(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 10, in clause 7, page 5, line 32, leave out subsection (8).
This amendment removes provisions stipulating that providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach obligations of confidence or other restrictions on disclosure.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Caroline.
Clause 7 sets out the significant powers to compel information that will be made available to the enforcement authorities detailed in clause 6. As we have heard, the enforcement authority will most often be the Secretary of State. The provisions in clause 7 provide enforcement authorities with the power to prepare and issue an information notice to request from a relevant public body information relating to a decision in respect of the Bill. The enforcement authority—usually the Secretary of State, as I say—can request any information likely to be useful for it to assess whether the provisions of the Bill have been contravened or are likely to be contravened.
Provision is also made in respect of clause 4, the gagging clause. Clause 7 means that the enforcement authority can request information if it is satisfied that a public body subject to the Bill is about to publish, may publish or has already published a statement prohibited by the Bill. The most egregious provision is subsection (8), which provides:
“A person providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach—
(a) any obligation of confidence owed by the person in respect of the information, or
(b) any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
“However imposed” is a challenging phrase. It seems to grant the Secretary of State or other relevant bodies the power to issue notices that would not only require all information to be handed over, but override normally protected duties of confidentiality, safeguarding or legal privilege. That is very significant. We would argue that those powers of investigation go beyond the powers of the security services to compel information. There is no clarity or sense of what checks and balances there are. Even the security services, which do not have that degree of power, have oversight mechanisms such as the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Frankly, this seems to be a very strong power to reserve to the Security of State or, indeed, the Office for Students.
We have heard evidence from multiple witnesses who are concerned about these provisions. We did hear from others who are less concerned, but even if colleagues consider the case I have set out to be wrong or overstated, the ambiguity is obvious. At the very least, the Bill is not clear enough. It is important to say that the Government do not—if I have understood properly what the Minister told the Committee last week—want the provisions to supersede legal privilege. That is welcome, and I am keen to have similar commitments regarding safeguarding duties. If that is the case, amendment 10 promotes that.
I believe that the Government ought to accept our amendment, or at least propose an alternative in lieu. What is in the Bill seems overbearing; if not overbearing, it is definitely unclear. That, at least, must be resolved.
Amendment 10 would remove clause 7(8), which stipulates that providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach obligations of confidence or other restrictions on disclosure.
The intention behind clause 7 is to provide a power for enforcement authorities to issue information notices to require information from a relevant public body relating to a decision in respect of the Bill. As drafted, the clause sets out a necessary and proportionate power for enforcement authorities properly to investigate potential breaches of the ban.
I must be clear that the clause does not place an undue burden on public bodies in scope of the ban. Information may be requested only if the enforcement authority is satisfied that a person has made or will make a decision or statement in breach of the Bill and that the information is likely to be useful for the enforcement authority’s investigation. Subsection (8) provides standard wording in order to give assurance to the person complying with the information notice that they will not be breaching an obligation of confidence or any other restriction on disclosure. The Bill is by no means unique in including such drafting; the same caveat is provided for in the Agriculture Act 2020, the Building Safety Act 2022 and the Health and Care Act 2022, for example.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North has said that he is concerned that the subsection would override the privilege between lawyer and client. I can reassure him that it does not. Legal professional privilege is a fundamental common-law right, including for those public bodies captured by the Bill, and specific words would not be needed to override it. The information power therefore does not extend to legally privileged material; I can confirm that I will clarify that point explicitly in the Bill’s explanatory notes. I would also add that Richard Hermer KC has subsequently clarified, in written evidence to the Committee on this point, his view that it is likely that a court would not deem legal professional privilege to be overridden by the clause.
Subsection (8) does not provide a right to extract the information, nor does it give a power to the Government; it simply provides the person who is disclosing information necessary to investigate a potential breach with protection against a claim for breach of confidence or any other restriction. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
It is really important that legislation passed by the House be clear and unambiguous. As we have heard repeatedly in this Committee from a wide variety of sources, including witnesses who gave oral evidence and those who submitted written evidence, the Bill fails that test.
This subsection is another example of that. The open-ended reference to
“any other restriction on the disclosure of information”
makes no distinction, for example, between somebody expressing a view in a private and in a professional capacity. That cannot be right. Subsection (8) should be deleted.
