Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Andy Slaughter]

I am going to impress the right hon. Gentleman even more in a moment by making a 180° turn and joining his critique of the Minister.

There may well be times when Zooming is more efficient and appropriate, but there will be many times when face-to-face meetings are more appropriate, including meetings with constituents. During the long debates that we had on the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, I cautioned many times that it moved too quickly to exclude people from the system in the name of efficiency. There is a danger that we will do that here.

The Minister fairly said that we must proceed with caution and be aware of some people’s digital limitations. It is easy to say that, but it is more difficult to ensure that it happens, because the same people who struggle with matters online are those who cannot make their voices heard, and they just disappear from the system. We have excluded people even though it was not intentional.

A second important category—coroners—was touched on. I will not say much now because I expect that we shall come on to the plans to move those online when we come to that section. The Minister will remember that Mr Rebello, senior coroner for the Liverpool and Wirral coroner area and secretary of the Coroners Society, said that he liked to have everybody in the room. He was not saying that for its own sake, but because there are times, when evidence is being heard or judicial decisions are being made rather than in administrative hearings, when it is important for people to be present. Although doing things remotely may have been the best that we could do during covid, that will not always be the case.

I simply caution that if justice is to be properly done, we should be cautious before we throw out the methods that have served us not just for decades but for centuries in assessing the quality of evidence, in advocacy and in ensuring that we get to the best result we can in every case. I hope that we will be as modern and efficient as we can, and use as much technology as we can, but not at the price of excluding people or of not seeing justice done.

[Alex Cunningham]

I appreciate the Minister’s sharing information about his past career; it is fascinating to find out what people have done in their previous lives. Perhaps one angle of his business could have been encouraging people to move to the north where, instead of buying a share in a house for £150,000, they could buy a lovely three-bedroom semi-detached house in Stockton; have access to our wonderful newly opened Globe theatre; and be 30 minutes from the Yorkshire moors, 40 minutes from the Yorkshire dales and only an hour from the Northumberland coast.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Cunningham]

I am glad the Minister is pleased. The amendment would mandate the Secretary of State to commission and lay before Parliament an independent review of the potential impact of the AOCSSP on defendants and the criminal justice system, its efficacy and operational issues.

I have spoken at some length about the numerous concerns raised about the procedure, and sought the Minister’s reassurance on many of them. The most appropriate form of reassurance would be an independent report into the impact of the procedure. The procedure marks quite a significant shift in the way we handle criminal cases and would establish the principle for all summary and non-imprisonable offences to be automated through an online plea, conviction and penalty website. The Opposition recognise the need to explore how we can deploy technology in the criminal justice system, but we do not agree that it can be done without a robust evidence base, especially when we are dealing with changes that potentially pose a threat to defendants’ rights, access to justice and the principle of open justice.

As JUSTICE has noted, the evidence base for the procedure is poor and none of the reports that the Government refer to in the Bill documents—Sir Robin Auld’s 2001 “Review of the Criminal Courts”, Sir Brian Leveson’s 2015 “Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings” and the Government’s own 2016 consultation, “Transforming our Justice System”—explores the real world consequences and risks inherent in the procedure. Furthermore, the 2016 Green Paper, in which the Government first proposed the introduction of an online conviction system, stated that the system should be using three offences before any decision was taken to make it permanent. It noted:

“We propose to test the system with a small number of summary, non-imprisonable offences in the initial phase of introducing the online conviction and fixed fine scheme, which would be: Railway fare evasion; Tram fare evasion; Possession of unlicensed rod and line. If this initial phase is successful, we plan to bring other offences, particularly certain road traffic offences, into the system in future.”

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

It does seem to be a bit of a feature of this Bill. When we were dealing with clause 2, we heard that the abolition of the Cart judicial review was to be a template for other offences, and the same is happening here. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that it is slippery slope? [Interruption.] I hear the Minister snorting from a sedentary position—

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[Andy Slaughter]

Even with the offences my hon. Friend has named so far—offences in which honesty is a factor—it is very important that the questions that he is asking are answered before we approve the Bill, especially if we are to get the number of offences increased through secondary legislation.

[Alex Cunningham]

My hon. Friend is entirely correct. That is why we have tabled the amendment, which would require data and proper research to be conducted, so the Government have something by which to measure their success or otherwise in introducing the procedure. My real concern is that future offences may well just come through the secondary legislation route, where the amount of scrutiny is somewhat limited. The Government propose using the procedure in the Bill initially for these offences, but nothing in the Bill suggests that the testing procedure the Government committed to in 2016 will actually be used to assess the procedure. Can the Minister confirm otherwise? That would be welcome.

As Transform Justice has pointed out, there is no evidence in the public domain about the online motoring conviction system, which was introduced in 2015. There is no public access to the postal charge paperwork, nor to the online form. There is no public data on how many people respond to the postal charge—we covered that point already—or how many complete the form online. There is also no data on how many people plead guilty or not guilty, or on the sanctions received.

The Government consulted on the automatic online conviction proposal in 2016, and many of the respondents raised concerns. None have been allayed in the interim. Indeed, the single justice procedure, which the procedure builds on, had only been in use for one year when the Government consulted on the online procedure. Since then, much more information about the workings and indeed failings of the single justice procedure has come to light. The Government have not explained how the current issues with the single justice procedure would not simply translate across to the AOCSSP procedure, or even be exacerbated, given the removal of any human oversight. JUSTICE has also said that it is not aware of any similar system deployed in other jurisdictions from which any advantages or disadvantages could be studied.

For those reasons, the Opposition believe that amendment 45 is vital. Significant changes to our justice system should be evidence based, and making evidence-based decisions now will save the Government and the justice system a lot of problems further down the line. I appreciate that I have sought rather a lot of information from the Minister thus far, but we are very keen that we go down the route where we get it right. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Andy Slaughter]

This third and final group of amendments deals with one specific point that causes us concern, but it is a matter on which I can be relatively brief. I give notice that, subject to what the Minister has to say, we will seek a vote on amendment 15, which is the substantive amendment.

Proposed new section 29A(5) provides that

“Where…an impugned act is upheld”—

either until the quashing takes effect in respect of a suspended quashing order, or retrospectively in respect of an prospective-only quashing order—

“it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been unimpaired by the relevant defect.”

We have significant concerns about the impact of that provision on collateral challenge, which this group of amendments would address.

