Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th September 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Steve McCabe]

I have to say that I agree with that last comment—I think clause 4 is unworkable, and it adds nothing to the Bill. It is a bit like clause 3(7). If anything, it undermines some of the intentions behind the Bill. Not surprisingly, it has been referred to as a gagging clause. It is virtually Kafkaesque, because it is coming a bit close to thought control. We are asked to accept that a person is not only prevented from doing something that contravenes clause 1 but that they are to be prevented from saying that, if it were perfectly legal to do so, they would want to do it. It would appear that they are not allowed to think that either. As I understand it, the Government say that the justification—this is an honourable aim—is that they are trying to protect community cohesion.

I ask hon. Members to pause for a second and work out how many people they know, and what institutions, would argue that community cohesion is being protected and safeguarded by these measures. The clause might prevent a person from saying that they intend to contravene clause 1 or that they would implement decisions that would, effectively, contravene clause 1 if it were legal to do, but it does not prevent them from saying a whole series of other abusive and offensive things about the state of Israel or anywhere else. In fact, it gives them a licence to say all those other things, and there is not a thing that can be done about it, provided they stay within the limits of existing law. I cannot see how this restriction is going to protect community cohesion. It is likely to have the opposite effect and to give those who do not share the Minister’s objectives on BDS a licence to look for ways to be abusive and offensive and still stay within the limits of the law.

I share the Minister’s desire to protect community cohesion and, as I have said, her overall objectives on the Bill, but I ask her to reflect on whether the proposals will really have the effect she seeks or whether it might be smarter to withdraw what is a pretty dysfunctional clause and go back to the drawing board to see whether there are more practical ways in which we could unite on protecting community cohesion.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow the passionate and high-quality contributions from the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts and my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak. I rise to address the issue of whether clause 4 should stand part of the Bill, because the Opposition believe that it should not. As we have heard, this is the so-called gagging clause, and colleagues will remember the significant discomfort about this provision on both sides of the House on Second Reading. It takes the Bill far beyond the existing consensus on combatting BDS actions that target specific states and into the realms of placing serious restrictions on freedom of expression.

Having listened carefully throughout our proceedings, I still cannot understand why the Government are so attached to clause 4. The road it takes us down is not helpful, and it will only muddy the waters in terms of what the Government seek to do. Let us be clear what clause 4 does. As we have heard from colleagues, it prohibits public bodies—yes, the entity but, in reality, the people who make it up—from making a statement that they would breach clause 1, were they able to, as a result of moral or political disapproval of a foreign state’s conduct. It is one thing to say that they cannot do it; now, they cannot even say that they would wish to—they cannot even talk about it.

We have heard the Minister’s qualification, and I will turn to it shortly. However, we must assess what is on the face of the Bill, which is a really bizarre limit on freedom of expression and contrary to the British values on which we pride ourselves. I know that there are Conservative colleagues who pride themselves on being free speech champions—indeed, it is a big part of what they do in this place and online—and I say to them that this may well be their moment to prove that.

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), who spoke so powerfully on Second Reading about her experiences fighting the British National party and about why this clause cannot stand. She said:

“arguments are never won by suppressing democratic debate”.—[Official Report, 3 July 2023; Vol. 735, c. 615.]

I agree. That is a lesson that politicians on both the left and the right are still wrestling with—certainly in the online space—and need to learn.

There is also a wider problem. This is part of a broader range of efforts by the Government to curtail free expression—a legislative programme that has whittled away at the civic space over many years. That includes the Trade Union Act 2016, the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014, the Public Order Act 2023 and more. The Bill adds to those as yet another unacceptable fetter on free expression. There is consensus to make progress on the Bill, but clause 4 is a particular sticking point.

We have heard from the Minister, in the evidence sessions and today, some admirable attempts to clear this up. She has said that this is a very narrowly understood restriction and that individuals who may be a decision maker on one day can talk in a personal capacity on another, when they are not making the decisions. I think that fails on three fronts.

First, that is not what it says on the face of the Bill. Clause 4(1) states that a statement of intent to “contravene section 1”, were that permissible, is not allowed and, at line 15, the words “(in whatever terms)” are added. I cannot square “in whatever terms” with what the Minister has said. If someone was on a television programme, could they have a disclaimer and set aside the “in whatever terms” provision? I do not think those two things sit together, and I feel confident that an enforcement authority relying on judicial review for oversight would fall back on what is on the face of the Bill, rather than what we have heard.