I rise to speak to amendments 11 to 13, which relate to clauses 9 and 10. Clause 10(1) states that:
“The Secretary of State must, by regulations, prescribe a maximum penalty for the purposes of section 9”.
Clause 9 states that an enforcement authority may impose a monetary penalty on someone if they do not comply with the provisions of the Bill. Similarly, clause 10(2) states that:
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about matters to which the enforcement authority must, or must not, have regard in exercising its powers under section 9”,
which refers to the power to impose monetary penalties.
The regulations set by the Secretary of State will be highly consequential, because they will show how the sharper elements of the Bill, which we have already discussed, will interact with the rights and freedoms of individuals. They will outline the monetary penalty, but also what the enforcement authority—most often, the Secretary of State—will weigh in making a decision. As drafted the Bill does not specify when the Secretary of State must make these regulations and when they will take effect. That leaves a degree of ambiguity, and a gap where people will be waiting to see when the provisions start to bite.
The Minister previously talked about measures being necessary and proportionate. It is necessary to have an enforcement regime, and proportionate for the shoe to drop at some point; otherwise there is no point in having the legislation. Also, having made a significant number of points around Henry VIII provisions, and, at length, been quite displeased by some of them, even someone with my hard heart would say that it is proportionate for those to be set by regulations, because they will change over time.
The quid pro quo for that is what I have set out in amendments 11, 12 and 13, which remove some of the ambiguity and has the Government say when they intend to set the regulations. These probing amendments—I will not press them to a Division—set out what ought to happen within 60 days of Royal Assent, which would give a degree of clarity for those who are getting their decisions in order and understanding when the provisions are likely to fall. I think that is proportionate. If 60 days is too short or long a period, I hope the Minister will say when the Government intend to do this. I suspect they want to get on with it, but people ought to have that clarity.
Amendment 11 would require the Secretary of State, via regulations, to set a maximum fine that can be imposed on public authorities in breach of the ban within 60 days of the Bill being passed. The suggestion by the hon. Member for Nottingham North to set a deadline of 60 days for the Secretary of State, while well intentioned, is inappropriate.
It is crucial that the threshold for fines is carefully decided in consultation with enforcement authorities, including the Office for Students and The Pensions Regulator. Since that will also be done by the affirmative procedure, the measure will need to go through both Houses. It will need to go through the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords, and it would need to be debated in both Houses. Clearly, it is a piece of legislation that the Government want to be implemented, so I give the Committee my word that we will do this as expeditiously as possible. It is wrong, however, to commit to 60 days.
The same arguments apply to amendments 12 and 13. We agree that expediency in setting out details of the enforcement regime is important, but we need to take into account proper consultation with the regulators and enforcement authorities, as well as due scrutiny in both Houses. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw the amendments—I know that he said they were probing amendments.
I am grateful for that answer from the Minister. I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis. The point about consultation is important, so I hope that is a full consultation, both with potential enforcement authorities and those who speak for those that are going to fall under the provisions, such as the Local Government Association.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Application of prohibitions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
May I take this opportunity to thank the entire Committee? We have worked effectively and expeditiously. I also thank the two Chairs and the Clerks.
Similarly, I want to put on record our thanks to you, Dame Caroline, and Sir George, to the top-class Clerks for all their help, to the civil servants for their work and to my colleagues. I draw special attention to my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy), who was shadow Secretary of State on Second Reading, for her efforts and support while we have been getting our work together, and to the Minister for her collegiate work, both inside and outside this room. I also thank her colleagues.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to the Minister for the case that she is making. We agree with everything she said about that hateful speech, but the problem is that she just said, a minute before, that so long as a person essentially walks out of the council building, or says, “I am talking in an individual capacity”, despite being the leader of the council, they can say all those things and there is no protection under the clause. What meaningful advantage does the clause actually provide?
This very much has the advantage of preventing Leicester City Council from making such a declaration. So anyone representing the views of Leicester City Council and saying, “I am standing here giving the views of Leicester City Council” is not allowed to do that.