Ordinarily, where a court has found a measure unlawful, even if it has not been quashed, it is possible to rely on that finding of unlawfulness in other proceedings—that is called “collateral challenge”. A person who has had to pay a tax under unlawful regulations, for example, would normally be able to bring a claim against HMRC to be refunded the money. However, new section 29A(5) requires an unlawful measure to be treated as lawful. That would preclude relying on the unlawfulness of a measure in other proceedings. That raises the possibility of people being charged with a criminal offence under unlawfully made delegated legislation, for example, but not being able to raise as a defence the fact that the legislation was subsequently found to be unlawful. As IRAL recognised, that position would leave the law in a “radically defective state”. A further subsection should be included to protect collateral challenge and third- party rights and defences where a remedy under new section 29A(1) is ordered.

New section 29A(5) states:

“Where...an impugned act is upheld by virtue of subsection (3) or (4), it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”

Imagine if one of the statutory instruments issued by the Health Secretary during the coronavirus crisis, which created imprisonable criminal offences, were declared illegal by a court. If a court granted one of the new remedies, this subsection would make it as though that imprisonment were always legal. A person could therefore not argue as a defence in the magistrates or Crown court that the statutory instrument was invalid, because this subsection requires a judge to pretend that it was valid.

As IRAL noted in paragraph 3.66 of its report:

“We readily acknowledge that the law would be in a radically defective state if such collateral challenges to the validity of administrative action were impossible.”

We agree and believe that collateral challenges should be expressly preserved in the Bill.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

Successive Tory-Lib Dem coalition and Tory Governments have made much of wanting to do away with red tape and simplify the law, but we have seen quite the opposite in practice. Does my hon. Friend agree that the legislation is yet another example of that? The sentences that he has just voiced are perhaps the best illustration of it. There will be all sorts of consequences to these particular measures. They are actually making things more complicated, less clear, and will provoke further litigation in time.

[Andy Slaughter]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point, and makes it better than I did. When one starts down this tinkering route—as the Government have in the Bill—and starts trying to nudge judges one way, putting in lists of qualifications and conditions with matters that have to be taken into account, altering the time period over which orders will take place, there are bound to be consequences. We have already said that there is likely to be uncertainty and satellite litigation, but genuine harm could also be caused in this way. I agree, as well, about red tape. It is all very well to try to cut through in that way—and it sounds very good when Ministers say it at the Dispatch Box—but unfortunately it leads to tragedies such as Grenfell Tower. Without the protection given by legislation and regulation on issues such as health and safety, the public are put at risk.

Even where a case has been brought and a decision has been found unlawful, the Bill stands to threaten the ability of people to bring collateral challenges. Proposed new section 29A(5) states that when a prospective-only or suspended quashing order has been made, the unlawful act is

“to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect”,

either retrospectively or until the quashing comes into effect. That situation, in which the court pretends that an unlawful decision was valid for a period of time, would appear to inhibit the ability of the person to rely on its unlawfulness in other proceedings. In other words, a person could be arrested under a regulation ruled unlawful by a court, but they would not be able to use that in their defence. The IRAL report quotes Professor David Feldman, whom we heard from, on the “intuitive revulsion” felt against that state of affairs, and concludes:

“We readily acknowledge that the law would be in a radically defective state if such collateral challenges to the validity of administrative action were impossible.”

Clause 1 fails to protect the ability of individuals to rely on the finding of unlawfulness of a measure in other contexts—for example, as a defence to criminal proceedings. A further subsection should be included to protect collateral challenge and third-party rights and defences where a remedy under proposed new section 29A(1) is ordered. The possibility of collateral challenges should be expressly protected by proposed new section 29A(5A), which is what amendment 15 seeks to do by ensuring that if a prospective-only or suspended quashing order is made, the illegality of the delegated legislation can be relied on.

That is really the only point I need to make on this group of amendments; of course, the other amendments are consequential on amendment 15. I hope that the Minister has taken the point. I ask him, in responding, to say first whether he supports amendment 15; if he cannot, as I say, we will press it to a vote. Would he then accept that this is an issue that needs to be dealt with? It clearly is. It may be unintended, but it is nevertheless a consequence of what the Government have set out to achieve in clause 1. Before the Bill comes back, it really needs to be dealt with.

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[Alex Cunningham]

I am glad my hon. Friend is going to get on to costs. In the evidence session earlier this week, the Minister spoke about having the privilege of attending the Lord Chancellor’s swearing in. He said:

“One of the things he swears is that he will ensure that resources are provided to the judiciary. This is not just about public money per se; it is about time”.––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 30, Q32.]

Should cash get in the way of justice, as it is here?

[Andy Slaughter]

Everything has a cost—it is a question of whether it is a reasonable cost. Unfortunately, we have seen the justice system of this country and every aspect of the budget of the Ministry of Justice cut more than any other Department in the last few years. Even the much heralded uplifts over the next few years will take us not much further than restoring half of the money that has been cut. I think it sits rather ill in the Government’s mouth to start talking about money, having done so much damage.

There is not an infinite amount of money, although the Government seem to discover various money trees around the place, and it is a legitimate factor to consider. What I am going on to look at is whether, in the case of Cart, the cost is a justifiable cost, either because of the remedy it provides or per se.

As I have said, Cart judicial reviews are used in cases where no other right to appeal exists. This type of judicial review is a crucial safeguard against errors in the tribunal system in decisions of significant importance for the people concerned, which often involve the most fundamental rights. It is usually used in asylum and human rights cases, in which the stakes are extremely high. In many cases, these are life-or-death decisions. It is unacceptable to insulate such decisions from judicial scrutiny.

In most cases, it is true that these are asylum and human rights cases, but not all of them are. One of our witnesses—Dr Morgan, perhaps—mentioned that Cart itself was not an asylum and immigration case. It would be wrong to categorise Cart judicial reviews as being for asylum and human rights cases. There are others as well.

Clause 2 would severely restrict Cart judicial review. The Government have not made the case for removing this vital safeguard against serious errors in the tribunal system in cases of the utmost importance. With this clause, the Bill would set a precedent for removing certain cases or areas from the scope of judicial review.

The desire to get rid of judicial oversight in any area should be of the utmost concern to those who care about the rule of law and the separation of powers. There is simply no evidence that judicial review is currently so prejudicial to good administration that it needs to be significantly restricted, and there was no conclusion to that effect in the Government-sponsored independent review. That is wholly unsurprising. That Governments find judicial review at times to be inconvenient is no justification for attempting to avoid judicial scrutiny, in this or other areas. It is particularly concerning in this specific instance.

The Bill will largely extinguish the power of the High Court to oversee decisions of the upper tribunal relating to permission to appeal first-tier tribunal decisions. This will affect all four chambers of the upper tribunal, and individuals will no longer be able to apply to the High Court. The removal of this safeguard is likely to impact some of the most vulnerable people in the system, taking away their protection from errors made by public authorities. These include refusals of asylum and, where human rights are engaged, decisions to deport someone, including where that person may have lived in this country for much, most or even all of their life.

