Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Alex Chalk and John Howell

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

Let me first declare an interest as an associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.

I thought for a moment that I was going to welcome the agreement that there clearly is between my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and me, but, given his last comments, I am not sure any more—I need to think about them. However, I think we are on the same sort of page at the moment.

I, too, welcome these Lords amendments and point out that they are a very good compromise between this House and the other place. I also welcome what the Minister has said in bringing them forward. In taking away the criminality, having a sunset clause and bringing in a consultation, they have done a tremendous amount to bridge the gap that there previously was during our discussions on this Bill. But in fundamental essence, the Bill remains the same in what it can do, and I am glad that it does.

I made the point on Report as to why that was important. I am not going to repeat the entire speech that I made then—I probably could not get away with that—but I stressed the need for agility and flexibility, and I put that in the context of the Singapore mediation convention. There is a great necessity to get the Singapore mediation convention into working order and on the statute book. The reason for that is twofold.

First, it fundamentally does no harm whatsoever—in fact, it does a tremendous amount of good for the small businesses that are choosing mediation as a means of settling their disputes. Secondly, it ends the farce we have at the moment with the system that is in place whereby if one has a mediation, one then has to agree an arbitration, however short that may be, in order to take advantage of the New York convention. That is a nonsense that we do not want to continue with. We must implement the Singapore mediation convention, which allows the results of a mediation to be recognised in the countries that have signed up to this.

The Minister was kind enough to say that I am a great champion of the Singapore mediation convention, and he is quite right, because I have seen that it does a tremendous amount of good for this country. It is also because, as the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) said, a tremendous amount of alternative dispute resolution takes place in this country. We are world leaders in this, but we will not remain so for very long unless we sign up to the Singapore mediation convention and get stuck into what the rest of the world is getting involved in. All I can do is recommend to the Minister that he gets on with introducing the statutory instrument to get the Singapore mediation convention up and running in this country. To repeat what I said on Third Reading, I am very happy to serve on the SI Committee that introduces the Singapore mediation convention and to see a great dream come true.

[Alex Chalk]

Let me begin, a little sooner than I had planned, by saying that I am absolutely delighted that this Bill is now going to be supported across the House. It is worth reflecting on the journey that we have made, because, as the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) rightly said, concerns were raised, first on Second Reading but also in the other place, but we have now got to the point where the Labour and Lib Dem amendments were withdrawn in the other place and this Bill will now receive cross-party support. In getting to this point, their lordships recognised, in the words of Lord Pannick, that “substantial and constructive” amendments had been made by the Government. We did so because we recognise that the issues we are addressing here, when it comes to the constitutional balance in our country, are ones that merit proper and careful consideration. But the imperative for this was in fact laid bare in the points made by the hon. Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson), who is no longer in his place—[Interruption.] He is back, as if by magic. He asked whether there would be different treatment for British citizens in different parts of the world. That is precisely what the Bill is all about. It is to try to reduce those differences. If we had no private international law agreements, that is exactly the situation we would increasingly find ourselves in. Because we are now better able to implement them, we are better able to provide that certainty and clarity which are in the interests of our constituents and their businesses, whether they manufacture widgets or any other products.

GCHQ Centenary

Debate between Alex Chalk and John Howell

Thursday 11th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk]

I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend. Selflessness and discretion are the watchwords that so many of these dedicated public servants live by, and he has explained the point extremely well.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

I give way.

[John Howell]

My hon. Friend mentioned cyber. Would he pay tribute, with me, to all those people who work in cyber, because that is the most incredibly difficult area to deal with, and they are doing us a great service?

[Alex Chalk]

I am very happy to do so, and I will come on to that in a moment. Let me make some progress now.

As the title of the debate suggests, GCHQ has been at the frontline of our nation's security for 100 years and, although based in Cheltenham, it is truly a UK-wide institution. Three of GCHQ’s directors have come from Scotland. Scots were behind the founding of signals intelligence. The Director of Operations for the National Cyber Security Centre is Welsh. Today, GCHQ has sites across our nation.