Let me move on to exact circumstances. Under the clause, individuals, including councillors, are not prevented from making statements of their personal opinions freely in their own capacity. Councillors are not a public authority and, therefore, they will not be prevented from expressing their support for or voting in favour of a BDS motion. For example, representations made by councillors during a debate that indicate that they would be in favour of their local authority engaging in boycotts or a divestment campaign will not be captured by the clause. It will apply only to statements made on behalf of a local authority. Therefore, if a local authority published the minutes of a debate or a meeting in which a councillor said that they would be in favour of their local authority engaging in such campaigns, this would not be captured.
As I have promised, I will make that distinction clear in the Bill’s explanatory notes. We want this to be very clear. There is a real concern that recent declarations of anti-Israel boycotts, even when they are not implemented in practice, have driven and contributed to rising antisemitism.
Clause 6 sets out the enforcement authorities for the Bill’s provisions. Subsection (2) sets out that the enforcement authority is the Secretary of State or the Treasury, unless otherwise stated. Subsection (4) states that for any decision or statement made by an English higher education provider, the enforcement authority will be the Office for Students. On the face of it, that seems a fairly benign set-up for enforcement, but it creates a distinction in how the Bill treats different public bodies, on which I would like to press the Minister.
On the one hand, the Bill is saying that enforcement against higher education providers will be given over to a third actor, the Office for Students. On the other hand, it is saying that local government will be policed by national Government instead. Amendment 8 tries to put those things on a more consistent footing and to say that there should be less variance in enforcement. The amendment puts forward the Office for Local Government as a more suitable authority for enforcement of the Bill’s provisions in relation to local government.
I hope that the Minister will cover this issue in her response, because I do not know why there is divergence. She can put me right if I am wrong, but I fear that this is a continuation of central Government’s heavy-handed manner with regard to local authorities. Part of the problem with our approach is that we get devolution when local leaders get the answer “right”, but not so much when central Government disagree with them. Adding clause 6 to the Bill unamended will continue the trend of the Government wishing to keep the reins on local government. Given that they have already chosen to use the Office for Students, surely aligning that with the Office for Local Government would make an awful lot more sense.
Amendment 9 is similar to my amendment 4 on Henry VIII powers. The Government are reserving the ability to change the enforcement authorities as they wish under subsection (6). Amendment 9 seeks to delete that provision and ensure that we can set out, through normal parliamentary processes, who will enforce the legislation. Local councils are not going to change that much, and public bodies generally are not going to change that much, but the Government need emergency powers to vary the enforcement agency. If the Government wish to do things a certain way, they should put that in the Bill, and if they wish to change it they should return to Parliament through primary processes.
I urge the Committee to reject the amendments. Let me explain why.
Amendment 8 would establish the Office for Local Government as the enforcement authority in relation to a decision or statement made by local authorities, except where specified otherwise. We have carefully considered the most appropriate enforcement authorities across the sectors that are covered by the Bill; for example, the Pensions Regulator has an existing role in regulating the administration and governance of the local government pension scheme. Although we are expanding some powers, the enforcement authorities listed in the Bill already have an existing role in enforcement for those public authorities. That is not the case for the Office for Local Government, which the hon. Member for Nottingham North is proposing.
The Office for Local Government is not envisaged as an enforcement authority for anything. It is intended to provide data and analysis about the performance of local government and to support its improvement, but it is not envisaged to have a role in regulating local government’s activities. It would therefore not be appropriate for it to have an enforcement role against local authorities in this context. Furthermore, Oflog is an office of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and, as such, does not have a statutory basis. The effect of amendment 8 would therefore be to keep responsibility with the Secretary of State.
Amendment 9 would remove the power given to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office to change the enforcement authorities in relation to a decision or statement captured by the Bill. The Bill will provide a power for the Secretary of State and other enforcement authorities to issue compliance notices, and to investigate and fine public bodies, where there is a breach of the ban. Public bodies subject to the ban will also be susceptible to judicial review if they break this law.
We have carefully considered the most appropriate enforcement authorities across some of the sectors covered by the Bill, such as the Pensions Regulator. For higher education providers on the register of the Office for Students, the Office for Students should be the responsible enforcement authority. As the Bill is drafted, the Secretary of State or the Treasury should be the enforcement authority for all other public bodies subject to clauses 1 and 4. Ministers of the Crown are not subject to the additional enforcement regime but are subject to judicial review.
In time, the most appropriate regulators for each of the sectors covered by the Bill may change. The Bill provides the necessary flexibility, via the power given to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office, to update the respective enforcement authorities if they change. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw his amendments.
