Energy Costs in Wales

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Clive Betts

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Westminster Hall

[Dr Whitehead]

The support is for two years for domestic properties. For business and commercial properties, it is for six months. The proposal that the Government have put forward for two years’ support on price rises is completely unfunded. We might, for example, have introduced a windfall levy, to accurately reflect the difference between what is happening in the UK market and the reasons for the price increases, and the profits being made by the energy companies supplying the UK, particularly with gas. Those profits are not based on some amazing technical breakthrough in the delivery of gas to the UK; exactly the same companies are providing exactly the same service in bringing gas from the wholesale market to the retail market in the UK, but they are making nine times the profit they were previously, for no extra work at all. The idea that we should put forward a windfall levy to cover a good proportion of the cost of those arrangements seems a complete no-brainer. I was quite astonished when the Government decided that they were not going to draw on that resource at all for the next phase of the support arrangements. Not only were they not going to introduce an immediate levy, but they were not going to introduce any sort of continuing levy arrangement to keep prices at a reasonable level.

The Labour proposal took into account what we do in the first instance with the windfall levy and what we do over the next period. I want to come to that in a moment, but it is important to recognise that the Prime Minister was bang on guilty of misleading the public in her recent conference speech, and other speeches, by saying that people would pay not more than—

[Mr Clive Betts (in the Chair)]

Order. I ask the hon. Member to be careful about the word “misleading”. Perhaps “unintentionally misleading” would be more helpful.

[Dr Whitehead]

Of course, the Prime Minister was unintentionally misleading the British public in this instance by saying that they would not pay more than £2,500 on their energy bills. She did correct herself later, but she gave the unintentionally misleading impression that we are all okay and will not pay more than £2,500 for bills—essentially, however much energy we use, it would not cost us more than £2,500. That is completely wrong. This is a support scheme based on units consumed. Therefore, households with very few resources but higher than average energy use will pay far more than £2,500 for their fuel this winter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

It is uncanny that the hon. Member has anticipated exactly what I was going to say next: one reason it was necessary for the UK Government to be relatively generous in their support is that the price rises in the UK are far higher than those across most of the rest of Europe. I will not go into the support that the French Government have put in place to support price rises, but French price rises are 4% or 5%. The rises are quite a considerable factor of how energy markets work in the UK as opposed to the arrangements elsewhere in Europe.

For a long time we had a Government pretty much asleep at the wheel on governing energy prices, thinking that an energy price cap would deal with the whole thing. But the energy price cap originally was supposed to deal with retail companies price gouging, not price rises coming from the wholesale market into the retail market in the UK as a whole. The fact is that UK energy prices are determined entirely by gas prices. We have done a lot over the years to start bringing renewable energy sources into the mix—indeed, 38% of our power is now supplied by renewable sources; if we take nuclear too, the majority of our energy supply is provided by low-carbon sources—but the UK retail market works as if it were supplied entirely by gas-fired power stations paying the price of gas to make electricity. That is because of the marginal effect of the way the UK energy market works, with auctions and how that all works. I do not think we will go into that this afternoon, but the fact is that the UK energy market is completely broken, in that it allows those really high prices to come through in a situation where we are—or should be—decreasingly reliant on gas.

Let me make a couple of suggestions. It is one thing to introduce price support for the immediate problem of energy price rises. By the way, that problem is not, as the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) said, exclusively about the Ukraine war. Prices were going through the roof well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They started increasing at a high and unsustainable rate from the middle of 2021. The Ukraine war has exacerbated that considerably, but it is by no means the only reason. One reason that prices increased considerably well before the Ukraine war started was the structure of energy markets in the UK, the extent to which they were completely prey to profiteering, and the fact that the UK Government were unable to do anything about the effect of increases in the international price of gas on the UK market.

If we have price support over the next period but we do nothing about that structural position, knowing that sky-high gas prices will be with us for probably—I am speculating—the next decade, or at least five to six years, and that the price will never come down to its level of three or four years ago, we will simply be here in two or three years’ time saying exactly the same thing under exactly the same circumstances. The price cap and the price support will have been and gone and we will be in exactly the same position as before.

Now is the time for the Government to fix the UK energy market rapidly, so that we do not find ourselves here again. That means getting us out of gas and on to renewables as quickly as possible. Without adding to what hon. Members have said, the Labour party’s commitment to a wholly renewable power system by 2030 is absolutely germane to ensuring we have an energy system that delivers us relatively low-priced energy that is not volatile, and is not subject to international power politics, with LPG vessels changing course halfway across the Atlantic because someone has bought their cargo at a higher price than they originally thought they were getting for it when they set out. All those issues would be resolved because the power would be UK-based and essentially free—once the capital cost of the renewables providing it had been taken away—and it would be entirely within the UK’s control to deal with prices in the UK. That is how to fix the particularly difficult energy market conditions.