It is important to understand that removing the normal supervision of the High Court in this area is particularly problematic given the existing constraints in the asylum and immigration system for the tribunal, and in the context of the Nationality and Borders Bill, which threatens to exacerbate those constraints. The danger is that those passing through this system will be at heightened risk of failing to receive a fair and full hearing of any appeal whatsoever. If so, the administrative decision to refuse asylum to, or deport, a person will go without any effective or independent oversight. That will be exponentially harmful, because it will tend to insulate the original administrative decision making from the degree of scrutiny that is necessary to have any prospect of improving and maintaining its quality.

The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that public bodies make lawful decisions. The provisions in this Bill would do nothing to improve that, such as by ensuring access to high-quality legal representation from an early stage in proceedings, or by improving guidance. Instead of reducing need, the Bill simply removes access to Cart judicial review, which allows individuals to challenge decisions to refuse them a right of appeal where those decisions are made unlawfully. Doing so narrows access to justice and means that people who are subject to unlawful decisions have less opportunity for redress. Cart judicial review is a vital remedy of last resort for people subject to unlawful decision making, and should be defended.

Turning to the statistics and costings, unlike prospective-only remedies or a presumption in favour of suspended quashing orders, it is right to say that reversing Cart was a recommendation of the independent review of administrative law. The counter-argument in favour of clause 2 is primarily said to be the cost of Cart cases and the use of valuable judicial resources. The costs of Cart JRs are described as a “disproportionate and unjustified burden” on the system. The Bill’s impact assessment estimates that between 173 and 180 High Court and upper tribunal sitting days will be freed up each year through clause 2, representing savings of between £364,000 and £402,000 a year. That figure is not high—it is less than some Members can pick up in their alternative jobs over a period of a few years—especially when considering the important role of Cart JRs in preventing serious injustice and ensuring that key decisions of the upper tribunal are not insulated from challenge.

A High Court judge can consider at least five applications for Cart judicial review in a single sitting day, an assumption that may be overstating the time taken to consider a single case. That figure of £364,000 to £402,000 is also inflated, because it considers the costs of the upper tribunal rehearing the case. That will occur because an unlawful upper tribunal permission decision has been identified by the High Court, so including those costs in the impact assessment is to include savings that result from allowing unlawful decisions to stand. That position cannot be acceptable.

Further, the average number of hours per Cart judicial review in the High Court that the impact assessment provides is 1.3 hours—again, that means up to five Cart JRs per day, which could easily be overestimating the time it takes a High Court judge to consider a single Cart judicial review case. That is especially true because there is a specific streamlined procedure for Cart JRs, which includes that if permission for the Cart JR is granted, unless a substantive hearing on that judicial review is requested, the court will automatically quash the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission. Moreover, that figure is inflated because it includes the cost of the upper tribunal rehearing the appeal in a successful case. That would constitute a cost saving resulting from allowing unlawful decisions to stand: those costs would only be saved because the upper tribunal’s unlawful refusal of permission to appeal was immunised from challenge.

There is already a high threshold for the use of Cart judicial reviews. In order for permission to be granted, the case must be shown to be arguable with a reasonable prospect of success. Lawyers must also show that there is an important point of principle under consideration, or another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. Applications for Cart judicial review of a decision must be submitted within 16 days of the initial decision having been sent, instead of the usual three months available in other types of judicial review. Unlike other judicial reviews, there is no right to an oral hearing: Cart judicial reviews are dealt with by paper application only, thus requiring minimal judicial resources.

As we have already touched on, IRAL’s recommendation to reverse Cart judicial review was based on the 0.22% figure, but I think it is now generally accepted that that figure was seriously flawed. The criticism of that figure attracted the support of the Office for Statistics Regulation, and the Government have now accepted it: their own analysis suggests that at least 3.4% of cases are successful, a figure 15 times higher than IRAL originally estimated. However, that figure is also not universally accepted, with the Public Law Project estimating that success rates for Cart JR are considerably higher. I know that there are a number of figures flying around, but I think quite a persuasive case was made for the figure of around 5%. I think the variation stems from IRAL’s misunderstanding of how to calculate success in Cart JRs, as well as procedural complexities that mean that they are rarely accurately reported.

Further, the Government’s definition of success does not reflect the purpose of Cart JRs and is unduly narrow. The analysis in the consultation response and impact assessment adopts an unduly narrow definition of success, which artificially deflates the success rate and artificially increases the projected cost savings. The Government define success as not only success in a judicial review, but also a finding in favour of the claimant at a subsequent substantive appeal in the upper tribunal. That is because the Ministry of Justice assumes that a Cart JR is successful if not only the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal is overturned, but permission to appeal is granted and the appeal against the first-tier tribunal’s decision is allowed.

That excludes all the cases in which Cart judicial review played a vital role in correcting an error of law in the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal, but the subsequent appeal was dismissed. That is not the normal approach to defining success in judicial review. It ignores the benefit that flows from a case that meets the Cart criteria being heard in the upper tribunal, allowing that more senior tribunal to consider important points of principle or practice and opening up the possibility of appeal to the Court of Appeal, thus preventing the upper tribunal from being insulated from the general courts system.

A Cart judicial review should be regarded as successful if it results in the refusal of permission to appeal being overturned. If we adopt that definition, the success rate is more like 5.5% or 6%, which is some 25 times higher than the IRAL panel thought and means that more than one in 20 cases are successful. That might be regarded as a reasonable and appropriate success rate for challenges to decisions by a senior tribunal, but that view is surely fortified by the nature of the issues at stake.

In any full assessment of the proportionate use of judicial resource, account needs to be taken of the weight of the interests. In the administrative appeals chamber, many appeals concern access to benefits that are designed to prevent destitution and homelessness, or to meet the additional living costs of disabled people. In the immigration and asylum chamber, almost all cases involve asylum and human rights appeals. The potential injustices at stake concern the most fundamental rights and may literally be a matter of life and death. The cases that succeed in a Cart judicial review will also, by definition, involve important points of law or practice, which would otherwise not be considered, or compelling reasons such as the complete breakdown of fair procedure.

Cart JRs have several purposes, including the identification of errors of law in upper tribunal permission decisions where important issues of principle or practice are raised. That will be achieved if the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal is quashed. The impact assessment states that of a total of 92 cases, out of 1,249 applications, 48 were remitted to the upper tribunal for permission to appeal decisions. That is in the context of immigration Cart JRs for 2018-19, minus cases pending an appeal decision in the upper tribunal. Therefore, based on those figures and a more accurate definition of success, which still does not account for settlement, the success rate is 7.37%—more than double the 3.4% that the Government now rely on, and more than 30 times the original figure cited by IRAL. In addition, there is required to be an arguable case that has a reasonable prospect of success.

