(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill Committees
Al Carns
Clauses 5 to 7 and schedules 2 and 3 relate to protection orders. The Government are committed to providing safety, justice and real support for all in the defence community, both now and in future, which is why a particular focus of the Bill is on protecting victims of serious sexual and violent crimes.
Currently, the service justice system cannot impose the full suite of protection orders that are available in the civilian criminal justice system. That can create inconsistencies and critical gaps in victim safeguarding, particularly where cases are based overseas and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the service justice system. It means that there are key vulnerabilities, insufficient protection powers in the SJS in comparison with the civilian system and, as existing orders do not convert into civilian equivalents, gaps in protection when a subject leaves service. Those gaps place victims, both in defence and in the wider public, at risk of continued harm. They mean that victims in the service justice system do not always receive the level of protection to which they would be entitled in the criminal justice system.
Clauses 5 to 7 will address those inconsistencies and will be central to providing enduring protection for victims by enabling service courts to make interim and full protection orders and notices that are enforceable even after someone leaves the service. Those service orders include sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection notices and orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders. The clauses will align the justice systems to ensure that no member of the defence community is left with lesser protections than their civilian counterparts. They will empower the service police to apply for interim and full orders and will empower the service courts to impose them, ensuring that victims receive enduring protection from further harm. The powers apply to service personnel and civilians subject to service law both in the UK and overseas, ensuring their worldwide application.
The service police are members of the armed forces who perform broadly the same role for the armed forces, wherever they are in the world, that their civilian counterparts perform in police forces across the UK. Although the service police currently operate in line with the principles of the guidance issued by the Home Office on disclosure of police information, the fact that they have no statutory duty to do so is a disparity with the civilian system. Clause 8 will therefore impose a requirement on the service police to have regard to existing statutory guidance about the disclosure of police information for the purposes of preventing domestic abuse, sexual offending and stalking. It will also amend section 77 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 to include the Ministry of Defence police in the list of police forces that need to have regard to the domestic violence disclosure system. This will better protect potential victims from the risks associated with domestic violence, sexual offending and stalking.
Clause 9 will ensure that offenders who have, for example, been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by a court martial for controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship are automatically supervised under multi-agency public protection agreements. Once those offenders are released from prison, they will be managed in the community in the same way as if they had been sentenced by the Crown court. If offenders under the scope of clause 9 are not managed under MAPPA when released on licence into the community, it may be harder for police, prisons and probation services to work together to protect the public and manage the risk that the offenders pose.
I will speak to new clause 12 in my closing remarks.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system.
It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance.
Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction.
However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary.
New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status.
The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time.
Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes.
Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition.
Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction.
Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect
“as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction”
and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority.
Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?
Al Carns
As someone goes across the single services and joint staff colleges, there will be different sections where they are trained on administering justice and the rights of a commanding officer. Importantly, there will be joint standing procedures produced around the clause, which everyone who becomes a commanding officer will have to read and ensure that they adhere to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Qualification for membership of the Court Martial
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing.
It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered.
There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill Committees
Al Carns
These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—
(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,
(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,
(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and
(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,
(b) must require that—
(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and
(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,
(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.
This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.
(1 month ago)
Public Bill Committees
Al Carns
I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Members for Exmouth and Exeter East, for Solihull West and Shirley, and for South Northamptonshire, for amendment 8, which seeks to define “due regard” in the Bill. I recognise their intent, their positivity and their commitment to the covenant, but I cannot accept the amendment.
The amendment is unnecessary because due regard is a long-established legal concept that public bodies already understand and routinely apply in practice. The existing covenant duty of due regard is already driving positive change in its current areas of housing, healthcare and education.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
Does the Minister not accept that there is inconsistent application of the covenant across public bodies, and that to try to fix that, which all of us on the Committee are seeking to do, there is strength in codifying it in the Bill?
