Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection From Eviction and Taking Control of Goods) (England) Regulations 2020

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Monday 7th December 2020 General Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection from Eviction and Taking Control of Goods) (England) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 1290).

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. The statutory instrument prevents enforcement agents—bailiffs, in plain English—from entering residential premises in England to execute a writ or warrant of possession until 11 January, except in the most serious circumstances.

The purpose of the measure is to protect public health by preventing people from being evicted from their homes by enforcement agents at a time when the risk of virus transmission is high and when local authorities and NHS services are typically under additional strain over the Christmas period. The instrument builds on the Government’s previous guidance on enforcement activity during the national lockdown in England, which was introduced by the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020, and on the intention to have a winter pause on evictions, which the Government announced on 10 September. The instrument before the Committee also prevented enforcement agents from entering residential properties to take control of goods during the national lockdown that ended on 2 December. It applies to enforcement action in England only.

The Government took unprecedented action to ensure that renters were protected from eviction at the height of the coronavirus pandemic, including by providing significant financial support and agreeing with the courts to use powers relating to court procedure to stay possession proceedings for a total of six months, until 20 September. That stay could only ever be temporary, however; the civil justice system and the rules that underpin it must be accessible, fair and efficient for tenants and landlords alike.

Ahead of the end of the stay on possession cases in the courts, the Government put in place a number of measures to manage the resumption of cases carefully, so that the courts were not overwhelmed and could make decisions; so that the most vulnerable could get the help and support they needed; and, in particular, so that tenants could have access to legal advice and support. The Government also worked with the judiciary and others to put in place new court arrangements to ensure appropriate support to all parties. Those court arrangements are in place and are working well, and I pay tribute to the working group convened by the Master of the Rolls and chaired by Mr Justice Knowles for the key role that it has played.

In addition, the Government took legislative action. The Minister for Housing laid a statutory instrument on 28 August to amend schedule 29 to the Coronavirus Act 2020 to require landlords to provide tenants with six months’ notice in all but the most serious cases. That approach ensures that tenants will remain safe and have additional time to find new accommodation, while empowering landlords to take action where necessary—if a tenant’s antisocial behaviour is severely affecting their neighbours’ quality of life, for example.

We have also taken some targeted action on the enforcement of evictions to protect public health during the extraordinary circumstances of the coronavirus pandemic. In September, guidance was issued to bailiffs to request that the enforcement of possession orders did not proceed in areas where local lockdown regulations restricted gatherings in residential properties, to prevent tenants being forced out of their homes at an unsettling time in areas where public health risks could be greater.

The Government also announced in September that we would take steps to prevent eviction action taking place over the Christmas period, ensuring that vulnerable tenants are not forced from their homes at a time when public and local authorities may be dealing with the usual level of increased demand on services. Bailiffs were issued guidance that they should not enforce writs or warrants of possession, other than in the most serious circumstances, between 11 December and 11 January, during the winter pause I mentioned. That is the necessary context—forgive me for setting it out in some detail, Sir David, but it is important.

At the beginning of November, following the introduction of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) (No. 4) Regulations 2020, enforcement agents were asked not to enforce evictions nationally at a time when the risk of transmitting the virus was high and a number of significant restrictions were in force. As the national restrictions were set to end just before the end of the national winter pause, the Government decided that it was appropriate to build on the guidance not to enforce evictions in England during that time with the legislative measure before the Committee. We therefore laid this instrument in Parliament on 16 November, to come into force on 17 November. We were able to do so because it was an urgent matter taken under the public health legislation. Today’s proceedings are now required to ensure that this made affirmative legislation continues to have effect.

The instrument is consistent with the policy that the Government have adopted since the start of the pandemic. It aims to strike a balance between prioritising public health and supporting the most vulnerable, while ensuring that landlords can access and exercise their right to justice in the most serious cases. For that reason, the instrument contains some limited exemptions from the ban on the enforcement of evictions. These exceptions relate to circumstances where the Government feel that the health risk is lower, or the competing interests of preventing harm to third parties or taking action against egregious behaviour are sufficient to outweigh the public health risks in enforcing eviction.

The instrument provides the following exemptions to the restrictions on enforcing evictions: first, where the claim is against trespassers who are persons unknown, and secondly, where the order for possession was made wholly or partly on the grounds of antisocial behaviour or nuisance, false statements, domestic abuse in social tenancies, substantial rent arrears equivalent to nine months’ rent that predate 23 March 2020, or the death of a tenant where the enforcing agent attending the property is satisfied that the property is unoccupied. The Government believe it is important that there is a clear, uniform and transparent process for establishing whether an exemption to the ban on evictions applies. For that reason, the instrument contains a requirement for the court to be satisfied on a case-by-case basis that an exemption applies.

The measure will be in force until 11 January. New rules require that all bailiffs must give 14 days’ notice of an eviction, which means that in most cases evictions will not resume anywhere in England until 25 January at the earliest. We continue to keep the position regarding the enforcement of evictions in local tiers under review, following the expiry of the national restrictions over the midwinter period. I know there has been significant interest in the House in the effect of removing tenants’ protection from eviction, which was provided by the stay on possession proceedings between 27 March and 20 September this year. Concern has also been expressed by hon. Members about the impact of these restrictions on the rights of landlords, who are dealing with difficult situations in which there is no reasonable alternative to possession proceedings.