In short, the streamlined procedure for Cart judicial reviews, together with the high test for permission in Cart cases, provides a proportionate means of achieving the aim, which the Government commend, of ensuring some overall judicial supervision of the decisions of the upper tribunal in order to guard against the risk that errors of law of real significance slip through the system. An entirely appropriate and proportionate amount of judicial resource is used in identifying and correcting errors of law that would have potentially catastrophic consequences for the individuals concerned.

As I have said, it is not just the number of cases but their nature that is concerning. Many relate to immigration and asylum. Many of the remainder concern access to benefits for the disabled and others facing destitution. The result of these appeals may decide whether someone has the means to live and to be housed, or whether they may be deported, separated from their family and face potential mistreatment, and the Government are not unaware of that.

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[Alex Cunningham]

As we are looking at this whole issue of scrutiny, which is so important, I cannot quite understand why the Government or anybody else would not want greater scrutiny of what they do on a day-to-day basis. Does my hon. Friend understand my feelings on that?

[Andy Slaughter]

I do understand, and I think that quite a lot of our witnesses understood that as well and could balance the relatively small numbers and the particular provision for Cart, which the Supreme Court upheld, against the very serious nature of these cases. I will go on to outline some cases. I will not do all 57, but I will give a handful of cases that will perhaps indicate the variety and the seriousness of the cases that we are dealing with here. It is very easy to deal with the law in the abstract, but we need to look at the type of individual who is affected and at the profound effect that it has on their life.

In addition to the equality implications, the fact that Cart JRs primarily relate to immigration and asylum decisions means that the human rights consequences may be particularly severe, impacting the right to life and the absolute right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, which are protected by articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights, as well as the right against return to persecution, which is protected by the refugee convention. An unchallenged, erroneous tribunal decision could also lead to long-term family separation, engaging article 8 of the ECHR, on the right to respect for a private and family life. Cart JRs prevent serious injustices. The Government recognised in the consultation that the removal of Cart JRs “may cause some injustice”. Almost all the cases in the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier tribunal relate to asylum and human rights appeals, which engage the most fundamental rights, including, in some cases, the difference between life and death.

I mentioned the 57 cases that were cited by ILPA, and there were also 10 cases identified by IRAL. Each involved a person’s fundamental rights and the upper tribunal incorrectly applying the law. Those examples included: parents’ applications for their child to be reunited with them; a child’s application to remain in the UK to receive life-saving treatment; the asylum claim of a victim of human trafficking and female genital mutilation; and many other deportation and asylum decisions where, if deported, the individuals faced persecution, their lives were at risk and/or they would be separated from their families. So let me briefly go through a handful of the cases that were cited.

In one case, the right to a Cart appeal saved a humanist asylum seeker who would have been wrongfully deported to Egypt to face state-sponsored persecution and vigilante violence. He relied on Cart to demonstrate that the tribunal judge erred in his case. It is also worth noting that the Home Office conceded his claim before it went to a full hearing at the Court of Appeal, which meant that his case will not show up on official statistics regarding Cart. Then we have the case of Nadeem, a young Afghan man who came to the UK as an unaccompanied minor and was in the care of social services. He was tortured by the Taliban as a child. His case was dismissed because, even though it was accepted that he was at risk in his home area, no medical evidence had been obtained to show that he was traumatised as a result of that torture. The trauma he had experienced and its impact on him made it unreasonable for him to relocate to Kabul. His brother, who had come here in the same circumstances, had that medical report, and his appeal was allowed. The day after Nadeem’s appeal decision was sent out, the country guidance showing that it was possible to safely relocate to Kabul was ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal. Nadeem was urgently referred to the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, which used Cart JR to enable him to bring his appeal. This appeal was subsequently allowed on the basis that the original decision was irrational. He was then recognised as a refugee and is starting to build his life in the UK with his brother, safe from the Taliban.

Then we have the case of Tania, who was a child victim of trafficking. Her asylum appeal was dismissed by the first-tier tribunal, which found that she was not trafficked and would not be at risk on return. She was 15 years old when she was transported to the United Kingdom to work with the family in question. Permission to appeal to the upper tribunal was sought, because, as a question of law, she could not “voluntarily” undertake such work as a minor. As a victim of trafficking, and given her profile, the objective evidence demonstrated that she would be at risk of persecution on return. Permission to appeal was refused by both the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal, but a Cart JR of this decision was successful, with the judge finding that the tribunals had failed to address the fact that Tania was a child victim of trafficking in their reasoning. The decision of the upper tribunal to refuse permission to appeal was quashed and permission to appeal to the upper tribunal was granted. Tania was subsequently recognised as a refugee and is no longer at risk of trafficking and forced labour, thanks to the successful intervention by way of Cart JR.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

Can my hon. Friend think of any reason why a Government or any other body should be afraid of the judicial review process if they think that they got it right in the first place?

[Andy Slaughter]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who makes exactly the right point. He did not hear me paying tribute to him when he was temporarily detained elsewhere. I am pleased that, as an experienced shadow Minister, he is on the Committee.

People in charge of public authorities should welcome judicial review, which, like many court and tribunal processes, is a way to scrutinise and improve decision making either directly through a challenge or because they want to avoid such a challenge. In my humble way, I remember the 10 years or so when I was running a local authority, and unless other members of the Committee were also in that position—there may well have been—I have probably been subject to more judicial reviews than anyone on the Committee. I must say that while we can take a view on the merits of an individual case, the process is generally beneficial for the authority. As my hon. Friend said, what have they got to hide?

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[Alex Cunningham]

In his evidence to the Committee, Sir Stephen Laws said:

“In my submission to the independent review of administrative law I drew attention to what I thought were the beginnings of a breakdown in trust between the political world and the judiciary, and the political salience of the issues around judicial review is evidence of that.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 14, Q8.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is lamentable that even those who were called by the Government to give evidence have reservations about current relationships between the courts and politicians, and how they could be worsened in future?

[Andy Slaughter]

It is not unique to this Government to be found wanting or to be challenged by the courts in such a way. Other Governments have not found favour with the courts and may have resented their intervention, but on the whole those Governments have sucked it up, if I can put it that way. However, this Government seem to take the view—we have recent evidence of this—that if they do not like the way that proceedings are going or tribunals are conducted, they can simply change the rules or change the tribunal.

I agree with my hon. Friend. I do not want to be overly dramatic, but these are worrying times. The Ekins view, which I described in the evidence sessions as tit for tat—a decision is taken and if the Government do not like it, they have a ready-made power to change it—is bad enough, but tinkering with the court process is worse.

