All 1 Debates between Alan Whitehead and Eleanor Smith

Tue 31st Oct 2017
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Second sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Eleanor Smith
Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 31st October 2017

(7 years, 1 month ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 View all Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 31 October 2017 - (31 Oct 2017)
Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
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Q I think it was made clear verbally on Second Reading that the Bill is certainly intended to be a contingency measure—a Bill that would come into operation only if having any other arrangement following Euratom proved not to be possible. I imagine that is what is meant by contingency.

I wonder if you might briefly share with us what you think might be possible so that the Bill is not a contingency, and whether you think the timescale that we have in front of us over the next period is sufficient to bring in either associate membership, perhaps, or similar arrangements with Euratom. Alternatively, if the Bill is to be used as a contingency, do you think that the timescale in front of us—bearing in mind all the detail of the secondary legislation that we need to get through as far as the Bill is concerned—will be sufficient to make that happen?

Sue Ferns: I think the answer is that we do not feel confident that the timescale is sufficient. From speaking to members in the ONR who essentially have to deliver the key provisions of the Bill, it is clear that they need to build an IT system to log the data properly. They need to have resources to deliver what is required, bearing in mind that we are a heavy utiliser of Euratom resources in the UK. As the previous witness said, we need to make sure that there are inspectors in place to be able to police the regime.

It is easy to say that; it is much more difficult to deliver it. Nuclear inspectors are thin on the ground at the best of times. Absolutely, ONR is doing its very best to try to ensure that it can expand its inspector resources, but I think even ONR feels that it is a challenge. The question is where will these people come from? The only obvious source is from elsewhere in the industry, because there are not qualified nuclear inspectors who are currently out of the labour market. That is absolutely a major challenge. The honest answer to the question is that I do not know whether the timescale is sufficient, but at this stage we certainly do not feel confident about it.

Kevin Coyne: I would answer that question with two responses. First, as I said, we as a union hoped that we would have remained in Euratom. We do that because we believe there is not a necessity to leave Euratom in effecting Brexit under article 50 and through article 160a. It was possible, I understand, to remain. That is important, because of the uncertainty that we now believe is cast over that.

As I said before, our concern is mainly with our members’ interests and with jobs. Sizewell B, for instance, will be in operation until 2034, and it relies extensively on components from the United States. It is very important that the co-operation agreements that the previous witness talked about are in place by 2019, and there must be serious doubt with the inspectorate in its current state. I believe that the numbers are 160 inspectors, and the ONR has fewer than 10 in place currently. So, there is the training and the programme and—importantly—all of that must cast doubt upon our ability, and if that is the case it will affect the smooth operation of nuclear plants in future, until there is a regime in place that equally matches the plants.

Secondly, I would argue that there is an impact on new nuclear development for the regime. For instance, there is the whole fuel cycle in Britain, which is gearing up to be a serious and important new operator of new nuclear build. We want within that the whole fuel cycle—the whole of the nuclear operation. As you know, in Preston we have a factory—Springfields—that produces fuel, which is wholly dependent on mixed fuels from other nations, co-operation agreements and the operation of Euratom in ensuring that that fuel supply is there and available.

There is a real threat, because of the problems with Westinghouse, that that plant in Preston would suffer as a result of the safeguards not being in place in time. That would result not only in the loss of jobs but in issues for the fuel cycle itself, for Britain’s ability to recreate the whole of the nuclear cycle for the export orders for the industry, and for the jobs that that entails.

Eleanor Smith Portrait Eleanor Smith (Wolverhampton South West) (Lab)
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Q I noted that you talked about training and wanting personnel to do work. How long would these individuals need for training?

Kevin Coyne: I will defer to my colleague, who is from the union that represents these people.

Sue Ferns: How long to train a nuclear inspector?