Future Relationship Between the UK and the EU

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. I have made many, many trips to Brussels. I have had many discussions with political parties across all of the EU27 countries, and I have never, on any occasion, sought to undermine the Government in any of those discussions. I made that commitment to the former Secretary of State when he started his role and when I started my role. Therefore, there is absolutely nothing in what the hon. Lady has said.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is giving, as one would expect, a forensic and detailed scrutiny of these proposals, but the end point of his argument must be that there should be a customs union. I understand the point, but has he made any assessment of the extent to which, in the country, there would be a sense of betrayal, which would place the disquiet that has taken place in this House into a cocked hat? Does he have any assessment of that?

[Keir Starmer]

The referendum answered the question, “Do you want to stay in or leave the EU?” We are now grappling with the question of what the future arrangements should be. We have to safeguard the manufacturing sector and we have to keep to the solemn commitment that there will be no hard border in Northern Ireland. Anybody who has looked at the issue has accepted that the only way to keep to that solemn commitment on Northern Ireland is to have a customs union with the EU.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

I want to extend the warmest possible congratulations to the new Secretary of State on joining the Cabinet—I know he has had to pop out for a short while—and to salute the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker). Whether one agrees or disagrees with him, he is clearly a man of integrity and principle. He worked incredibly hard in his Department.

This is the first contribution that I have made to any of the Brexit debates. It was 25 years ago that I was a Government Whip engaged in securing support for the Maastricht treaty, with Britain’s two opt-outs, so brilliantly negotiated by John Major. I learned from that experience the deep and fierce passions on Europe that are held by so many of my friends and colleagues across the House, and in particular on the Conservative Benches.

I have to say, in all honesty, that the position today is far worse in terms of internal conflict and disagreement than ever it was during the Maastricht era. Of course the divisions are not just within this side of the House; they run throughout our constituencies—mine was divided almost exactly 50:50—and between friends and family. They have led to a breakdown in collective responsibility in the Cabinet, with a consequent breakdown in normal party discipline far worse than anything we remotely saw during the parliamentary stages of Maastricht. This breakdown in relationships, these deep divisions in this place and outside, are going to be very difficult indeed to heal.

I come now to the White Paper. I was dismayed, although not surprised, that my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) resigned; dismayed because, despite some of the ludicrous, and at times mischievous, briefings he was subjected to, he was so clearly the right negotiator for Britain, with his business and European experience making him uniquely qualified for the task.

I have always felt throughout this process, as a Back-Bench Member of Parliament, that the best interests of my constituents are served by supporting the Executive in these very difficult negotiations: that the legislature—that is us—should give the Executive some leeway and the benefit of the doubt. That is not an enormously dissimilar approach to the way the 27 other stakeholders in the EU are more or less rowing in behind Monsieur Barnier. But in the end, particularly in a Parliament where there is no majority, and where therefore power has so self-evidently passed from the Cabinet room to the Floor of the House of Commons, it is we, the legislature, who will decide, and the House of Commons that will reach its verdict on the deal that the Executive negotiates. It is for that reason that the arguments for a meaningful vote are so essential and have had to prevail, as they have done, in the House.

[Alex Chalk]

My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Does he agree with the maxim of the former President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson, that the first rule of politics is that its practitioners must be able to count? That is so important when we come to consider our debates over the coming weeks.

[Mr Mitchell]

That is a very true maxim, and one that is engraved on the walls of the Government Whips Office.

It seems to me that there are now really only two possible outcomes. The first is a deal based very largely on the Chequers settlement. Both my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) have honourably and eloquently voiced reservations and no one is going to be entirely satisfied with what has been produced, but the current Administration have basically bet the farm on the Chequers formula and will now have to repel all boarders, if I may mix my metaphors, whether from Brussels or from Somerset.

Many of us regret the Government’s decision to give in at the first whiff of grapeshot emanating from the west country earlier this week, precisely because giving in will make it more difficult to resist counter-pressure from other directions for change. It is extraordinarily unlikely that we will do better than the plan set out in the White Paper, but there ought to be enough in the broad Chequers outline for people of good will to work with and coalesce around.