[Alex Cunningham]

There was much discussion in the evidence sessions about tit for tat, or whichever expression one wishes to use, and it is lamentable. Surely the Government have always been able to address issues that have embarrassed them, and they do not have to take this broad-brush approach to negate that possibility in the future.

[Andy Slaughter]

Much of the evidence suggests that the public are quite sophisticated about this. They see that all Governments make mistakes, get caught out and have to change their minds. In the end, the public make a judgment about a Government’s overall record. It is quite wrong for Governments to be, as this one is, so thin skinned that any criticism requires not just a response but, effectively, a punishment of the person or body who does the criticising.

What are the consequences of the changes that clause 1 of the Bill makes to the Senior Courts Act 1981, to provide for quashing orders either not to take effect until a specified date or to come into force without any retrospective effect? As has been said, the usual practice is that the quashing order comes into force immediately and operates as if the decision that has been ruled unlawful had always been null and void. Remedies in judicial review are discretionary and will often result in a declaration that the act was unlawful, with remedial action left to the public body. However, when a court decides to issue a quashing order, it is right that the unlawful decision should stand no longer and that those affected should have proper redress. Because a court can make this remedy after finding that a public body acted unlawfully, the quashing order renders the unlawful act null and void; the act never had any legal effect, and therefore its consequences must be unwound.

Whereas quashing orders have hitherto been made by the courts to confirm that a decision by a public body is of no legal effect, the Bill provides that the effect of such orders may be suspended until a prescribed time, potentially subject to conditions—temporarily validating a decision that has been judged unlawful. In deciding whether to suspend an order or make it prospective-only, the courts must have regard to a range of factors, including any detriment to good administration that may arise from its decision. The Bill requires a court that has decided to make a quashing order to suspend the order or to limit its retrospective effect if doing so offers

“adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”,

unless the court

“sees good reason not to do so.”

Thus clause 1 would limit the effectiveness of quashing orders.

The quashing order is a powerful tool that ensures that unlawful Government decisions can be overturned, and that those who have suffered the consequences can obtain real redress. The courts have the power to suspend the effect of quashing orders, although the power is rarely exercised. Although the case law on this is not absolutely certain, it is reasonable to argue that courts already have this power. Suspension operates like a time lock on the unlawful action, meaning that the court can delay the effect of its ruling and give the public authority time to sort out its mistake. Limiting the retrospective effect ensures that the remedy has effect only on the date that it is made, rather than affecting things that have already been done. If the court suspends the quashing order or makes it prospective-only, things done before the suspension or things done in the past are treated as if they are valid. The current law strikes the right balance in reserving this remedy for exceptionally rare cases.

As I have said, it is important to remember that all remedies in judicial review are discretionary. In exercising their remedial discretion, the courts will consider a range of factors and will take into account the impact of quashing on certainty and the needs of good public administration. Where significant administrative disruption or chaos could result from a quashing order, the courts have the power to issue a declaration instead, and they often do. Often, the court will simply make a finding that a public body has acted unlawfully and leave it to the public body to determine what action should be taken in response to that finding.

Research by the Public Law Project shows that, in challenges to statutory instruments, a declaration rather than a quashing order is the most common remedy following a successful judicial review. That practice shows that the courts deal very well at the moment with all those circumstances, and it calls into question the need for clause 1. In any event, there are already limitations on a court’s ability to grant quashing orders. For example, section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 requires the High Court to refuse a remedy if it appears

“highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different”

if the public authority had not acted unlawfully, unless there are

“reasons of exceptional public interest.”

Section 31(6) of the same Act also allows the Court to refuse relief on the grounds of undue delay

“if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.”

Claimants’ access to quashing orders is therefore already strongly regulated. However, an immediate and retrospective quashing order is an important tool for righting injustice and ensuring that the Executive acts only within its legal powers. Combined with the existing controls on quashing orders, the proposed reforms weigh the scales of justice too heavily in favour of the Executive. Prospective-only quashing orders would invalidate an unlawful act only from the point of the court order onward, leaving past conduct, including conduct complained of by the claimant, untouched.

Clause 1 goes significantly further than the recommendations made by IRAL. The IRAL panel recommended legislating for a discretion to make suspended-only quashing orders. It did not recommend legislating for prospective-only quashing orders, and it recommended against a presumption of limiting the effects of a quashing order in this way. Subsection (9) of proposed new section 29A, inserted by clause 1, creates a presumption that these weakened quashing orders “must” be made where to do so would provide “adequate redress”—absent good reasons. Such a presumption not only goes against the Government’s stated intention to provide flexibility for judges, but risks encouraging the use of these new orders in circumstances where it would be unjust and unfair to do so. As the Government acknowledge in their consultation response,

“Presumptions were not recommended by the IRAL Panel and generally met with scepticism from respondents to the consultation.”

However, it does not appear to have had any effect.

Suspended and prospective-only quashing orders undermine the rule of law, which requires that no person should be subject to unlawful action and that individuals have access to an effective judicial remedy against unlawful measures. Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights further protects people’s rights to an effective remedy. Although the Bill requires that the court considers whether a provision offers adequate redress before making a suspended or prospective-only quashing order, it does not preclude the possibility of an order being made without adequate redress. We are concerned about the potential for suspended or prospective-only quashing orders to impact third parties affected by an impugned human rights or equality decision and the implications for their ability to access legal aid. It is unclear whether cases likely to result in suspended or prospective-only orders would meet the test of sufficient benefit to the individual, and therefore justify a grant of legal aid.

Most concerning of all is the prospect that either or both types of orders could be mandatory for the judge, as the clause contains an apparent presumption that they will be made where there is “adequate redress”. The Bill does not specify who for, but one of our amendments deals with that. The Bill as it stands will reduce judicial discretion to give an appropriate remedy. I will say more about that later.

Clause 1 risks undermining individuals’ ability to hold the Government to account. The provision could also mean that individuals are found guilty of offences made under unlawful regulation or are unable to be compensated for the impacts of unlawful state action. The point of judicial review is to ensure good decision making by public bodies. It is concerned not with the result in itself, but that the right procedures are followed and that the body is operating within the law. Within the separation of powers that forms our political system, it is an important check by one branch on another, acting in the interests of the public. The Bill does nothing to improve the decision making of public bodies; in many ways it will have the opposite effect. Making challenges harder to bring and remedies less effective may make things easier for Government, but at a cost to the general public.

I will give two or three examples of previous cases. I remind the Committee that the Government’s own election manifesto promised to

“ensure that judicial review is available to protect the rights of the individuals against an overbearing state”

and to secure access to justice for ordinary people—laudable aims. These new remedies will not, however, uphold that promise. I will demonstrate that with a short synopsis of some case studies.