The statutory instrument also set out a nationwide prohibition on enforcement agents taking control of goods inside residential properties while the national restrictions are in place. The measure did not prevent enforcement agents from taking other steps to enforce debts and fines under the taking control of goods procedure, including making contact via remote means such as telephone; visiting, but not entering, properties; taking control of goods located outside homes or on the highway; and enforcement at business premises. The Government believe that such steps may be safely undertaken in line with the Government’s published covid-secure guidance for enforcement agents using the taking control of goods procedure. The Government’s view, therefore, is that this policy strikes a proportionate balance between protecting against the risk of transmission and allowing the continuation of the administration of justice.

Forgive me for one moment as I find the next part of my speech.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

Want to read mine?

[Alex Chalk]

Thank you for that kind offer.

I will close by saying that the courts remained open throughout the national restrictions in November. The court rules and procedures introduced in September will ensure protections for both tenants and landlords. For example, landlords are required to send the court information about the impact that the pandemic has had on their tenant; a new review stage has been introduced so that tenants can access legal advice; and landlords are required to reactivate any existing claims that were in the system before 3 August. The Government have published comprehensive new guidance for landlords and tenants to explain all these new arrangements and their impact on the court possessions process.

Our approach strikes the right balance between prioritising public health and supporting the most vulnerable renters, while ensuring that landlords can access and exercise their right to justice. Landlords can action possession claims through the courts, but evictions will not be enforced apart from in the most serious cases. This instrument provides tenants with protection from eviction, ensuring that vulnerable tenants are not forced from their home at a time when public and local authorities may be dealing with the unusual level of increased demand on services. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk]

Let me deal with this point about courts. Because so much money has gone into providing perspex and so on, the number of courtrooms available for trials is higher than the baseline. That is important. Even before this pandemic, we had increased by 50% the amount of funding that was going into rape support centres, because we recognised the importance of providing that support. We will continue to support individuals through independent sexual violence advisers and through providing that capacity in our court system so that victims can get the justice they deserve.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

The court backlog is not just a number; it is a tragedy for every victim who is awaiting justice. The Tory PCC for Hertfordshire wrote to Ministers back in June to say that victims were pulling out of trials and that criminals were walking away scot-free as a result. How many crimes need to go unpunished before Ministers will come before the House with a plan backed up by targets and resource so that criminals are brought to justice?

[Alex Chalk]

I regret that the hon. Gentleman has not read the plan that has been published, because if he had, he would know that in the magistrates courts the backlog is being eroded, because disposals have exceeded receipts since the end of July, and that the number of trial courts is higher than the baseline. If he had read the report, he would know that. This Government are keeping courts running and ensuring that justice will be served.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is great to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Bone—welcome back to the Committee. I rise to speak to new clause 25, on the repeal of provisions about defence for controlling or coercive behaviour offence.

Domestic abuse against disabled people is simply not discussed enough. They are hidden victims. When abuse against disabled people is raised, it is usually in the context of adult safeguarding processes, which labels disabled people as vulnerable adults and which disabled survivors and specialists in the field tell us is failing them.

The new clause reflects 10 years’ worth of casework by Stay Safe East, one of only two organisations in England and Wales led by disabled women supporting disabled survivors, and its partner organisations, in an advisory group on domestic abuse and disability. That is two specialist disability and deaf services for a disabled population of 10 million people.

The data on abuse against disabled people is grim. Disabled adults are at least 1.5 times more likely to be a victim or survivor of violence than non-disabled adults. Disabled women are at least three times more likely to experience domestic abuse from family members, be that their partner, parents, siblings, adult children or other family members. Some of the abusers will also be the person’s carer. It is highly likely that those figures are an underestimate, as the only example—the crime survey—is not in an accessible format for deaf and disabled people to participate in, and many survivors cannot access external help.

The rate of domestic abuse against disabled men is also higher than against non-disabled men, but disabled women are more likely to experience repeated, sustained and more violent abuse than disabled men. Disabled children, and particularly disabled girl children, are more likely to experience sexual violence and physical abuse than non-disabled children. What is more, disabled people may have other people in their lives who have a level of control, whether that is unpaid carers or paid carers from an agency, or a personal assistant.

This is the case for disabled women across all communities, of all ages and all backgrounds. Disabled women face specific forms of abuse at the hands of partners, family members and paid or unpaid carers: control of communication; control of medication; restricting access to disability support; using a person’s impairment to control them—for example, playing on their mental health or taking advantage of the fact that they have learning disabilities—forced marriage on the grounds that the partner “will look after you when I am gone”; and constantly abusing women because of their impairment. That, in itself, is a form of hate crime.

Abusers hold the very real threat that, “They will take your kids away from you” over a disabled woman. In the experience of both Stay Safe East and SignHealth, a deaf-led service for deaf survivors of domestic abuse, deaf or disabled mothers are at much higher risk of losing their children through the courts or other domestic abuse. In some cases, the courts opt to place children in the care of an abusive father rather than letting them live with a disabled mother, who is considered a poor parent for reasons simply of her disability, and providing support to keep the children with her.

