Criminal Justice Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Alex Cunningham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Graham, at the start of what is the final session of the 16, including the evidence sessions, that we have had on this Bill. I am sure that if there is popular demand, we can agree to have some more—[Laughter.] No, I did not think that that would be terribly popular.

We were in the middle of discussing new clause 19, moved by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), on a new criminal offence of cuckooing. As we ran out of time, I was saying that the way in which the new clause is drafted does not require there to have been duress, coercion or consent. The shadow Minister intervened to draw attention to subsection (1)(b)(iii), which requires duress or coercion, but the other limbs of the test do not require duress or coercion and the clause is worded as an “or”. That is to say, if any one of limbs one to four are engaged, the offence is made out. For example, if limb one alone is engaged—if there is drug dealing at the premises—the offence is made out even if there is no coercion, because the test is structured as an “or” rather than an “and”, and any one of the four limbs may apply.

The way the new clause has been drafted means that, even where there is no coercion or duress and even where consent has been freely given by the person living in the residential building, the offence would none the less have been committed. That is not exactly the definition of cuckooing that we would ordinarily recognise, which would involve duress and/or coercion of a typically vulnerable person. For that drafting reason, we could not support the new clause.

There are a number of elements of existing criminal law that provide protection here or that are relevant. For example, sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 create various so-called inchoate offences, such as encouraging or assisting the commission of offences, which would likely be engaged here and the maximum penalty for which is the same as the primary offence. Even if the person doing the cuckooing is not committing the offence but is organising or encouraging others, including the vulnerable person, to do so, an offence is committed.

If a criminal offence such as drug dealing is being committed, that is illegal. Under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the production or supply of controlled drugs is an offence, so if somebody were occupying another person’s flat or house for the purpose of drug dealing, they would be committing an offence under that Act. Similarly, if they were trying to compel the victim—that is, the vulnerable person—to do something they did not want to do, it is quite likely that sections 1 or 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 would be engaged as well.

Another offence that would likely or could be engaged is that of aggravated trespass, under section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. That section rather confusingly refers to “land”, but the definition of land in that context includes buildings. The offence there is where the person trespassing on land, which definitionally includes buildings, has the intention of “intimidating”, “obstructing” or “disrupting” the lawful activity of others, which will include the right to quiet enjoyment of their premises. Critically, the word “intimidating” is included in that aggravated trespass offence. Clearly, if somebody were coercively cuckooing a vulnerable person, it would be very likely—indeed, near certain—that they would be intimidating them. Not only would we be able to prosecute them for the primary offence, such as drug dealing, but possibly for aggravated trespass under section 68.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

The Minister has used three expressions in the last few minutes: “quite likely”, referring to the Modern Slavery Act, “likely”, and then—sorry, I have lost the third one. My apologies, Sir Graham. I trained as a journalist, but sometimes I cannot read my shorthand. The Minister has three times used the word “likely”, but “likely” is not good enough. Possibly, maybe, perhaps—all these words mean the same thing. They do not mean certainty, and I hope that he will recognise that what we are trying to do is to get a specific clause to deal with cuckooing. I will speak further on that when I respond to the Minister’s speech.

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[Chris Philp]

The antisocial behaviour plan, published in the spring of last year, committed to engaging with stakeholders on that question. That engagement has happened and continues to happen. On the point about penalties, if someone is occupying someone else’s house and is dealing, for example, class A drugs, the maximum penalty, wherever that happens, is life. Under the Modern Slavery Act, the maximum sentence under sections 1 and 2 for making another person a victim of modern slavery is life imprisonment. The penalties available are severe. In the two examples that I just gave, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.

The maximum penalty for participating in the activities of an organised crime group under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is five years. On the inchoate offences under sections 45 or 46—that is, where someone is incited or encouraged to commit an offence—the maximum penalty is the same as that for the primary offence. So, it is not true that the maximum sentences available in this sphere are in any way light or incon-sequential.

This matter obviously concerns everybody. It is as much a matter of enforcement as anything else because, as I have explained, we have a number of different laws on the statute books that cover such behaviour with significant penalties attached. The question is how we make sure that they are properly enforced. As drafted, the new clause probably does not have quite the intended effect, because it is widely drafted. Even if it were drafted to include a requirement for duress or coercion or that consent had been withheld, we could legitimately debate whether it does or does not fill a lacuna.

In addition to the criminal sanctions that I have just enumerated, there are a very large number of civil orders available to try to prevent a property being misused. I will not go through the detail of them all because that will take too long, but I will list what they are. They include closure notices, community protection notices, public space protection orders, civil injunctions under part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, criminal behaviour orders, gang injunctions, a section 8 notice under the Housing Act, and slavery and trafficking risk orders. Those are civil measures, but they are in addition to the various criminal measures that I enumerated.

In conclusion, the Government accept the spirit of the concern that has been raised. Cuckooing is a concern; it happens, and it needs to be stopped. It is worth saying that we have closed down a very large number of county lines over the last four years—I think about 3,000. Enforcement action is happening. There is scope to go further, but numerous existing criminal offences give the police the powers they need. We need, collectively, to make sure that the police always exercise those powers where cuckooing occurs.

[Alex Cunningham]

I have listened to the Minister in some detail. Nobody will ever accuse him of not being prepared with stats and with the information at his fingertips.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, for a vulnerable person who is a victim of this sort of offence, civil orders occupy a no-go place. That person would not have the understanding or the wherewithal to pursue such an order and, if the authorities cannot intervene because the law is not sufficient, they cannot do so on that person’s behalf either. I do not accept that civil orders in any shape or form help to address this particular problem.

[Chris Philp]

I would point primarily to the criminal offences I enumerated, but, on the question of civil orders, other agencies such as local authorities, or in some cases the police, could of course apply for the civil order. Obviously, we would not expect the vulnerable person to apply for the civil order themselves, but there are agencies, which include local authorities, that could certainly do so on their behalf.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful to the Minister for providing clarification on that. As he heard me say earlier, we are looking at the new clause very much as creating a specific offence of cuckooing. I recognise the lesson in drafting that he has given me this afternoon.

It had been my intention to push the new clause to a vote but, after the lesson in drafting from the Minister, I no longer intend to do so. The Minister is aware, however, that there is considerable cross-party support for this aim. The Minister says that he has a problem with the drafting of the clause, but he does not appear to have a problem with its purpose, so on that basis I ask that he work with others—some from his own side, although we are happy to pitch in as well—to bring forward what we believe is needed: a specific clause on cuckooing that will once and for all protect the victims, rather than giving free rein to those who choose to exploit them. On that basis, in the hope that we will see something come back later, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Sexual exploitation of an adult

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for ‘Causing or inciting prostitution’ substitute ‘Sexual exploitation’, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for ‘causes or incites another person to become a prostitute’ substitute ‘sexually exploits another person’.