In the case of the British Medical Association, the Health Secretary issued the National Health Service Pension Schemes, Additional Voluntary Contributions and Injury Benefits (Amendment) Regulations 2019, which tried to introduce a power to suspend or withhold payments of NHS pensions, where an employee had been charged with an offence. There was no right of appeal from that power, and the suspension did not come to an end when the employee was acquitted or where proceedings were withdrawn.

At the time of the case, that power had never been exercised. The British Medical Association brought the case as a matter of principle: that potentially innocent medical staff could be denied a pension simply for being charged with an offence that they did not commit. Finding the regulations to be unlawful, the judge granted a quashing order.

Given that the case did not relate to an actual use of the power or an individual who was a victim of the power, the judge might have regarded a suspended or prospective-only order as adequate, meaning that under the Bill, the judge would have been expected to suspend the effect of the order or make it prospective-only. However, in the time that it took the Health Secretary to consult on the draft and lay new regulations, there would have been nothing to prevent Ministers from exercising the unlawful powers, as doing so would have been valid under proposed new section 29A(3) to (5) of the 1981 Act, which makes otherwise illegal uses of power legal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

My hon. Friend is giving a series of good examples as to why the Government’s proposals are flawed. In his evidence to the Committee on Tuesday, Dr Morgan said:

“I would take the presumption out altogether. I think what this clause is doing—certainly what it should be doing—is enlarging the power of the courts to tailor relief in a way that they see fit, and removing the obstacle that the Supreme Court laid in their path in Ahmed v. HM Treasury (No. 2). Thus, I just do not see why it is there. The Government say that it is to encourage the courts to use this remedy, but I do not see why we should try and push the courts in a particular direction.”

He went on:

“I also think, if subsection (9) is taken out, subsection (8) could be taken out as well.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 24, Q23.]

So there is clearly support for the line that my hon. Friend is taking.

[Andy Slaughter]

I am grateful for that quote from Dr Morgan, which is far more learned and eloquent than anything I can come up with. His evidence was very measured and showed nothing other than looking at the Bill with a fresh pair of eyes. On some of the decisions he supported the Government, and in some cases he could not see any point or purpose.

There is grave concern about the impact of any changes to the law of judicial review on children and young people with special educational needs and their families. Children and young people with special educational needs often rely on legal remedies such as judicial review to ensure that they receive the special educational provision and wider support to which they are legally entitled. Judicial review is an essential remedy in cases where there is no other way that a complaint can be resolved—for example, by complaining directly to the public body concerned or the local government and social care ombudsman. Any changes to the law on judicial review should take account of the particular factors relating to children and young people with special educational needs.

I will give a few examples of situations that arise quite commonly; Members may well have been involved in some such cases. Local authorities may fail to comply with statutory timescales for issuing or amending an education, health and care plan for a child or young person, resulting in the child or young person missing special educational provision or schooling. A local authority may fail to make the provision set out in a child or young person’s EHC plan, resulting in the child or young person missing education; fail to comply with the order of the first-tier tribunal; or decide to stop providing the home-to-school transport to which a child or young person is entitled, meaning that they cannot get to their place of learning. A school governing body may refuse to admit a child or young person despite the school’s being named in the child’s EHC plan, where there has been no formal exclusion. Those are just a few examples of how judicial review can be used to ensure that children and young people receive the special educational provision and support to which they are entitled by law. It is essential that it remains a meaningful option for them and their families.

The measures, if enacted, will weaken the effectiveness of the remedies available to the courts and will deny an essential remedy to children and young people with SEND and their families. The Bill will deter people from using judicial review as a way of righting unlawful decisions by public bodies. Any change to judicial review should encourage access to justice, not limit it. It will also limit claimants’ access to legal redress for unlawful actions, which will take away any accountability of Government or agencies for unlawful action that has already taken place.

I will make some very specific comments on the first group of amendments. The lead amendment is amendment 12, which is the only one I will press to a vote. Amendments 40 and 41 are contingent on amendment 12.

Proposed new section 29A(1)(b) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 allows for quashing orders to be made including provision

“removing or limiting any retrospective effect of the quashing”—

in other words, a prospective-only remedy. For prospective-only orders, despite a state decision or action’s being found unlawful, the order quashing it would be forward-looking, leaving the individual who brought the case without proper redress for what has already happened to them and, potentially, with no change in their circumstances at all.

Proposed new subsections 29A(4) and (5) set out the implications of that change. The decision or act in question is to be treated as valid and

“unimpaired by the relevant defect”,

for all purposes, for the period of time before the prospective effect of the quashing order. As has been expounded countless times by the courts, the rule of law requires that those exercising public power should do so lawfully. However, the Government would be under absolutely no legal duty to address the injustices caused by the unlawful measure, and there would be no scrutiny as to the effectiveness of such remedies. We do not consider that to be an appropriate or principled solution.

In issuing a prospective-only quashing order, the courts would be determining that an unlawful measure should be treated as if it were lawful retrospectively, which is problematic for many reasons. First, it undermines the rule of law, which at its core dictates that all are subject to the law, that no person should be subject to unlawful action, and that individuals have access to an effective judicial remedy against unlawful measures. Prospective-only orders entail a direct rejection of those principles, allowing unlawful executive acts to stand and, therefore, preventing individuals who were previously impacted by them from challenging them. As recognised by the consultation, that could lead to severe unjust outcomes. By introducing prospective-only remedies, the Government are making another concerted effort to insulate themselves from accountability at the cost of those who have been let down by a public body and anybody who may be in the future.

Prospective-only remedies have the potential to create opportunities for injustice in individual cases, to weaken the rule of law and to introduce unnecessary layers of complexity into an already functioning system. This is another example of the Government wasting time and resources on fiddling with an area that works well, while many other areas of the justice system cry out for attention.

Future of Legal Aid

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Thursday 1st November 2018 Westminster Hall

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the future of legal aid.

It is a pleasure indeed to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Henry. I am delighted that we have three hours to debate the important and complex subject of the future of legal aid. Let me begin by thanking the Backbench Business Committee for allowing the time, the many hon. Members in attendance and the cross-party group, More United, which has championed this issue and pressed successfully for this debate.

We are in Justice Week, the aim of which is to show the significance of justice and the rule of law to every citizen in our society and to register the importance of an effective justice system beyond the usual audience of professions and practitioners. That aim is reflected in the many representations and briefings we have received in preparation for this debate. They have come not only, as one might expect, from the Law Society, the Law Centres Federation, LawWorks and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, but from Mencap, Mind, Oxfam, Amnesty International, Youth Access and the Refugee Council. The message is that legal aid is important to everyone, but particularly to the poorest and most vulnerable.