Unfortunately, disabled victims who are able to speak out against this face multiple barriers to gaining safety and justice. Poor access to refuges or emergency accommodation; voice phone-only contact with many services, which excludes deaf women and those without speech; services not set up to deal with victims who need long-term support; a lack of quality, accessible information or British Sign Language interpreters; no access to counselling—the list is very, very long.

Worst of all is not being believed by police, social workers or health workers because they are disabled women, which is something that is frequently reported by deaf and disabled women who approach the two specialist organisations. A little-known clause, now subsections 76(8) and (9) of the Serious Crime Act 2015, introduced what has been dubbed “the carers’ defence” by disabled survivor groups. It introduced a worrying caveat into what was a piece of legislation to protect victims of abuse, by allowing an abuser who is facing charges of coercive control to claim that they were acting in the best interests of the victim.

That provision was originally brought to the attention of legislators through the efforts of Sisters of Frida, a disabled women’s collective, and Stay Safe East, but it became part of the 2015 Act. Although the clause may have been introduced with the best of intentions, to avoid unnecessary prosecution of carers who were, for example, preventing somebody with dementia from going out alone because they were at risk, there is a real risk that it could be used by abusers to claim that they are acting in the best interests of somebody they are controlling with malicious intent.

That is especially true of people who might be seen to have capacity issues, such as deaf people, people without speech, people with cognitive issues as a result of a stroke, people with learning difficulties and people with mental health challenges. That, of course, is a substantial number of potential victims among those who face the greatest barriers to safety and getting justice.

For example, the parents of a young woman with mild learning disabilities stopped her going out alone, only letting her go to college with a chaperone, on the grounds that she was at risk from strange men. The parents had failed to teach their daughter about safe relationships, had removed her from personal, social, health and economic education lessons in school, and had controlled her friendships with her peer group. The family claimed that they were protecting her. The young woman initially believed that her parents were doing their best for her, but as she grew up she came to realise that she could make her own decisions. It subsequently emerged that, on top of all the coercive control, the family were taking the young woman’s benefits, and there was also physical abuse.

The section gives a clear message to disabled survivors and victims generally: “Your decisions are not your own, and abusers can claim to be acting in your best interests.” “For her own good” is an expression we often hear abusers using, even if they are abusing that very interest, and the courts will let them get away with exercising abuse of power over their victims.

In a context where disabled survivors are the least likely to speak out, and where, if a case does go to court, the chance of a successful outcome for the victim is very low, especially for disabled victims, that is not the message that we want legislation on domestic abuse to give to survivors or, for that matter, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service or abusers. The Care Act 2014 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 both provide sufficient protection for genuine carers who face malicious allegations. A law to protect victims is not the place for a clause that protects potential abusers.

All too often, concerns about disabled victims are ignored. The Government now have a real opportunity to listen, and we urge the Minister to take full advantage of that opportunity. We are talking about a group with many intersectional and very complex challenges, which provide additional areas for abusers to exert control and abuse.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

This is the first of two debates on different aspects of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. As the hon. Member for Hove has indicated, new clause 25 seeks to repeal the defence in section 76(8), which has been labelled by some as the “carers’ defence”.

Currently, the coercive or controlling behaviour offence allows for such a limited defence if the accused believes that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. It is important to note that the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that in all the circumstances of the case their behaviour, while apparently controlling, was reasonable. This defence is intended to cover cases, for instance, in which the accused was the carer for a disabled spouse, and for medical reasons had to compel their partner to take medication or to stay at home for their own protection.

It is worth taking a moment to consider the sorts of circumstances in which that defence might apply. Imagine a situation in which neighbours walk past a home and see someone who wants to get out of the front garden and on to the road, and is in some distress at not being able to do so. That neighbour calls the police, and the police then investigate. It emerges that the person trying to get on to the road is, very sadly, suffering from dementia, and their partner is a person of unimpeachable integrity and good character—a decent, loving partner of many years’ standing who has shown nothing but care and compassion for that individual, but who is concerned that if they get out on to the road, they will be a danger to themselves and others. Is it seriously to be suggested that that person should be at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace?

[Alex Chalk]

Of course it might be the case, but the important thing is that this defence allows a proper opportunity for a tribunal of fact to consider that, and I think it is absolutely right that it should do so. It is worth noting that under section 76 the burden is on the individual to advance that defence, and for a tribunal of fact to then consider whether it has been disproved. In other words, if that individual advances something that is utterly implausible, a jury—or indeed a bench of magistrates—would have little difficulty in exposing it as such.

[Peter Kyle]

It is important to note that we are leaping straight from a hypothetical, in which a woman with dementia is trying to climb over a fence, to court. However, between those two stages we have the first responders. Having experienced the training, care, compassion and expertise of the frontline responders in the prevention team of Sussex police, I would find it extraordinary if a frontline responder could not tell the difference between these scenarios, or certainly determine whether there is enough evidence to pursue the kind of prosecution that the Minister is describing.