By the way, a lot can be done in that direction before we get to that position by decoupling energy prices in the UK market from the gas market. That can be done by changing the way people receive their rewards, as far as energy is concerned, and renewable obligations and contracts for difference, as far as renewable energy is concerned. We could perhaps introduce a green power pool arrangement, whereby renewable power is traded in advance of gas, and the gas is placed on the margins without the ability to swamp the whole market. That means that we perhaps have to introduce a strategic reserve for gas-fired power stations outside the market as we move towards a wholly renewable energy market.

None of that will wait for the energy crisis to be over. If we do not do these things very quickly, we will just repeat ourselves. One of the key things—

[Mr Clive Betts (in the Chair)]

Order. I think we are getting to the point at which the Minister needs to come in.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed.

The Opposition will look very closely at whether the Government are serious about moving our energy economy on to the sort of renewable basis that we have set out. One of the early indications that they are not is the recent shenanigans going on with solar farms and wind in this country. We will look on, and we hope the Government have success in moving the energy economy away from a reliance on gas. Certainly, introducing fracking and exploring more for gas in the North sea will not fix it; indeed, they will do the opposite. This is about getting renewables in place for our power system as soon as possible and ensuing we are proofed against crises in the future. That would be of great benefit for Wales and for UK customers as a whole, because their bills would assuredly come down in the future. It is a policy for the long term, not one just to fix the windows a bit while it is raining.

[Mr Clive Betts (in the Chair)]

I ask the Minister to leave a couple of minutes for the hon. Member for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin) to sum up at the end.

Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Clive Betts

Tuesday 7th September 2021 Westminster Hall

[Dr Whitehead]

I try to set myself a self-denying ordinance of not straying too far into wider issues such as firm power, but I would say that carbon capture and storage is very well developed already, and is up and running. I have actually been to see a carbon capture and storage plant operating at full scale in Canada.

However, it is not a question of whether carbon capture and storage can actually do the work, and it is not that the technology has not been developed to make carbon capture and storage perform the entire chain of activities—sequestration, storage, transport, and so on. It can do all those well and at scale; that has already been proven. It is a question of how quickly we can develop carbon capture and storage and put it into operations, so that it works from the day they start, with carbon capture and storage on the back of them, rather than developing operations that are carbon capture and storage-ready, but where carbon capture and storage is not on the back of that process. That is really a question of planning and investment, more than anything else, but it needs to be done in the right place at the right time. That is the end of my diversion.

The issue for Springfields nuclear fuel, therefore, is that there is clearly a substantial valley of death before what Springfields can reasonably expect for its work for the future. If we leave it at that, it is inevitable that, even if it eventually survives that gap and comes through well in the end, that may well be at the cost of all the skills in that organisation and most of the workforce; and, at a time when Springfields’ services absolutely will be required in the national interest, its ability to spring back may well have expired in the meantime.

As a country, we cannot let that happen. I therefore congratulate the unions, Prospect and Unite, for campaigning strongly for that view of Springfields as a company. It is beholden on the Government to take that view as seriously as the workforce do—and, I think, all of us in this Chamber do—in their responses and reactions to this particular issue.

When looking at the nuclear sector deal that was signed in 2018, I was interested by this statement from the Government on securing fuel capabilities:

“We will work with the UK nuclear fuel industry to ensure continued, commercial operation of their facilities and secure the long-term future of these important UK strategic national assets to deliver future energy security as well as ensuring the UK nuclear fuel industry continues to deliver long-term UK economic benefit”.

That is what they committed themselves to in the nuclear sector deal. However, as far as I know, nothing has yet been done about that.

Therefore, my first question to Government is: does the Minister intend that that nuclear sector deal commitment will actually be carried out? Are the Government looking seriously at ways in which Springfields nuclear fuels can be properly supported during this period of its existence and assured of remaining in existence as we move to whatever the next stage of our UK nuclear programme is?

My second issue is also important. Are the Government serious about moving on the programme for the already existing nuclear facilities and bringing in arrangements to give greater certainty on the development of Sizewell C? I refer to what hon. Members have also mentioned this afternoon: the regulated asset base arrangement or similar. If the Government do not like that arrangement, an alternative could give certainty to the development of Sizewell C in the next period. As I am sure the Minister knows, there is a row going on between Departments about whether the regulated asset base should be introduced for Sizewell C. That needs resolving. Something needs to come out shortly to get that programme under way. That is also relevant to the future of Springfields nuclear fuels in the way I have described it this afternoon.