I extend my thanks to those organisations not only for their help for today, but for the work that they do every day to support the justice system and those who need to navigate it. Indeed, I extend thanks to all the legal aid lawyers outside the House, not least my own local law centre in Hammersmith and Fulham, which is ably led by Sue James, last year’s legal aid lawyer of the year. I extend thanks also to those in the House who do the same, not least the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), and the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on legal aid, my hon. Friend the Member for Westminster North (Ms Buck).

My final thanks are as follows. It would not be right to let a debate on this subject pass without acknowledging the work of Carol Storer, the director of the Legal Aid Practitioners Group for the past decade, who is leaving this month. There will be other opportunities to mark her outstanding contribution as an advocate and organiser for the whole legal aid community, but I know that hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber will have benefited from her skill and knowledge and been on the receiving end of her charm and persuasion.

I am sure that the Minister will have good news for Carol and all those I have mentioned when she responds both today and in the post-implementation review of part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—hereinafter LASPO. It was good to hear the Minister confirm this week at the APPG that the review will be published before the end of the year. I know by that she does not mean, “By way of written ministerial statement on the last sitting day.” Obviously, that will not be the case, because it is going to be good news and the Government will want to boast about it.

This is a complex and many-faceted subject, and I will not be able to cover all areas and concerns, so let me start with my requests to the Minister, because I do not want them to get lost. We have just heard from the Chair of the Select Committee on Health and Social Care, the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), that cuts to prisons are causing serious deterioration in the health and welfare of prisoners. We should not be surprised. The Ministry of Justice budget will be cut by almost half in little more than a decade of continuing austerity. It is the biggest cut to any Department, and it is a relatively small Department, with only three major areas of spend. Inevitably, all three areas—not only prisons and probation and the courts service, but legal aid—are going through debilitating change. My first request to the Minister is that she tackle the funding issue head on. No one is saying that all the cuts since 2010 will be reversed, or that the clock will be turned back, but if the Government wish to honour their stated objectives for LASPO, and in particular,

“To target legal aid at those who need it most”,

they must put something extra in the pot.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend will remember when we sat on the Bill Committee and warned of the intended and potentially unintended consequences of the cuts and changes being made. Does he agree that the nightmare for people desperately in need of legal aid for everything from housing to medical negligence cases has been worse than expected, and that justice has certainly been denied to them?

[Andy Slaughter]

Yes. I will come on to the actual, rather than the predicted, effect of LASPO. Without spoiling the surprise, we will find that the Government have overachieved in cutting budgets and underachieved in every other respect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Slaughter]

I absolutely agree. Pre-LASPO, my own law centre employed eight solicitors across a range of, mainly, social welfare law, but now it can afford to employ only two solicitors. It is only through the generosity of the local Labour council—against the backdrop of its own budget cuts—and that of charitable trusts that it is able to top up that number with further practitioners. Even the previous position, however, was insufficient for the need, as I well know, and the current position is almost unsustainable.

[Alex Cunningham]

Mencap mentions very specifically in its briefing the distress faced by people with disabilities who cannot get the support they need, and who drop out of the social security and care system because there is no one to speak for them. Even if they qualify for assistance, they cannot find the specialist lawyers they need. Mencap says that that is happening across the country. Does he agree that the Minister needs to look at increasing provision, and also needs to assess whether the necessary specialist lawyers are available in the system to help people?

[Andy Slaughter]

That is particularly important to my hon. Friend and he makes a very good point. We have been briefed by both Mencap and Mind on today’s debate. It will not surprise anyone that Mind said that people with mental health problems are twice as likely as members of the general population to experience legal problems and four times as likely to experience complex legal problems—in other words, problems that extend across a number of different disciplines. As was predicted, those are the people who are worst affected.

Even as the Bill was being published, alarm bells were being rung, and not only by Opposition Members. I had the pleasure of leading for the Opposition in Committee on LASPO. We heard not only from experts and users of the system but from the Government officials. The impact assessments that accompanied the Bill predicted that people with protected characteristics would be disproportionately affected by the cuts.

The official MOJ line was:

“The wide-ranging availability of legal aid can lead people to assume legal action is their only option, even where early practical advice could be of more help to them and avoid them needing a lawyer at all.”

Gillian Guy, the chief executive of Citizens Advice, said the money available was not enough and that we were losing precisely the swift and practical advice offered by CABs and advice and law centres. She added that Citizens Advice research suggested that every £1 spent on early advice saved around £9 later, partly by avoiding unnecessary and expensive tribunal hearings.

Richard Hawkes, the chief executive of Scope, said:

“To cut legal aid at a time of unprecedented changes to welfare support would mean disabled people who fall foul of poor decision-making, red tape or administrative error being pushed even further into poverty as they struggle to manoeuvre the complicated legal system without the expert support they need…This could result in a ticking timebomb of poorly prepared and lengthy tribunals and appeals, choking the courts and not saving money, but actually costing the government far more in the long term.”

The Government were warned. Did the predictions of doom come to pass? We know that they did. In fact, LASPO has cut far more deeply than had been billed. The stated aim was to reduce the legal aid budget by £350 million, but last year spending was £950 million less than in 2010, at £1.6 billion, as against £2.55 billion in 2010-11, with similar percentage falls in both civil and criminal legal aid.

While waiting for the Government review of LASPO—it was promised for between three and five years post-enactment, but we are now nearer six years post-enactment—we have not been short of expert opinion on its effects. Reports by the Justice Committee, the National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Bar Council, the Law Society, the Bach Commission and the Low Commission have been consistent in highlighting the serious failings of LASPO. In 2017, the Bach Commission found that

“the justice system is in crisis. Most immediately, people are being denied access to justice because the scope of legal aid has been dramatically reduced and eligibility requirements made excessively stringent. But problems extend very widely through the justice system, from insufficient public legal education and a shrinking information and advice sector to unwieldy and creaking bureaucratic systems and uncertainty about the future viability of the practice of legal aid practitioners.”

In 2015, the Justice Committee published its verdict:

“Our overall conclusion was that, while it had made significant savings in the cost of the scheme, the Ministry had harmed access to justice for some litigants and had not achieved the other three out of four of its stated objectives for the reforms. Since the reforms came into effect there has been an underspend in the civil legal aid budget because the Ministry has not ensured that many people who are eligible for legal aid are able to access it. A lack of public information about the extent and availability of legal aid post-reforms, including about the Civil Legal Advice telephone gateway for debt advice, contributed to this and we recommend the Ministry take prompt steps to redress this.”

