War in Ukraine

Debate between Alex Mayer and Tim Roca

Thursday 4th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

I add my commendation to the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) for securing this important debate. Hearing the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) speak reminded me of our trip to Ukraine earlier in the year. Thinking of surreal moments, it cannot be more surreal than being on a road outside Kharkiv watching him try to fix a car that was not working properly.

In recent weeks, it has become painfully clear that many of us underestimated the sophistication and intent behind the Trump Administration’s manoeuvres regarding Ukraine, Europe and Russia. What at first seemed like a genuine pivot towards supporting Ukraine now appears, in retrospect, to have been a carefully orchestrated performance designed to protect Russian assets, pave the way for future business dealings and shape a narrative in which Ukraine’s defeat was treated as inevitable.

At the heart of that strategy lies the $300 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets that hon. Members have mentioned repeatedly this afternoon. For many years, including in this place, we have debated whether those assets should be used to help Ukraine defend itself and rebuild. But we now know from reports that US officials have been placing intense pressure on European Governments to leave those assets untouched, and indeed insisting it is their view that they be returned to Russia after any peace deal, while feigning, for months, a willingness to ramp up support for Ukraine.

That illusion was crucial, because the more Europeans believed that Washington might still back Ukraine, the less likely European Governments were to take unilateral steps, including seizing or repurposing those Russian assets. It was a calculated sleight of hand, and it succeeded. Even now, European leaders remain hesitant, while Washington has now made its position unmistakably clear that Ukraine is expected to accept a settlement that has been shaped by Russian interests—because, I believe, it is Trump’s assessment that Russia will ultimately prevail.

We have to face the facts: the September-October pivot, when Trump and Vance claimed that Russia was losing and Ukraine could win, was most likely theatre. Trump has always accepted the Russian narrative of inevitable Ukrainian defeat, and once the pretence ended, US officials made their message clear to the Ukrainians: “Accept a deal now or face a worse one later. Russia can fight indefinitely; Ukraine cannot.” In my view, this is not diplomacy; it is coercive pressure on Ukraine, and it carries an unmistakable message that the United States Administration are now structuring their policy around the assumption of a Russian victory in the long term. Many of us will be incredibly worried that Trump will pressure Ukraine into giving up territory and ultimately fail to give any meaningful security guarantees. It is for Ukrainians who have paid a price in blood to decide for themselves what price they are prepared to pay for peace.

What does this mean for Europe and for Britain? First, it means that we must accept the truth that if Ukraine is to resist Russian maximalist aims, we must step up now, not in six months or in two years. Secondly, it means that the fate of Russian sovereign assets is not a technical financial matter but a strategic one, and every delay, hesitation and concession on this issue weakens Ukraine and emboldens the Kremlin. Thirdly, it means we must recognise that 2026 will likely be the decisive year in this war. Yes, Russia faces mounting economic difficulties, fuel shortages and internal discontent, and the Kremlin still insists on its war aims, but its capacity to sustain the war is not limitless, and a sense of futility in Moscow is a necessary condition for peace. Ukraine’s ability to hold the line, supported through European unity, is central to bringing that moment closer.

I do not think that we have touched this afternoon on the fact that Ukrainian resilience is not endless either. There are hundreds of thousands of cases of desertion—a stark measure of exhaustion and eroding morale among frontline soldiers. Many units are under-strength and increasingly reliant on poorly trained conscripts rather than experienced volunteers. Some brigades operate without adequate rest, rotation or munitions. Commanders describe troops who are physically depleted, mentally exhausted and losing confidence in the strategic direction of the war. The result is a brittle front, with units stretched to breaking point, lacking resilience and vulnerable to sudden local collapses. Without substantial support, I really worry that the Ukrainian military could face a cascading breakdown as Russia continues to pile on the pressure.

The strain on Ukraine’s civilian population is equally acute. After three years of missile and drone attacks, millions of Ukrainians endure repeated power outages, damaged infrastructure, deep psychological trauma and limited access to heating, electricity and clean water. Mental health support has deteriorated sharply, especially as winter approaches. Displaced families have exhausted their savings, livelihoods have vanished, and the cumulative stress of air raids, mourning for the dead and uncertainty has driven a marked rise in depression, anxiety and long-term trauma. Communities live in a cycle of destruction and partial recovery, eroding resilience with each passing month.

We should be clear-eyed about our own position. We had warning after warning, but we never did enough—the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the full-scale invasion several years ago, yet still we did not ramp up defence spending. The British armed forces have experienced years of hollowing out, cuts to troop numbers and chronic under-investment. Only now are we finally beginning to reverse some of that decline, but can we honestly say that the pace is adequate to the threat we face?

[Alex Mayer (Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard) (Lab)]

I am struck by what my hon. Friend has just said. About eight years ago, during Trump’s first term, I was in the United States with a group of Latvian MEPs. I remember being almost bemused by how often the Latvians wanted to turn whatever discussion we were having to defence. To some extent, it was kind of annoying me by the end, but now I realise that I was completely and utterly wrong; they knew what they were doing in that instance and I did not. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to sell this concept of a peace dividend? I was really sold on it, but it did not exist at that moment, because investment is required first in order to get peace in the long term. What we are really looking for is peace in Europe in the long term, so once again we genuinely do need a peace dividend.

[Tim Roca]

I completely agree. As the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) raised earlier, it is the Baltic countries—Poland, Finland, those that have had direct experience of Russian aggression—that are most clear-eyed about the Russian threat. We do not want a wishy-washy peace that does not deliver genuine security. There has to be genuine security as the basis of any peace.

We in this House must not dodge. We are building a coalition of the willing, and in any peace agreement we may potentially be asked to agree to put British troops on the ground and contribute to maintaining ceasefire lines or to deter Russian aggression. We have to be honest about where the British public are at, and I am not convinced that the British public are yet psychologically in the place they need to be in for that commitment. We all have a duty to contribute to the understanding of the threat that Russia faces to our security here at home. We must speak honestly with the country about the risks that we face, the commitments we may be asked to make, and the moral and strategic imperative of ensuring that Russian aggression does not succeed. If Ukraine falls or is coerced into a settlement that gives the Kremlin what it could not win on the battlefield, Europe will not be safer.

An essential truth that has been revealed in recent months is that Ukrainian resilience is not infinite. Its morale depends on it knowing that the world has not forgotten it. Every air defence system, shell, economic sanction on Russia and measure to support Ukraine and its statehood matters—not just materially but psychologically. Every equivocation, delay and wavering signal emboldens Putin and his gang of thugs. We are clear that Ukraine is fighting not only for its freedom but for the principle that aggression should not be rewarded. I believe that Members of this House agree with those principles. Therefore, we must act with urgency, clarity and resolve.

I think there have been two references by hon. Members this afternoon to Munich. We are 87 years on from what was described as a “total and unmitigated defeat”. Today, I do worry that the Trump Administration’s push for peace, shaped by Putin’s interest, risks making the same mistake in pressuring Ukraine to accept a settlement that serves the aggressor rather than justice or security. Let us be clear in this place that we stand with Ukraine to uphold its sovereignty and security, because we do not want to repeat the errors of the past.