(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for ‘prostitution’ substitute ‘sexual exploitation’, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for ‘prostitution’ substitute ‘sexual exploitation’.

(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (2) for ‘sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A’ substitute ‘section 53A’, and

(b) at end insert—

‘(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.’.” —(Jess Phillips.)

This new clause is an amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in Sections 52 and 53, “replacing prostitution for gain” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to new clause 44, which enacts a recommendation of the Home Affairs Committee, which I am a member of, and is supported by its Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson). The clause is very simple. It outlaws pimping, and we need it to combat sex trafficking.

Members might be surprised to learn that some forms of pimping are still legal in this country. Take pimping websites, which the Home Affairs Committee looked at during our inquiry on human trafficking. These websites are dedicated solely or partly to advertising people for prostitution. The operators of the sites knowingly pimp people for prostitution, and the biggest sites make millions of pounds from it. Despite it being illegal to place a prostitution advert in a phone box, our laws are failing to keep up with technological change; that same advert can be hosted on a website with complete impunity. As a result, pimping websites make it as easy to order a woman to sexually exploit as it is to order a takeaway. This has been a total boon for sex traffickers.

The Home Affairs Committee concluded:

“Websites advertising prostitution significantly facilitate trafficking for sexual exploitation.”

The websites make it quick and easy for traffickers to advertise their victims and connect with their customers nationwide. As a result, pimping websites are now a core component of the standard business model of sex trafficking in the UK. Shockingly, one of these websites admitted to the Home Affairs Committee that it allows single individuals to advertise multiple women for prostitution at the same time on its site and allows the same contact phone number to be used across multiple different adverts. These are both obvious red flags for sex trafficking.

We also know that one trafficker convicted of sexually exploiting women in the UK spent an astonishing £25,000 advertising his gang’s victims on the same pimping website. The group exploited at least 11 young Romanian women, trafficking them from across the north-west of England and Northern Ireland. Chillingly, law enforcement revealed that the website operators responded to the fact that one man was spending thousands of pounds advertising women for prostitution not by calling the police but by allocating him his own account manager to make sure he could spend more. It is an absolute scandal that these pimping websites have been allowed to operate in plain sight. To combat trafficking in this country, we must update our laws so that it is illegal to pimp online as well as offline.

New clause 44 would enact the recommendation of the cross-party Home Affairs Committee to make it a criminal offence to facilitate or profit from the prostitution of another person online or offline. I hope we can come together across the House to make that recommendation law.

[Alex Cunningham]

I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friends the Members for Swansea East and for Birmingham, Yardley, and of others who do so much to advance women’s rights through their work in and out of this House. That is, of course, across parties.

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned her work with the STAGE project. One of the members of that group is A Way Out, a fantastic charity based in Stockton with which I am very familiar. It does hugely important work supporting vulnerable and excluded women, families and young people to live lives free from harm, abuse and exploitation. I know that many of us on this Committee have civil society groups and charities in or near our constituencies that dedicate themselves to tackling abuse and exploitation in our communities, and I am sure that we would all like to put our thanks to them on the record this afternoon.

As my hon. Friend has just outlined, new clause 23 replaces the term “controlling prostitution for gain” in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with

“sexual exploitation of an adult”.

That would follow more closely the terminology introduced into English law in 2015 in relation to the sexual exploitation of children, which my hon. Friend has outlined in detail. The new clause may help to address some of the cliff-edge differences in treatment that those subject to such exploitation experience when they turn 18.

I am sure that the Minister recognises the need for continuity of support for those subject to or at risk of exploitation, and agrees that simply turning 18 should not provide a reason for changing perceptions of and treatment for victims of sexual exploitation. Is the Minister aware of any discussions in the Department, following the changing of the terminology around sexual exploitation of children, about the way that the law refers to such exploitation when perpetrated against adults? If so, could she share them with the Committee?

New clause 23 also aims to provide a definition of adult sexual exploitation through the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The STAGE project’s access-to-justice work has identified that women who have experienced sexual exploitation can face barriers to accessing justice at all points in the criminal justice system. One of the contributing factors to the barriers that many victims face when accessing justice is that some may not even initially recognise that they have experienced sexual exploitation —partly on account of the fact that there is no statutory definition of adult sexual exploitation.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts about the potential benefits of introducing a statutory definition in relation to this type of offending. That may be of help not only to victims, in understanding their experiences as adult sexual exploitation, but to criminal justice professionals, such as the police, in identifying cases of this horrific offending.

I turn briefly to new clauses 26 and 30, which would respectively repeal soliciting and loitering as an offence and provide for a process allowing the Secretary of State to disregard convictions and cautions related to soliciting. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has outlined, this offence has been dispro-portionately used to criminalise vulnerable and exploited women, after which the offence stays on their criminal record for decades—I think I heard my hon. Friend say “up to the age of 100”, but I do not know how many people get to 100.

The retention of those records can be distressing and degrading, and can interfere with the ability of the women to move on with their lives. It can prevent them from getting access to certain jobs and may make accessing certain types of support more difficult. Even when the women are trying to move forward with their lives, they are confronted by yet more challenges because they have been criminalised, while many of those actually perpetrating such exploitation have not.

The Centre for Women’s Justice has been challenging this regime in the courts in recent years through its HOPE—history of prostitution expunged—campaign, with some notable successes. One of the women involved in the campaign, whose name has been changed to Martha to maintain anonymity, said:

“I have a sheer panic when I see a job and then see ‘DBS required’. I feel the reaction I experience is a form of trauma—anxiety, anger and rage. I also feel disgust that people are so judgmental when to me the perpetrator, who experiences none of this, is the one who should feel shame”.

Clearly, more needs to be done to ensure that criminal records do not compound trauma for these victims and prevent these women from moving forward with their lives.

The Government have made some reforms to criminal records recently, most notably in the Police Crime Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was being debated in Parliament around the same time as one of the Centre for Women’s Justice cases was being heard. The Government were not minded to expand the provision of criminal record reform further at that time. Can the Minister tell me whether anything has changed in the interim? Has the Department considered any other mechanisms through which the impact that criminal record disclosure can have on those women may be reduced?

Finally, on new clause 44, which creates a new offence of facilitating or profiting from the prostitution of another person, will the Minister share her views on measures to combat such exploitation? Overall, I hope we can have an update on the work of the Government to ensure that exploitation offences criminalise the exploiters rather than those being exploited.

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[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause seeks to align our definition of “human trafficking” with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel. We have heard all about cuckooing today. You could be in your house for this; you might not have travelled anywhere.

