Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Thursday 1st March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Richard Benyon]

I am reliably informed that there are inconsistencies. I suggest that, for simplicity, if the Bill were to say that any reference to “gross violation of human rights” is to conduct that constitutes, or is connected with, the commission of a gross human rights abuse or violation, and whether conduct constitutes or is connected with a commission of such an abuse or violation is to be determined in accordance with section 241A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, we would have the consistency that the campaigners—and, I think, the Government—seek.

I understand that the Government want to achieve this. They want to see the full Magnitsky on the statute book. This suggestion offers a way of making sure that we get the definitions right.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Cheryl, and to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury. There is no one in this House who has done more than he has to prosecute this matter. I am also grateful for the contribution from the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland.

Although I am entirely sympathetic to the Magnitsky principle, there are three reasons why, on careful textual analysis, amendment 2 is flawed—not just a bit, but quite significantly—and should therefore be rejected. That should not be taken in any way as a disagreement with the principle, but it echoes the point, which has already been made, that we have got to get this right.

The overarching point is that, although the amendment intends to transpose the substance of section 241A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, as amended by section 13 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland referred to, there are three errors in the transposition that will cause confusion, hold back the Magnitsky principles and create a field day for lawyers.

First, in the context of defining a gross human rights abuse or violation, amendment 2 would insert subsection (6B), which says,

“The first condition is that the conduct constitutes the torture of a person or a group of people”.

The expression “a group of people” is not to be found in the 2002 Act, which is the UK’s primary criminal financing legislation and allows for civil recovery of cash on the basis of non-conviction proceedings. Property can be forfeited irrespective of whether a person has been convicted. That is the key piece of legislation, but the amendment contains a crucial inconsistency. The insertion of “a group of people” creates a problem, because lawyers will look at it and say, “Why has Parliament inserted that here, but not in the Proceeds of Crime Act?”

[Helen Goodman]

The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point. I will tell him why we did that; I do not know whether this was considered when the 2017 Act went through. Gross human rights abuses may involve, as in the case of Magnitsky, one person being tortured and abused, or they may involve—as in the case of the Rohingya, who are being pushed out of Rakhine state across the Bangladeshi border—a whole group of people. We did not want to exclude the latter because the treatment was substantially different. That was our thinking, and it was so that we did not just solely focus on the Russian situation. We are obviously interested in disincentivising human rights abuses across the globe.

[Alex Chalk]

I entirely commend that intention, but I fear that in reality, the wording risks causing confusion and potentially having precisely the opposite effect. The Interpretation Act 1978 indicates that, in any event, the single includes the plural. In other words, where the text says,

“the torture of a person”

that is apt to include “a group of persons”. Lawyers and judges will look at the insertion and ask why it has been included. On the basis that Parliament does not legislate in vain, they will have to try to allocate a meaning to it, which is simply going to cause confusion. That is the first textual difference, which creates confusion rather than clarity.

Secondly, the amendment, in inserting subsection (6D)(b)(ii), would import another change that will cause worrying inconsistency. That includes the qualificatory words,

“who in instigating the conduct, or in consenting to or acquiescing in it, is acting in the performance or purported performance of his or her official duties”.

In the Bill, that applies only to a person acting in an official capacity. It does not apply to a public official. That inconsistency could lead to the perverse outcome that the net will be drawn more widely in this Bill than in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and that public officials, under subsection (6D)(b)(i), could be off duty but a person acting in an official capacity could not. That would be perverse and would create confusion.

The third and most important confusion is in proposed new subsection (6E). By omitting a key phrase, the amendment would create a vast loophole in the legislation. In its definition of torture, the amendment excludes the following very important text from the 2002 Act:

“It is immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether it is caused by an act or omission.”

Proposed new subsection (6E) talks about

“the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering”,

but because that is not defined as including mental suffering and omission, it means that inflicting mental suffering and omitting to provide heat, water, food or light—I hope that hon. Members perceive those things to be torture—would be excluded. They are included in the 2002 Act but would not be included under the amendment.

[Helen Goodman]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be running two arguments at once. I cannot see any mention of such deprivations in the 2002 Act, so I am not sure whether he is criticising the substantive drafting. Is his overriding concern that he does not like the drafting, or that it is inconsistent?

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[Alex Chalk]

My overriding concern is that I do not like the drafting because it is inconsistent. Although I am very sympathetic to the Magnitsky principle, for which the hon. Lady and my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury have powerfully advocated—I look forward to what the Minister has to say about that—this drafting has gone not just a bit awry but quite seriously awry. Creating confusion and inconsistencies between the two key pieces of legislation will mean that lawyers have a field day and that the victims are not be protected. For those reasons, we need to look at this again, get it right and ensure that what ends up on the statute book is truly fit for purpose.

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

We genuinely appreciate that this issue is of significant concern to right hon. and hon. Members, as the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland and hon. Members on both sides of the House who spoke on Second Reading made clear. I acknowledge the long-standing and heartfelt commitment to this important cause that my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury has demonstrated. We do not want to do anything other than take seriously what Members from both sides of the House are arguing.

Let me go into some of the details and suggest how we might proceed. Amendments 1 and 2 relate to including in the Bill gross human rights abuses as a basis on which sanctions may be imposed. As Lord Ahmad made clear in the other place, the list of purposes currently in the Bill ensures we can continue to implement sanctions for the same reasons we do now—for example, in the interests of international peace and security or to further a foreign policy objective of the UK. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said on Second Reading last week, we already implement human rights-based sanctions against 10 countries, including Iran, Libya, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Overall, that means that sanctions against more than 200 individuals and entities are in place now, and that approach will continue under the Bill.

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[Helen Goodman]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s offer. I think that the Committee can take a decision in principle. I am not trying to prevent debate on the Bill—far from it. It was the Government Whip who did that on Tuesday, so I am certainly not going to have that laid at my feet now. We can come back to the matter on Report in the way that the Minister suggests, but I would like—

[Alex Chalk]

May I respectfully suggest that amendments 1 and 2 do go together? I say that because to legislate for a purpose that would provide

“further accountability for, or act…as a deterrent to, the commission of a gross human rights abuse or violation”

and then not to define what is meant by “gross human rights abuse or violation” would be to legislate for the bow, but not for the arrow. The two things go together. To leave out the definition would be to create such a gaping hole in the legislation that we would be in dereliction of our duty, it seems to me. I hope that saying that will not be perceived as being in any way unsympathetic to the principle, but leaving out the definition would mean that we were left with not just inadequate legislation, but incomplete legislation.

[The Chair]

It may be helpful if I let the Committee know that if amendment 1 is withdrawn or negatived, amendment 2 falls as well.