I am grateful for the Minister’s reply. I do not intend to press either amendment to a Division, but I will make a couple of points in response.
The Minister mentions that Oflog may not sit elegantly with the Office for Students, because the Office for Students has an existing role doing this type of activity, whereas Oflog does not. However, Oflog was only established in June, so of course it does not have a similar record or similar experience, but that is a person-made thing that could be changed. The Minister also says that Oflog was not envisaged as an enforcement authority, but I cannot believe that the Office for Students was ever really envisaged to be an enforcement authority either.
Similarly, the default enforcement authority in the Bill is the Secretary of State. I do not think that many people go to the ballot box imagining the capacities of different Secretaries of State to kick doors in; I hope not, anyway, because they certainly would not cast a ballot for me. I am therefore not wholly convinced that that is a brilliant argument against the amendment.
I also cannot accept the final point that the most appropriate agency may change in time. If that were the case as a result of the disestablishment of the Office for Students, say, that would itself require primary legislation, and the enforcement agency would be changed routinely as part of that. I do not think that Ministers should have the ability to change enforcement agencies on a whim—because one agency does not give the answers they want, for example—but I think there is a real risk of that. However, I do not think that that is enough to divide the Committee at this point, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jacob Young.)
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir George, and to speak to amendment 3, which stands in my name.
We have now moved to the short but important process of line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, which is itself short but important, with just 17 clauses and a schedule. In the high-quality Second Reading debate, we saw the significant strength of feeling among Members across the House. Frankly, there was not an even party political divide, which always makes things a bit more interesting. I suspect that colleagues’ mailbags, like mine, have been full of strong views from their constituents.
On Second Reading, the Opposition tabled a reasoned amendment setting out our significant concerns about the Bill, which very much start with clause 1. It is a long-standing Opposition position that we do not support boycott, divestment and sanctions-type activity against the state of Israel. As my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly said on Thursday, we are implacably imposed to it. I cannot improve upon that sentiment, which is also the view of the Government. It should not have been hard, if that was what the Government wanted, to build consensus around a proportionate set of regulations that would tackle the issue. Instead, clause 1 and the Bill generally are needlessly broad, with sweeping powers and far-reaching effects. Whether consciously or not, that has created an undesirable degree of division.
The Opposition do not think it wrong, in itself, for public bodies to take ethical investment and procurement decisions, given that there is a long history of councils, universities and others taking a stance in defence of freedom and human rights. After all, it is local ratepayers’ money, and it is reasonable for them to want a say in how to spend or invest it. Similarly, the money in a pension fund belongs not to the Secretary of State but to its members, so it is reasonable for members of funds, through their trustees, to wish to express their views on how the money is invested. We know that that is also the Government’s view, because they have carved out a wide range of exceptions in the schedule. It is clearly not in debate that there ought to be a degree of local say on such activity.
However, it is important to say, at the start of our line-by-line scrutiny, that there is a significant difference between legitimate criticism of a foreign state’s Government and what some have sought to do in recent years. There are those who have sought to target Israel alone, hold it to different standards than others and create hostility towards Jewish people in the UK. That is completely wrong, and we fully support efforts to tackle antisemitism in this country. However, this solution is not sufficient. In its unamended form, clause 1 will go far beyond what we are seeking to resolve and will create a series of problems along the way.
My amendment 3 seeks to clarify the ambiguous wording that a public body may not have regard to a “territorial consideration” when making procurement and investment decisions. As the then shadow Secretary of State—my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy)—and I asked on Second Reading, is that supposed to mean that public bodies may refuse goods from a nation state such as China because of a general disregard for human rights, but may not refuse cotton goods from a territory such as Xinjiang state because of concerns about genocide of the Uyghur population? Or does it mean, as I suspect it may, that all actions of all foreign Governments are beyond the scope of local decision makers unless excepted in the schedule? Perhaps it is illustrative of where we are in the process of reviewing the Bill that that remains in doubt. We have seen doubt in the written evidence, and obviously doubt was felt at Second Reading, too. We need greater clarity in the Bill.