The organisation was formed in 1919 under the original name of the Government Code and Cypher School, specialising in cyphers and encryption—securing our own codes and cracking those of our adversaries. As the engaging GCHQ Instagram stories have reminded us, cryptography and military intelligence are as old as war itself. The Spartans used cyphers. Julius Caesar did too. Elizabeth I’s famous spymaster, Sir Francis Walsingham, used the methods of a 9th-century Arabian scholar, Abu Yusuf al-Kindi, to crack enemy codes. Shakespeare wrote in the play “Henry V”:

“The king hath note of all that they intend,

By interception which they dream not of.”

Those words are engraved on a plaque at Bletchley Park.

Back in 1919, the Government Code and Cypher School was the result of the merger of Room 40 in the Admiralty, responsible for naval intelligence, and MI1(b) in the War Office, responsible for military intelligence. It was said in one of the books that I have read on this subject to be,

“an eccentric mix of art historians, schoolmasters, Cambridge dons and Presbyterian ministers”.

In those days, being able to solve the Daily Telegraph crossword in under 12 minutes was, it appears, routinely used as part of the recruitment test; but of course we know that GC&CS broke the German Navy’s codes, and famously it intercepted the 1917 telegram for German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann that revealed the German plan to begin unrestricted submarine warfare in the north Atlantic, in breach of the commitment to US President Woodrow Wilson. That contributed to the US joining the allied war effort.

In 1939, GC&CS was given the name GCHQ to better disguise its secret work. In that year, shortly after Munich, Neville Chamberlain was given an intelligence report that showed that Hitler habitually referred to him in private as “der alter Arschloch”. Parliamentary decorum prevents me translating that, Mr Speaker, but I can say that that revelation, in the words of one diplomat, was said to have

“had a profound effect on Chamberlain.”

By June 1944, Bletchley Park had accessed the communications between Gerd von Rundstedt, the Commander of the German Army in the west, and his superiors in Berlin. The importance of decrypted German communications—known as the “Ultra secret”—which my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has referred to, to the war effort is universally recognised. It gave the Allies an invaluable insight into the enemy’s capabilities and intentions.

Of course, the world has moved on a great deal since then. In 1984, Denis Healey said in this House of Commons:

“GCHQ has been by far the most valuable source of intelligence for the British Government ever since it began operating at Bletchley during the last war. British skills in interception and code-breaking are unique and highly valued by…our allies. GCHQ has been a key element in our relationship with the United States for more than forty years.”—[Official Report, 27 February 1984; Vol. 55, c. 35.]

As the director of GCHQ said at an event I attended in London only yesterday, GCHQ might be 100 years old, but its time is now.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Debate between Alex Chalk and John Howell

Monday 14th May 2018 Westminster Hall

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

This was of course a tragedy—that goes without saying—but, as was put so powerfully by so many people, in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng), it was also a national shame. It was a disgrace. That it could have happened in our country is unthinkable. It is a matter of shame that we could not keep those people, many of whom came to our country, safe.

We cannot change the past, and nothing that we say or do in this debate can begin to mitigate or soothe the pain suffered by so many families. It is not intended to. Our job is to focus like a laser on ensuring that justice is done, and specifically on ensuring that the inquiry is properly constituted. We have to ensure that one dreadful injustice is not replaced by another.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way.

[Alex Chalk]

No—I will in a second.

Notwithstanding the points powerfully made by the hon. Member for Kensington (Emma Dent Coad), I want to pay tribute to the dignity of the community in the face of unimaginable pain. Why? Because at the time it happened, I had a child who was five—I am not unusual; many people in the Chamber will have children—and I remember reading about the case of Isaac Paulos. I cannot say how I would have responded if it had been my child, but I doubt it would have been with such dignity.

I also pay tribute to the media, who have told the stories behind the statistics. I do not know whether anyone else in the Chamber read the story of Marco and Gloria, the Italian couple in their 20s who moved to London to find work as architects. Marco’s family and friends have written a children’s book, turning what happened into a fairytale. It is a story of unbearable poignancy, and just one of many tributes, but we must always remember that these are not statistics; these are people.

[Phil Wilson in the Chair]

That, perhaps, all goes without saying. What is really important is that we add value in the debate. The conclusions drawn must have credibility and legitimacy, so we must strike the right balance, ensuring that the panel that considers these incredibly grave matters is not, on the one hand, unwieldy and slow or, on the other hand, too narrow as to lay itself open to the suggestion of having conclusions arrived at by individual whim.