The UN definition of human trafficking, as set out in the Palermo protocol, is the

“recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”

As somebody who has spent time at the UN, I can say that its writing style is never snappy. It becomes the place that time forgot when you are trying to agree wording.

In contrast to that, the definition of human trafficking set out in section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 refers only to cases in which

“the person arranges or facilitates the travel of another person…with a view to”

that other person “being exploited.” Currently, cases that would be considered human trafficking by the UN are not considered to be human trafficking according to our legislation. For example, the current definition excludes cases of harbouring individuals; we just talked about that.

Therefore, as we have discussed, instances of sexual exploitation taking place in one location—such as a person’s home, somewhere they have travelled to freely, or online—would be considered human trafficking under the UN definition but not under the Modern Slavery Act. That happened to a woman who was supported by the STAGE project. She was placed in a B&B when she was facing extreme poverty, homelessness and mis-treatment. Unfortunately, she faced sexual exploitation and forced labour, perpetrated by the owners of the B&B. That is not uncommon in our unregulated supported accommodation services. That bed and breakfast had been used by housing and social services authorities for years to house vulnerable people, and the owners exploited their vulnerabilities. That woman was not trafficked and would not have been covered by the definition; inconsistency with the UN definition means that people like her are not protected in this country.

[Alex Cunningham]

Human trafficking has been with us for thousands and thousands of years, but it has no place in a modern society. The nature of human trafficking offences makes it challenging to assess the number of victims in the UK, but we know that referrals through the national referral mechanism for modern slavery and human trafficking have increased. In the year ending December 2022, 7,936 referrals were made for potential victims of exploitation taking place solely in the UK. That was an increase of 10.3% on the previous year. Almost two thirds of British victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are children being exploited for criminality. That accounts for 2,534 children.

The National Crime Agency has warned that the rising cost of living has almost certainly exacerbated the risks of modern slavery and human trafficking. It has said that it is likely that organised crime groups will consider ways to maintain profitability by offsetting rising costs on to victims, such as by spending less time on victim welfare and by coercing victims into providing even more arduous and risky services.

I am grateful that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has provided the Committee with the opportunity to discuss the legal framework around human trafficking. I am sure that all of us in this room would wish that framework to be as robust as possible. As my hon. Friend explained, new clause 24 amends the definition of human trafficking in the 2015 Act to bring it in line with the UN definition, notably by removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel. As such, there are a number of cases that would be considered human trafficking by the UN that would not be recognised as such by our criminal justice system.

I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on the discrepancy, particularly if she has had any sense from the Department of the number of cases that may fall into that legislative gap, or if she is aware of any cases of the types that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley outlined, which would not be recognised as human trafficking in English criminal law.

I am particularly interested to hear some comments from the Minister in relation to my hon. Friend’s point about offences that take place online, which may not fit the current requirement to have involved travel. Such online offending has increased significantly in recent years with even easier access to digital devices and the internet, and it was driven up during covid lockdowns. I wonder whether the Department has considered the impact of amending the framework in the way that my hon. Friend has suggested. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Jess Phillips]

Over six years ago, in 2017, the then Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said:

“There needs to be a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system when they themselves are victims of abuse”.

However, no such review has ever taken place, and the criminal law still fails to protect those who experience abuse that drives them to offend. We all know that it does that and there has been endless evidence over many years; the Corston report, now decades old, still stands. While householders have legal protection when they act in self-defence against an intruder, no such protection is available to victims—survivors—acting in self-defence against their abuser.

New clauses 31 and 32 would introduce two measures to address that: a new statutory defence for those who are coerced into offending, and an amendment to the law on self-defence for those who use force against their abuser. Common law defences are outdated and ill-fitting to the context of domestic abuse, leaving survivors with no effective defence. These amendments would modernise the law and reflect improved public understanding of domestic abuse. They are based on legal precedents in place to protect other groups and are not gender-specific. They would address gaps in legal protection for survivors, strengthen recognition of the links between victimisation and offending, and deter inappropriate prosecutions. These reforms should be accompanied by a cross-Government policy framework to aid implementation. We propose that the two new clauses and new schedule 2 be added to the Bill.

New clause 31 amends the law on self-defence and is modelled on the provisions for householders in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. There are Acts that seem to be about two completely separate things put together; it is good to see that Labour Governments did that as well! The clause would allow survivors acting in self-defence against their abusers the same protection as householders defending themselves against an intruder. In the case of a householder using force against an intruder, section 76(5A) of the 2008 Act provides that the degree of force used by said householder

“is not to be regarded as having been reasonable…if it was grossly disproportionate”.

A householder can therefore use force that is dispro-portionate, but not grossly disproportionate, provided that the degree of force was reasonable. It is outrageous to deny equivalent protection to women who are victims of domestic abuse defending themselves against someone who has raped, tortured, abused and attacked them. As Nicola Wake has argued, that disparity in protection is impossible to justify.

New clause 32 and new schedule 2 introduce statutory defences for survivors modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act. They would give survivors of domestic abuse similar protections to victims of human trafficking who are compelled to offend. A case study from the Centre for Women’s Justice makes the need for that clear:

“YS is charged with driving whilst disqualified, driving with excess alcohol, driving without insurance and dangerous driving. An officer noticed a vehicle with its brake lights permanently illuminated and swerving from side to side. He activated the siren, indicating for the vehicle to stop. The vehicle did not stop, and a chase continued for five minutes. In the driving seat was a woman, YS.

YS explained she had been dragged from her home partially dressed by her partner, forced to drive, and that he threatened to kill her if she did not drive on. The partner was screaming at her throughout, punching her in the ribs and trying to grab the steering wheel.

The police stop this vehicle and YS is prosecuted. Despite running duress and despite her being viewed as credible, she is convicted. Her conviction was upheld on appeal to the High Court.”

Duress was brought up earlier, and I got some points in the break on the defence of duress from some lawyers who have run these cases. As demonstrated by that case study, the defence of duress in these cases is inadequate. For example, the duress defence emphasises the threat of death or serious injury and ignores complexities of DA: a barrister I spoke to in the break said, “Basically, the reason duress doesn’t work is because it doesn’t work. You have to basically prove you had a gun to your head in the moment.” It does not recognise sexual, financial or psychological abuse. It also fails to recognise the nature of domestic abuse, because for the defence of duress to succeed, the threat of physical harm must be imminent—it has to be a gun to your head. The proposed statutory defence is closely modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which provides a defence for victims of trafficking who offend as part of, or due to, their experience of modern slavery or trafficking. The same protections should be offered to victims of domestic abuse.