My amendment 3 is a probing amendment. I will not seek to divide the Committee on it, but I hope that it will provide an opportunity for the Minister to give clarity. I think we know that the Government mean that it is not territory-only boycotts that are out of scope, but rather that all boycott-type activity, where it disapproves of foreign conduct, is out of scope. I hope to hear that from the Minister.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts. My amendment 3 would have the same effect as her amendment 23 and is similar to amendment 22, so the same arguments stand.
I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say about amendment 31. It relates to the important debates we had in our evidence sessions about the reasonable observer test, which I struggled with a little. When I asked the witness panel about that, we heard slightly mixed evidence. I was willing to accept it as a term of art which would be well known to the courts and therefore not likely to provide another issue for litigation, but that point seems to be in doubt. I hope that the Minister can be clear about why this approach has been chosen.
I have no doubt that this legislation is heading straight for the courts. That was obvious from written and oral evidence and the Second Reading debate, and it will be obvious throughout our line-by-line discussions. Our debates in Committee will be germane to court proceedings as well, so it is important to have the greatest possible clarity in the Bill and in our discussions.
Finally, amendment 30 relates to a matter that I shall address in detail when we debate clause 4 stand part.
Conceptually, the Bill stands up and is easy enough to understand when we think about public bodies as entities in their own right. However, it swiftly starts to disintegrate when we consider that those entities are made up of a person or persons. I thought that there were some admirable logical gymnastics on that point from the Minister during our evidence sessions. She said that on one day a person might be a councillor, a trustee or a Mayor, and thus the decision maker, but that on another day, in another context, they might no longer be and would therefore not have their freedom of expression fettered. I am not sure that that is credible, but I suspect that the Minister will want to speak to that point, so I hope to hear some greater clarity on it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir George, with other hon. Members from all parties. The Bill is an important piece of legislation that has been brought to this place to fulfil a manifesto commitment to ensure that the UK speaks with one voice internationally, and to promote community cohesion within the United Kingdom. We have 17 clauses and one schedule to discuss in four sittings.
Amendments 22 and 23 would remove the references to “territorial consideration” from the Bill. I am not sure that this is what the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts intended, but the amendments would broaden the scope of the Bill. In its current form, the Bill will prohibit only territorial considerations
“that would cause a reasonable observer of the decision-making process to conclude that the decision was influenced by political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct”,
but the amendments would mean that when a public authority is making a procurement or investment decision, all considerations influenced by political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct would be captured, not just territorial considerations—unless, of course, they were also excluded in the schedule.
The condition of “territorial consideration” in the ban means that the Bill only bans certain boycotts or divestments that “specifically or mainly” have regard to a country or territory. It does not currently, for example, prohibit public authorities that have an environmental policy for their procurement or investment decisions that is universal rather than country-specific. The amendments would arguably prohibit such policies, which is not the intention of the Bill.
Amendment 4 would remove the power granted to the Secretary of State to amend the schedule so as to make exemptions to the ban for certain bodies and functions and certain types of considerations, and to amend or remove regulations made under those powers.
The power is necessary to ensure that the ban can evolve over time and operate as intended. The Bill rightly applies to the full range of public authorities. That is necessary to ensure that we have a consistent approach to foreign policy and to stop public authorities being distracted from their core duties by divisive debates and policies. In the event that the ban has unintended consequences for a public authority and impacts on its ability to deliver its core functions, however, this power will allow the Secretary of State to exempt the body, or a function of that body, from the ban via a statutory instrument. The exercise of the power will be subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses.
The power will also allow the Secretary of State to exempt certain types of considerations from the ban. That may be necessary if the Secretary of State needs to react quickly to international events. In the drafting of this legislation, my officials have been careful to ensure that the Bill applies only to appropriate bodies and types of considerations. However, the Government may also decide that a certain consideration should be made exempt from the ban so that the Bill can operate as intended. The Secretary of State requires the power so that he can respond effectively to potential unintended consequences that the Bill might have on a public authority without the need for primary legislation. If that had to be done through primary legislation, a public authority might have its ability to carry out public functions hindered for an extended period. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful for that answer, but I am afraid that the Minister has rather made the Opposition’s case for us. It is deeply concerning to hear that the purpose of the provision is about anxiety in Government concerning the possibility of a bundle of unintended consequences that could hinder a public body’s activities for a number of months, as has been said. That is the reality—we have said that from start to finish. This thing will set a fire. This thing will roll in ways that we cannot conceive of, because it is so broadly drawn and, in places, so erratically drawn. That is a reason for not proceeding with the Bill in this form, and for coming back together to produce—as we are all keen to—something that is less broad and wide-ranging, but delivering a solution to the problem that we are seeking to tackle.