[Alex Chalk]

We have to be very clear about this. If an individual does not have that defence, considering the elements of section 76, we would be left with a person who is apparently being caused some distress—as would be evident to the first responder, or indeed to a police officer, who might have to effect an arrest—and the distress would appear to have been caused by that person’s liberty having been restricted. In those circumstances, unless the individual has the defence that they were exercising proper control in the interests of the other person, they are at risk of being arrested and prosecuted. That would be a serious concern, would it not?

I should also add—I do not think this point is controversial—that there is an exemption within section 76 concerning under-16s. In other words, where people are in a position of responsibility for somebody who is under the age of 16 and may have to inhibit that person’s liberty, that is considered perfectly understandable and justified. The argument would therefore be this: why is it that in circumstances where, sadly, an individual is at risk and vulnerable, it should not be open to that carer—who everyone accepts is loving, decent and caring—to say that this was in the interests of the individual?

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s premise that it is possible that some people would seek to advance an unmeritorious defence. That is absolutely right, but I respectfully say to him that when he says, “The courts let them get away with it,” he is unfairly labelling the courts. In my opinion, the courts have shown themselves well able to see through a spurious defence. The carer who seeks to try it on and to abuse this proper defence will be given short shrift by a bench of magistrates, or indeed by a jury. We should trust juries and courts to do justice in each case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

No, it is not the same at all. If the hon. Lady will listen for a moment, the point is that there is, on the face of a statute, a defence that the jury can consider. They get to consider it only if a judge is satisfied that there is a prima facie defence—in other words, if what the defendant is advancing is patently and transparently unmeritorious, it may well not even go to a jury. A judge might say, “This is such a load of old nonsense that it doesn’t even cross the threshold for a jury to decide.” It is simply where there is a prima facie case. We should trust juries to say, “Is there something in that, or is there not?” It is not for us to adjudicate in every single case. Trust juries; trust the people. It is different from the point that the hon. Lady was making about rough sex, because there was a lacuna in the law. Our job is to fill the lacuna and then leave it to juries, who have shown for many centuries that they are well placed to do justice in a specific case.

I will make a final point on this issue, because I do not want to dwell too long on it. If the policy were not in place, there is a danger that the same people that the hon. Member for Hove quite properly wants to stand up for, and who we want to stand up for—namely, people with disabilities—could be disadvantaged if people take the view of, “Hold on a moment. By doing what I think is genuinely and objectively in the best interests of an individual, I am at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace. Do you know what? Why on earth should I be doing that? Why should I be putting myself at risk in that way.” We have to ensure that we do not inadvertently, and despite the best intentions, find ourselves making life more difficult for the people we want to support.

[Peter Kyle]

The Minister is a very effective advocate, but the bottom line is that all the agencies representing frontline victims and survivors are speaking with unanimity. They want the law changed and the new clause struck off, because they say it is affecting their service users. There is no organisation out there working with service users that is defending the clause; it is only him.

[Alex Chalk]

With respect, that is not a fair characterisation. Parliament had the opportunity to consider the Bill in 2015. It went through Committee stage in this House, and it went through the House of Lords. It was Parliament’s will that it should exist. What is now being suggested, less than five years later, is that we should sweep away something that was there in the past. In my respectful submission, the case for that has not been made.

Of course, all matters are considered with care, particularly matters of this kind of sensitivity, but we have to be alive to the fact that sometimes, if we remove such a defence, we risk making the position far worse for the people we want to protect. We see that time and again when people are concerned that if they are not given the opportunity to advance their defence and simply to say, “Listen, you decide whether I have got this wrong.” If they do not have the option at least to put forward their defence so that 12 people who have no prior knowledge can make a fair decision, it would be unfair on them and would risk unfairness to people with disabilities.

The final point that I want to make is that the equivalent domestic abuse offence in Scotland contains a similar defence, under section 6 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, as does the proposed new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, which is clause 12 of the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill, currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly. This is not an outlier provision, I respectfully submit.

Notwithstanding the very proper concerns expressed by the hon. Gentleman, I invite him to consider that, set in a wider context, seeking to exclude the provision is not necessary. In the light of my explanation, I invite him to withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Kyle]

Speak for yourself!

[Alex Chalk]

I am sure that hon. Gentleman does look at it.

The 1997 Act was amended to include section 2A, which deals with the “Offence of stalking”. Section 2A says:

“A person is guilty of an offence if… the person pursues a course of conduct… and… the course of conduct amounts to stalking.”

Then, however—this is what I think is brilliant—the 2012 Act goes on to look at the sorts of behaviour that might constitute stalking. Subsection (3) says:

“The following are examples of acts or omissions which, in particular circumstances, are ones associated with stalking… following a person… contacting, or attempting to contact, a person by any means… publishing any statement”

relating to that person. It continues:

“monitoring the use… of the internet… loitering in any place… interfering with any property in the possession of a person… watching or spying on a person.”

The reason why that is important is that it sets out the sorts of behaviour that could be stalking, but it is not exhaustive.

The reason why I say of all that is that if someone at the end of a relationship, when the two people are no longer living together, engages in a course of conduct that, to the man or woman on the Clapham omnibus, is a bit like stalking—whether or not that means trying to exert economic control—there is the potential for offences there, and I will come on to them while I am still sympathetic to the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.

