleman is a compliment that I shall treasure. This is not about the European Court of Justice; it is about this House having a genuine choice at some stage. It must be able to look at what the Government have negotiated and say yes or no, without the sword of Damocles of a bad deal or no deal, which was the threat from the Prime Minister, hanging over it.

[Angela Smith (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Is not one of the problems with the concession that has just been made that it tacks together in one votable motion the withdrawal agreement and the potential trade agreement? If Members do not like the trade agreement, they will face the unpalatable option of voting down the withdrawal agreement, thereby bringing us back to where we are now with the outcome of the referendum.

[Alex Salmond]

The hon. Lady makes a very astute point, but I think the issue is even more fundamental: we have to know what happens when we say no before we go ahead at the present moment.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Alex Salmond]

Not just now.

We make an effort to solve the problem in new clause 180, which we call the reset amendment. It asks the Prime Minister to seek from the European Council an agreement that if this House and the other place refuse to agree the terms negotiated, we will reset to our existing membership of the European Union on the current terms and try again. We would then approve a deal only once we believed its terms were in the interests of this country. The Prime Minister should be prepared to present us not with a bad deal or no deal—not a bad deal or World Trade Organisation terms—but a deal that we know is in the interests of our constituents and the country. That is fundamental to this debate.

I know and understand the exigencies of political leadership, but the date of the end of March came about at the Tory conference because Brexiteers were beginning to get a bit flappy about whether the Prime Minister was a born-again Brexiteer or still a secret submarine remainer. I cannot understand why people think—even on the Brexiteer side, because presumably the Brexiteers want success for this country and its economy—that it is a good idea to invoke article 50 before we know what the destination will be. Similarly, I cannot believe that it is a good idea to leave the European economic area, which is governed by different agreements and instruments, until we know what the alternative is. Instead of giving these points away and putting all the negotiating power in the hands of those we are negotiating with—they are our partners now, but in any negotiation there is a tension between two parties—any negotiation depends on the cards in your hand. If the other side know that after two years the sword of Damocles comes down, it puts them in a much more powerful position in the negotiation.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

I agree with most of what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. It is very important to have an amendment, so that the House and the Government know exactly where we are going. Why do we not put those on the Government Front Bench on a TUC course to learn how to negotiate?

[Alex Salmond]

The hon. Gentleman makes an astute point. There is a lot to be learned about a negotiating position. The prime point is not to put yourself in a position of weakness with the European Union. On the whole, they are honourable people who want what is in the interests of the continent of Europe. Certainly, it is not a good idea for the Government to put themselves in a position of weakness with the new President of the United States, who will take every possible advantage from an opponent he senses—as he will sense—is negotiating from a position of weakness.

I argue strongly for the new clause and the amendments we have tabled, which aim to secure the position at the end of the negotiations before we embark on something that will leave this House not just with a bad deal or no deal, but with a metaphorical gun pointed at our head when we address these serious questions. We have to know the end position before we embark on that fundamentally dangerous course.

[John Redwood]

I agree fully with the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) that we should not wish to do anything that weakens or undermines the British bargaining position. All the efforts of this House, as we try to knit together remain and leave voters, should be designed to maximise our leverage, as a newly independent nation, in securing the best possible future relationship with our partners in the European Union. That is why I find myself in disagreement with many of the well-intentioned amendments before us today. I think they are all, perhaps inadvertently, trying to undermine or damage the UK’s negotiation—[Interruption.] One of my hon. Friends says, “Nonsense,” but let me explain why it would be dangerous to adopt the amendments.

We are being invited to believe that if the House of Commons decided that it did not like the deal the Government negotiated for our future relationship with the EU and voted it down, the rest of the EU would immediately say sorry and offer us a better deal. I just do not think that that is practical politics. I do not understand how Members believe that that is going to happen. What could happen, however, is that those in the rest of the EU who want to keep the UK and our contributions in the EU might think that it would be a rather good idea to offer a very poor deal to try to tempt Parliament into voting the deal down, meaning that there would then be no deal at all. That might suit their particular agenda.

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[John Redwood]

The hon. Gentleman has won that argument. We will have a vote in this House on whether we accept the deal and I hope that that works out well. My criticism is not of the Government’s decision to make that offer. I think it was a very good offer to make in the circumstances. My criticism was and is of those Members who do not understand that constantly seeking to undermine and expose alleged weaknesses damages the United Kingdom’s case. It is not at all helpful. As many of them have talent and expertise through their many links with the EU, it would be helpful if they did rather more talking about how we can meet the reasonable objectives of the EU and deal with the unreasonable objectives held by some in the Commission and a number of member states.