There are precedents, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), the SNP spokesperson on justice affairs, showed. I remember the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. Its advantage, in one view, was that it considered matters quickly, between August 2003 and January 2004. However, as everyone in the Chamber remembers, when it published its findings, it had a credibility issue. We must ensure that we do not repeat that mistake.

Many in the Chamber will have spent time in the criminal courts, and we know that jury verdicts have their currency and legitimacy because juries are derived from the communities they serve. They do justice by reflecting the common sense and shared experience of people in everyday life. That ought to be the bedrock of how we go forward.

From my experience, just an appeal from a magistrates court in a relatively modest case will involve a judge and two lay assessors. That is why it is critical that the other members of the panel, which includes Mr Justice Moore-Bick, have decision-making power. They cannot simply be there to be thought of as making up the numbers; they must bring their weight of experience from the community and shared understanding. By the way, over many centuries lay people have shown themselves well able to analyse complex issues and do justice. To those people who might suggest we have simply a single judge, it is no answer to say, “Oh, it’s too complicated, too difficult, too technical.” Lay people are capable of understanding—of course they are—as long as matters are properly presented, and I am sure they will be.

Having decided on that format, we must let the tribunal get on. There must be cool, forensic analysis of the evidence so that the answers we get are valid. Whatever the consequences that flow from the inquiry—consequences there will be—they must be built on solid ground. This is our task. This is our duty. We owe the victims nothing less.

UK Bee Population

Debate between Alex Chalk and John Howell

Tuesday 14th November 2017 Westminster Hall

[Alex Chalk]

I agree and am grateful to the hon. Lady for that helpful contribution.

The point being got at, whether by a poet or a scientist, is that of the 100 crop species that provide 90% of food worldwide, 70 are pollinated by bees. Bees, as we know, transfer pollen from anthers to stigmas, frequently over long distances. Seeds are produced, but, crucially, genetic diversity, so vital to the health of many plant species, is promoted. That service, which perhaps we take too much for granted, is worth in the order of £600 million a year through increased crop yield in oilseed rape and the quality of various fruit and vegetables.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way on an important point. He has spoken about the ban on neonicotinoids. I wonder how we will ensure that whatever replaces them is equally safe. My farmers have already made the point that what may follow may not be any safer.

[Alex Chalk]

As always, my hon. Friend makes a critical point. The issue is this. The Government have put a line in the sand, which is that anything that is to go on our crops must pass the test of rigorous academic and expert scrutiny. That applies to neonicotinoids, so it must apply to anything that comes next. Nothing should go on our crops unless it can be shown to be safe. That must be the rule of thumb that we apply.

Homicide Law Reform

Debate between Alex Chalk and John Howell

Thursday 30th June 2016 Westminster Hall

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of reforming the law on homicide.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Evans, on this auspicious day. I wish to make crystal clear that the debate is about the law of homicide, not fratricide.

Putting that to one side, the real point is that the law of homicide is a mess. That was put more elegantly by the Law Commission in its 2006 report “Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide”, in which it said that the law of homicide is

“a rickety structure set upon shaky foundations.”

In essence, the problem is that the law lacks a rational or defensible structure. It does not chime with common sense—and in this area of the law perhaps above all others, it should.

As long ago as 1874, a Select Committee stated:

“If there is any case in which the law should speak plainly, without sophism or evasion, it is where life is at stake; and it is on this very occasion that the law is most evasive and most sophistical.”

That remains the case more than 100 years later, and that will not do. In the words of the Law Commission, the time has come to

“promote certainty…in a way that non-lawyers can understand and accept.”

But the problem is far more serious than mere opaqueness. The problem is that the law of homicide creates injustice—injustice to defendants and injustice to society—and that is something that we in this House must always stand ready to confront and resolve.

What is the solution? It is very simple: to split the current offence of murder into two categories, one of first degree murder and another of second degree murder. Manslaughter should remain as before, albeit more tightly circumscribed.

What, as a matter of law, is murder? It is committed when someone unlawfully kills another person with an intention to kill that person or to do them serious harm. That second element is really important. It means that someone who reasonably believed that no one would be killed by their conduct is placed in the same offence category as the contract or serial killer. That, in a nutshell, is the problem.