I am particularly mindful of that because in my own county of Gloucestershire—the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle has already mentioned this—Hollie Gazzard was brutally murdered. Those who have been victims of stalking say that it is like murder in slow motion, because of so much of what precedes it in terms of stalking behaviour. My point is that that can include economic abuse as well.

However, Surviving Economic Abuse argues further that stalking and harassment offences, although relevant, are not designed specifically to prosecute the sort of behaviour we are discussing. I accept that, but it is also fair to point out that, because of the way that stalking offences are drafted, it is not beyond the wit of man or woman to conceive of how they could be included, based on the facts of a specific case.

In addition, the new statutory definition of domestic abuse includes ex-partners among those defined as “personally connected” and does not have a “living together” requirement. Therefore, an amendment to the controlling or coercive behaviour offence could be seen as conforming within the definition in clause 1.

However, the case is not clearcut, given that the offence is still relatively new, and there is currently limited data available in support of a change. Because the case is not clearcut, the Government committed, in response to our 2018 consultation on domestic abuse, to conduct a review of the offence, as the hon. Lady is aware.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Peter Kyle]

The Minister is making a good point. As he knows, the opportunity to amend legislation does not come up often, and we often do not get the chance to amend the perfect piece of legislation. Using all his wit, experience and erudition, he is able to find the failings in the new clause, but a principle is at stake. If he is saying that this is not the ideal piece of legislation or method to achieve those aims, will he spend a bit of time telling us what is, whether he will back it and whether he will make it happen swiftly?

[Alex Chalk]

I invite the hon. Gentleman to listen carefully to what I say in due course, and I hope that he will not be unhappy—

[Peter Kyle]

Disappointed.

[Alex Chalk]

Disappointed—thank you. Do you want to make the speech?



The concern with the new clauses, among other things, is that they do not necessarily replicate the dictum in Brown.  To those who are not familiar with this, a case more than 20 years ago, Crown v. Brown, laid down some case law—a point adverted to by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that we recognise needs to be clarified. The point that I will develop in due course, which I think will find favour with the hon. Member for Hove, is that that is precisely what we intend to do. The concern is that these new clauses, for the reasons I have indicated—I will not go into any detail on new clause 5, because it is a similar point that I would seek to make—limit the application of the principles in Brown to offences that occur in a domestic abuse situation. I heard the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley say sotto voce, “Isn’t a Tinder date an intimate personal relationship?”. The reality is—I speak as someone who has defended as well as prosecuted—that the job of a defence advocate is to find whatever wiggle room there is in the law. Our job here is to close that down.

As I have indicated, the prosecution would have to show also that this activity was either not consensual, or was consensual and also amounted to domestic abuse. Again, defence counsel will be seeking to ask, “Is this really domestic abuse in circumstances where it is consensual?”. You can immediately see the arguments that would be made in court. The key is for us to close that down and give practitioners—but, more importantly, people—absolute clarity about what is and what is not acceptable. As I said at the outset, we need to ensure that any change made is clear, and does not inadvertently create loopholes or uncertainties in the law.

I invite the hon. Member for Hove to accept that despite the difficulties, we have been anxiously and actively considering for some considerable time how we can best ensure greater clarity in the law. We aim to set out the Government’s approach in time for Report.

[Peter Kyle]

On behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, I thank the Minister for his comments and the considered way he made them. We particularly thank him for the timeframe he outlined. Making a statement before Report is incredibly important; we need to move swiftly. The Minister knows better than anyone that if the same thing happened to one other person in the coming weeks, it would be an absolute travesty, so we need to make sure that these loopholes are dealt with quickly.

[Alex Chalk]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman has said, and I leave it where it stands. I understand and I agree. I turn to new clauses 6 and 7. Those who have argued passionately in respect of the so-called rough sex defence will acknowledge that perhaps this point is contingent on that. There are also real practical difficulties with new clauses 6 and 7. Let me develop them briefly.

New clause 6 requires the personal consent of the personal Director of Public Prosecutions where a charge or plea less than murder, for example manslaughter, is applied or accepted in cases of domestic homicide. That sounds unobjectionable. It would be perfectly sensible if the DPP was readily able or had the capacity to give that kind of personal consent. However, there are practical problems with it. Let me set out the context. A statutory requirement of this nature is, and should be, extremely rare. It should only be imposed where a prosecution touches on sensitive issues of public policy, not simply sensitive issues, which are legion in the criminal justice system. The only recent example of this consent function applies to offences under the Bribery Act 2010, and last year, a Select Committee undertaking post-legislative review of the 2010 Act recommended that the requirement for personal DPP consent be reconsidered.

We have to acknowledge that the Crown Prosecution Service handles a high volume of serious and complex casework nationwide, and it is important that prosecutors have the confidence to take their own legal decisions. Introducing requirements for personal DPP consent could serve to undermine or frustrate this approach. It would also, I am bound to say, potentially sit uneasily alongside other very difficult decisions that prosecutors have to make. Suppose, for example, in the context of a terrorist prosecution, that because of the way the evidence emerged, or because of new lines of enquiry, a decision was made to take the defendant off the indictment in respect of a bomb plot, but the prosecution said, “We are going to continue to prosecute him in respect of possession of materials that might be of assistance to a person planning an act of terrorism.” These are immensely difficult and sensitive decisions. However, there is neither the capacity nor the wherewithal for the DPP to make those personal decisions all the time.

