Energy Spending Priorities: Investors and Consumers
Debate between Alan Whitehead and Angus Brendan MacNeil
Mr MacNeil
As a rural MP, I am aware of that issue. The hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) is also assiduously aware of it, and I commend and congratulate her on raising it in Committee on just about every possible occasion. The hon. Gentleman will be delighted to know that on several occasions the Scottish Government were praised for their actions and—perhaps tongue in cheek; perhaps not—maybe I could recommend that energy policy in that area be devolved to the Scottish Government who, according to the evidence, seem to be doing a better job of it for the whole UK than other Governments.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
Does the Chair of the Committee have anything to say about the almost collapse of solid wall insulation in homes that was predicted by the new ECO arrangements, as set against the suggestion by the Committee that by the end of the fourth carbon budget we should have in place 2.2 million solid wall insulation completions? Has the Committee considered that issue?
Mr MacNeil
It is always with certain trepidation that I give way to the hon. Gentleman, because what he does not know about energy, nobody else knows either. He sat on our Committee early on and did a fine job, and he also sat on the Committee in the previous Session, where he was highly regarded. There is some concern about solid wall insulation. If I remember right, the figures expected are far below what is needed and have almost collapsed, which, as he said, would be very worrying.
Let me start approaching a conclusion—that is more often a hope during speeches in the Commons than a statement of full intent. I thank my Committee colleagues for their excellent work on these inquiries, as well as the hundreds of companies and individuals who gave their time and expertise to inform our conclusions. It is appreciated. I Chair the Committee on Energy and Climate Change, but I am not an expert. I can, however, take information from experts, distil it, and hopefully get policy points out of that. Along the way, I will hopefully develop some expertise in those areas.
The Government’s response to our investor confidence report demonstrated disregard for the Select Committee inquiry process, and their response to our CCS report leaves important questions unanswered. Their response to the report on home energy efficiency appeared only this morning—eight weeks late. I hope that when the Secretary of State responds to this debate on the Government’s spending priorities, she will afford the House and my Committee a little more courtesy than her Department has sadly shown so far—I say that with regret because I like the Secretary of State personally. We have raised the issue with Ministers in Committee and several times by letter, and we need more information that businesses and homeowners might use and need to plan their energy futures. That would be an important step.
Finally, it is only right that a Committee should reflect that it is not all about MPs or the Chair, and we are fortunate to have talented people working with us. Last, but by no means least, I thank Dr Farrah Bhatti, the Clerk, Gavin O’Leary, the Second Clerk, Stephen Habberley, the specialist, Jamie Mordue, senior committee assistant, Henry Ayi-Hyde, Committee support assistant, and our ever cheerful Nick Davies, the media officer. For the investor confidence inquiry I thank senior specialist Andrew Buglass, founder of Buglass Energy Advisory, and Kirsty Hamilton, a lady with many jobs—of course she has because, like your good self, Madam Deputy Speaker, she has a Scottish background.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach). She has made a very thoughtful contribution, most of which I agree with. I hope that this will set the tone for the rest of the evening’s debate, because there is now a wide consensus that the storm of changes that were made last summer to a whole range of renewables incentives has created enormous problems for investor confidence and substantial uncertainty over the Government’s direction on energy policy overall. The three excellent reports from the Energy and Climate Change Committee that we are also discussing this evening underline how the problems have arisen and what they consist of. However, we have also seen the acceptance by the Government of the fifth carbon budget in the past couple of days. It is great that they have accepted it. It would have been nice to have included shipping in it, but I understand that they are not going to proceed with that. Nevertheless, they have accepted the fifth carbon budget, which describes the onward march of renewables as absolutely essential for the reduction of our emissions.
The fourth carbon budget dealt with the essential nature of carbon capture and storage and the forward march of energy efficiency in homes. I made the point in an intervention earlier that the fourth carbon budget assumed that there would be 2.2 million solid wall treatments in homes, but the changes that have taken place over the past year have all pointed in the opposite direction to the imperatives that the Committee on Climate Change put forward in the carbon budgets. There are therefore real question marks in relation not only to investors but to future policy overall. How can we be on target with those budgets—as I hope we will be—at the same time as undertaking all the recent changes?
The cancellation of the carbon capture and storage programme was thoroughly deplorable. The justification for the changes to the renewables incentives was that this was all about the levy control framework. The framework came in in 2011 and it was supposed to place limits on the levies that were arranged in relation to certain renewables. This would also have an effect on what customers’ bills would look like, as the levies would be passed down to customers’ bills in the end. However, the levy control framework was almost inevitably going to be a car crash, both in terms of how it was conceived and of what it was going to look like by 2020.