[Alex Cunningham]

I will be brief, because my hon. Friend’s contribution was very thorough. The explanatory statements make it clear that the aim of these new clauses would speak to the agenda of the House in relation to ending violence against women and girls while ensuring that they get the protection of the law. There is no doubt that the development of such defences in law is far from easy—in fact, it is extremely complicated, as was illustrated—but it is important that we get it right. Labour is determined that women and girls are protected from violence. The work done by my colleagues will help to ensure that we as a society do better in that regard.

No one can doubt that women can be driven to defend themselves when subject to controlling behaviour and domestic abuse, and they can then face prosecution for their actions. Similarly, the controller can drive them to commit other crimes for the benefit of that controller. It can be well argued in both cases that those women are not responsible for their own actions. I am interested in what the Minister will say and how she will address such things to ensure that the victim is not turned into a criminal.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling new clauses 31 and 32 and new schedule 2, which would create two new statutory defences for victims of domestic abuse. She mentioned the defence of self-defence, which is not available to householders only; self-defence is a complete defence available to anyone put in a situation where they are required to engage it. I make that point in passing.

The Committee is aware of the work that the Government have done on domestic abuse, so I will confine my remarks to our most recent work, which has focused on the issues set out in the hon. Member’s new clauses and new schedule. First, she is aware that we commissioned a domestic homicide review—undertaken by Clare Wade KC, who has given evidence to the Committee—which was the first from any Government to look at homicide in a domestic context. As part of that exercise, we invited Clare Wade to look at the law on domestic abuse defences. She did not have time to do so then, but she recommended that a further review should be undertaken. At the end of 2023, we commissioned that review by the Law Commission to look specifically at women driven to kill their abusive partners and the defences available to them, and to consider specifically whether legislative change was necessary. The review is due to conclude later this year—I understand by the summer.

I hope to reassure the hon. Member by reading out a few sections—I will only read short sections—of the review’s terms of reference, which I believe dovetail neatly with the points she has made in her new clauses and new schedule. Those terms of reference state:

“Most deaths that occur in the context of domestic abuse involve male abusers who kill their female victims. A much smaller number of (almost entirely female) victims of domestic abuse kill their (almost entirely male) abusers…Despite reforms to the partial defences of provocation (now loss of control) and diminished responsibility, concerns continue to be raised that the existing defences to murder and their application in the courts do not achieve just outcomes for this group of victims of domestic abuse who become defendants.”

It continues:

“The Law Commission will review the use of defences in domestic homicide cases in the light of modern understandings of the effects of domestic abuse on victims. The project will consider, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) whether the existing defences to murder, and arguments as to lack of requisite intent for murder, operate satisfactorily in the context of a defendant who has suffered domestic abuse;

(2) if not, whether reform of the existing defences or a new bespoke defence or defences are needed for the group identified…while ensuring that reformed or new defences are appropriately limited…

(3) the operation of the applicable rules of evidence, procedure, and ways that the defences are considered from the beginning of the police investigation up to and including at trial, in this context”.

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[Alex Norris]

I note what the Minister says around the transformed approach. The only evidence that will work is whether the charging number increases and cases get to judgment. We will wait to see whether that proof is in the pudding, but on that basis I am happy not to press the new clause, although we might have to return to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 40

Doorstep theft: aggravating factor in theft offence

“(1) The Sentencing Code 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 72 (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—

‘72A Theft from outside a dwelling place

(1) This clause applies where the court is considering an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968.

(2) Where the theft is of an item delivered to, but not yet taken inside, a person’s dwelling place, the court must—

(a) treat this fact as an aggravating factor, and

(b) state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause defines theft from a doorstep as an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing in cases of theft.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Increasing numbers of people are choosing to shop online regularly, as opposed to shopping on the high street. With that comes an increase in the number of opportunist thieves. Examples of crime prevention advice on doorstep thefts include, on the Staffordshire police website, Chief Inspector Giles Parsons advising shoppers

“to do all that they can to stop this crime happening… Ask for your deliveries to be diverted to trusted neighbours or friends if you’re not going to be home. If this isn’t possible, attempt to rearrange to a time when you know you will be in or choose to collect it instead.”

Similar advice urging preventive safety measures can be found on the Merseyside police website.

Meanwhile, parcel theft has received little attention in Parliament, although it was raised in the other place in June last year, when the then Business and Trade Minister, the Earl of Minto, said:

“Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, it is the seller’s responsibility to ensure items ordered are delivered and Ofcom requires postal operators to take all reasonable steps to minimise exposure of postal packets to risk of loss, theft, damage or interference in terms of an essential requirement.”

Citizens Advice assumed a statutory responsibility to represent consumers of postal services in 2014. It publishes a parcels league table, and the 2023 results showed that the rate of parcel problems is incredibly high. It says that urgent action is needed, but it focuses its work on better regulation of the parcel delivery sector, rather than on sentencing for individual offenders. Overall, there has been a more limited focus on the offenders themselves.

Contrary to the lack of parliamentary discussion, the issue has been gaining attention in the media. The Telegraph reported on “porch pirates” in December last year, arguing:

“It’s a crime born of modern lifestyles, the explosion in online shopping providing new opportunities for thieves.”

The technology and locker company Quadient submitted freedom of information requests to UK police forces seeking statistics on parcel theft. The average reported value of a stolen parcel is £115.07, which, with Citizens Advice claiming that 5.5 million parcels are stolen each year, suggests a hidden economy of up to £630 million. Police forces warn that just a fraction of parcel theft is actually reported, meaning nobody knows the true extent of the problem. Comparing data held by the police to Citizens Advice’s figure, it appears that fewer than 0.002% of parcel thefts are ever reported.

The material released in response to the freedom of information request also indicated that the most common time for thefts to occur is between 9 am and 5 pm. Forces report that people aged 22 to 34 are the most likely to have a parcel stolen, suggesting that many parcels are stolen from young people while they are at work. The highest average value indicated for a stolen parcel was—no surprise—from City of London police, at £1,128, almost 10 times higher than the UK average. Conversely, Durham constabulary reported an average of £9.78, less than a tenth of the UK average and £1,118 lower than City of London.

Given the growing concern among consumers, whose doorsteps are no longer safe places, it is clear that firm action must be taken. The new clause would introduce an aggravating factor for such offences, recognising that, while the thieves may not actually enter properties, they do trespass in the gardens or yards of their victims, who may well come face to face with them. Criminals should know that, if they are prepared to enter people’s property to steal—just like a burglar would—they risk a higher sentence than for theft from, say, a shop.

The Minister will be pleased to know that I have no intention of pressing the new clause to a vote, but I hope that she will recognise this growing crime in our communities and take action to address it.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for shining a spotlight on an increasingly common offence. I reassure him that we take theft offences seriously. He will be aware that the maximum sentence is already seven years.