Advice officers around the UK began looking for alternative sources of funding so that they could continue working with clients who would soon find themselves ineligible for legal aid. However, with local authority budgets cut, few sources of funding were available. Many agencies closed and private firms found that it was no longer economic to undertake legal aid work. As we have heard, whole areas of help have been removed from scope, leaving millions unable to get advice or representation. There has been an almost complete collapse in early legal advice. That means that cases now escalate and are resolved only after becoming much more complex, traumatic and expensive, if they are resolved at all.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead (Teresa Pearce) said, the Government argued that removing legal aid for most private family law matters would increase the uptake of mediation so families could resolve their problems outside court. They predicted an increase of 9,000 mediation assessments and 10,000 mediation cases for the year 2013-14. Instead, there was a decrease of 17,246 mediation assessments in the year after the reforms, and the number of mediation cases fell by 5,177 in the same period. One reason for that was the withdrawal of firms from those areas of law, leaving no one to signpost litigants to mediation.

The removal of legal aid from most areas of family law has had a disproportionate effect on women. In a survey carried out by Rights of Women and Women’s Aid, 53% of respondents took no action in relation to their case because they could not apply for legal aid. It is becoming so difficult for victims of domestic violence to obtain legal aid that last year, the Government were forced urgently to review the criteria for legal aid in such cases. Time limits preventing victims of domestic violence from obtaining legal aid for court hearings were scrapped and rules were relaxed to accept evidence from victim support organisations. Despite that, there are still concerns that too many women are falling through the cracks and not getting the help they need.

A dramatic increase of litigants in person following LASPO has created a severe strain on the court system which, to quote the retiring Director of Public Prosecutions this week, is already “creaking” under the effects of significant cuts and court closures.

Post Office Closures

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Tuesday 25th April 2017 Westminster Hall

[Alex Cunningham]

rose—

[Andy Slaughter]

rose—

[Margot James]

I will give way once—I only have 10 minutes.

Jerusalem (Humanitarian Issues)

Debate between Alex Cunningham and Andy Slaughter

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Alex Cunningham]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that everyone should be living together in peace and harmony with the right to the same human rights within the city of Jerusalem, and I hope that one day we will get there. To finish my point, the authorities make it impossible for the centre of Palestinians’ life to be Jerusalem, and then expels them because it is not.

Furthermore, planning rules have been made to ensure that as little land as possible is available for Palestinians to build on. Fewer than 200 building permits are granted each year, even though the EU heads of mission in East Jerusalem assessed that 1,500 housing units are necessary to meet Palestinian housing need. A building permit is rare, mostly because the Israeli municipality has zoned most Palestinian areas to prevent building—according to the UN, that restriction applies in all but 13% of East Jerusalem—but even those who live in areas where building is permitted suffer years of delay and mounting costs in seeking permission to build.

Palestinians face an impossible dilemma as their family grows: do they live in squalid overcrowded conditions, move out of the city, or risk building illegally? Many take the chance of building without a permit, resulting in about 85,000 Palestinians being at risk of losing their homes. In addition, Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem are being demolished by the Israeli authorities: they demolished 670 homes between 2000 and 2008, and recently rubber-stamped the decision to demolish homes in Silwan to make way for a tourist park, which alone will make another 1,000 Palestinians homeless.

That comes at the same time as the building of illegal Jewish settlements continues unabated, forming an inner and outer ring around Jerusalem. The inner ring, home to around 200,000 settlers, combined with the wall cuts off Jerusalem from the west bank. The outer ring, home to another 100,000 settlers, further isolates the west bank from the Palestinian cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem. Moreover, settlements continue to be built on land confiscated from Palestinians. On the fringes, homes are being seized by Israeli settler groups on the pretext that the land on which they are built was once in Jewish ownership, but to which those groups have no legal entitlement.

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it speaks volumes about the arrogance of the occupying power that following the UN Human Rights Council’s vote last week, by 36 votes to one, to send a delegation to investigate the illegal settlements—illegal under international law—in East Jerusalem and the west bank, the Israelis have refused to co-operate with the council, refused admission to the delegation, and indeed is considering sanctions against the Palestinian Authority for even daring to raise the matter?

[Alex Cunningham]

It is clear that the world at large wants to do something about these issues, so why will the Israelis not let people in? What do they have to hide? I want an answer to that question, too.

The inequality of treatment of Palestinians’ claims is outrageous. They are legally barred from reclaiming property in West Jerusalem that they were forced to abandon, even if they still have the title deeds and the key to the front door. To ensure that Jerusalem can become the capital of Israel and Israel only, and to try to ensure that it never becomes the shared capital with Palestinians, Israel has used planning laws, home demolitions, settlement building, the wall and insecure residency rights, even as the international community, including the UK, the EU and America, has sat back, talked and done nothing practical to stop Israel. We all know about the influence of the US and of US and European aid to Israel. Why is no one taking action that will result in change?

Let me tell the House about Raya and Issam—two people who best illustrate the injustices faced by the Palestinian people. Raya lives in Jerusalem. Her husband, Issam, lives 15 minutes’ drive from the centre of Jerusalem in a village just outside the city limits in the west bank, but he cannot visit his children’s school and could not be with Raya in hospital when she had their baby, because his village is outside the city boundary. He says:

“It’s easier for me to go on holiday to Germany than it is to visit my children's school in Jerusalem.”

When they married, Issam applied for a family unification permit, so he could live with Raya in Jerusalem. The application cost him $5,000 in lawyer's fees, but was refused on the grounds that he worked for the Palestinian Authority five years earlier. The authorities also cited the fact that he had been in jail during the first intifada 20 years ago, despite his being there only for writing slogans and waving banners. Issam’s 15-minute drive has now turned into a two-hour nightmare, involving travelling by bus to Ramallah and waiting at the notorious Qalandia checkpoint twice a day to take the children to and from school, because an Israeli settlement has blocked the route from his village to Jerusalem.

As a brief aside, there are still 4,417 Palestinian political prisoners held in Israeli jails as of January 2012, including 310 people with indefinite detention without charge or trial, 170 children, 27 elected members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and seven women.

It is on the record, from both Houses, that the UK has “made representations” month on month, year on year, to the Israelis objecting to increased settlements and home demolitions, making it clear that these actions are unacceptable, are illegal under international law and must stop, but what we are not told is how the Israelis reply, and we are never told of any positive outcome from these conversations.

Israel is accelerating the pace of settlement expansion, demolitions, expulsions and arrests in a way that makes the two-state solution increasingly unviable. Words are not enough; actions are clearly needed, and it is vital to demonstrate that breaches of international law have consequences, not only in diplomacy, but in the wider area of political and economic agreements.