European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

The hon. Gentleman has not been able to convince his own Front Benchers. Senior Opposition Front Benchers, such as the shadow Business Secretary, have spoken of the huge damage there would be to our democracy if we did what he advocates, which is to end the uncertainty by calling a second referendum. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] We hear the cheers from the Labour Benches. The policy in the manifesto on which Labour Members were elected was to honour the referendum, yet they cheer. It is on page 24 of the Labour manifesto on which the hon. Gentleman stood.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a fundamental fallacy at the heart of the Opposition’s position? On the one hand they say that there is zero appetite on behalf of the European Union to renegotiate the Government’s deal, yet they claim there is somehow a huge appetite to negotiate another deal as yet unspecified. The reality is that unless they vote for this deal they will become the handmaiden of hard Brexit.

[Stephen Barclay]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. He alludes to the 78-day plan being put forward by the Opposition, which the EU has made clear is not credible, their sister parties have made clear is not desirable, and which I suspect many on their own Back Benches recognise is not doable. Yet they persist with it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Prime Minister will respond to the debate in the final speech next Tuesday. She has been talking to a number of European leaders in the weeks since this debate was postponed. She will obviously want to respond to the questions that the right hon. Gentleman fairly puts, either during her speech in that debate, or possibly earlier. That is the most I can commit to on behalf of my right hon. Friend this evening. I also say to the right hon. Member for Belfast North and his colleagues that there is certainly a recognition—indeed, an understanding—on the part of the Government of the concerns that they have expressed. We continue to discuss with him and his colleagues how we can seek to provide the necessary assurances about the Union that he is asking us to provide. I will make sure that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is aware of his wish to have a more detailed response to the points he has raised this evening.

I think it is worth the House reminding itself that the EU has an interest, just as we do, in bringing the backstop to an end quickly, should it ever be needed at all. Of course, the fear is often expressed, here and outside, that despite the legal obligation in the withdrawal agreement for the backstop to be temporary; despite the explicit provision in the withdrawal agreement for technology or other measures to be deployed to make the backstop superfluous; despite the duty to replace it as rapidly as possible; and despite, for that matter, frequent public statements by the Taoiseach, the European Commission and other leaders that they have no wish or interest in having the backstop as anything more than an insurance policy, we will still be trapped in it for many years, or even indefinitely. Ultimately, this boils down to a lack of trust within the United Kingdom in the good intentions of the European Commission and some member state Governments.

The irony is that there is a lack of trust of the United Kingdom on the other side of the table, too. One of the most striking developments since the withdrawal agreement was finalised and published has been the fierce criticism levelled at Michel Barnier by Governments in some EU member states. For them, the backstop, should it ever be used, would allow goods from the entire United Kingdom, including agricultural produce, to access the whole of the EU single market, without tariffs, quotas or rules of origin requirements, and that would be granted without the UK paying a penny into the EU budget, without the UK accepting the free movement of people, and with the UK accepting a much less onerous set of level playing field requirements than those demanded of EU member states.

[Alex Chalk]

Is it not a fact that what from our point of view might be considered a backstop is, from the European Union’s point of view, a back door? Does that not express the EU’s concern that we would be paying not a penny piece for something that would provide a material advantage—an unfair advantage, as some would see it—in terms of access to the single market?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is right. Indeed, that fear reinforces the concern that the EU has about the important legal principle that a free trade agreement or association agreement with a third country cannot be based on an article 50 withdrawal agreement, which was intended by the treaty to cover the necessary legal arrangements for a member state’s departure from the Union. The Commission knows that for exactly the reason my hon. Friend gives, the longer any backstop were to last, the greater legal risk it would face of challenge in the European courts from aggrieved businesses, whether in the Republic of Ireland, France, Belgium or elsewhere, complaining that that principle was being breached to their commercial disadvantage.

We should not underestimate the importance of the guarantee of no hard border on the island of Ireland and no customs border in the Irish sea. It is no coincidence that the Northern Ireland business community is overwhelmingly and vocally supportive of this deal. However, there are aspects of the backstop that are and will remain uncomfortable. If it were needed, it would mean that a portion of EU law would apply in Northern Ireland for the duration of the backstop—about 40 pages of the 1,100 pages of single market acquis legislation.

The Government, as I said earlier, are mindful of the fact that we already have some regulatory differences between Northern Ireland and the rest of the country. We have sought, both in previous statements and in the package we put forward today, to identify ways in which the practical impact of any such requirements can be minimised, so that ordinary businesses and customers in Northern Ireland or Great Britain see as little change as possible.