[Alex Salmond]

Despite the right hon. Gentleman’s certainty about irrevocability, the person who drafted the clause, Lord Kerr, thinks that notification is revocable. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the former Attorney General, who is sitting to the right hon. Gentleman’s right, is not absolutely sure but does not agree with him, and the Brexit Minister does not know. Does this not remind us of a certain question in European history, where of those who knew the answer one was mad, one was dead and the other had forgotten? Is this the basis on which he wants to take us over the cliff edge?

[John Redwood]

I have attempted to give the House a clear definition and to show that there is good legal precedent for my argument, based on senior lawyers and the Supreme Court. I note that the SNP does not have a clue and does not want to specify whether the notification is irrevocable.

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[Alex Salmond]

Unless my memory betrays me, the hon. Gentleman himself was one of the two thirds back in 1975 when he voted for the European Community, so all these years he was campaigning against the sovereignty of that decision; indeed, he was campaigning against his own sovereignty and his own decision.

[Sir William Cash]

That is politics, as the right hon. Gentleman knows only too well, because he has a similar experience in his position with regard to Scotland.

The bottom line is that we are faced with a simple decision, which is going to be decided in a vote later today, I imagine—it might be in part tomorrow as well, and then there will be Third Reading. I hope that all these attempts to, in my judgment, produce different versions of delay will effectively be overridden by the vote taken by the House as a whole, in line with the decision taken by the British people. That is the right way to proceed.

I would like to add one further point, with respect to the Bill itself. I am in no way criticising the selection of amendments, because I think it is entirely right that we should have an opportunity to look at a variety of permutations before the main vote is cast. But I have to remind the Committee that the Bill, which was passed by 498 to 114, simply says that it will

“confer power on the Prime Minister to notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention”,

as expressed by the referendum itself,

“to withdraw from the EU.”

Clause 1 simply says this, and no more:

“The Prime Minister may notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.”

I am glad to see that it goes on to say—just to put this matter to bed, in case anybody tries to argue that, somehow or other, this could be overridden by some other European Union gambit— that “This section”, which we have already passed in principle,

“has effect despite any provision made by or under the European Communities Act 1972 or any other enactment.”

In other words, nothing that emanates from the European Union is to stand in its way. That is a very simple proposition. The Bill is short because it should be short.

I would just like to make one last point, looking back at what the Supreme Court said. The Supreme Court made a judgment on one simple question: should we express the intention to withdraw and notify under article 50 by prerogative or by Bill? There was a big battle, and many people took differing views. We respect the Supreme Court decision, and that is why we have this Bill. The fact is that that is final.

In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment, the court itself made it clear what the judgment was meant to be about, which was whether this should be done by Bill or prerogative. The court said it should be done by Bill. It added—these are my last words on the subject for the moment—that it was about one particular issue, which was the one I have mentioned. The court then said the judgment had nothing to do with the terms of withdrawal, nothing to do with the method, nothing to do with the timing and nothing to do with the relationship between ourselves and the European Union. Yet new clause 1 spends its entire verbiage going into the very questions that the Supreme Court said the decision was not about. So that new clause and the others are all inconsistent both with the Supreme Court decision and with the decisions taken on Second Reading.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Let me start by correcting the record. I had something to do with the production of our manifesto, which clearly the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) was unable to read in the time available to him. It made no assertion such as he suggests. It was perfectly clear that what it said about the single market would be superseded were there a referendum with the unanticipated result of the British people taking us out of the EU as a whole. I regret that decision—I voted and campaigned to remain—but the British people voted to leave.

The interesting thing about this interesting debate is that it is one of those moments when the cloak of obscurity is lifted from an issue and the dynamic that is actually going on becomes clear. We have reached the crunch issue. We have reached the point at which we are discussing whether the effect of the Supreme Court judgment should be that Parliament has the option at some future date of overruling the British people and cancelling the leaving of the EU, or whether it should not have that ability.