Al Carns
I absolutely agree, and I am one of the biggest champions for shouting about the postcode lottery in the delivery of the covenant. Putting that in the Bill would not change it. It requires education, communication and, in a lot of ways, internal support within local authorities to deliver it. The hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East mentioned the lack of skills at local council level—that is the problem. It is not necessary to amend the Bill; the statutory guidance will be absolutely clear and concise on what the covenant means.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful to the Minister for indulging me. I do not disagree that, to a greater or lesser extent, this is a matter of education, but there is the issue of guidance being guidance and not being mandatory. If a definition were included in the Bill, it would provide a much stricter framework—alongside the education piece for local authorities—to ensure that we are getting this right. Does he agree?
Al Carns
I agree with the premise of the hon. Member’s point. Where I disagree is in how local authorities may view that and how it may restrict their ability to deliver services across other requirements, in line with local priorities. In my letter to the Committee, I wrote:
“When developing the Armed Forces Covenant Legal Duty, due regard was deliberately chosen to bring about lasting positive change…whilst at the same time retaining some flexibility for public bodies to make decisions that are right for their local context and circumstances.”
That is really important, because some of our constituencies will have different levels of need compared with others. Some may have large veteran populations; others may not. Some may have a large number of cancer patients, for example. Prioritising veterans in a very narrow, bounded line above those individuals may skew a whole list of requirements and needs across other public services, hence my point about communication and education, and then the yearly accountability in line with the covenant, which is critical to ensure a level of accountability.
Government Departments are also demonstrating how covenant considerations are driving change in practice. For example, this Government have gone further than before by removing local connection requirements for access to social housing for all veterans. I would be really interested if the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford has examples of where that local connection requirement has not been removed; if he does, I ask him, please, to highlight them to my office so that we can take them on and deal with them, because we removed the requirement last year.
Our experience of the public sector equality duty also shows that a duty of due regard, when properly supported, is sufficient to drive lasting cultural and organisational change, but I do accept that this is the first step to moving in that direction. In addition, the covenant’s statutory guidance, which we can scrutinise in due course, will include a dedicated section explaining what due regard means in practice, including the key issues faced by the armed forces community that bodies must consider. I would welcome the whole House’s view on how that can be improved—if, indeed, it thinks it should be.
Al Carns
I completely agree. The reality is that the implementation of the covenant has been really narrow, across three different Departments. The Bill will broaden the number of policy areas it covers to 12 plus two, which will put an onus on councils and allow people to hold them to account on delivering in line with the armed forces covenant. That is a positive step in the right direction. When we combine that with Valour over time, starting small and broadening out, we will end up with a data-based solution that ensures that councils can support their armed forces community in a more effective and balanced manner.
A definition of due regard in the Bill risks being overly narrow and could unintentionally limit how bodies apply it in practice.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I promise the Minister that this will be the last time I intervene.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
That was a lawyer’s promise; the Minister can read it as he wills.
Does the Minister not think that having a definition of due regard in the Bill would assist the courts in interpreting its application in cases where a public body’s decision is challenged by a member of the armed forces community?
Al Carns
When it comes to the legal process, we must ensure that there is the flexibility in local councils to adhere to the covenant in line with the broader issues and capacity that they may have to deal with. Some council areas have a huge number of veterans, and others have very few. Many councils, including mine in Birmingham, have a huge housing problem. Should we prioritise a single mum with a child, or a veteran? If we made that too explicit, we would skew how local councils view veterans and the armed forces as a whole. That is quite dangerous.
Al Carns
We continue to discuss with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales how best to enhance the cross-pollination of EHCPs and individual support plans. We will continue to do so and, in particular, will try to speed up the transition and make it smoother for highly mobile children.
To legislate in the way the shadow Minister suggests, when a White Paper is already out and changes in legislation are coming, could result in the incorrect solution for armed forces families. What I would recommend is a discussion with the Minister for Veterans and People to update the right hon. Member in full and ensure that any ideas or insights that he has are pulled into that work, so that we come up with the best collaborative solution. The Government’s preferred approach is collaboration within existing frameworks, underpinned by the covenant duty, which will deliver the practical benefits without the unintended consequences.