Secondly, I would argue that a person who is a decision maker because they lead a local authority, is a cabinet member or is even, perhaps, a member of the council or a Mayor is always a decision maker. I do not think that they can just turn it off or on. I do not think that saying that is credible. I know that when people overreach in what they say on social media or in the media more generally, they might try to disassociate themselves from it in an attempt to shield their colleagues, but I do not think they get much shrift in that. Never mind when we get to the conflation where—we have current precedent—a leader of a council is a Member of Parliament. We also have recent and multiple examples, including one that lasted a significant period, where a Member of Parliament was also an elected Mayor. Are they fettered from talking about foreign policy in debates in this place? Can they take off those hats? I do not believe that they credibly can.

Finally, and this is the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak, we heard on Second Reading, and we have heard in Committee, that the purpose of the clause is to stop decision makers adding to or creating a situation where a community, particularly a minority one, is made unsafe. This is important, and the evidence from the Jewish Leadership Council and the Board of Deputies of British Jews brought that home. What the Minister has said in Committee, however, is that a decision maker could essentially say whatever they want, up to the point of advocating a boycott, and avoid that harm. As my hon. Friend says, it implies that a person can stand up and say anything they wish, in the most inflammatory terms, but that would not make people feel or be less safe. All that would do that would be the final phrase, “And I think we should boycott them.” I would say that the 200 words of inflammatory speech—of conspiracy theories and racist or hateful language—is where the harm is.

The clause does not add anything to the Bill, which leads us to our problem. We are being asked by the Government simultaneously to accept that the provision is broad enough to be impactful and to protect from harm, but narrow enough, as the Minister says, to apply in only a very small number of cases at a very small moment in time. I would say that those two things cannot be true together. The clause does not have to exist for the Bill to operate, which is why I believe we can safely vote against it without harming the overall goal.

[Bob Blackman]

Can I just put a contrary argument about the logic and flow of the Bill as planned? First, we have to look at clause 1. We are talking about individuals who are making decisions about placing contracts and buying goods and services from organisations that are affected by foreign policy. That is the first decision. Only the people in that position are affected in this way.

I am not a lawyer, either, but this is how I read the situation. A person cannot say, “I am going to break the law.” We cannot have an individual making a decision standing up and saying that. It clearly would be a contravention of the Bill and would be quite logical, and that is why we have clause 4(1)(a). If the person was to say, “If it were lawful to do so, I would act in this way,” that would create problems in community cohesion. We have seen that in what Leicester wanted to do, which is a prime example of what could happen if this clause is not included. From what I have heard, saying that this is about people in a representative democracy, whatever their guise, muddies the waters. The BDS movement focuses on Israel, the occupied territories and the Golan Heights, and it is targeting public authorities of all types.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful to the Minister for the case that she is making. We agree with everything she said about that hateful speech, but the problem is that she just said, a minute before, that so long as a person essentially walks out of the council building, or says, “I am talking in an individual capacity”, despite being the leader of the council, they can say all those things and there is no protection under the clause. What meaningful advantage does the clause actually provide?

[Felicity Buchan]

This very much has the advantage of preventing Leicester City Council from making such a declaration. So anyone representing the views of Leicester City Council and saying, “I am standing here giving the views of Leicester City Council” is not allowed to do that.

Let me move on to exact circumstances. Under the clause, individuals, including councillors, are not prevented from making statements of their personal opinions freely in their own capacity. Councillors are not a public authority and, therefore, they will not be prevented from expressing their support for or voting in favour of a BDS motion. For example, representations made by councillors during a debate that indicate that they would be in favour of their local authority engaging in boycotts or a divestment campaign will not be captured by the clause. It will apply only to statements made on behalf of a local authority. Therefore, if a local authority published the minutes of a debate or a meeting in which a councillor said that they would be in favour of their local authority engaging in such campaigns, this would not be captured.

As I have promised, I will make that distinction clear in the Bill’s explanatory notes. We want this to be very clear. There is a real concern that recent declarations of anti-Israel boycotts, even when they are not implemented in practice, have driven and contributed to rising antisemitism.

--- Later in debate ---

Enforcement authorities

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 6, page 4, line 28, at end insert—

“(3A) In relation to a decision or statement made by, or for the purposes of, a local authority, the enforcement authority is the Office for Local Government.”

This amendment changes the enforcement authority for local authorities from the Secretary of State or Treasury to the Office for Local Government.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 9, in clause 6, page 4, line 38, leave out subsection (6).

This amendment removes the provision allow the Secretary of State or Minister for the Cabinet Office to amend this section so as to change the enforcement authority in relation to a particular description of decision or statement.

Clause stand part.

[Alex Norris]

Clause 6 sets out the enforcement authorities for the Bill’s provisions. Subsection (2) sets out that the enforcement authority is the Secretary of State or the Treasury, unless otherwise stated. Subsection (4) states that for any decision or statement made by an English higher education provider, the enforcement authority will be the Office for Students. On the face of it, that seems a fairly benign set-up for enforcement, but it creates a distinction in how the Bill treats different public bodies, on which I would like to press the Minister.