There now seems to be some clarity about future auctions relating to contracts for difference under the framework up to 2020, but it does not look as though there will be much money in those auctions. It does not look as though they will be significant, and the levy control framework itself will come to a sharp cliff edge at the end of 2020. That is partly because when the framework was first designed, it was largely based on the renewables obligation, which involved a fixed amount of payment from the Government to those receiving renewables obligation certificates, whereas the change to contracts for difference has resulted in varying sums coming forward. As energy prices go down, so the cost of the payments goes up, resulting in less and less money in the levy control framework. This is a fundamentally badly designed arrangement for dealing with future renewables deployment if we are serious about getting that deployment in line with our carbon budgets.
We need clarification on whether there will be a levy control framework from 2020 onwards. I was interested to discover this morning that a consultation about changes in the 2014 contracts for difference orders had turned into a consultation about whether there should be a levy control framework at all after 2020—not about what it should consist of, or how it should work. I believe the Secretary of State indicated in her “reset” speech that some offshore wind would be auctioned after 2020, in which case there must be a levy control framework, but that is all the information that we managed to obtain. The consultation consists of one question and nine pages, and it does not tell us a great deal about the framework itself.
Mr MacNeil
I was interested in what the hon. Gentleman said a few moments ago about the effect of the levy control framework in an environment of low energy prices. Such an environment puts greater demands on the framework, which was probably conceptualised when prices were higher, or even heading in that direction. Another question is posed by the fact that the framework is not being revised to take account of the future capacity market.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman—the Chair of the Committee—is right to raise those questions. The effect on the levy control framework of the change in prices—and it should be noted that the prices of gas, electricity and oil are now below the lowest conceivable scenario in the Department’s energy projections—was simply not anticipated by the Department when it designed the framework. Moreover, the framework only takes into account the expenses to consumers of power. As the hon. Gentleman said earlier, it is clear that investment in renewable energy is affected. The change in the merit order and the downward pressure on prices has a real effect on wholesale prices. It is estimated that for every pound that is invested, about 60p comes back. That has not been taken into account in the calculation of the costs of the levy control framework, and I think that it is an argument for another fundamental redesign of the framework after 2020.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned another issue that I consider to be as important as the levy control framework itself: the signals that are given out by the parallel arrangements for the capacity auctions, which have exactly the same effect as the framework on customer bills. The energy companies will pay into a levy, which will eventually land on customers’ doormats in the form of a bill. However, although the Department has said that capacity auctions for the continuation of supply of non-renewables for mineral-based power stations will be within the levy control framework, they have kept the sums involved in those auctions outside the headline total for the limit of the levy control framework up to 2020.
That may not be particularly surprising. It is clear that all the billions of pounds that have been thrown up against the wall in relation to capacity auctions—when it comes to trying to get some new gas-fired capacity power stations on stream, or, failing that, to ensure that gas-fired, coal-fired and, indeed, nuclear power stations can continue to supply energy—bear no relation to the limits that have been set for the levy control framework. Not only do they bear no relation, but the Committee on Climate Change estimates that some £70 of a customer’s bill will fund renewables by 2020. It is currently about £35.
On capacity auctions, a new auction was recently announced for a period preceding those of the two T-4 auctions that have already taken place. The estimated cost to consumers for those capacity auctions will be something like £15 on the bill for the first two auctions and as much as £36 for the most recent auction. If we add the figures together, we find that by about 2020 the cost to the customer of capacity auctions will be about the same as all of the costs rolled up for renewables under the levy control framework, yet one is capped and the other is not. If the Government are prepared to put up £5.5 billion on capacity auctions but not to proceed with the levy control framework, which is actually able to deal with renewables investment over the next few years, that must send a message to renewable and low-carbon investors. That is fundamental and needs to be addressed.
I will bring my remarks to a close, but I hope that the Secretary of State will indicate in her response that the levy control framework will be coming forward after 2020 in a decent form and that it will be reviewed to take into account my points about its operation.
Draft Renewables Obligation Closure etc. (Amendment) Order 2016
Debate between Alan Whitehead and Angus Brendan MacNeil(9 years, 2 months ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Gillan.
As the Minister set out, the effect of the order will be to close access to the renewables obligation for solar arrays of under 5 MW by March 2016. It represents another early closure of the RO, alongside the one for onshore wind and, as she mentioned, the previous one relating to larger solar. One might add that reining back renewables is another perverse, sudden policy intervention. As she mentioned, the category of solar in question eventually proved rather successful. If the solar industry at the sub-5 MW level had been as unsuccessful as, say, the green deal, perhaps the closure would never have happened. Perhaps that is not a terribly good example to use, because of course the green deal has been scrapped as well, on the grounds that it was unsuccessful.
To understand how sudden and random the intervention was, we need only look at the supporting documentation for the statutory instrument, from which we can see that the consultation on the early closure, and the grace periods attached to it, which the Minister drew attention to, commenced on 22 July and closed on 2 September—just when everyone was on holiday; but perhaps that is beside the point.