Courts are already required to consider an offender’s culpability when sentencing, which allows sentences to reflect the circumstances of the individual case. As the sentencing guidelines are structured, cases of theft that indicate a high level of culpability include those where planning took place, where there was premeditation, where a vulnerable victim was deliberately targeted, or where the offending was undertaken as part of a group and the offender played a leading role. By contrast, a theft that took little or no planning—for example, some kids nicking a box off a doorstep—would be a lower-culpability offence. That is how we square the nature of the offending.

[Alex Cunningham]

I accept that, and a child who nicks a box off a step just needs a good talking to, in my opinion, but I illustrated in my speech that this activity is becoming more and more organised, and doubtless will be more so in the future. We have to think ahead and make sure that we are ready. It might be the organised crime thing of the year. If people can pick up parcels worth more than £1,000 from somebody’s doorstep, there is certainly a need for proper action.

[Laura Farris]

The guidelines already include a range of aggravating factors for theft, among which are stealing to order, an intention to cause harm to the victim personally, and where the theft was an act of revenge. Obviously, previous convictions of any kind will also be an aggravating factor and result in a higher sentence.

At the moment, the Government resist the new clause, on the basis that it treats doorstep theft more seriously than other theft in similar circumstances, such as the theft of something that had not been delivered but was still sitting in the back of the van. We think that should be treated comparably. At the moment, we think the new clause would lead to discrepancies in the law of theft, which would not be a good development. Therefore, with respect to the hon. Member for Stockton North for raising a perfectly valid point—and I rather regret that he might be right that this is a growing area of crime—I urge him to withdraw the new clause.

[Alex Cunningham]

As I have indicated, I will withdraw the new clause, but I am grateful for the opportunity to raise the fact that this is a growing problem in our society. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 41

Offence of assaulting a retail worker

“(1) It is an offence for a person to assault, threaten or abuse another person who is a retail worker, and who is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(2) The offence under section 1 of threatening or abusing a retail worker—

(a) is committed by a person if the person—

(i) behaves in a threatening or abusive manner towards the worker, and

(ii) intends by the behaviour to cause the worker or any other person fear or alarm or is reckless as to whether the behaviour would cause such fear or alarm.

(b) applies to—

(i) behaviour of any kind including, in particular, things said or otherwise communicated as well as things done,

(ii) behaviour consisting of—

(A) a single act, or

(B) a course of conduct.

(3) No offence is committed under subsection (1) unless the person who assaults, threatens or abuses knows or ought to know that the other person is a retail worker and is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding £10,000 (or both).

(5) An offence committed under subsection (1) is aggravated if the behaviour constituting the offence occurred because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.

(6) Where, in proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is—

(a) specified in the complaint that the offence is aggravated by reason of the retail worker enforcing a statutory age restriction, and

(b) proved that the offence is so aggravated,

the court must—

(a) state on conviction that the offence is so aggravated,

(b) record the conviction in a way that shows that the offence is so aggravated,

(c) take the aggravation into account in determining the appropriate sentence, and

(d) state—

(i) where the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is different from that which the court would have imposed if the offence were not so aggravated, the extent of and the reasons for that difference, or

(ii) otherwise, the reasons for there being no such difference.

(7) Evidence from a single source is sufficient to establish, for the purposes of this section—

(a) whether a person is a retail worker,

(b) whether the person is engaged, at the time, in retail work,

(c) whether an offence committed under subsection (1) is aggravated because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.

(8) In this section—

“retail worker” —

(a) means a person whose usual place of work is retail premises, or whose usual place of work is not retail premises but who does retail work,

(b) includes, in relation to a business that owns or occupies any premises in which the person works, a person who—

(i) is an employee of the business,

(ii) is an owner of the business, or

(iii) works in the premises under arrangements made between the business and another person for the provision of staff,

(c) includes a person who delivers goods from retail premises.

“retail premises” means premises that are used wholly or mainly for the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public.

“retail work” —

(a) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is retail premises, means any work in those retail premises,

(b) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is not retail premises, means work in connection with—

(i) the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public, or

(ii) the sale or supply of services (including facilities for gambling) in respect of which a statutory age restriction applies,

(c) in the case of a person who delivers goods from retail premises, means work in connection with the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public done during the period beginning when the person arrives at a place where delivery of goods is to be effected and ending when the person leaves that place (whether or not goods have been delivered),

(d) is not dependent on a person receiving payment.

“enforcement” , in relation to a statutory age restriction, includes—

(a) seeking information as to a person's age,

(b) considering information as to a person's age, or

(c) refusing to sell or supply goods or services,

for the purposes of complying with the restriction (and “enforcing” is to be construed accordingly),

“statutory age restriction” means a provision in an enactment making it an offence to sell or supply goods or services to a person under an age specified in that or another enactment.”—(Alex Norris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would create a new offence of assaulting a retail worker. It is no secret that I have been pursuing this issue in some form for my entire parliamentary career, so I do not think the Minister will have been surprised to see it on the amendment paper. The new clause builds on the long campaign by the shop workers’ union USDAW—I declare an interest as a member—the Co-operative party, Tesco, the Co-op Group, the British Retail Consortium and many others to create a new law with tougher penalties for those who attack and abuse shop workers. It is a campaign that unites workers and management, and retailers big and small. We have made significant progress in previous legislation by securing an aggravating factor in sentencing for assaulting a shop worker, but a proper offence has yet to be introduced. The new clause would do that.

Everyone has the right to feel safe at work. The Minister asked a number of times during the evidence sessions why shop workers should be treated as a distinct category. The important factor is that, as well as selling things for themselves or their employer, depending on whether they own the shop or are employed to work there, and wearing their name badge or uniform, they have been asked by us in this place to restrict the sale of dozens of categories of items, including cigarettes, alcohol, knives, acids—you name it. That is a hugely significant act of public service, and the consequences of their not abiding by that request are very significant for them personally and potentially catastrophic for the rest of society.

In that moment, shop workers are put at risk, because every declined sale is a possible point of friction. Actions taken by us have created that flashpoint for violence and abuse, and many of us will have heard the harrowing stories of life-changing injuries that shop workers have suffered simply doing their job. It seems to me proper that if we are going to use legislation to require shop workers to enforce restrictions, then we should be prepared to use it to protect them. We should have their backs in that moment. That is the basic premise.

[Alex Cunningham]

My hon. Friend referred to the evidence sessions. Paddy Lillis said:

“There are about 1,000 incidents a day, and we think that that is just the tip of the iceberg”.––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 110, Q57.]

He went on to encourage retail workers who are not reporting incidents to do so. The Government’s defence against calls to introduce a specific offence has always been, “There’s not enough of it. It’s not significant enough for a specific offence.” Does my hon. Friend agree that if there are 1,000 incidents a day, there is good cause for the new clause?