I have two direct questions for the Minister, both relating to the future of Springfields nuclear fuels, which we want to see secured. We want to make sure that the Government play a full role in securing that future, so that we can say that that national asset is in good shape and in good hands. In passing, there is a question mark about the future ownership of Springfields nuclear fuels. As a national asset, perhaps it should be a Government agency, so that we can secure its activities for the future in a way that befits its importance to the country.

[Mr Clive Betts (in the Chair)]

If the Minister could allow a minute at the end for the mover of the motion to comment, that would be helpful.

UK Decarbonisation and Carbon Capture and Storage

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Clive Betts

Tuesday 24th January 2017 Westminster Hall

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I was going to say that the debate had been characterised by a mighty cross-party alliance in favour of CCS, which I heartily concur with, but obviously there is this afternoon one exception to that. I want briefly to address that exception: the hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson).

The issue is basically about the imperative to decarbonise our energy supplies, and it is an unashamed imperative because we know that climate change is real and that, if we do not do anything about it, that will be disastrous overall, for us all. Indeed, we can go back, in terms of alternative costings, to the Stern report. Stern said that doing nothing on climate change would probably consume 5% of our GDP, whereas doing something about it might consume 1% of our GDP. It is a very substantial investment for the future and rather a good bargain overall, in terms of what we might put in and what we might get out.

Of course, the same applies, in the context of the energy sector, to CCS. The question is really how we decarbonise our energy supplies, using different potential scenarios, and what would happen if we did not take CCS into account as far as decarbonising our energy supplies was concerned. It is not that we cannot, but it is about the relative costs of doing that with different technologies. It is not me saying this: it is the Committee on Climate Change in setting out its scenarios for the fifth carbon budget, which, of course, the Government have now adopted as a way forward over the next period.

We have basically adopted a scenario for energy decarbonisation that has at its centre, and as part of that fifth carbon budget, that energy emissions should be below 100 grams of CO₂ per kWh by about 2030. The Committee on Climate Change says that the investments we have at the moment give us an emissions intensity of about 250 grams of CO₂ per kWh. If we close remaining coal-fired power stations and replace them with gas-fired generation in the short term, that would take emissions marginally further down to 190 grams of CO₂ per kWh.

Of course, if all the existing nuclear power stations were also replaced by gas, and gas met new demand subsequently, emissions intensities would rise to over 300 grams of CO₂ per kWh by 2030. The Committee on Climate Change goes on to say:

“Commercialisation programmes for CCS and offshore wind alongside lowest-cost investments in the 2020s in a mix of new nuclear, onshore wind, solar and offshore wind rather than expanding gas generation would bring emissions intensity down to below 100 gCO₂/kWh.”

That is a very straightforward and exact road map for where we need to go in terms of energy decarbonisation.

Of course, if we did not have CCS in that scenario, we would have to do a lot of different things to replace what CCS would have done by physically taking the carbon dioxide out of the process and putting it into the ground. We would have to do something else to take that carbon dioxide out of the process. That could be a lot of additional energy efficiency or it could be a lot of new, different low-carbon plant.

We come to the question of what the alternative costs might be if we did not have CCS in the process. Indeed, the NAO report on the carbon capture and storage pilots, which hon. Members have mentioned this afternoon, clearly sets out that meeting the 2050 target for decarbonisation of our whole system, without CCS, would

“cost up to £30 billion more in the power sector alone”.

Hon. Members have mentioned what that means in terms of an annual basis, but that is the overall cost. Interestingly, the NAO cites where that particular figure comes from: of course, it came from the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 2015.

We are clear about the ends, but we are not currently clear about the means. That is where the scandalous cancellation of the two pilot projects—which, by the way, had already been included in those Committee on Climate Change estimates I just mentioned, so we are even further back from the starting line than we would otherwise have been—puts us in terms of having, at the moment, the possibility of ends.

We have agreed the fifth carbon budget. The Government are due to produce their low-carbon plan some day soon; I think it was supposed to be last year and then it was supposed to be this spring, but I see from the industrial strategy announcement yesterday that the target is now some time in 2017. I am interested to know from the Minister whether that low-carbon plan is going to be published in the early part of 2017, as I hope. If it is, I would be extremely surprised if it included no mention of the key role CCS will have to play in making that plan a reality. That is the truth of the matter: without CCS, it is very difficult to envisage a lot of the systems that we talk about in terms of low-carbon energy as a whole—not just low-carbon electricity—working very well.

My hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Tom Blenkinsop) mentioned, among other things, the possible role that hydrogen might play in the future heat economy. Hydrogen can be made by electrolysis of spare electricity but it is more likely that, during the earlier period, it is going to be made using existing infrastructure by steam methane reformation. That gives us a potent fuel in terms of sorting out the decarbonisation of our heat structures, and possibly the substantial decarbonisation of our transport structures, but CO₂ is a by-product that needs sequestering in the process, otherwise it is not low-carbon at all.