Amendment 12, which seeks to continue adoption and fostering arrangements automatically across local authority boundaries, would raise significant practical difficulties. Each local authority operates with its own procedures, safeguarding requirements and legal frameworks. A single, one-size-fits-all statutory requirement risks creating confusion, administrative burden and potential delays, which is precisely the kind of disruption that the amendment seeks to avoid.
The Ministry of Defence already provides comprehensive guidance for service families through the adoption and fostering defence instruction notice, which embeds the MOD’s role firmly within existing civilian-led systems. These long-standing civilian frameworks already ensure continuity for families when they move. In combination with the strengthened covenant duty, they provide a far more practical and effective approach than the amendment process.
The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford raised a specific case. I am more than happy to take it offline. If we can help directly where the system has not worked, or help with the process, I will pass it on to the Minister for Veterans and People, and we will get after that problem set.
The covenant’s statutory guidance provides a flexible and practical framework that respects local authority responsibilities while directly addressing the challenges faced by service families. It ensures that individual circumstances can be properly considered without imposing rigid requirements that may not fit every complex case.
For those reasons, the Government consider the amendment unnecessary and duplicative. We remain fully committed to supporting healthcare needs for armed forces families, improving SEN provision and ensuring robust support for those involved in adoption and fostering. We will continue to work collaboratively with delivery partners and improve guidance where needed, rather than impose inflexible statutory mandates that risk unintended consequences. I hope that that provides reassurance. I ask hon. Members not to press amendments 10, 11 or 12.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful to the Minister for setting out his broad support for the intent of my amendment, if not for its practical workings. I am grateful for the invitation to meet him and his ministerial colleague to see how we can reach a settlement to ensure equality for armed forces personnel on this issue. On the basis of his reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons Chamber
Al Carns
The reality is that the last Government’s legacy Act made promises that could not be kept, and explaining why to our veterans community is exceptionally difficult, and I will not lie on that. On the same hand, we have been clear that inquests that were started by the last Government, but stopped—such as Loughgall in 2014—must continue and come to their rightful conclusion. We must ensure that throughout that process, all our veterans are protected as we progress.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
The Minister has more experience than most with the global threats facing this country. In those circumstances, we need to be recruiting the brightest and best to our armed forces and retaining them. He has set out current retention levels with certain detail, but that is before the Bill passes through Parliament and, as the Government hope, becomes enacted as law. Does he not recognise that the inequality of arms under the legal system for our veterans is likely to have a significant impact upon retention?
Al Carns
This Government have an exceptional record on supporting our veterans. We put more money into veterans than any other Government in the past 10 years. We put £50 million into Valour. We have enhanced the Op Restore programme. Op Courage on mental health has now got £21 million and has rolled out. Our career transition partnership is second-to-none. On housing, we have got Op Fortitude. We have had 4,100 referrals and more than 1,000 veterans supported. We are doing a fantastic job for veterans. We must ensure that they are protected as we go forward.
(7 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons Chamber
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
For many veterans, hearing loss is one of the hidden scars of service, and in a number of cases, it has been linked to defective 3M hearing equipment. Will the Minister use their arts of persuasion on the Prime Minister to ensure an independent inquiry, so that we can find out the extent of this, and see whether any other equipment is involved and how we can prevent it from happening again?
Al Carns
Anyone with hearing loss from equipment can absolutely apply for compensation through the war pension scheme or the armed forces compensation scheme. Broader work is happening on those specific bits of capability outside this place.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Commons Chamber
Al Carns
As part of our future veterans strategy, a women veterans annexe will provide specific guidance on females wanting to leave the armed forces. It is also important to mention that we are not just setting up the violence against women and girls taskforce; we have the sexual harassment survey going out, the tri-service complaints system, the review of our zero-tolerance policy by a KC to move to 100% action, an international culture and behaviours conference to learn best lessons from our international partners, and the modernisation of our military appraisal system to ensure that people who get involved in unacceptable behaviour are tracked through the system so they can be held to account.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)