My right hon. Friend the Minister made it perfectly clear that there will be a vote, but he also made it perfectly clear that that vote will be between the option of accepting a particular set of arrangements that have been negotiated by Her Majesty’s Government, and not accepting those arrangements and thereby leaving the EU without either a withdrawal agreement or an arrangement for the future. He is right to be optimistic that we can reach such agreements, but neither of us can possibly know whether we will. It is therefore right, if one is trying to follow the logic of the referendum decision, that the judgment of this House should simply be about whether the deal is good enough to warrant doing or, on the contrary, we should leave without a deal.

That is a completely different proposition from the one which, in various guises, some on the Opposition Benches—I exempt entirely from this the Opposition Front-Bench team—are putting, which is that Parliament should instead be given, by one means or another, the ability to countermand the British people’s decision to leave the EU by having a vote either on whether we should or should not leave or, in the proposition of the leader of the Liberal Democrats, on whether the people should have a second referendum on whether we should leave. In both of those propositions is a clear determination to undo the effect of the referendum, and we have now reached the point at which that has come out into the open.

[Alex Salmond]

The alternative is just to instruct the Government to negotiate a better deal. The phrase in the Conservative manifesto, which the right hon. Gentleman did not write, was:

“We say: yes to the Single Market.”

That sounds pretty unequivocal.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Not at all; at that moment we were a member of the EU and we said yes to the single market. I campaigned for the single market and I campaigned to remain part of the EU. That was the Government’s position in the referendum. But we also committed to a referendum, and the point of committing to a referendum, which we made perfectly clear not only in the manifesto but in a range of speeches around it, was that if the British people voted to leave, we would leave. It seems to me perfectly clear that the word leave means leave. It does not mean remain. The right hon. Gentleman is an expert parliamentarian, and he has been arguing in many ways, over a long time—the leader of the Liberal Democrats has been arguing it more explicitly—that leave ought to be translated as remain. I deny that that is a translation to which the English language is susceptible.

It seems to me to be perfectly clear that those of us who campaigned to leave and those of us who campaigned to remain have a choice: we can either accept the referendum result or reject it. I accept it, and some Opposition Members also take that view. It may be that some take the view that we should reject the referendum result, and that is a perfectly honourable view. The leader of the Liberal Democrats was effectively arguing, more openly, that we should reject the referendum result. I do not in any way decry his ability to argue that, but everybody who is arguing that should come out openly to that effect, as he did, and not pretend that they are trying to invent some method of parliamentary scrutiny. They are doing nothing of the kind; they are trying to invent a means of undoing the result of the referendum. This House has voted conclusively not to undo the result of the referendum. I think the House was right to do that, but whether it was right or not, it should do that with its eyes open and should not be gulled by anybody into passing amendments that have an effect that it has not signed up to openly.

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[Mr Grieve]

I can read what is on the paper. I take the view that this is a significant step forward, but I will say no more about it at this time.

[Alex Salmond]

The House will have its say; the question is about the circumstances in which it has that say and the default position if it does not agree. May we adjudicate between the Daily Mirror, No.10, the Minister and the interpretation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman by having something on paper in the Bill? In that way, all our interpretations can be crystallised around an essential truth.

[Mr Grieve]

With characteristic sagacity, the right hon. Gentleman goes to the heart and nub of the problem. Is it readily possible to put into the Bill the intention read out at the Dispatch Box by the Minister? In fairness to the Minister and the Government, there are, I am afraid, some really good reasons why that presents difficulties.

The most obvious difficulty is the finite nature of the negotiating period under article 50. One of the things I was interested in was whether we could secure from the Government an undertaking that we would have a vote at the end of the process—before, in fact, the signing of the deal with the Commission. Contrary to what is set out in new clause 110, the Council of Ministers and the Commission are not two separate processes. The Commission will sign the initial agreement when the Council of Ministers gives it the authority to do so, and it then goes to the European Parliament for ratification or approval—call it what you will. Those are not two separate things.

Our problem is that if the negotiation follows the pattern that we have often come across in the course of EU negotiations—running to the 11th hour, 59th minute and 59th second—and we are about to drop off the edge, I confess that I do not particularly wish to fetter the Government’s discretion by insisting that at that precise moment they have to say, “We’re terribly sorry, but we can’t give you a decision until 48 hours after we have dropped off because we have to go back and get approval from both Houses of Parliament.” That is a real problem inherent in what to my point of view is the ghastly labyrinth into which, I am afraid, we have been plunged. We have to try to work our way through it with common sense.