The essential role that carbon capture and storage will play across the board in our decarbonised, low-carbon energy economy is without question. The question is: what do we do about it? We have heard mention this afternoon of the estimable Oxburgh report, which was essentially commissioned by Government after the closing down of the pilot schemes. Without wishing to repeat some of the details of the Oxburgh report that have been mentioned this afternoon, I would say that the report does not talk about pilots and does not talk about ways of trying to introduce bits of CCS here and there. It talks about a very practical route forward, which is costed and relatively low-cost, for what Government need to do—exactly in line with what we think we are doing at the moment about industrial strategy and how we move that forward—to make carbon capture and storage a part of our energy landscape over the next period.

I commend anybody who has not read that report to look at exactly what it says. That is exactly what it does: it sets out how we move forward over the next period to integrate carbon capture and storage with various measures as part of our processes. I ask the Minister whether the Government intend to respond to the Oxburgh report in the near future. If they do intend to respond, what form is that response likely to take? I hope that when the Government decide to respond, they respond in a very positive way because that is what we need right now. Undoubtedly, we need to decarbonise radically. Undoubtedly, carbon capture and storage has to be a part of that decarbonisation. Setting out a way forward for making carbon capture and storage a reality in our energy firmament is, it seems to me, a very high priority for Government at the moment.

[Mr Clive Betts (in the Chair)]

I thank all hon. Members for being so co-operative with the time available to make sure that we got everyone in and they had a full opportunity to contribute. I now call the Minister.

Low-carbon Growth Links (China)

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Clive Betts

Thursday 18th April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I do not want to detain hon. Members for long; indeed, I cannot, because I have only four minutes. Just as an aside, I draw hon. Members’ attention to an Asterix comic of a long time ago, entitled “La Zizanie”, which was about a person who went into Asterix’s camp and annoyed everyone so much, setting people against each other, that they lost track of what it was they were trying to talk about. I merely want to leave that on the table.

The Select Committee report is not about whether Britain has an imperialistic relationship with China and wishes to influence the whole of Chinese development. It is a modest effort to look at how the UK’s climate change and energy considerations might be attached to relations with the largest emitter of CO₂ in the world. I am talking about a country that is developing rapidly economically, and changing equally rapidly its position as regards its stance on climate change. The report tried to consider how those two things might be matched. Unless we do not believe that there is any merit whatever in having any sort of international dialogue with anybody, we should take that Select Committee view at face value and welcome it for what it is.

The report is not a view that all is rosy in the world of China, but a timely reminder that China is changing its view on climate change. A number of things are happening in China that underline that view. Indeed, just yesterday, the Minister in charge of climate policies, Xie Zhenhua, indicated that the aim for the Chinese economy now is a reduction in the 2011 levels of carbon intensity by 40% to 45% by 2020. It also wants to boost its non-fossil fuel use to 15% of energy consumption by 2020. He talked about the beginning of the carbon market in Shenzhen in June and then later in the year in Shanghai. Significantly, he said that instruments will be included in the Shanghai carbon trading market that will take credits off the market when supplies are too high and prices are too low. He said that China would learn from the difficulties that are taking place in Europe and that it was committed to the development of a carbon trading market. In the 11th five-year plan, China had attempted to reach some targets. Among other things, it closed down factories for a number of weeks towards the end of the five-year period for each region to reach its target.

China understands the situation now and has developed its way of doing things enormously, so that its measures on carbon trading arrangements begin to coincide with other countries around the world. Therefore, there could be international co-operation on these matters, built on the basis of everyone following similar practices. We should not dismiss that on the grounds that the UK has a population of 65 million or 70 million and that China has a population of many billions, thus making us insignificant. Actually, we have a role to play in this matter and in a dialogue with China, along with other countries in the EU and across the world. That takes us back to that multilateral discussion that we were concerned about in the previous debate. This is not about Britain being imperialistic and trying to tell China what to do; it is a question of the UK’s contribution to a country that appears to be changing many of its assumptions about its own growth and how it goes forward.

Whatever we may think about elements of the political and economic situation in China and how they are dealt with, it is worth while collaborating with China to a far greater extent for the greater good, not only of China or this country but of the wider world. If the Committee’s report has been able to emphasise and underpin that process, it has achieved a good purpose. However, hon. Members should not read into the report something that is not there. It is an honest attempt to consider how UK advances and UK positions may be aligned more closely with other countries and with China in particular. China is indeed changing its stance on climate change—it is not a delusion to say that—and for its own purposes, as well as for international purposes, beginning to make substantial changes in how it goes about its economic activity, and it is important that we do likewise—

[Mr Clive Betts (in the Chair)]

Order.