The Minister’s argument is not for retaining subsection (2), but for revisiting the provisions. I therefore hope that, having said that, she will reflect on the fact that she discussed the great anxiety about the unintended consequences of the Bill. That is what we should be addressing, instead of just giving yet more powers to Secretaries of State to act as they wish. I will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
That is a very good point. This amendment carries the risk of allowing a multitude of different statements on human rights, without any consistency, resulting in the community friction that we all desperately seek to avoid. That is why we are looking to boycott the BDS movement.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. To address the point made by the hon. Member for Harrow East, the circumstance he outlined could happen now, of course. Part of the reason we are here and that legislation in this space is important is that it does not happen in that way, does it? As we heard in the evidence sessions, it almost exclusively tends to be targeted at Israel. I do not think there is any evidence to suggest that local expertise is causing a thousand flowers to bloom across public bodies. Actually, amendment 2 would protect against that because it would give local authorities tools to say, “Look, we can only do this if we can engage in it across the piece, and we don’t think that that is core business.”
The Minister has expressed her concerns about distractions for local authorities. I know from my time in a local authority, during which we pushed back against a boycott of Israel, that these things flair up over a short period, a lot of energy goes into them, and it would have been much better to have had a fixed point. The amendment reserves the right of the Secretary of State to set out the form, so there would be no wild variance across all public bodies. It would give them a fixed point to anchor to, which would take a lot of pressure off the leaders of public bodies.
I am grateful to the Minister for making those points, but the reality is that we are in slightly different positions. I still hold out the hope—and I will be actively working on this between now and the final stages of this Bill—that our positions will become closer. At this point, however, given that the gap has not closed during this debate, I will have to press my amendment to a Division. We want to send a clear message that there are other ways of achieving this very important purpose.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Francis Hoar: Yes, of course they can, but as Professor Tettenborn said, that does not stop councillors making them on the campaign stump, and it does not stop the Mayor making them in a personal capacity. I am afraid I do not find that a convincing argument at all.
Q
Francis Hoar: I have answered that.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Jon Richards: I do not think we do. I think we think that the level of regulation of the LGPS is also already very high. You will have seen that the Government have just introduced a whole series of additional pension consultations, which we have to do—which poor Jo has to deal with and spend a long time on. Again, we think there is significant regulation. We have a regulator and we have a clear fiduciary duty. Trustees have clear responsibilities, including training responsibilities. They have a clear understanding of what should be done. There is a need for improving governance, and we have been doing a lot of work on that, including training. We have also tried to issue guidance on the need to be clear that, if there are challenges, or attempts to move people away from the fiduciary duty, we need to drag people back to that, and they should not be diverted by some of the political games that are potentially out there.
Q
Councillor Jamieson: I am speaking personally here. This is not an LGA view, just to be clear. I think the principle of this legislation is absolutely fine and, in many ways, helpful because it enables people on a pension committee to be very clear that they cannot consider countries when looking at this. However, my caveat is that there are some details in the regulations that need clarifying and those are quite concerning. It is not the principle but some of the details and we just want to make sure that some of those are right.
Q
We speak a lot in this Parliament about transferring power from here to local communities, namely our local councils. The Bill very much transfers power from our local councils to this place. How do colleagues in the local government family feel about that?
Councillor Jamieson: Thank you very much for your kind words. As I should have mentioned in my little statement a moment ago, I am very vexed—and was very vexed as chairman of the Local Government Association—by the underlying trend of giving powers to local government with one hand and taking them away with multiple hands. I can genuinely understand why it is being done, but I do not like the fact that it is another example of central Government just eating away at the freedoms and devolution of local government, but there are far more contentious areas than this one in which I would argue that the Government have taken back powers.
Councillor Deering: My view is very similar. I do not know that in Hertfordshire we feel particularly that this is a power grab from us; I think we understand the rationale of the Bill, or the proposal. If we had more experience of problems in the area, maybe we would feel differently, but I think we would say that we are fairly relaxed about this.