[Alex Norris]

Yes. We are talking about an epidemic scale, and it behoves us to take action. Too many staff have given up on us or on the police and are just pricing violence and abuse in as part of the job, which they should never have to do, or leaving the industry and going to do something else.

The staggering degree of violence and abuse is now accompanied by shoplifting. The new crime statistics published last week show that shoplifting has increased by just under a third in the last year alone, as criminals run rife in our town centres. That is what our staff are facing every day—that is the level of the onslaught—and it has a knock-on impact on those who do not work in the shops but live in and love their community. Businesses in difficult economic circumstances can go under if hit hard by persistent shoplifting, which has a catastrophic impact on local economies and puts off residents. Similarly, big chains are making judgments on a store-by-store basis about whether to keep their shops open if they cannot protect colleagues or if crime makes them unviable, and a big retailer pulling out of a community has a huge impact on the high street.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

That is not quite what I was saying. I am going to point out a number of potential weaknesses in the new clause. That is one of them, but it is not the only one. I am just saying that it does not address any of the more serious assaults from ABH upwards. It would not affect probably 100% of the assaults of most concern, and probably 90% of all assaults.

The second issue is equity between retail workers and other public-facing workers. Retailers do very important work. As the shadow Minister rightly said, they do things such as age verification, which we in Parliament asked them to do. They put themselves in harm’s way, and they have been suffering from appalling abuse, which we all want to stop. All of those things are absolutely true.

This new clause, however, targets only retail workers. There are quite a few other workers with an equally strong claim. When it came to the statutory aggravating factor, which I will talk about in a moment, we orientated it towards all public-facing workers—not just retail workers. If we accept new clause 41 as drafted, reasonable questions might arise about teachers, who sometimes suffer assault at school, or bus, tram or tube drivers. What about refuse collectors, local councillors, social workers, and all these other workers who do an important job on behalf of the public, who sadly are often assaulted? They might say, “What about us?” In the previous bit of legislation, which I will refer to in a moment, we directed it towards the inclusion of all public-facing workers, not just retail workers, important though they are of course.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am sorry for trespassing on the territory of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North. When we changed the law in relation to health workers, it was because there was a recognised high incidence of assaults on them. We have the same situation now with shopworkers. We do not have the same situation with teachers, refuse collectors or other public servants.

[Chris Philp]

Other public-facing workers sadly suffer from assault—bus drivers being an obvious example. I will come on to the legislation we introduced. The hon. Member for Stockton North and I were both on the Bill Committee for the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. He will recall that, recognising this concern about retail workers and others, we passed a measure that made it a statutory aggravating factor where the victim of any assault—not just common assault—was a public-facing worker. When judges pass sentence and the victim is a public-facing worker—that includes retail workers—they are obliged by primary legislation to consider a longer sentence than they otherwise would. Reflecting the seriousness of this issue that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, so eloquently talked about, this ensures that there is a longer sentence—the person concerned will go to prison for a longer period of time. That came into force less than two years ago, so we have taken action. It would be reasonable to consider just how that is bedding in before going further, much as I sympathise with the intent behind this new clause.

Mention has been made of the offence in Scotland on which the new clause has been modelled, which I think came into force in 2021. The shadow Minister referenced the fact that there has apparently been some uplift in charges in Scotland as a result. I would be interested to find out—maybe outside of this Committee—how that has been established. Prior to this offence going on to the statute book in Scotland, offences where a retail worker was the victim would have been recorded just as assaults, in common with all other assaults. I do not know how it is possible to strip out the baseline to understand how many retail worker assaults were being prosecuted before the new law compared with afterwards. Before the new law in Scotland, they would all just have been counted as regular assaults. I do not know how those that had a retail worker as a victim could be isolated. Maybe the shadow Minister could write to me or we can discuss it later, because I would be interested to hear how that data is derived.

I know I am not supposed to show props or exhibits, so I will not do so, but I have some data on shoplifting prosecutions in Scotland and England over the last seven or eight years that has been indexed. The Committee may want to know that the graph in Scotland and England basically tracks one for one, including the two years after 2021. Certainly, the prosecution of shoplifting offences, which is different from assaults but gives a sense of police action, does not seem to be any different in Scotland and England over the period concerned. If there is evidence, from USDAW or otherwise, on the effect of that Scottish law change, I would be very interested to see and consider it further.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland did not ask me to press new clause 50. However, I can see from looking through the list of supporters that she has managed to unite me and the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson)—she may be the only person ever to have managed that. I hope he doesn’t take my ribbing too seriously and change his vote on something.

The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland tells me that the Minister and the Secretary of State have both been engaging with her and that she wishes to continue that engagement, so I imagine that these issues will arise again on Report or even in the Lords. I will not press the new clause to a vote today, but the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland is young, bright and short and is determined to see some action on the issue before she leaves this place. Who could blame her, considering her experiences? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 51

Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability

“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute ‘Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales’.

(3) In section 28—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from ‘based on’ to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—

‘—

(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;

(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;

(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;

(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or

(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or’;

(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from ‘hostility towards’ to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—

‘—

(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;

(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;

(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;

(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or

(v) persons who are transgender.’;

(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of ‘membership’ leave out ‘racial or religious’ and insert ‘relevant’.

(4) In section 29—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(5) In section 30—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated” and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(6) In section 31—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(7) In section 32—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 51 would address the disparity between existing characteristics and current hate crime legislation. It would create parity for maximum possible penalties for all five characteristics defined under the sentencing code. Under current hate crime legislation, hate crimes based on race and/or religion can have higher maximum penalties than their base equivalents, whereas hate crimes based on sexual orientation, transgender identity and/or disability cannot. This creates a two-tier system of justice.

There are precedents for expanding the characteristics covered by aggravated offences. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 originally defined only racially aggravated offences; this was amended in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to include religiously aggravated offences. In December 2021, the Law Commission published “Hate crime laws: Final report”, a comprehensive review of all hate crime legislation. Its conclusion was:

“We remain of the view that we expressed in our 2014 report that the current hierarchy of protection is unfair and sends a distinctly negative message to victims of hate crimes on the basis of disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. We therefore recommend parity of protection for aggravated offences across all five characteristics.”

It also stated:

“There was very strong support for a consistent approach amongst organisational stakeholders…For example, The Bar Council simply said…‘There would not appear to be any good reason to withhold parity of protection across the range of protected characteristics.’”

Does the Minister agree with the Law Commission’s recommendation that offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity should be encompassed within the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998?