The date of 22 July happened also to be the date on which projects that were not fully agreed, for example in the planning process, could make no further progress through grace periods. To show how random that turned out to be, I have a note from a leading UK solar company, telling me that the 22 July grace period qualification deadline was
“by definition was unknowable even 24 hours in advance”
of its being announced and that 22 July was the first time anyone in the industry knew about the date. The company had one project, which it was 95% ready to submit as a full planning application; but it did not intend to do so until about a week after the consultation was published.
When the 22 July consultation was published, with the grace period definition within it, the company scrambled within 24 hours to try to submit its project, but failed by one day. With one day’s notice it did quite well to fail by one day; but nevertheless it was still cut off, which means it has £1 million tied up in a project that may now not qualify for anything, solely on a technicality it could not control, despite the fact that the planning application was 100% valid and less than one day late.
Indeed, the process of consultation has been substantially criticised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in another place, which drew particular attention to the deficiencies in the consultation period and the difficulties caused, particularly with the sudden emergence of grace periods, for the industry as a whole.
The central justification for the policy lurch is also to be found in the supporting documents; as the Minister has also mentioned, it is to keep within the levy control framework, that half-mythical, half-real device that now hovers over most renewable deployment for the next 10 years—or should we say the next five years.
Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)
I did intend to intervene on the Minister about that, but is not it high time there was full transparency on the levy control framework, so that given the lurches and changes there have been in policy we could at least have some idea of what is underpinning this? There are investors in particular who have got quite nervous in the last while, with the possible pushing up of premiums they will have to borrow with to invest in the future.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman has clearly, with a little long-sightedness, been looking over my notes, because that is exactly the point I need to emphasise now about the levy control framework. Although we think that the issue is about the next 10 years, as far as the deployment of renewables is concerned, we simply do not know in any detail what will happen to the levy control framework between 2020 and 2025, despite the fact that the Government have indicated that detail will be filled in at some stage. Obviously, that is a cause of continued consternation for those attempting to plan some sort of future for their longer-term projects.
We need to emphasise that many of these projects require a number of years to undertake, and therefore some form of guidance and certainty would be useful for projects that may be starting now and may not be operational and available for contracts for difference, if there are such things in the period between 2020 and 2025. It would be helpful if those companies had at least the assurance that they were not wasting their time by putting forward proposals for the future.
The impact assessment for the SI says in its opening lines:
“The proposed interventions intend to limit projected spending under the Renewables Obligation, while not harming projects that have already made significant financial commitments”—
which is not necessarily the case, as we have seen—
“This is to limit the impact on the LCF of significantly greater solar deployment than previously anticipated.”
Of course, we do not know the actual impact on the LCF of significantly greater solar deployment than previously anticipated because we do not know the effect of overspends within the LCF—that is, the LCF’s original projections for spending on solar and the overspend in terms of the variation from those original projections. We do not know that because apparently we are not to be trusted with that information. No variation figures have been published, nor are apparently likely to be.
Indeed, I have now asked three parliamentary questions on the effects of that variation, which is central to the impact assessment of this SI. On each occasion, I have been met in the answer with complete stonewalling, on frankly increasingly spurious grounds, on what those variation totals consist of. I am sure the Minister is aware of that issue, because it was she who signed off the answers to those questions on the future of the LCF variation.
It would be helpful for the passage of this debate if the Minister, perhaps by an intervention, gave me the actual sums for the variations over the period relating to solar. It would be even more helpful if she gave those relating to variations in her Department’s calculations as far as the LCF is concerned below 5 MW. We could then determine whether the variations in spending really had such an impact on the LCF that they caused this particular decision to come about, or whether they were of an order that would not have had much of a substantial impact on the LCF—as I suspect may be the case, though we do not know.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that intervention. Frankly, the information she has provided the Committee with today is rather in line with the circumstances in which she felt she could respond to my parliamentary questions. I hope the Minister is not offended by any suggestion that she personally prevented me from getting the information that I requested. My point is that the levy control framework is now so opaque, in terms of its operation and its variations, that it affects proper scrutiny of how decisions have come about. That is not as a result of possible spending in the future but about variations in the past—what was originally thought to be the trajectory of the levy control framework and, as reported in the impact assessment, its actual trajectory in terms of overspending, and how that relates to subsets of that, in particular as we are discussing this afternoon, subsets of solar expenditure as they relate to sub-5 MW installations.
Mr MacNeil
Just picking up on the point about the LCF and the OBR, if the LCF is opaque, the OBR varies wildly in its estimates. In November 2014, the projected LCF spending was £6.25 billion in 2021, but by July 2015—eight months later—the forecast spending was £9.8 billion, a huge change of approximately 50% in the OBR’s projections. That further adds to the hon. Gentleman’s call for clarity and an end to the opacity.
The Chair