On the one hand, the Bill is saying that enforcement against higher education providers will be given over to a third actor, the Office for Students. On the other hand, it is saying that local government will be policed by national Government instead. Amendment 8 tries to put those things on a more consistent footing and to say that there should be less variance in enforcement. The amendment puts forward the Office for Local Government as a more suitable authority for enforcement of the Bill’s provisions in relation to local government.

I hope that the Minister will cover this issue in her response, because I do not know why there is divergence. She can put me right if I am wrong, but I fear that this is a continuation of central Government’s heavy-handed manner with regard to local authorities. Part of the problem with our approach is that we get devolution when local leaders get the answer “right”, but not so much when central Government disagree with them. Adding clause 6 to the Bill unamended will continue the trend of the Government wishing to keep the reins on local government. Given that they have already chosen to use the Office for Students, surely aligning that with the Office for Local Government would make an awful lot more sense.

Amendment 9 is similar to my amendment 4 on Henry VIII powers. The Government are reserving the ability to change the enforcement authorities as they wish under subsection (6). Amendment 9 seeks to delete that provision and ensure that we can set out, through normal parliamentary processes, who will enforce the legislation. Local councils are not going to change that much, and public bodies generally are not going to change that much, but the Government need emergency powers to vary the enforcement agency. If the Government wish to do things a certain way, they should put that in the Bill, and if they wish to change it they should return to Parliament through primary processes.

[Felicity Buchan]

I urge the Committee to reject the amendments. Let me explain why.

Amendment 8 would establish the Office for Local Government as the enforcement authority in relation to a decision or statement made by local authorities, except where specified otherwise. We have carefully considered the most appropriate enforcement authorities across the sectors that are covered by the Bill; for example, the Pensions Regulator has an existing role in regulating the administration and governance of the local government pension scheme. Although we are expanding some powers, the enforcement authorities listed in the Bill already have an existing role in enforcement for those public authorities. That is not the case for the Office for Local Government, which the hon. Member for Nottingham North is proposing.

The Office for Local Government is not envisaged as an enforcement authority for anything. It is intended to provide data and analysis about the performance of local government and to support its improvement, but it is not envisaged to have a role in regulating local government’s activities. It would therefore not be appropriate for it to have an enforcement role against local authorities in this context. Furthermore, Oflog is an office of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and, as such, does not have a statutory basis. The effect of amendment 8 would therefore be to keep responsibility with the Secretary of State.

Amendment 9 would remove the power given to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office to change the enforcement authorities in relation to a decision or statement captured by the Bill. The Bill will provide a power for the Secretary of State and other enforcement authorities to issue compliance notices, and to investigate and fine public bodies, where there is a breach of the ban. Public bodies subject to the ban will also be susceptible to judicial review if they break this law.

We have carefully considered the most appropriate enforcement authorities across some of the sectors covered by the Bill, such as the Pensions Regulator. For higher education providers on the register of the Office for Students, the Office for Students should be the responsible enforcement authority. As the Bill is drafted, the Secretary of State or the Treasury should be the enforcement authority for all other public bodies subject to clauses 1 and 4. Ministers of the Crown are not subject to the additional enforcement regime but are subject to judicial review.

In time, the most appropriate regulators for each of the sectors covered by the Bill may change. The Bill provides the necessary flexibility, via the power given to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office, to update the respective enforcement authorities if they change. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw his amendments.

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for the Minister’s reply. I do not intend to press either amendment to a Division, but I will make a couple of points in response.

The Minister mentions that Oflog may not sit elegantly with the Office for Students, because the Office for Students has an existing role doing this type of activity, whereas Oflog does not. However, Oflog was only established in June, so of course it does not have a similar record or similar experience, but that is a person-made thing that could be changed. The Minister also says that Oflog was not envisaged as an enforcement authority, but I cannot believe that the Office for Students was ever really envisaged to be an enforcement authority either.

Similarly, the default enforcement authority in the Bill is the Secretary of State. I do not think that many people go to the ballot box imagining the capacities of different Secretaries of State to kick doors in; I hope not, anyway, because they certainly would not cast a ballot for me. I am therefore not wholly convinced that that is a brilliant argument against the amendment.

I also cannot accept the final point that the most appropriate agency may change in time. If that were the case as a result of the disestablishment of the Office for Students, say, that would itself require primary legislation, and the enforcement agency would be changed routinely as part of that. I do not think that Ministers should have the ability to change enforcement agencies on a whim—because one agency does not give the answers they want, for example—but I think there is a real risk of that. However, I do not think that that is enough to divide the Committee at this point, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jacob Young.)