New clause 51 comes in the context of soaring levels of hate crime reporting. Over 145,000 cases were reported in 2022-23. Across all monitored strands of hate crime, the numbers of offences have soared since 2011-12. Racially motivated hate crime rose by over 200% in the period, topping 100,000 instances for the first time in 2021-22. Meanwhile, hate crime motivated by religion increased by 433%. What is wrong with our bloomin’ society? By sexual orientation, it has increased by 493% and, by transgender identity, it has increased by 1,263%. Violent crime or crimes against the person rose as a proportion of hate crime offences from 29% in 2012-13 to 41% in 2022-23. The number of violent hate crime offences has risen sixfold, from 12,739 to 63,895 in 2022.

LGBT+ people and people with a disability should be able to live their life free from fear, abuse or violence. Labour has committed to take back our streets and be tough on hate crime. We will do so by strengthening and equalising the law so that every category of hate crime is treated as an aggravated offence, to ensure that everyone who falls victim to a hate crime is treated equally under the law. I hope that the Government will support new clause 51.

[Laura Farris]

I will be brief. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his explanation of the new clause, which seeks to add disability, sexual orientation and trans-gender identity as protected characteristics for the purposes of the aggravated offences set out in the Crime and Disorder Act. I agree with him that it is important that our legal framework is robust and comprehensive when it comes to hate crime. It was for that reason that the Government asked the Law Commission to carry out a detailed review of hate crime legislation.

The Law Commission provided very helpful recom-mendations on the reform of hate crime laws in December 2021, and the Government intend to publish later this year a full response that will address each recommendation. In the interest of brevity, I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be premature to make decisions before the formal Government response is published. The Law Commission made 34 recommendations, and we want to respond to each one. Accordingly, I respectfully invite him to withdraw the new clause.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, but I think it is clear that the Law Commission favours this work. We favour it—we believe in equality—so I will press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Norris]

I am grateful for the Minister’s assurances on the Government’s intent, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1

Notification orders

“1 The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 is amended as follows.

2 (1) Section 40 (overview) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2) after paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) orders applying the notification requirements to persons dealt with in the United Kingdom for certain offences to which this Part does not apply (see section 57A and Schedule 4A),”

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

“(4) Schedule 6A provides for orders applying the notification requirements to persons dealt with for certain service offences to which this Part does not apply.”

3 In section 57, in the heading for “Notification” substitute “Foreign offence notification”.

4 After that section insert—

“57A Domestic offence notification orders

Schedule 4A makes provision for notification orders applying the notification requirements of this Part to persons who have been dealt with for certain offences that are not offences to which this Part applies.”

5 (1) Section 59 (application to service offences) is amended as follows.

(2) The existing provision becomes subsection (1) of that section.

(3) After that subsection insert—

“(2) Schedule 6A makes provision for notification orders applying the notification requirements of this Part to persons who have been dealt with for certain service offences that are not offences to which this Part applies.”

6 (1) Section 61 (meaning of “dealt with” for an offence) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (4)(b)—

(a) for “or” substitute “, paragraph 2(6)(b) of Schedule 4A”;

(b) after “Schedule 6” insert “or paragraph 2(6)(b) of Schedule 6A”.

(3) In subsection (5), at the end of paragraph (a) (before the “and”) insert—

“(aa) paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 4A or paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 6A (conditions for making domestic or service offence notification order where offence dealt with before commencement),”

7 (1) Schedule 4 is amended as follows.

(2) In the Schedule heading for “Notification” substitute “Foreign offence notification”.

(3) For “notification order”, in each place it appears (including in any heading except the Schedule heading), substitute “foreign offence notification order”.

8 After Schedule 4 insert—

“Schedule 4A

Domestic offence notification orders

Introductory

1 In this Schedule—

“the appropriate court” means—

(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court;

(b) in Scotland, the Court of Session;

“authorised person” means the Secretary of State or—

(a) in England and Wales, a chief officer of police;

(b) in Scotland, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;

(c) in Northern Ireland, the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;

“offence”: any reference to an offence is to an offence under the law of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland (and does not include a service offence).

Domestic offence notification orders

2 (1) This paragraph applies where an authorised person makes an application to the appropriate court for an order under this paragraph (a “domestic offence notification order”) in respect of a person (“the offender”).

(2) The court must make a domestic offence notification order in respect of the offender if it is satisfied that the following 4 conditions are met (and must otherwise refuse the application).

(3) The first condition is that the offender has been dealt with for an offence (“the relevant offence”) that—

(a) was committed before 29 June 2021,

(b) is punishable with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and

(c) is not an excluded offence.

(4) “Excluded offence” means—

(a) an offence to which this Part applied when the offender was dealt with (see sections 41 and 42),

(b) an offence in relation to which section 30 or 31 of this Act or section 69 of the Sentencing Code applied,

(c) an offence in relation to which section 31 of this Act would have applied if paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of that section were omitted, or

(d) an offence under section 19, 21A or 39 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

(5) If the offender was dealt with for the relevant offence before the commencement of this Part, sub-paragraph (4) applies as if for paragraph (a) there were substituted—(a)an offence which, on the commencement of this Part, was within section 41(1) or (2),.

(6) The second condition is that—

(a) the offender has been dealt with for the relevant offence in a way mentioned in section 45 (reading any reference to an offence to which this Part applies as a reference to the relevant offence),

(b) the offender was aged 16 or over at the time of being dealt with for the relevant offence, and

(c) the offender—

(i) is imprisoned or detained in pursuance of the sentence passed or order made in respect of the offence,

(ii) would be so imprisoned or detained but for being unlawfully at large, absent without leave, on temporary leave or leave of absence, or on bail pending an appeal, or

(iii) is on licence, having served the custodial part of a sentence of imprisonment in respect of the offence.

(7) The third condition is that the relevant offence has a terrorist connection (see section 93).

(8) The fourth condition is that the period in respect of which the notification requirements would apply in respect of the relevant offence (see section 53) has not expired.

Restrictions on applications for domestic offence notification orders

3 (1) A chief officer of police may make an application for a domestic offence notification order in respect of a person only if—

(a) the person resides in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) the chief officer believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, that area.

(2) The chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland may make an application for a domestic offence notification order in respect of a person only if—

(a) the person resides in Scotland, or

(b) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Scotland.

(3) The chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland may make an application for a domestic offence notification order in respect of a person only if—

(a) the person resides in Northern Ireland, or

(b) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.

Effect of domestic offence notification order

4 The effect of a domestic offence notification order is that the notification requirements of this Part apply to the offender.

Modifications of this Part

5 (1) The following modifications apply where a domestic offence notification order is made.

(2) Section 43(1) does not apply to the offender, as regards the relevant offence.

(3) Section 47(1) (initial notification) applies as if the reference to the day on which the person is dealt with were a reference to the date of service of the domestic offence notification order.

(4) For the purposes of section 53 (period for which notification requirements apply), references there to “the offence” are to the relevant offence.

