Energy Bill

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davey]

My hon. Friend has campaigned on the issue and he initiated a recent Adjournment debate on it. Whether it is new nuclear, onshore wind or other energy infrastructure, we need to consider how local communities can benefit, and we will do that. I give him that assurance again today.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Is the Secretary of State aware that according to his impact assessment, a market-wide capacity payment system would cost the customer 11 times more on their fuel bill than a strategic reserve system of capacity arrangements? Does he intend to take that into account as the Bill progresses?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the wise words of the former Minister, the hon. Member for Wealden (Charles Hendry).

The Bill, as its long title states, is intended to reform the energy market by encouraging low-carbon electricity generation. Essentially, the Bill should ensure that we have the mechanisms and regulations at our disposal not just to keep the market working well, with a secure electricity supply and reasonable prices for customers, but that that is done over the next 20 years within a framework of decreasing carbon emissions from all energy-producing plants that makes every drop of energy go as far as possible through efficiencies, good management in the system and, just as importantly, by removing from the system as much demand as possible, so that emissions are avoided by not producing additional energy in the first place.

The present energy market arrangements—the British electricity trading and transmission arrangements system—have served us well in some ways. They have ensured that a capacity margin has been constantly available to guarantee supplies and at some stages of its existence has applied downward pressure on prices. However, the world has changed radically since the present market arrangements were first introduced more than a decade ago. Prices are going up, not down, massive amounts of plant are being retired from the system in the next few years and their replacements will need to be far lower carbon than the retiring plants. Most importantly, the trading arrangements of the market are carbon blind and do not, in themselves, advantage low carbon over high carbon; it is left to other devices, such as the renewable energy obligation, and subsequent work with the market to do that.

If the ambition of the Bill is to be realised, three things will be central. First, we cannot in the end use the devices of the past market reliably to achieve the goals set out in the Bill for the future market, yet, remarkably, the Bill claims to reform the energy market without reforming its mechanisms. Real reform, such as the introduction of a pool system to make the wholesale selling and purchasing of energy for retail fully transparent and accessible for all, is wholly absent.

Secondly, we need a sense of where we are supposed to go with the encouragement of low-carbon electricity. What does that phrase mean in practice? Is it just a warm aspiration that can be set aside when the going gets a bit tough? If it is not, it seems essential that a target level of emissions should be included in the Bill, but there is no such target. The Secretary of State favours a target, but I am afraid that we have a bit of a problem with what we might call Liberal Democrat capture and storage. [Interruption.] A glass of water for the Secretary of State, please. During the passage of the Bill, I hope that a coalition of people who believe that there should be a target can get together to rectify that, regardless of party stances.

Thirdly, even if there were a target in the Bill, measures elsewhere in it will still take us in precisely the opposite direction and make its aspiration redundant. They need removing or replacing. I strongly believe that the Bill needs to do what it sets out to do in the long title. We need a robust framework that can guide the next stage of deployment of renewable and sustainable energy and that can establish effective mechanisms for those plants, once deployed, to bring their energy to market. We need a market that can deal with new and existing producers fairly and consistently, so that the goal of a well-balanced marketplace encouraging new entrants, rewarding and supporting the best management of energy and celebrating the removal of demand from the system as the ultimate way to decarbonise it can be achieved.

The Bill does some of those things, but, overall, in its present state and with its manifest large gaps, it is not fit for the purpose that it has to advance. These shortcomings simply have to be remedied, because we need the stability and certainty of a coherent and fair market system to encourage and sustain the unprecedented investment in our plant, our networks and our neighbourhoods that will be necessary for an enduring low-carbon energy environment. The regime needs to instil confidence and last for perhaps twice as long as a central system as its predecessor did. The measures in the Bill, many of which I accept are complex and difficult to get right, fail that test at present.

The Bill needs extensive surgery, and in the limited time available perhaps I can list one or two of the major operations that need to be rostered. Are the arrangements for securing a counterparty to contract for difference deals really right? Is there a potential conflict of interest in the body that the Bill selects to be both the system operator and the delivery body for CFDs? Is the proposed transition period between the end of the renewable obligation and the emergence of CFDs workable? Should there be a longer period of changeover and a better opportunity for next stage renewable developers to work with renewable obligation certificates?

Does the ending of an obligation for renewable power purchase and the disappearance of power purchase agreements not place potentially insuperable obstacles in the way of independent generators of low-carbon energy bringing their output to market? Are the administrative arrangements for the setting of a strike price in the Bill not so weighted as to give an advantage to new nuclear that they risk undermining the veracity of other strike price arrangements and the possibility of meaningful auctions in the future? Is a market-wide capacity payment system not just a recipe for paying too much bill payer money to produce overcapacity, when better, cheaper arrangements such as strategic reserve arrangements exist?

Why are there no demand-side reduction measures in the Bill and why will any measures as yet undetermined by the Government appear only at the very end of the legislative process? Why does the level at which energy performance standards are set effectively exempt all gas throughout its operational life?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order.