It is sad to note that there is a high volume of cases involving domestic homicide, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley well understands. It means that charging decisions need to be made urgently, and sometimes at a speed, where no personal DPP involvement is possible.

These considerations apply equally to cases in which a lesser plea may be accepted. If pleas are offered in court, prosecutors are required to make a decision in an incredibly short period of time after speaking with the victim’s family, and the DPP could not be involved in that level of decision making. I invite the Committee to consider the circumstances, supposing it is in court: because of the way that the evidence has come out, there is the consideration of whether a lesser plea should be accepted. The hon. Lady pointed out that this does not always happen, but if the family have been properly consulted, it is no kindness to that family to say, ‘Do you know what? We’re not going to make a decision on this, which would let you begin to heal and put this behind you. We’re going to put this off for two or three weeks while the DPP has to consider it.’ Court proceedings will be suspended awkwardly, and the poor family will be left hanging.

Forgive me for stating the obvious, but it bears emphasising that the real remedy is for good prosecutors––the overwhelming majority are good and do their duty with diligence, conspicuous ability and conscientiousness– –to liaise with the family in a compassionate and inclusive way. I understand the desire for additional scrutiny in such significant and sensitive cases, but I assure the Committee that the Crown Prosecution Service already has systems in place to check and challenge decision making in these circumstances. Internal CPS policies require that chief crown prosecutors are notified of any and all homicide cases. It is likely as well that domestic homicides would be subject to a case management panel with a lead lawyer and either the deputy chief crown prosecutor or the chief crown prosecutor, so there is senior oversight.

The point that I really want to underscore is that because cases of domestic homicide inevitably have a lasting and dreadful impact on victims’ families, people deserve support and compassion, particularly as criminal proceedings can be upsetting and difficult to follow. Procedures are in place to ensure that is given. Where there is an allegation of murder, the police very often appoint a family liaison officer as a matter of course to assist with the process. I speak as someone who has prosecuted several murder cases. The role that liaison officers play is absolutely fantastic. Otherwise, the poor family turn up in court with no idea what an indictment is, wondering “What on earth is this examination-in-chief stuff? What is this plea and trial preparation hearing?”. The liaison officer role is invaluable, and needs to be supported by prosecutors speaking to family members, as they increasingly do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Kyle]

I have never heard a journalist wanting the rule that prevents reporting from naming victims of sexual violence overturned. Has the Minister?

[Alex Chalk]

What I can say, from my experience in court, is that it is not unusual for the press to seek to overturn reporting restrictions where they are imposed at the discretion of the court, so although the hon. Gentleman may be right that in fact there is not a particular drumbeat in respect of sexual offences, I hope that the Committee will not be gulled into thinking that the press do not very often seek to overturn reporting restrictions that are imposed. The arguments that are made are, “Why should we be having secret justice?”, and so on. Those arguments are very often dispatched by the court; they are considered not to be valid, and then they are sometimes taken on appeal and so on. The only point that I am seeking to make is that we must be careful in this area and strike a balance, so that we do not find ourselves bringing the law into disrepute.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 11th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Chalk]

Courts have a common law discretion to manage their own proceedings, but it will be important for us to assist the them as much as possible by setting out the categories that should trigger the exemption. Although courts can act of their own motion, it is none the less important to prescribe to an extent that the provision applies in circumstances where somebody has been convicted, charged or cautioned. I will develop that point in the following passage.

In the light of the recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, the clause now makes provision that the automatic ban will also apply in other cases where a witness has adduced specified evidence of domestic abuse. The evidence will be specified in regulations and, as recommended by the Joint Committee, we intend for this evidence to broadly replicate that which is used to access civil legal aid. That is probably the point that the hon. Lady was driving at.

The prohibitions also apply reciprocally, to prevent a victim from having to cross-examine their abuser in person. Where the automatic ban does not apply, the clause also gives the court a discretion to prohibit cross-examination in person where it would be likely to diminish the quality of the witness’s evidence or cause significant distress to the witness or the party. That is the point about a court’s discretion: the judge has the individuals in front of them, can hear from them and can make a decision based on that.

In any case where cross-examination in person is prohibited, either under the automatic prohibition or at the discretion of the court, the judge must consider whether there is a satisfactory alternative means by which the witness can be cross-examined or the evidence can be obtained. That would include means that already fall under the judge’s general case management powers, such as putting the questions to the witness themselves or via a legal adviser, or by accepting pre-recorded cross-examination. I suppose one might imagine cases where the things that need to be cross-examined on are so narrow in scope that it would not be worth the aggravation of instructing independent counsel if the judge can do it and do justice in that way. It is important that the court can act of its own motion and flexibly, and the clause retains that flexibility.

If there are no satisfactory alternative means, the court must invite the prohibited party to appoint a legal representative to carry out cross-examination on their behalf. If they choose not to, or are unable to, the clause gives the court the power to appoint a legal representative—an advocate—for the sole purpose of conducting the cross-examination in the interests of the prohibited party. The court must appoint an advocate where it considers this to be necessary in the interests of justice.