(5) For the meaning of “the relevant offence”, see paragraph 2(3).”

9 After Schedule 6 insert—

“Schedule 6A

Service offence notification orders

Introductory

1 In this Schedule—

“the appropriate court” means—

(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court;

(b) in Scotland, the Court of Session;

“authorised person” means the Secretary of State or—

(a) in England and Wales, a chief officer of police;

(b) in Scotland, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;

(c) in Northern Ireland, the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Service offence notification orders

2 (1) This paragraph applies where an authorised person makes an application to the appropriate court for an order under this paragraph (a “service offence notification order”) in respect of a person (“the offender”).

(2) The court must make a service offence notification order in respect of the offender if it is satisfied that the following 4 conditions are met (and must otherwise refuse the application).

(3) The first condition is that the offender has been dealt with for a service offence (“the relevant offence”) that—

(a) is punishable with imprisonment for more than 2 years,

(b) is not an excluded offence, and

(c) if a day has been appointed for the commencement of section 1 of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 as that section has effect for the purposes of section 69 of the Sentencing Code as applied by section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, is committed before that day.

(4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b) “excluded offence” means—

(a) a service offence to which this Part applied when the offender was dealt with (see paragraphs 1 and 2 of Schedule 6),

(b) a service offence in relation to which section 32 of this Act or section 69 of the Sentencing Code applied, or

(c) a service offence as respects which the corresponding civil offence is an offence under section 19, 21A or 39 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

(5) If the offender was dealt with for the relevant offence before the commencement of this Part, sub-paragraph (4) applies as if for paragraph (a) there were substituted—

“(a) a service offence as respects which the corresponding civil offence was on the commencement of this Part within section 41(1) or (2),”.

(6) The second condition is that—

(a) the offender has been dealt with for the relevant offence in a way mentioned in paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 (reading any reference to a service offence to which this Part applies as a reference to the relevant offence),

(b) the offender was aged 16 or over at the time of being dealt with for the relevant offence, and

(c) the offender—

(i) is imprisoned or detained in pursuance of the sentence passed or order made in respect of the offence,

(ii) would be so imprisoned or detained but for being unlawfully at large, absent without leave, on temporary leave or leave of absence, or on bail pending an appeal, or

(iii) is on licence, having served the custodial part of a sentence of imprisonment in respect of the offence.

(7) The third condition is that the relevant offence has a terrorist connection (see section 93).

(8) The fourth condition is that the period in respect of which the notification requirements would apply in respect of the relevant offence (see paragraph 7 of Schedule 6) has not expired.

Restrictions on applications for service offence notification orders

3 (1) A chief officer of police may make an application for a service offence notification order in respect of a person only if—

(a) the person resides in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) the chief officer believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, that area.

(2) The chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland may make an application for a service offence notification order in respect of a person only if—

(a) the person resides in Scotland, or

(b) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Scotland.

(3) The chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland may make an application for a service offence notification order in respect of a person only if—

(a) the person resides in Northern Ireland, or

(b) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.

Effect of service offence notification order

4 The effect of a service offence notification order is that the notification requirements of this Part apply to the offender.

Modifications of this Part

5 (1) The following modifications apply where a service offence notification order is made.

(2) Section 47(1) (initial notification) applies as if the reference to the day on which the person is dealt with were a reference to the date of service of the service offence notification order.

(3) Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 does not apply to the offender, as regards the relevant offence.

(4) For the purposes of paragraph 7 of that Schedule (period for which notification requirements apply), references there to “the service offence” or “the offence” are to the relevant offence.

(5) For the meaning of “the relevant offence”, see paragraph 2(3).””—(Chris Philp.)

The new schedule provides for orders applying the notification requirements in Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

[Alex Cunningham]

On a point of order, Sir Graham. Is it in order for me to thank you and your fellow Chairs for keeping us in order while still allowing us free-flowing discussions; the Hansard staff and other House staff; our Public Bill Office staff, who always manage to keep me in order; the Ministers for listening and recognising that the Bill has some way to go to satisfy those of us in opposition; and my colleagues and Government Members for their contributions?

I have saved my last comments for the right hon. Member for Croydon South. During our deliberations, he confessed to having some affection for me—I much appreciated that. I had developed an affection for his beard. I had thought that he was trying to rebuild the reputation of the beard within the Home Office after the Home Secretary, having insulting my constituency, was disqualified from the parliamentary beard of the year competition—a competition that I assure the Committee I went on to win. I hope that I can encourage the right hon. Member for Croydon South to reconsider and grow the beard again. He could succeed me next time around!

[Chris Philp]

Further to that point of order, Sir Graham. I appreciate the shadow Minister’s advice on the beard. Contrary to speculation in the Daily Mail a day or two ago that it was removed for electoral reasons, it was in fact removed following intense lobbying by my daughter, who did not like it very much. Perhaps in the future I can aspire to follow in the shadow Minister’s footsteps as parliamentary beard wearer of the year.

Let me say a huge thank you to everyone involved in this process. We have sat for 16 sessions, including the evidence sessions and our line-by-line consideration—and haven’t they flown by? We have considered 53 new clauses and debated 80-odd clauses in total. May I thank you, Sir Graham, for your benign and benevolent chairmanship, as well as Sir Robert Syms, Ms Bardell, Dame Angela Eagle and Mrs Latham, who have also been in the Chair?

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, who made what I think was her ministerial debut on a Bill Committee with great aplomb and attention to detail. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall, who has been silent but omnipresent—although he almost broke his silence when I was very nearly late the other day.

I thank both shadow Ministers for their very thoughtful and reasonable points. We have had a constructive debate and there are many areas of common ground where we can work together. I am very grateful to them for that. In particular, I thank the hon. Member for Stockton North; I think this is probably the third or fourth Bill Committee we have worked on together, and my affection for him remains undimmed.

I thank the other Members of the Committee—those who have spoken, and perhaps even more so those who have not. Their contributions have all been very interesting and valued, and on some of the clauses we have had a very well-informed and informative debate. I thank the Committee Clerks; Hansard, who may at times have struggled to keep up with what we were saying; and the Doorkeepers who have superintended proceedings.

I thank the officials in the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office, as well as those in the Department for Transport and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who have worked for a very long time on this Bill, along with our private offices. As hon. Members can imagine, a huge amount of work goes into preparing a Bill like this one. Teams of dozens of people—perhaps even more than dozens—work over many months, and sometimes even years on some clauses. On behalf of hon. Members and the public, I put on the record our thanks to the officials in those Departments for the work they have done. Without their work, legislation like this would not be brought forward.

It remains only for me to say how much I look forward to discussing the Bill further when it returns to the Floor of the House on Report.