Let me give an example. Imagine a retired colonel living in my constituency of Cheltenham. He is aged 65, has lived an utterly unblemished life and served his country with great distinction, and is known for his charitable work. He is upstanding in every way. He lives with his wife, who has Parkinson’s disease and for whom he is the sole carer. A neighbour moves in next door who has a string of convictions for antisocial behaviour. Every night, he holds noisy parties that go on into the small hours. Endless polite requests from the colonel are ignored. Endless local authority noise abatement notices are ignored. So, after the umpteenth such party, with his and his wife’s already poor health suffering, the colonel goes round at 3 o’clock in the morning to remonstrate with his neighbour. He takes with him—this is important—a cricket bat in case there is a violent confrontation. The neighbour, who is very drunk, becomes abusive and the colonel, overcome with anger and frustration and at the end of his tether, says, “Right, that’s it. Let’s see how you party when your big toe is broken,” and strikes the neighbour’s foot with the cricket bat. The neighbour falls back, hits his head on a crate of beer standing in the hallway and is knocked unconscious. The colonel immediately calls 999 and tries to resuscitate him, the police and ambulance arrive and the colonel tells them exactly what happened, but the neighbour is rushed to the local hospital, diagnosed with a bleed on the brain, and dies.

The post-mortem report reveals that the deceased’s toe was broken. When interviewed, the distraught colonel admits that he lost his temper. What happens in this case? The only charge that the law allows for is murder. That means that the only sentence that the judge can impose, despite the colonel pleading guilty at the first opportunity, is life imprisonment, because he intended to do grievous bodily harm by breaking the toe. It is because he took a weapon to the scene—the cricket bat—that the starting point for the minimum term that he must serve is 25 years’ imprisonment, and because the offence is murder, he must serve every last day of that term. In effect, the colonel goes to prison for the rest of his life—25 years. He has a mandatory life sentence.

That is unjust. Although it is clear that a person who kills in such circumstances should be guilty of a serious homicide offence, it is equally clear that because he did not intend to kill, the offence should not be in the top tier or highest category. The current law does not chime with common sense. Academic research into public opinion tells us that, but frankly, we do not need academic research; we need simply to consult our common sense. The particularly daft thing—I hope that that is parliamentary language—is that when Parliament passed the Homicide Act 1957, it never intended a killing to amount to murder, which at that time was a capital offence, unless the defendant realised that his or her conduct may cause death. The law of murder was widened because of an unexpected judicial development immediately following the enactment of the 1957 legislation—the case of Vickers, which is about interpretation of the expression “malice aforethought”. In my view, that colonel should be guilty of second degree murder.

The injustice is further underscored when we add the potential for what are known as secondary parties or accessories to be convicted of a murder. Imagine that before the colonel had set off, his frail wife had told him where the cricket bat was stored and in frustration said to him, “Now, go and use it. Teach him a lesson.” She, too, could find herself facing the punishment and disgrace of a murder conviction and the same 25-year minimum term. She should of course be guilty of an offence, but again, she should be guilty of second degree murder, with the judge having the discretion not to impose a mandatory life sentence.

This issue is particularly topical because the Supreme Court has looked at the case of Jogee and more tightly circumscribing accessory liability—the so-called prosecutor’s friend—but still we are left with a situation in which the unsatisfactory law of homicide leads to manifest injustice.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

I wonder whether my hon. Friend has in his mind what the range of sentences should be for second degree murder.

[Alex Chalk]

Certainly, on any view, life imprisonment must remain the maximum sentence—that is the maximum in the United States for federal offences where second degree murder is charged—but the key point is that the judge should have discretion. The Sentencing Council has done a terrific job of laying down guidelines—not tramlines—and the courts have shown themselves to be well able to dispense justice.

The case for reform becomes even clearer when we consider manslaughter, another homicide offence. Whereas, as I have indicated, the law of murder creates injustice for defendants, the law of manslaughter creates injustice for society. What is manslaughter? It can be committed in one of four ways, but just two of those are relevant for these purposes: unlawful act manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter. The latter largely speaks for itself for these purposes, but let me explain what happens when a killing is the result of a defendant’s unlawful act—that is, one that all reasonable people would realise would subject the victim to the risk of some physical harm, albeit not serious harm.