There could be circumstances where it is not possible to protect the prohibited party’s rights to access to justice and/or a family life without the appointment of such an advocate. This might be in circumstances, for example, where the evidence that needs to be tested by cross-examination is complicated, because it is complex medical or other expert evidence, or because it is complex or confused factual evidence, say from a vulnerable witness. The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance in connection with the role of that advocate.

The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the fees and costs of a court-appointed advocate to be met from central funds. We understand the particular skill and care that is needed to carry out cross-examination of a vulnerable witness effectively. We will be designing a full fee scheme to support these provisions, in consultation with the sector and interested parties, prior to the implementation of the Bill.

This clause seeks to ensure that, in future, no victim of domestic abuse has to endure the trauma of being questioned in person by their abuser as part of ongoing family proceedings. It makes a big difference, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Peter Kyle]

It is rare but pleasing when one agrees so fully with the person one shadows, and I am grateful to him. I do not want to shock the Minister—I do not want him to be clutching his pearls as I say such words—but it is certainly the situation we find ourselves in on this clause. We are not opposing or seeking to amend the clause; we agree fully with it and what it seeks to achieve.

However, I want to spend a bit of time explaining how we got to where we are, because it is important. It is important that we make sure the record reflects the situation that this clause seeks to rectify and the impact that the cross-examination by perpetrators of victims has had on people. In so doing, I speak on behalf of a great number of advocates, both in Parliament and outside, over a great period of time. I can speak for myself on this issue, but I am very aware of the fact that I am also speaking on behalf of a lot of other people.

I had personal experience of this issue very soon after getting elected in 2015. Soon after the election, I was sitting on the floor of my campaign office among the detritus of a very vigorous campaign, sorting through things and trying to figure things out, when a very fragile, very vulnerable and very damaged woman suddenly appeared in the doorway. She came in to see me, and said, “Are you the new MP?” I said yes, and she said, “I saw your leaflets. You look like a friendly person. I am now going to flee my relationship, and I will only speak to you about it.” We sat in the corner of the office, and this woman was bruised and bleeding. She had literally escaped from the relationship, and I, as an MP of a few days, was thinking on the inside, “Oh my God, what do I do in this situation? How do I help this extraordinarily vulnerable person?” I just did the best I possibly could, and that involved brokering a relationship between her and the police, about which she was terrified. She was scared of the authorities because the authorities had let her down so many times, repeatedly. I supported that woman, and she went into a protective programme. She now has a new identity and a new life, and although she will never ever be able to escape the horrors of what she went through, she certainly has an opportunity to discover new, more fruitful aspects of life, which she was prevented from doing before.

One of the aspects I experienced very soon after the process of supporting her began was the experience of the family court. I could not believe what I heard when she came to see me after some hearings in the family court, where she was made to share the space of the person she had fled. Having seen her on the day she fled her relationship, it was horrendous to hear that she was forced into the same waiting room as this person, had to be in the same space when their relationship was discussed and, crucially, was cross-examined by him.

At the same time, another constituent came to see me in my surgery. She had just been cross-examined by her abusive partner for the third time. She had previously been hospitalised; the perpetrator had broken more than a dozen or her bones and repeatedly raped her. On the third appearance in the family court, she was shaking so violently that she needed assistance to get to the taxi afterwards. On the journey home, the taxi driver had to stop and help her out of the taxi so that she could vomit on the pavement.

That was happening to people who I was sitting with and who I represented in Parliament. I could not understand that the very institutions that existed to protect people like them were facilitating the abuse—in front of judges, in a room with police officers, abuse was happening, and nobody was offering support. To my shame, I could not quite believe that this was possible in 21st-century Britain. When I came back to Parliament, I sought out my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and asked him about it. I said, “I am hearing this thing, but I can’t believe it is possible.” He, as the former Director of Public Prosecutions, said, “It is happening, and there is a big campaign out there to try and change it.”

I could not believe that it was still happening, so I went to speak to Ministers. Repeatedly, Minister after Minister told me that a cultural change was needed in the criminal justice system, not a legislative change. I could not accept that. Having gone to speak to judges to understand why change was not happening, and having repeatedly spoken to Ministers, I found it incredibly hard to believe that the Government were not seeing or understanding the abuse. Of course, they were seeing it, but they were refusing to change. There are many lessons here, and I hope Back Benchers realise that persistence is one of them.

On 15 September 2016, I secured a Backbench debate that was led by Angela Smith, the then Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge. We had gone with a cross-party group to get a Backbench debate. There were several Tories in the group, and we worked as a formidable team. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley was not part of the group that went to the Backbench Business Committee, because she sat on the Committee and was supposed to be impartial, but it was clear from her facial expressions where she stood on the issue.

During the debate itself, I was able to put on record the most shocking example of this abuse that I have ever come across. In the eight or nine months leading up to the debate, I met dozens of women who had gone through such abuse. The most shocking case was that of Jane Clough—some people in this room will be aware of her case. I am not the sort of person who normally quotes himself, but in going through all the different debates that have taken place in Parliament in the last five years on this issue, I read some of the examples I put on record, and I want to quote directly from one debate. My reason for doing so is that I want Members to realise, and I want the record to reflect, that this example has been on the House of Commons record for almost four years.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 10th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Chalk]

I will say a couple of things. First, I completely agree with the hon. Lady’s observation that the powers are very stark but very welcome. It is important to note why they are in place. It is not uncommon that cases cannot necessarily be proven to the criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt. The tribunal has to be satisfied that it is sure; however, there can be serious lingering concerns that, were it to apply a test of the balance of probabilities, it would have no difficulty in finding that the abuse had taken place.

It is to cater for those circumstances that the courts can now impose really quite robust measures to ensure the protection of complainants and the rehabilitation of perpetrators. They are important powers, and benches and courts will want to exercise them wisely. Inevitably, they apply to individuals who have not been convicted of any offence. The courts will therefore need to tread carefully to ensure that justice is done, but they have shown themselves well able to do that for many centuries.

[Peter Kyle]

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point very well that, for some of the issues that we are tackling with the legislation, the powers already existed in other pieces of legislation, but the courts, in their conservatism, refused to exercise them. As my hon. Friend asked, will the Minister ensure that his Department gives the right steer to the courts, which the president of the family division can translate into something that is actionable on the front line in family courts up and down the country?

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Ultimately, he will understand why I say that a very proper distinction exists between the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary are proudly and profoundly independent, and they will take their course and impose the orders if they think that it is in in the interest of justice to do so. Of course, we must ensure that courts are properly aware of the powers available to them. I have no doubt that the president of the family division, and indeed the Lord Chief Justice in the criminal sphere, will use their good offices to ensure that that takes place.

On the point that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether we can look after the event to check that the powers are being used, first, there is, as she knows, the issue of the pilot. That provides a significant period to establish whether the orders are being taken up. Secondly, the Office for National Statistics has an annual publication of DA statistics that includes the different orders, so we will be able to get a sense of the extent to which they are being applied.

I hope that this will not sound overly fastidious, but one should not necessarily automatically read reluctance into a low level of use in one part of the country compared with others. It may be, because each case turns on the facts, that it was not appropriate in those circumstances. However, as a general observation, we will keep an eye on it, and there will be data on which the hon. Lady will no doubt robustly hold the Government to account. I beg to move.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

It may be in the guidance but, I respectfully suggest, does not necessarily need to be in it. When a court comes to consider what it will or will not do, it may look at this measure and say, “Are we precluded from banning him from her workplace? If the answer to that is no, we will go ahead and do it, regardless of what is in the guidance.” It may be that it will be in there anyway, but I am confident that, as the Bill is set out, it is drafted sufficiently widely—deliberately so—for the courts to see their way to do justice and impose protections as they see fit.

[Peter Kyle]

One benefit of this approach to legislation is that it allows scope for creativity in the individual court to tailor to a specific circumstance that might not be predictable. In such circumstances, how can other courts learn from that innovation? It is obviously the responsibility of the judiciary, including the president of the family division of the High Court, but we have learnt from bitter experience that some courts and judges are almost impervious to change—I speak with respect to the former one before us. How does the Department seek to use innovation on the frontline in family courts to ensure that family courts in other parts of the country benefit?

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Tuesday 9th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call acting shadow Minister Peter Kyle.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

Disaster victims, just like victims of crime, deserve to have their rights enshrined in law. Only last week, a murderer was released on parole without the victim’s family even being informed, let alone consulted. Successive Governments have promised and pledged a victims law for the past 12 years. The Tory manifestos for the past three elections have promised a victims law. Will the Government commit to publish the draft Bill by this autumn?

[Alex Chalk]

This Government are absolutely determined to stand up for victims. We will be having a revised victims code and a revised victims law. That is built on a proud record of standing up for victims. [Interruption.] We will be publishing it as soon as possible.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Peter Kyle

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 4th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Peter Kyle]

Q My final question to Suzanne is about cross-examination in family courts. It is a bit strange speaking out into the ether, but I know you are there somewhere, Suzanne. The legislation outlaws the vast majority of cross-examination. Do you believe it goes far enough? If you think it should go further, specifically what else would you like to see?

Suzanne Jacob: I think you have heard from many of the witnesses today what an incredible ordeal family court is at the moment. Anything that can improve that process is important to do, so we at SafeLives are very supportive of the amendments that Women’s Aid has suggested, in terms of going further and getting rid of cross-examination from all parts of the court process when someone is facing an alleged abuser or ex-abuser. That is really important.

There are also a number of other suggested changes from other organisations around the role and expertise of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, for example, which we think are important. There is currently something innately adversarial about the family court process, which makes it an incredibly painful thing for both adults and children to go through. Many, many women who go through the family court process would tell you that they would rather they had just stayed with the abuser rather than go through family court, which is a horrible indictment of our current processes.

[Alex Chalk]

Q I have a couple of brief questions and then something particular, if I may. All of us here will want to make this Bill the best it can be, of course, but do I understand you to welcome in broad terms the fact that there is a Domestic Abuse Bill, in principle?

Ellie Butt: Yes, absolutely.