Take this example. The defendant barges into a nightclub queue in Cheltenham. He has a string of criminal convictions for assault and criminal damage. In the queue, he is being drunk and obnoxious. He is insulting women for what they are wearing and telling them to get out of his way. The victim is the mother of two children. She works at nearby GCHQ and she is on a hen do. She politely asks the defendant to move to the back of the queue. His response is to say, “You silly cow; you need a slap.” He then strikes her repeatedly and hard to the side of the face with his open hand. She falls back, hits her head on the kerb and is knocked unconscious. The defendant runs off. The victim later dies, and the post-mortem shows that she suffered bruising—albeit no fracture—to her cheekbone and the fatal injury was caused by the impact on the kerb. The police arrest the defendant, who denies everything, but CCTV proves his guilt.

Under the law at present, that defendant can be charged only with unlawful act manslaughter, because the harm that he caused falls short of grievous bodily harm. The net effect is that he will be convicted of an offence that carries a far lesser stigma than murder and for which there is no mandatory requirement for a life sentence, and if he gets a determinate sentence, he will serve only half of it. Is that thug, I ask rhetorically, less culpable than the retired colonel or his wife? The only distinction is that the colonel intended to break a toe and the thug intended to commit a marginally less serious assault. In my view, that is a distinction without a difference—it is a distinction that is completely lost on the general public and, frankly, on me.

So, what needs to happen? This is not some academic exercise. Those two examples are not entirely artificial and they expose fundamental injustices. The first, as I have indicated, is to the victim, in the case of the colonel, and the second is to society in the case of the pub queue thug. The solution is clear: we need an offence of first degree murder that would encompass intentional killing only. I recognise the Law Commission, in 2006, wanted to add

“killing through an intention to do serious injury with an awareness of a serious risk of causing death.”

That is fine, and I understand it, but in my view it is a complexity that unnecessarily detracts from the simplicity of the proposal I put before the House.

An offence of first degree murder would simply and coherently communicate to the public the particularly heinous nature of the crime of taking life and would attract the special condemnation and opprobrium that that deserves. To paraphrase Colonel Tim Collins’ famous eve-of-battle speech in 2003, anyone convicted of such an offence would truly live with the mark of Cain upon them. That offence should also, as at present, attract a mandatory life sentence.

Under my proposal, second degree murder would encompass killing through an intention to do injury that is more than merely transient or trifling. In plain English: it would encompass killing through unacceptable violence and thuggery. That would include the colonel and the pub queue thug—people who committed a significant assault on others but who did not intend to kill. That category of offence would not require a mandatory life sentence. Instead, judges would be free to do justice, weighing in the balance all of the aggravating and mitigating factors. For clarity, that would not include the case of the most minor assault. Think of someone creeping up behind a person, playing a trick on them and flicking their ear as a piece of horseplay. That is technically an assault, of course, but is obviously very minor. If that person fell over and died that should remain as manslaughter.

So, where does that leave manslaughter? Manslaughter would remain predominantly focused on cases of gross negligence. That is, offences in which there has been no unlawful assault or intention to kill, but in which the negligence has been so dreadful as to become criminal. The advantage of that is that people get it; people would understand that—it chimes with common sense.

Those are not outlandish suggestions. Other jurisdictions—most obviously the United States—have two categories of murder. For murders in the US over which the federal Government have jurisdiction, life imprisonment is only mandatory for first degree murder. For second degree murder the mandatory sentence is described as

“a term of years to life.”

So why now? Because it is long overdue. The current distinction between murder and manslaughter is almost certainly more than 500 years old. No further general category of homicide has been developed in the intervening period, despite the fact that society, values and knowledge have changed out of all recognition.

The need for modernisation was obvious to our Victorian forebears. In this place, William Gladstone himself indicated his willingness to rationalise the law but nothing came of it—it keeps getting put off. That approach led one cynical criminal lawyer to remark at the beginning of the 20th century that the hope of a criminal code being enacted by Parliament that would address the problems of the law on homicide was as remote as

“expecting to find milk in a male tiger”.

We cannot keep putting this off. Modernising this key area of law is, to borrow the words of the Law Commission

“an essential task for criminal law reform.”

It is time for this generation to take up the challenge and to create a law that is truly fit for the modern age.